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Addressing the persistence of the Cartesian paradigm in body studies, this thesis explores a post-
Cartesian perspective of embodiment.  
I theorise embodiment as a phenomenon possessing a dual character ± i.e., a phenomenon located 
at the intersection of a pre-individual and individuated dimension, and thus characterised by both a 
relational/open-ended/processual nature and a differentiated/self-organising/structural aspect. I 
suggest that this dual character is reflected in two main ways of getting to know and acting in the 
world. One is an individuated/dichotomous mode of embodiment where the mind-body dualism is 
phenomenologically salient ± I name it the Being. The other is a pre-individual/non-dichotomous 
mode of embodiment where dualism(s) vanish(es) IURPRQH¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO ILHOG DQGPLQG
and body are experienced as a duality in unity ± I call it the Becoming.  
I investigate these propositions by means of a case study constituted by two self-cultivation 
SUDFWLFHV 'DRLVW ,QWHUQDO $UWV DQG 6SLQR]D¶V 3UDFWLFDO 3KLORVRSK\ $LPLQJ DW VKLIWLQJ IURP WKH
Being to the Becoming, both practices engage with our phenomenological world by employing the 
strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context. That is, both practices seek to 
attune, and thus experience the ontological unity of, the experiential dimensions constituting 
relationships like those between mind and body, internal and external environments of 
embodiment, language and corporeality, and representational and non-representational forms of 
knowledge.  
In this way, conceived of as not separate at the ontological level while amenable to change at the 
epistemological level, these relationships are regulated by a principle of dynamic correspondence 
entailing that they can be experienced by the embodied agent as dualism(s) or dualities in unity, 
according to respectively dichotomous and non-dichotomous modes of embodiment. On this 
ground, embodiment is re-conceptualised as a dynamic process of individuation which can shift 
between different modes, each possessing different degrees of emergent properties and capacities 




































As with DQ\RWKHUµWKLQJ¶RUERG\,EHOLHYHWKDWWKLVWKHVLVFDQEHVWbe conceptualised as a process 
of individuation caught between a pre-individual and an individuated dimension, which possesses 
both a processual and structural aspect. My hope, of course, is that the thesis also possesses a 
certain degree of agency and is capable of bringing about a degree of novelty in the world ± at the 
end of the day, this is what doctoral research should do!  
While the individuated and structural aspect is shown by the work itself, here I intend to spend a 
few words on the pre-individual and processual aspect ± that is, I wish to acknowledge the 
involvement of other processes of individuation, which, by being entangled with my work, made it 
possible.   
Despite my first thank you going to all the research participants, there is no doubt that this thesis 
could not have been brought about without the Economic and Social Research Council, which 
awarded me a scholarship to pay the fees for my PhD and sustain me throughout it.  
Obtaining an ESRC scholarship, however, could have not happened without the supervision of 
Professor Chris Shilling, who has provided invaluable guidance throughout my research. I have 
always been surprised by his capacity to think ahead and understand, before me, where I was 
heading. I certainly could not have walked this path without him showing me the way.  
Although at one point he left for a new academic adventure, my second supervisor, Dr Jonathan 
Ilan, provided me with vital ethnographic advice, and utterly impressed me by showing the amount 
of data he had collected for his PhD research ± exceeding verbal explanations and giving me a 
sense of the work I was going to do! 
Nevertheless, the very genesis of my doctoral research owes a great debt to the friendship offered 
by Professor Peter Hampson, who is responsible (among other things) for exposing me to the 
arguments of Ian McGilchrist, in turn an important source on which this study draws.  
And, of course, I have to thank Pina Cirillo who, albeit unwittingly, has indoctrinated me into 
feminism since my birth. Her contagious vitality and motto ± µFHOHULW\ UDSLGLW\¶ ± have been 
crucial for completing my doctoral research.  
Finally, my biggest thank you goes to Sabina Capaccio and Rosario Giovine. Although in a very 
GLIIHUHQWZD\ERWKPDQDJHGWRVPXJJOHLQWRP\VWXEERUQDQGF\QLFDOPLQGWKHLGHDWKDWµSRVLWLYH
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Thesis Introduction  
 
 
Conceived of as a concept through which the symbolic and the material, psychical interiority and 
corporeal exteriority, and cognition and affect acquire their univocity, the notion of embodiment 
promises to bridge the gap between mind and body which we inherited from Descartes ± but to 
what extent does the notion fulfil its promise? The more I delved deeper into this question, the 
more I seemed to understand that, rather than having gone away, the Cartesian paradigm is often 
explained away in social theory. ,Q WKLV ZD\ DOWKRXJK DFNQRZOHGJHG DV PLVWDNHQ 'HVFDUWHV¶
dualistic theorising still appears to be subtly imbued in the same social theory which endorses an 
anti-Cartesian stance. It is on these premises that with the present study I wish to provide a 
contribution to a re-conceptualisation of embodiment able to transcend extant anti-Cartesian 
approaches to the body and further develop the advances made by the field of body studies into a 
post-Cartesian perspective.  
To do so I have structured this thesis in three parts which are preceded by a prologue and followed 
by an epilogue. The prologue sets the scene for the rest of the study by making an analytical 
distinction between the erroneous Cartesian ontological claim of mind and body belonging to two 
different realms and the epistemological truths related to the relationship between mind and body. 
Here I contend that while mind and body are not two separate substances, our embodied 
experiences are characterised by a wide range of phenomenological differences, whose material 
and immaterial dimensions represent two exemplary variations. Put another way, I argue that while 
Descartes has greatly influenced the way we live out the mind-body relationship (indeed, to the 
extent that his paradigm still pervades contemporary anti-Cartesian theorising), the relationship 
itself is constitutive of the character of human embodiment. In this way, from its inception, the 
study employs an ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist theoretical framework.  
Following the prologue, I review the literature in the field in part I of this thesis, where I provide 
evidence of the persistence of the Cartesian dualism in body studies while at the same time 
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identifying the valuable arguments advanced by the most influential perspectives. Here I scrutinise 
the three major turns occurring in social theory: the linguistic, the corporeal, and the affective turn. 
By doing so, I contend that despite the differences characterising each perspective, when 
addressing our embodied experiences, actions, and identities, often either one term of the mind-
body dualism is privileged and/or set in opposition to the other, or the qualitative differences 
between these two experiential dimensions are erased and/or conflated. In this respect, I illustrate 
in what ways the persistence of the Cartesian paradigm in social theory appears to have left crucial 
relationships unexplained, such as those between internal and external environments of 
embodiment, language and corporeality, representational and non-representational forms of 
knowledge, and, indeed, mind and body.  
In addition, I argue that, along with the just rejection of the transcendent, solipsistic, and self-
contained Cartesian person, most approaches to the body appear to have unnecessarily disregarded 
WKH FDXVDO SRZHUV RI WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V µLQQHU¶ OLIH ± that is, the phenomenological nuances 
according to which we get to know and act in the world, including material and immaterial 
experiential dimensions. This has resulted in an over-emphasis on the open-ended character and 
the external environments of embodiment at the expense of our lived experience and internal 
environments of embodiment, which are often reduced to irrelevant epiphenomena.  
Finally, and importantly, besides highlighting the useful insights to retain and the pitfalls to avoid 
of each approach to the body, part I reveals a feature of embodiment which appears to be only 
implicitly acknowledged by extant perspectives. That is, by reviewing existent literature in the 
field, embodiment emerges as a phenomenon located at the encroachment between a pre-
individual and individuated dimension, possessing therefore a paradoxical, chiasmic, and thus dual 
character: both a relational, open-ended, and processual phenomenon and a self-organising and 
differentiated system endowed with its own structure and properties. It is therefore by bringing to 
the fore this dual character that I intend to explore a post-Cartesian perspective of embodiment. 
However, before embarking on my exploration, I explain in what ways this endeavour is carried 
out in part II of this thesis.  
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Part II concerns the methodology employed by the present research ± i.e., its rationale, aims, 
conceptual strategy, and methods. Here, on the ground of my initial analytical distinction between 
the ontological conclusions and epistemological truths related to the mind-body relationship, and 
of the dual character of embodiment emerging from the review of extant literature, I identify a 
FRQFHSWXDO VWUDWHJ\ DEOH WR µGHDO¶ ZLWK ERWK WKese aspects in a non-dualist manner. This is a 
strategy long employed across Western and Eastern traditions, which consists of emplacing, 
grounding, or enveloping dualism(s) ± including that between mind and body ± in a wider non-
dualist context and turning them into dualities in unity. In this way, opposed to forms of 
GXDOLVPV RU µIODW¶ DQG RQH-dimensional views of embodiment encountered in existent 
perspectives, this approach involves a type of monism able to account for the plurality involved in 
our lived experience.  
Furthermore, to aid my exploration of post-Cartesian territories, I identify two self-cultivation 
practices which I use as a case study. One is constituted by the Daoist Internal Arts (DIA) of 
neigong, qigong, and tai chi chuan; and the otKHULV%DUXFK6SLQR]D¶V3UDFWLFDO3KLORVRSK\633
I employ the latter as a theoretical lens to examine the former, which I use as an ethnographic 
empirical arena. Both practices acknowledge that the dual character of embodiment is reflected at 
the phenomenological level, where we can shift between two main ways of getting to know and 
acting in the world ± two modes of embodiment which I name the Being and the Becoming.  
Here I explain that when the Being predominates, one tends to experience the world according to a 
binary, either/or, and linear logic, as a structure made up by individuated and distinct entities, like 
mind and body ± this is a dichotomous mode of embodiment where dualism(s) are 
phenomenologically significant. When, instead, the Becoming mode becomes salient, one 
experiences the world according to a paradoxical, non-linear, and circular logic, as an ever-
changing, unfinished, open-ended process, where mind and body, subject and object, internal and 
external, you and I, are not separate entities ± this is a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment 
where dualities in unity are significant. Aiming at tapping into the tacit knowledge of the body, 
bringing about a radical shift from the dichotomous Being to the non-dichotomous Becoming, and 
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thus actually experiencing dualism(s) as dualities in unity, both DIA and SPP adopt the strategy of 
enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context.  
It is on this ground that I set my aim to contribute towards an approach to theorising and 
researching embodiment which can: 
1. Transcend extant linguistic, corporeal, and affective approaches in body studies.  
2. Engage with the analytical distinction related to the different experiential dimensions of 
embodiment ± e.g., mind and body, internal and external environments of embodiment, 
language and corporeality, representational and non-representational forms of knowledge 
± without conflating or setting these in opposition.  
3. Advance our understanding of how the relationships between these different experiential 
dimensions come to be and change. 
4. Retain a fundamentally process-oriented, open-ended, and relational framework, while 
accounting for the causal powers of our phenomenological life and individuated 
dimension.  
To achieve these aims, within the DIA empirical arena, I investigate the strategies practitioners 
employ, the struggles they engage with, and the problems they encounter, in shifting from 
dichotomous to non-dichotomous modes of embodiment. To do so, I ask: 
1. How do DIA practitioners talk about their minds, their bodies, and inner and outer 
dimensions?  
2. What are the discursive, corporeal, and affective resources they draw on in their 
endeavour? 




4. How are the symbolic dimension and verbal communication employed to stimulate 
particular embodied experiences and embodied outcomes in DIA practices? 
In support of my empirical investigation I utilise an ethnographic approach involving a set of 
methods suited to address the phenomenological varieties characterising human embodiment ± 
these are: participant observation, auto-phenomenology, in-depth semi-structured interviews, 
drawing as research method, and multimodal discourse analysis.  
Having set my aims according to an appropriate rationale, chosen a strategy to achieve these aims 
in consideration of Daoist and Spinozian insights, and equipped myself with an array of suited 
methods, I set off for my exploration in part III of this thesis.  
In addressing the present rHVHDUFK¶VDLPVDQGTXHVWLRQVLQSDUW,,,,VKRZLQZKDWZD\V',$DQG
SPP i) distinguish between the experiential dimensions of embodiment and their reification as 
substances belonging to separate worlds, ii) engage with the dual character of embodiment, and iii) 
employ the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context. I do so by analysing 
the two modes of embodiment of the Being and the Becoming, as well as the four exemplary 
phenomenological relationships between mind and body, internal and external environments of 
embodiment, language and corporeality, and representational and non-representational forms of 
knowledge.  
Here I illustrate that, in both DIA and SPP, these relationships are regulated by a principle of 
dynamic correspondence according to which what occurs on one term is paralleled on the other. 
This principle of correspondence is dynamic in the sense that, while at the ontological level it does 
not entail that the two terms of a relationship are separate, at the epistemological level the 
relationship itself is not fixed, but, rather, amenable to change. That is, the two terms/experiential 
dimensions constituting a relationship can be experienced by the embodied agent as distinct or 
united ± i.e., as dualism(s) or dualities in unity, according to respectively dichotomous and non-
dichotomous modes of embodiment. 
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In this respect, to achieve a shift from the Being to the Becoming and turn dualism(s) into 
dualities, both the DIA practitioner and Spinoza subscribe to this principle of dynamic 
correspondence and actively engage with these phenomenological relationships (i.e., those 
between mind and body, internal and external environments of embodiment, language and 
corporeality, and representational and non-representational forms of knowledge), attune their 
terms at the phenomenological level, and actually experience their ontological unity. In this way, 
in both self-cultivation practices, the linear/binary logic of the dichotomous Being is 
instrumentally employed to access the paradoxical/circular logic of the non-dichotomous 
Becoming.  
It is therefore on this ground that both DIA and SPP grant an ontological primacy to the mode of 
the Becoming, which thus envelops the fictive yet functional mode of the Being. And it is by 
employing the conceptual strategy of enveloping dualism(s) that both DIA and SPP operate within 
a theoretical framework which is able to account for an individuated dimension possessing its own 
phenomenal world, causal powers, and emergent properties within a non-dualist, relational, and 
process-oriented ontology ± i.e., a theoretical framework which is epistemologically pluralist yet 
ontologically monist.  
I develop these arguments by dedicating a chapter to each of the above relationships, which I first 
discuss within the DIA empirical arena and then re-UHDGWKURXJKWKH633¶VWKHRUHWLFDOOHQV7KLV
type of outline makes particularly visible the ongoing dialogue between the empirical and the 
theoretical constituting this thesis, while also resembling the circular logic underpinning DIA 
training, where immediate engagement and conscious deliberations continuously inform each 
other. Nevertheless, to engage with contemporary issues in body studies, towards the end of the 
case study the theoretical component acquires a more prominent role with a discussion of notions 
such as processes of individuation, agency, and degrees.  
Re-conceptualised as a phenomenon which can shift between different modes, each endowed with 
different degrees of emergent properties and agentic powers, here I advance a view of embodiment 
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as a dynamic process of individuation whereby an immanent dimension self-actualises by bringing 
about novelty in the world. Additionally, I propose to conceive of agency as a matter of 
attunement between external and internal environments of embodiment, or, indeed, of shifting 
from a dichotomous to a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment. Moreover, I suggest that the 
notion of degrees can function as an efficacious antidote to dualist theorising, particularly apt to 
theorise dynamic relationships. ,QWKLVUHVSHFWIROORZLQJERWKWKH'DRLVW WUDGLWLRQDQG6SLQR]D¶V
theorising, the shift from the Being to the Becoming is also conceived of as an ongoing process 
which can be enacted according to different degrees, each possessing its own emergent properties 
and agentic powers. 
All in all, I offer a contribution to a post-Cartesian perspective on embodiment which is faithful to 
a process-oriented ontology while also being able to account for the causal powers of our 
phenomenological world and individuated dimension. However, as my contribution remains on a 
theoretical level, in the epilogue of this thesis I discuss a recent publication on youth leisure 
practice to provide a snapshot of the possible ways the approach suggested by the present research 

















Prologue: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MIND AND BODY ± 




After his in-depth phenomenological investigation into our lived experience, René Descartes 
FRQFOXGHGWKDWWKHZRUOGLVPDGHXSRIWZRGLVWLQFWµVXEVWDQFHV¶± one material, the 
other immaterial. The French philosopher arrived at this conclusion by reifying two dimensions 
according to which we experience the world. The physical realm, which we experience as having a 
spatial extension, was reified as one of the two substances: Extension ± WKH µUHV H[WHQVD¶ 7KH
mental realm of the soul, which cannot be localized in the three-dimensional space, became the 
other substance: Thought ± WKH µUHVFRJLWDQV¶$FFRUGLQJ WR'HVFDUWHV LQ FRQWUDVWZLWKSK\VLFDO
phenomena, the mental realm could not be explained by, and was thus able to free itself from, the 
deterministic laws of natural science. As the only living beings endowed with soul, humans would 
therefore be able to transcend the physical natural world.  
By attributing to two dimensions of our phenomenological life the status of two distinct 
substances, the French philosopher created a dramatic, neat, and irreconcilable divide between 
mind and body ± the mind was placed outside the body, outside nature, and indeed outside of the 
world; and the body was reduced to a mere object. Yet, while fully acknowledgLQJ 'HVFDUWHV¶
errors at the ontological level, the present research contends that it would be equally mistaken to 
reject his acknowledgment of what appear to be self-evident epistemological qualities of our lived 
experience. That is, the current study makes a distinction between the ontological conclusions of 
Descartes and the epistemological truths related to the relationship between mind and body. As it 
allows us to endorse an ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist theoretical framework, 
this is a crucial distinction which needs to be clarified further.   
Although many would acknowledge that various aspects of our experiences ± e.g., what 
philosophers call qualia: colours, tastes, smells, etc. ± have properties which are qualitatively 
different from those of physical phenomena, the Cartesian mind-body perspective has been 
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subjected to numerous critiques. Such sharp divide between the mind and the body, the subject and 
the world, and the subsequent problematic interaction between the two terms of these 
UHODWLRQVKLSV DUH RIWHQ LGHQWLILHG DV WKH PDLQ SUREOHPV ZLWK 'HVFDUWHV¶ DUJXPHQWV ,I DV LV
apparent to everybody, the body affects the mind and vice versa, what is the point of contact 
between a material and an immaterial domain? What is the nature of the relationship between these 
two dimensions? We are therefore faced with the problem of a transcendent mind which is 
inexplicably able to interact with the physical world and vice versa.  
Leaving aside for a moment the peculiar and untenable Cartesian worldview, the relationship 
between the world we experience, our body, and us as embodied agents, has long been debated 
across both Western and Eastern philosophical traditions. This enigmatic relationship is still salient 
in a number of fields of contemporary applied research (e.g., artificial intelligence, robotics, 
medicine, psychology) which struggle to understand how an objective and material world is 
related to subjective and immaterial phenomena. While the challenging task of a cross-cultural 
genealogy of the mind-body relationship is far beyond the scope of the present research, a few 
observations can be made in order to begin to clarify the subtle yet crucial distinction underpinning 
WKLV WKHVLV¶DUJXPHQWV± the distinction between the ontological conclusions of Descartes and the 
epistemological truths related to the relationship between mind and body. 
Philosopher Jonathan Shear (2000), for instance, makes a persuading argument for the universality 
of the division between material and immaterial worlds, and argues that what is culturally diverse 
is the modality with which we experience such worlds (e.g., in our culture we see dreams or other 
PHQWDOSKHQRPHQDDVOHVVµUHDO¶$QGFHUWDLQO\ WKH%XGGKLVW WUDGLWLRQKDVGHDOWZLWKWKHPLQG-
body relationship for more than 2,000 years (Varela et al. 1993/1991). Even before that, Indian 
philosophers were debating issues related to the relationship between an immaterial consciousness 
and material phenomena in a vein not too dissimilar from contemporary philosophers of mind and 
cognitive scientists (Ganeri, 2012). Likewise, the same arguments are certainly valid for the 




Indeed, although the Cartesian contentions are firmly rejected, within a number of domains of 
contemporary research the relationship between mind and body is a source of heated debate. As 
noted by philosopher Colin McGinn (1997/1989: 532):  
[A]s traditional theologians found themselves conceding cognitive closure with respect to certain of 
the properties of God, so we should look seriously at the idea that the mind-body problem brings us 
bang against the limits of our capacity to understand the world. 
In a similar YHLQSV\FKRORJLVW6DXORGH)UHLWDV$UDXMRREVHUYHVWKDW³ZHILQGWKDWDIWHU
40 years of neurophysiological research, we still do not have the least idea of how to solve the 
PRVWEDVLFSUREOHPVDERXWKXPDQFRQVFLRXVQHVV´ 
In light of the above observations, it is not surprising that ± as noted by science and technology 
studies scholar Lucy Suchman (2008: 147) ± the struggle involved in the creation of embodied and 
HPEHGGHGDUWLILFLDODJHQWVKDVOHDG$,UHVHDUFKHUVWR³UHVRUWWRVRPHNLQGRI\HWWR be determined 
µQHZVWXII¶DVWKHPLVVLQJLQJUHGLHQWIRUKXPDQ-OLNHPDFKLQHV´,QDOOWKHVHILHOGVLQRWKHUZRUGV
the acknowledgment that Descartes was mistaken in his conclusions has certainly not made 
redundant the issues concerning the relationship between mind and body. As argued by 
SKLORVRSKHU<DVXR<XDVD³WKHPLQGERG\LVVXHLVQRWVLPSO\DWKHRUHWLFDOVSHFXODWLRQ
but it is originally a practical, lived experience [...]. The theoretical is only a reflection on this 
OLYHGH[SHULHQFH´ 
Philosopher Joseph Levine (1983) makes these issues especially salient with what he famously 
GXEEHG WKH µH[SODQDWRU\ JDS¶ WKH FRQFHSWXDO GLYLGH EHWZHHQ D SK\VLFDOLVW DFFRXQW RI WKH EUDLQ
states and our actual lived experience. For instance, I invite the reader to imagine she is looking at 
a vivid red flower and is experiencing its redness. We know that the conscious experience of vivid 
red does arise when HOHFWURPDJQHWLFZDYHIRUPVLPSLQJHRQRQH¶VUHWLQDDQGDUHGLVFULPLQDWHGDQG
categorized by a visual system. However, what we do not know is exactly how from this 
SK\VLFDOPDWHULDOREMHFWLYH V\VWHP RQH¶V OLYHG H[SHULHQFH RI YLYLG UHG ± i.e., a 
mental/immaterial/subjective phenomenon ± arises. There is therefore an explanatory gap which 
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leaves the Cartesian problematic of the mind-body interaction untouched: we have a material and 
objective realm (the brain) which appears to cause an immaterial and subjective phenomenon 
RQH¶VOLYHGH[SHULHQFH 
By asking why our lived experience arises in the first place, such an explanatory gap is stressed 
even further by philosopher David Chalmers. If, Chalmers (1996) asks, our behaviour is merely 
the outcome of complex neural activity, in turn, produced through the input/output interaction 
between our embodied brain and the world, why do we need to be conscious in the first place? 
&DOOLQJ WKLVSUREOHP WKH µKDUG SUREOHP¶ RI FRQVFLRXVQHVV VWXGLHV &KDOPHUV LELG HPSOR\V WKH
ILFWLRQDOFKDUDFWHURID]RPELHWRHPSKDVL]HWKHJDSEHWZHHQIXQFWLRQVDQGH[SHULHQFH&KDOPHUV¶
zombie is like any other human being except for the fact that it lacks lived experience. The 
physical structure of the zombie is identical to that of a human being and it behaves exactly as one 
RIXV\HWLWLVµHPSW\LQVLGH¶± it is not conscious.  
Although counterintuitive, &KDOPHUV¶DUJXPHQWKLJKOLJKWVWKHIDFWWKDWLQPHUHO\SK\VLFDOLVWWHUPV
a structure identical to that of a human being (i.e., possessing a brain and a body, and embedded in 
the environment with which it interacts) does not need to be conscious at all in order to function as 
any other conscious embodied agent. To reiterate, if our behaviour is simply the outcome of the 
complexity of our neural patterns and the interaction of our sensory-motor system with the 
surrounding environment, why would we need to be conscious? What is the function of our lived 
experience? And once more, what is the nature of the relationship between our lived experience 
and physical processes?  
I am highlighting such unanswered questions as these appear to be bypassed, ignored or 
deliberately disregarded in too many contemporary perspectives of body studies. For instance, if 
our actions are the mere outcome of the material, social and cultural environments in which we are 
embedded, why do we need to be conscious at all? Is there no two-way causal relation between 
what we sense, feel, think and our course of action? Is our lived experience a mere 
epiphenomenon? I believe that these are important questions which, while occupying a central 
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place in research conducted in other fields, appear only to be particularly salient in sub-
sociological fields such as medical sociology (Bendelow, 2010).  
In fact, to provide a contribution towards further developments of the sociological advances made 
by body studies, the present research intends to make these problematics more visible in social 
theory. Although conceived of and interpreted in very different terms, it does seem that the mind-
body relationship persists in its relevance, and this state of affairs is not only down to Plato or 
Descartes, even though both philosophers may be held responsible for having heavily influenced 
our ± historically, geographically, and culturally located ± conceptualisation and experience of this 
relationship.  
To be sure, the way we live out our embodied condition and experience the relationship between 
our mind and body has been radically changing throughout history and across cultures. To remain 
in the Western world and in the modern era, after the Renaissance the body came to be seen as an 
object of mind, a mechanism which could be viewed with a certain detachment. With the 
Enlightenment, we also began to conceive of ourselves as at the centre of the networks of our 
UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKQDWXUHDQGYLHZWKHZRUOGDVVRPHWKLQJVHSDUDWHGIURPRXUVHOYHVµRXWWKHUH¶± 
objectified, represented, and ready to be mastered (Heidegger, 1977, in Burkitt, 1999: 56). Indeed, 
'HVFDUWHV¶theorising emerged precisely from this climate (Burkitt, 1999). 
Nevertheless, it is important to make a distinction between the contingent character of our 
embodied experiences and the peculiar ways the relationship between mind and body can be 
experienced and lived out and fundamental structures of human embodiment constituting the 
foundations of social and cultural domains. As compellingly argued by philosopher Drew Leder 
 LQKLVSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO DFFRXQWRI µLPPDWHULDO¶ H[SHULHQWLDO GLPHQVLRQV ³experience 
SOD\VDFUXFLDOUROHLQHQFRXUDJLQJDQGVXSSRUWLQJ&DUWHVLDQGXDOLVP´ 
$FFRUGLQJWR/HGHULELGLPPDWHULDODQGPDWHULDOH[SHULHQWLDOGLPHQVLRQVDUHDVSHFWVRIKXPDQV¶
embodied character rather than the result of a Cartesian influence. Rather, what instead can be 
linked to the Cartesian paradigm is the reification of these experiential dimensions. In relation to 
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WKHPLQG IRUH[DPSOH/HGHU LELGDUJXHV WKDW³>D@QH[SHULHQWLDOGLVDSSHDUDQFH LV UHDG LQ
RQWRORJLFDOWHUPV´DQGWKHUHIRUHDs it cannot be represented in the same way the objectified body 
FDQ RXU PLQG VXEMHFWLYLW\ DQG OLYHG H[SHULHQFH DUH WKRXJKW RI DV DQ µRWKHU¶ VXEVWDQFH ± as 
belonging to a transcendent world. 
Leder is, once again, making the distinction between the epistemological character of our 
immaterial experiences and the reification of these experiences as a distinct substance at the 
ontological level. He stresses the fact that, in line with a Cartesian paradigm, such immateriality is 
conceived of as outside our world, rather than one of the many dimensions through which we live 
out our embodied condition. By referring to the notion of the lived body, Leder (ibid.: 8) states: 
In Cartesianism, the human mind is viewed as an island of awareness afloat in a vast sea of 
insensate matter. The notion of the lived body makes room for a more inclusive sense of spirit ± 
one immanent throughout the physical world and expressing itself at all levels of nature, as in a 
Whiteheadian or animistic ontology.  
While the lived body, the immanence of mind in the physical world, and the Whiteheadian 
ontology will be discussed later, what is relevant to the current argument is that, as Leder (ibid.: 3) 
rightly suggests, to tackle the persistence of the Cartesian paradigm we need to acknowledge rather 
WKDQQHJDWH³LWVH[SHULHQWLDOWUXWKV´ 
In other words, it might be helpful to separate the Cartesian and cognitivist split between the 
knower and the known from the mind-body relationship which provides the basis for our lived 
experience (Stenner, 2008). With respect to theorising and researching embodiment, to borrow the 
ODQJXDJH RI 6LPRQ :LOOLDPV DQG *LOOLDQ %HQGHORZ   RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV D ³XVHIXO
distinction can be made here between duality and dualism´ 7KDW LV D GLVWLQFWLRQ between the 
usefulness of analytical categories such as mind and body (which are, inevitably, always implicitly 
employed) at the epistemological level and their reification as self-contained entities at the 
ontological level. This is also a matter of not conflating analytical categories and addressing the 
complexities involved in the ways we experience and act in the world (Archer, 2000). Put another 
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way, this distinction can help us stick to monism at the ontological level while accounting for 
pluralism at the epistemological level.  
In experiential terms, human embodiment is an immensely rich and complex phenomenon. The 
world we experience consists of what we touch, hear, see, smell, and taste. The way we experience 
our body includes interoceptive sensations, such as kinaesthesis (the ability to feel movements of 
the limbs and body), bodily pleasure and pain, temperature, internal damage, the need for 
sustenance and rest, etc. Moreover, our experiences involve reflections, thoughts, memories, 
images, and inner verbal conversations. In fact, many of our experiences consist of peculiar 
combinations of these aspects, continuously shifting along a virtually infinite range of qualitatively 
different experiential dimensions. Yet, without reifying them as separate worlds, setting them in 
opposition, or conflating the nuances involved, the basic qualitative difference between material 
and immaterial experiences can be employed as a helpful analytical starting point to orientate 
ourselves in such wide range of phenomenological variations.  
Phenomenologically, we are all familiar with these variations: while many of our experiences can 
be located in three-dimensional space, other kinds of experiences have a more immaterial 
connotation. Examples of the former are my experience of the chair, the desk, the keyboard, and 
WKHFRPSXWHUVFUHHQLQIURQWRIPHQRZRUWKHIORZHU,FDQVSRWLQP\QHLJKERXU¶VJDUGHQIURP
my window. Examples of the latter can be the desire to eat a particular dish, a mental image of an 
installation I saw in an exhibition, or the inner conversations with which I am evaluating the lines I 
have just written. Nevertheless, the different qualities involved in these experiences do not need to 
create sharp divides in the qualities characterizing our phenomenological world.  
In fact, these qualities could be divided into an unlimited range of shades, dimensions, and 
FDWHJRULHVPRUHRUOHVVIXQFWLRQDOWRRQH¶VDQDO\WLFDOSXUSRVHV)RULQVWDQFHDFUDPSLQP\FDOID
feeling of lightness in one of my joints, or a gurgle in my stomach, cannot be located in the 
SK\VLFDO VSDFH ZLWK WKH VDPH SUHFLVLRQ DV D IORZHU LQ P\ QHLJKERXU¶V JDUGHQ ± here we have 
different degrees of material experiences. Similarly, the mixture of feelings of a doctoral student 
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before an important presentation cuts across material and immaterial connotations as the more 
physical features, such as the increased heartbeat, the upward flow of heat, or the narrowing of the 
visual field, are experienced alongside too-subtle sensations that are difficult to pin down in a 
three-dimensional space or be represented at the discursive level.  
+HQFHHPERGLPHQW LV IDUIURPEHLQJDµIODW¶RURQH-dimensional phenomenon, but rather it is a 
phenomenon enacted and experienced on the basis of different experiential dimensions ± it is a 
multidimensional phenomenon (Burkitt, 1999; Shilling, 2005). And I argue that all its dimensions 
need to be accounted for as having causal currency, even those we tend to perceive as immaterial ± 
i.e., are consciousness, subjectivity, mind, conscious deliberations, affective states, and sensations 
OHVVµDFWXDO¶WKDQPDWWHU"/HVVUHOHYDQWZKHQLWFRPHVWREULQJLQJDERXWFKDQJHLQWKHZRUOG",Q
this respect, I very much welcome the numerous calls of those contemporary social and cultural 
theorists who urge us to re-think materiality as something more than matter (e.g., Ansell-Pearson, 
2017; Blackman, 2012; Coole & Frost, 2010; Grosz, 2011, 2017). And I share philosopher 
(OL]DEHWK *URV]¶V   GRXEW ZKHQ VKH QRWHV WKDW ³perhaps materialism is no longer an 
DGHTXDWHWHUPDQGZHQHHGWRJHQHUDWHDQHZWHUP´ 
Overall, what I am pointing out here is that which we still do not know about our embodied 
FRQGLWLRQ ZKDW &KULV 6KLOOLQJ  [L FDOOV ³WKH HPHUJHQW SURSHUWLHV RI WKH HPERGLed 
VXEMHFW´ :H NQRZ WKDW RXU ERGLHV DUH PXFK PRUH WKDQ WKH PHUH VXP RI ELRORJLFDO DQG VRFLDO
processes, yet, as we do not know how these processes are exactly related, we remain oblivious to 
the body itself. The questions asked more than two decades ago by Grosz (1994: 189) ± ³:KDW
RQWRORJLFDOO\VSHDNLQJLVWKHERG\":KDWLVLWVµVWXII¶LWVPDWWHU":KDWRILWVIRUP",VWKDWJLYHQ
RUSURGXFHG"´± remain troubling concerns in body studies.  
Once more, it may be helpful to discern between dualism(s) and dualities. Indeed, the paradoxical 
and dual character of the lived body ± both subject and object, structure and process, differentiated 
and open-HQGHGPDWHULDODQGLPPDWHULDODQG³µRQH\HWPDQ\¶>DQG@µPRUHWKDQRQHDQGOHVVWKDQ
PDQ\¶´± has long been acknowledged yet it is still theoretically undeveloped (Blackman, 2012: 
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 7R EH VXUH UDWKHU WKDQ DQVZHULQJ ZKDW DUH SHUKDSV µLPSRVVLEOH¶ TXHVWLRQV WKLV UHVHDUFK
intends to provide a contribution which can help with effectively engaging with the above issues 
within body studies. 
To sum up, I have argued that the mind-body relationship and the qualitative differences according 
to which we get to know and act in the world are not a Cartesian construction. Although the 
LQIOXHQFHRI'HVFDUWHV¶RQWRORJLFDOFRQclusion still shapes our Western and contemporary way of 
thinking of and living out the mind-body relationship, I have contended that this relationship 
nevertheless relates to fundamental features of human embodiment. On this ground, I have 
suggested distinguishing between the Cartesian disembodied subject and the view of mind and 
body as two separate substances and the multidimensionality and richness of our 
phenomenological life, encompassing both material and immaterial experiences. In other words, 
by reMHFWLQJ 'HVFDUWHV¶ RQWRORJLFDO FODLPV ZKLOH UHWDLQLQJ WKH HSLVWHPRORJLFDO WUXWKV LQKHUHQW LQ
the relationship between mind and body, I have proposed the adoption of an ontologically monist 
yet epistemologically pluralist theoretical framework. I have furthermore advocated engagement 
with the Cartesian paradigm in a more direct manner, and questioned the view of our lived 
experience as a mere epiphenomenon.    
Having introduced the relationship between mind and body in more general terms, in what follows 
I wish to show in what ways this relationship has been approached in social theory. By reviewing 
extant literature in the field, I will argue that the just anti-Cartesian stance underpinning 
sociological studies of the body has nevertheless produced the unwanWHG µVLGH HIIHFWV¶ RI L DQ
over-emphasis on the open-ended and relational character of embodiment and ii) the neglect of the 
HPERGLHGDJHQW¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOOLIHDQGLWVFDXVDOSRZHUV± two intertwined outcomes which 
are identified by this thesis as impediments to a truly non-dualist social theory. In this respect, I 
ZLOO FRQWHQG WKDW 'HVFDUWHV¶ IUDPHZRUN QRW RQO\ DSSHDUV WR SHUPHDWH HYHU\GD\ GLVFRXUVH DQG
common sense, but it is also imbued in the very academic theorising aiming at overcoming it, 
inevitably shaping the way we conceptualise the body and the very notion employed to address the 
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Cartesian paradigm ± that of embodiment, which appears to still leave mind and body either set in 












Introduction ± Mind and Body in Social Theory  
 
Seen more as a philosophical rather than sociological preoccupation, the mind-body relationship 
has never been a major concern in the discipline. Nevertheless, the Cartesian paradigm did 
LQIOXHQFHWKHGLVFLSOLQH¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKHPLQGDVSLRQHHUVRIWKHGLVFLSOLQHDLPHGDWHVWDEOLVKLQJD
field of enquiry separate from the natural sciences, which were concerned with the physical world 
(Shilling, 2012/1993). Within tKLVFRQWH[WWKHVRFLDOO\XQLQWHUHVWLQJµIOHVKO\¶ERG\IHOORXWVLGHWKH
sociological domain, and fathers of the discipline like Émile Durkheim believed that focusing on 
the social sphere was the only possible way to produce meaningful explanations of human 
behaviours (ibid.).  
For 'XUNKHLPRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVWKLVPHDQWFRQFHQWUDWLQJUHVHDUFKRQµVRFLDOIDFWV¶ 
[Social facts] consist of manners of acting, thinking and feeling external to the individual, which are 
invested with a coercive power by virtue of which they exercise control over him. Consequently, 
since they consist of representations and actions, they cannot be confused with organic phenomena, 
nor with psychical phenomena, which have no existence save in and through the individual 
consciousness. Thus they constitute a new species and to them must be exclusively assigned the 
term social.  
7KXVXQZLWWLQJO\PLUURULQJ'HVFDUWHV¶PLQGERG\VSOLWIURPLWVRXWVHWWKHGLVFLSOLQH¶VFRQFHUQV
shifted towards the disembodied realm of the symbolic, the representational, and the mind. 
0RUHRYHU'XUNKHLP¶VTXRWDWLRQUHYHDOVWKDW IURPWKHYHU\EHJLQQLQJ WKHIRFXVZDVH[FOXVLYHO\
QDUURZHG RQ DQ µH[WHUQDO¶ GLPHQVLRQ LQ RSSRVLWLRQ WR WKH LQQHU µSV\FKLFDO SKHQRPHQD¶ DQG
µLQGLYLGXDOFRQVFLRXVQHVV¶ZKLFKZHUHQHJOHFWHGDORQJVLGHµRUJDQLFSKHQRPHQD¶ 
Yet, the body did not disappear completely. As Shilling (2012/1993: 21) argues, the body has 
DOZD\VEHHQDQ³DEVHQWSUHVHQFH´± i.e., even when the focus was not directly on the corporeal, 
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sensual, and lived features of the body, human physicality was nevertheless implicitly present in 
sociological investigations. Actions, affective states, language ± all aspects inextricably linked to 
our embodied condition ± inevitably needed to be taken into account by the founding fathers of the 
discipline interested in social mobility, health, morbidity, mortality rates, as well as in embodied 
µVRFLDOFDWHJRULHV¶VXFKDVµUDFH¶VH[DQGVRFLDOFODVVLELG 
However, if with its focus on the mind, sociology has traditionally showed a tendency to generate 
disembodied accounts of social phenomena, this trend began to change during the 1980s, when the 
body became an explicit focus of analysis in social theory and a sociology of the body started to 
emerge. Perhaps unsurprisingly, an explicit interest in the body was concomitant with an explicit 
concern with the mind-body dualism (Crossley, 2007), which became a target of a series of attacks 
within the social sciences. In fact, in the following four chapters, by scrutinising extant literature in 
the field, I intend to elucidate in what ways this anti-Cartesian stance has developed in social 
theory. 
I begin in chapter 1 by explaining that alongside the rejection of the Cartesian person, there has 
been an unnecessary and unproductive over-emphasis on external environments of embodiment at 
the expenses of the individuated dimension of the embodied agent and her phenomenological 
world. Here I furthermore argue that the Cartesian paradigm still appears to be subtly pervading 
extant conceptualisations of the notion precisely advanced to bridge the mind-body gap left by 
Descartes ± i.e., the notion of embodiment. I subsequently discuss in chronological order the three 
major turns occurring in body studies since its inception: the linguistic, the corporeal, and the 
affective turn ± in chapters 2, 3 and 4 respectively. When scrutinising these extant approaches, my 
critique is sympathetic. That is, I consider theorists able to offer valuable insights when it comes to 
theorising and researching the body, while, at the same time, showing that their arguments, if 




In chapter 2 I show that the linguistic turn is concerned with the body as a system of meaning, a 
cultural product ± i.e., the representational/objectified body. Here I draw on the arguments of 
philosophers Michel Foucault and Judith Butler to demonstrate that this perspective has the merit 
of having emphasised the causal powers of the immaterial dimensions of mind, the symbolic, and 
language. However, while theorists of the linguistic turn have pointed out that embodiment is also 
a discursive phenomenon, I illustrate that they do not appear to have explained in what ways 
language and corporeality are implicated, leaving, therefore, a gap between the two terms, and 
mind and body still set in opposition.  
To compensate for this lacuna, in chapter 3 I show that the corporeal turn attempted to integrate 
the insights of the linguistic turn with the lived, sensual, and performative aspects of embodiment. 
$QXPEHURI WKHRULVWVZLWKLQ WKLV WXUQRIIHUYDOLGKHOS WR VXSSRUW WKLV WKHVLV¶ HQGHDYRXU ,Q WKLV
respect, I employ the arguments of cultural anthropologist Thomas Csordas, who urges us to spell 
out in more detail the relationship between the semiotic and phenomenological dimensions of 
embodiment, and suggests that language, rather than only detaching us from it, can also provide 
access to our corporeal dimension. I furthermore draw on the theorising of philosopher Elizabeth 
Grosz, who stresses the danger of explaining away the mind-body dualism, and advocates novel 
conceptual devices to account for the paradoxical nature of embodiment, which possesses both a 
processual nature and structural aspects.  
Following these two theorists, I momentarily suspend my chronological outline of body studies to 
introduce the thought of philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Not only does the French 
phenomenologist inform the arguments of Grosz, Csordas, and many other authors involved in the 
FRUSRUHDOWXUQKHDOVRHQYLVDJHVDYLHZRIWKHERG\ZKLFKPRUHWKDQRWKHUVLQIRUPVWKLVWKHVLV¶
re-conceptualisation of embodiment. In fact, for Merleau-Ponty, embodiment is a chiasmic and 
processual phenomenon located at the encroachment between a pre-individual and individuated 
dimension, thus possessing a dual character. In addition, discussing Merleau-3RQW\¶V DUJXPHQWV
allows an in-depth qualification of the phenomenological approach endorsed by the current 
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research, which aims at addressing that in-between space both separating and unifying these pre-
individual and individuated dimensions. 
I conclude my review of the corporeal turn by noting that, despite the promising premise, the aim 
of bringing mind and body together has never been fully achieved by this perspective. Instead, 
what acquired currency in sociology during the 1990s were material-semiotics theories of 
embodiment like actor-network theory (ANT), which, rather than meaningfully accounting for all 
the dimensions of embodiment, seem to be prone to an analysis of social phenomena which is 
ultimately flat, lifeless, and merely descriptive. Here the dimensions targeted ± the material and the 
semiotic, and mind and body ± are conflated and therefore become elusive, as what remains are 
only abstract links, connections, and entanglements.  
Following the corporeal turn, in chapter 4 I outline the features of the affective turn by mainly 
referring to the arguments of social theorist/philosopher Brian Massumi, who epitomises both the 
valuable insights to retain and the pitfalls to avoid of this latest turn in social theory. I explain that 
the turn to affect has the merit of consolidating the process-oriented ontology endorsed by the 
present study, conceptualising matter as alive and endowed with an experiential aspect, and 
theorising the body as possessing its own properties and agentic powers.  
, IXUWKHUPRUH FRPSDUH 0DVVXPL¶V WKHRULVLQJ ZLWK WKDW RI 0HUOHDX-3RQW\¶V DQG RXWOLQH WKHLU
similar conceptualisation of embodiment as a phenomenon caught between a pre-individual and 
individuated dimension, as well as their shared interest in tapping into the transformative space 
between these two dimensions. Here I illustrate how the notion of affect appears to possess the 
potential to productively engage with the dual character of embodiment ± i.e., with both its 
processual nature and non-linear logic and its structural aspect and either/or logic.  
I then move on to the problems often encountered when turning to affect, and show that affect 
theorists like Massumi seem to stress only the autonomous character of affect, and the dissonance 
occurring between mind and body, rather than also considering the possibility of an attunement 
between these two dimensions of embodiment. That is, I illustrate how in contemporary theorising, 
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affect tends to be conceived of as a force only operating at a nonconscious level ± i.e., as 
something which makes us move and has an influence on us, but upon which we are unable to act. 
In this way, I show that despite the just stress on vital, visceral, and sensuous aspects of the body, 
rather than developing the calls of the corporeal turn, a number of theorists involved in the 
affective turn fell instead into an inverse Cartesian dualism, where the body and its materiality, 
rather than the mind and its immateriality, becomes the privileged term of the relationship.  
Finally, I summarise my literature review by arguing that the notion of embodiment has not 
fulfilled its promise of overcoming the Cartesian paradigm. That is, when theorising our embodied 
experience, action, and identity, often either one of the terms of the mind-body dualism is 
privileged at the expense of the other, setting mind and body in opposition, or the qualitative 
differences between the ways we get to know and act in the world are erased and/or conflated, 
producing sterile forms of monism. In other words, rather than having gone away, it seems that the 
Cartesian dualism is too often explained away when theorising and researching embodiment.   
More importantly, however, I contend that the analysis of extant approaches has drawn attention to 
an aspect of embodiment which is only implicitly acknowledged by contemporary perspectives. 
That is, embodiment emerges as a phenomenon caught between a pre-individual and an 
individuated dimension, as being both many and one, open-ended and differentiated, a process and 
a structure ± i.e., embodiment appears to be a phenomenon possessing a dual character. It is in fact 
this aspect that this thesis has chosen to explore further in order to address the impasse currently 
vexing body studies. While following a dual path to transcend a dualistic approach might seem an 
idiosyncrasy, I suggest that it is precisely in this way that we can move from a mere anti-Cartesian 
stance to a truly post-Cartesian theorising of embodiment. And it is precisely with this anti-
Cartesian stance, which I intend to move away from, that I begin my review of extant literature of 





Chapter 1: THE ANTI-CARTESIAN PROJECT AND THE NOTION OF 
EMBODIMENT  
 
1.1 The Anti-Cartesian Project ± The Over-Emphasis on External Environments and 
the Neglect of Our Phenomenological World  
 
An exemplary text underpinned by an anti-Cartesian stance is Changing the Subject, published in 
1984 by social psychologists Julian Henriques, Wendy Holloway, Cathy Urwin, Couze Venn, and 
Valerie Walkerdine. While critiques of the Cartesian paradigm abounded much earlier than this 
publication, arguments like those advanced by Henriques and his colleagues acquired currency in 
body studies and still appear to strongly resonate in contemporary theorising of the body after 
more than three decades. 
,QKHUHQWLQ+HQULTXHVDQGFROOHDJXHV¶DUJXPHQWVDUHWZRPDMRULQWHUWZLQHGRXWFRPHVZKLch are 
identified in the present research as obstacles to further developments when theorising and 
researching embodiment. Resembling Durkheim, these are i) an exclusive focus on an external and 
open-HQGHG GLPHQVLRQ DQG LL WKH GLVPLVVDO RI WKH VXEMHFW¶V phenomenological world. In fact, 
these two consequences are difficult to pull apart: once the attention is directed to external 
environments, the inner life of the subject can only disappear. But in what way were these 
outcomes associated with an anti-Cartesian standpoint?  
Mainly drawing on psychoanalytic and post-structuralist theories, in contrast with the unitary, 
consistent, and rational Cartesian person, Henriques and colleagues (1998/1984) conceptualised 
the subject as exclusively dynamic, fluid, and fragmented, always positioned in relation to a 
particular social and cultural milieu. Such emphasis on the open-ended character of the embodied 
agent entailed the abandonment of analytical distinctions such as those between the individual and 
society, inner and outer dimensions, and, indeed, mind and body ± suspiciously seen as a heritage 
of the Cartesian perspective. However, by not accounting for the fact that embodied agents not 
only continuously change but are also able to hold coherently together, ratKHU WKDQ µFKDQJLQJ¶
reduced to society and culture, here the subject, along her phenomenological life, risks 
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disappearing altogether. Bearing this peril in mind, where is the present study located in relation to 
this anti-Cartesian stance?  
Answering the above question can help to explicate a number of subtle distinctions made by the 
current research. To begin with, this thesis certainly subscribes to the rejection of the self-
contained Cartesian person (as, indeed, the great majority of contemporary theorists would do). 
The unitary self is a concept undeniably difficult to sustain. Our self appears to be at the centre of 
the world we experience. It feels like an inner agent who makes decisions, carries out actions, and 
acts upon the world; it appears to be a source of opinions, fears, hopes, and desires. However, to 
employ the words of cognitive scientist/biologist Francisco Varela, philosopher Evan Thompson, 
DQGSV\FKRORJLVW(OHDQRU5RVFK³DOORIWKHUHIOHFWLYHWUDGLWLRQVRIKXPDQKLVWRU\
± philosophy, science, psychoanalysis, religion, meditation ± have challenged the naïve sense of 
self. No tradition has ever claimed to discover an independent, fixed, or unitary self within the 
ZRUOGRIH[SHULHQFH´ 
A similar argument could be made for cognitivist internal processes. Indeed, it is not clear where 
these internal processes would take place, unless we want to imagine what the philosopher Daniel 
Dennett names Cartesian Theatre. With the metaphor of the Cartesian Theatre, Dennett 
(1993/1991) intends to challenge the persistent belief that there is an unspecified location in the 
brain (or anywhere else, for that matter) where the subject is, the content of consciousness comes 
DQG JRHV DQG RXU OLYHG H[SHULHQFH µKDSSHQV¶ 7KLV SODFH LV SURYRNLQJOy imagined by Dennett 
LELG DV D VWDJH LQ RQH¶V KHDG ZKHUH D OLWWOH KRPXQFXOXV UHFHLYHV LPDJHV DQG RWKHU VHQVRU\
stimulations through a screen and acts on these by means of an instrument panel. Imagining such a 
place is an absurdity, as philosopher William James (1890, in Blackmore, 2010/2003: 57) was 
already noting when asserting that there is no place in our body where our lived experience can be 
IRXQG³QRFHOORUJURXSRIFHOOVLQWKHEUDLQRIVXFKDQDWRPLFDORUIXQFWLRQDOSUH-eminence as to 
appear to EHWKHNH\VWRQHRUFHQWUHRIJUDYLW\RIWKHZKROHV\VWHP´ 
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Indeed, contemporary cognitive sciences are increasingly moving towards a view of our lived 
experience which is not conceptualised as something occurring in our brain but, rather, as a 
phenomenon extending beyond our body into the surrounding material, social, and cultural 
environments (e.g., Clark & Chalmers, 1998; Thompson, 2007; Varela et al., 1993/1991). But, 
most importantly, the Cartesian person of classical cognitive science and experimental psychology 
± a unified, consistent and rational cognising subject of an external world internally represented in 
her mind ± would reproduce the inexplicable mind-body gap, the problem of a transcendent 
immaterial mind, knower of a material world set apart from it. Instead, this study is in favour of an 
embodied agent who, by means of her body, is directly involved in bringing about a world, rather 
than being separate from it. That said, it is my initial distinction between ontological conclusions 
and episWHPRORJLFDO WUXWKV ZKLFK GUDZV D OLQH EHWZHHQ WKLV WKHVLV¶ DQG +HQULTXHV DQG KLV
FROOHDJXHV¶DUJXPHQWV 
For example, it is one thing to recognise the problems related to the Cartesian paradigm, but 
another to ignore or explain away the fact that our experiential world includes both mental and 
physical dimensions. It is one thing to realise the elusive character of our sense of self, but another 
WRSUHWHQGWKDWWKHH[SHULHQFHRIDQµH[SHULHQFHU¶DWWKHFHQWUHRIHYHU\WKLQJZHDUHDZDUHRIZLWK
an exclusively personal character inaccessible to other people, does not exist. It is one thing to 
move away from the sterile notion of internal processes, but another to reduce the phenomenology 
of inner feelings, conversations, and reflexive thoughts to irrelevant epiphenomena. It is one thing 
to pay the closest attention to social processes, practices, and language, but another to substitute 
the subject with the symbolic world, the speaker with the text, the doer with the doing, and thus to 
focus exclusively on an outer dimension.  
In fact, Henriques and colleagues (1998/1984) did identify a number of unanswered questions 
present in their perspective. For instance, they wondered: if the subject is multiple rather than 
unitary, how does she hoOGWRJHWKHU":KDWDFFRXQWVIRUWKHFRQWLQXLW\RILQGLYLGXDOV¶DFWLRQVDV
they repeatedly position themselves within particular social and cultural contexts? If we focus on 
social processes without considering the subject, then how can we theorise agency, creativity, 
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change, and resistance? In acknowledging the inability of their framework to provide adequate 
answers to these questions, they were seeing their proposal as a point of departure to address issues 
of power/knowledge and social inequality more efficaciously. Therefore, they were aware that 
there were problems, but they thought that these could be solved by working within the proposed 
framework.  
Yet, and significantly, in the foreword of the 1998 re-edition of their book (14 years after the first 
HGLWLRQ WKH\ DGPLW WKDW ³GHVSLWH LQWHUHVWLQJ QHZ LQLWLDWLYHV VLQFH Changing the Subject was 
published, some of the basic problems it raises, both epistemological and ontological, still are at 
LVVXH´ +HQULTXHV HW DO  [LY ,Q IDFW WKHLU SURMHct to move on from the Cartesian 
perspective does not seem to have entirely succeeded so far, and, indeed, some of the authors of 
Changing the Subject moved away from the psychoanalytic, post-structuralist, and linguistic 
approaches initially informing their work, and became among the advocates of the turn to affect 
HJ +HQULTXHV 9HQQ 7KHVH µNQRWW\¶SUREOHPV , FRQWHQG DSSHDU WR VWLOO YH[ WKH
notion advanced to address them ± that of embodiment.  
 
1.2 The Notion of Embodiment ± Addressing Dualism(s) 
 
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, the notion of embodiment emerged as a key concept 
for explaining our phenomenological world, actions, identities, and socio-cultural practices 
(Shilling, 2012/1993). Advanced to address the Cartesian mind-body divide, embodiment is 
conceived of as a concept elucidating the univocity of mind and body, accounting for material and 
immaterial experiences, and emphasising the intersection of our psychical interiority and corporeal 
exteriority (McNay, 1999). The notion is furthermore employed to avoid both deterministic and 
voluntaristic accounts, where our lived experience is theorised as determined either by the societal 
norms disciplining our body or by the conscious deliberations of a transcendent mind (ibid.). 
Overlapping with the notion of the lived body ± the body which brings about a world for us, and is 
both subject and object ± embodiment is also intended as an existential condition, which makes 
possible both culture and the self (Csordas, 1994; Leder, 1990; Shilling, 2012/1993).  
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Embodiment stresses relationality, contingency, and co-constitution (Blackman, 2012; 
Papadopoulos, 2011), and entails our experiences and actions as always situated, as emerging from 
a spatio-temporal and material-semiotic assemblage of human and non-human components 
through which the lived experience of the knower and the object of her knowledge are enacted 
(Haraway, 1991). Our phenomenological world is thus also embodied in the sense that it extends 
beyond the boundaries of our skin, as it is emplaced in social, cultural, and material environments. 
0RUHWKDQDµWKLQJ¶ZLWKFOHDUO\GHILQHGERXQGDULHVHPERGLPHQWLVWKHUHIRUHVHHQDVDG\QDPLF
process, whereby symbolic and material worlds are brought about (Blackman, 2012). Challenging 
dualism(s) such as subject-object, nature-culture, agency-structure, interiority-exteriority, 
symbolic-material, and, of course, mind-body, embodiment acquired the status of a notion which 
can, or indeed needs to, be theorised and researched in its own right (Shilling, 2012/1993).  
All in all, embodiment promises to go beyond the Cartesian framework and account for the 
multidimensionality of our phenomenological world ± but to what extent has the notion fulfilled its 
promises? Of course, as embodiment has been increasingly employed for socio-cultural analyses, 
the notion has been approached in a wide variety of ways, which cannot be included even in a 
much more ambitious endeavour than this thesis. At risk of oversimplifying, however, I contend 
that despite the differences between extant perspectives, the mind-body dualism ± along with the 
problems we have seen left unaddressed in the anti-Cartesian project ± has remained embedded in 
the very theorising advanced for overcoming it. As a consequence of this, there has been a 
tendency in body studies to either stress one polarity of the Cartesian dualism at the expense of the 
other, or to erase the qualitative differences between mind and body. In short, mind and body are 
either set in opposition or conIODWHGDQGWKHUHIRUHQRQHRIWKHQRWLRQ¶VFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVDOUHDG\
proposed appears to be satisfactory alone.  
I will develop my contentions by outlining the features of the three major turns in body studies: the 
linguistic turn, which appeared to explain the body with mind and language; the corporeal turn, 
which ended up conflating mind and body; and the affective turn, which seemed to reduce the 
mind to the body and matter. I will show that all these perspectives clearly endorse an anti-
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Cartesian stance, but, paradoxically employ either a dualistic framework setting mind and body in 
opposition, or a flat and unproductive monism erasing the qualitative differences of immaterial and 
material experiential dimensions. In addition, none of these perspectives appears to be willing to 
FRQVLGHU WKH FDXVDO SRZHUV RI WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V LQQHU OLIH DQG LQWHUQDO HQYLURQPHQWV RI
























Chapter 2: THE LINGUISTIC TURN 
 
2.1 The Power of Discourse  
 
Committed to the anti-Cartesian project and drawing on post-structuralist perspectives, theorists of 
the linguistic turn in the social sciences concentrated their efforts on language and everyday talk. 
These theorists have the merit of recognising that language and the symbolic world are as actual as 
matter and the material world, and rather than a mere means of communication, they are 
LQVWUXPHQWV WR µGR¶ WKLQJV WR SURGXFH UHSURGXFH DQGRU WUDQVIRUP WKH SUDFWLFHV FRQVWLWXWLYH of 
society. Yet, despite its merits, by not being able to meaningfully theorise the relationship between 
immaterial and material dimensions of embodiment, and language and corporeality, the linguistic 
turn appeared to reproduce the very mind-body divide it intended to avoid. In fact, what emerged 
from this turn was a model of embodiment where everything is explained by resorting to the 
symbolic realm of the mind, which is, in turn, set in opposition to the materiality of the body. In 
this way, unwittingly IROORZLQJ'HVFDUWHV KHUH WKHPLQGSOD\V WKHNH\ UROHZKLOH µWKHERG\¶ LV
inevitably objectified. 
In addition, like the other approaches to the body which will follow, the linguistic perspective 
appears to neglect internal environments of embodiment and our phenomenological world. This 
appears evident when one considers the idiosyncrasy which vexes this perspective, which on the 
one hand emphasises language and on the other neglects reflexivity, a faculty which can only be 
employed within the symbolic domain. Foucault is exemplary in this respect. As he stated in 
several interviews (see Crossley, 1994: 123-134, 160-165, for a useful account), it is by unveiling 
the discursive structures of power that the subject can reflexively resist the regimes of truth 
constituted by means of language. That is, as inner conversations and reflections are articulated 
within a symbolic experiential dimension, the awareness of the ways the exercise of power works 
through the structure of language and discourse ± at the level of mind ± endows the embodied 
agent with a critical distance and the possibility of generating anti-authoritarian ideas.  
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Nevertheless, while both the subject and her reflexive faculties are implicitly the ultimate target, 
they are never explicitly considerHG LQ )RXFDXOW¶V DFWXDO ZRUNV DJDLQ RQH QHHGV WR UHVRUW WR
LQWHUYLHZVWRILQG)RXFDXOWGLVFXVVLQJWKHVH$VQRWHGE\1LFN&URVVOH\³)RXFDXOW¶V
methodology consistently prioritises the rule over the rule follower, the practice over the 
practitioner and the statement over the statement-maker and, as such, it does not have the 
WKHRUHWLFDOWRROVWRDGGUHVVWKHUHIOH[LYHDJHQWWKDWLWLGHQWLILHV´,PSRUWDQWO\VXFKDYLHZDSSHDUV
WRQHJOHFWQRWRQO\ WKHHPERGLHGDJHQW¶V UHIOH[LYHFDSDFLWLHVEXWDlso the qualitative richness of 
her phenomenal life as a whole.  
That is, not only reflexive capacities but also affective states, feelings, desires, pleasures, and pains 
are constituted and regulated in discourse (see, for instance, Edwards, 1997). Discourses are here 
meant to be historically and culturally located dynamic systems of statements, ideas, and practices 
ZKLFK WKURXJK WKHLU LPSOLFDWLRQV FUHDWH ILHOGV RI SRVVLELOLWLHV IRU SHRSOH¶V µGRLQJ¶ DQG µEHLQJ¶
DQG µQRW GRLQJ¶ DQG µQRW EHLQJ¶ )RXFDXOW, 2002/1972; Butler, 1993). In this way, our entire 
phenomenological world is explained by recurring to only the one dimension of language. In this 
respect, both Foucault (2002/1970) and Butler (1988) blame phenomenology for assuming a pre-
given subject and a pre-constituted human nature ± a subject who has an existence which precedes 
discourses (see also Althusser, 2001/1971).  
However, while the embodied agent is constituted and regulated in discourse, she does not in turn 
constitute discourse. In fact, the very notion of subjectivity is here charged with the double 
PHDQLQJRIWKH)UHQFKµDVVXMHWWLVVHPHQW¶± both subjectivity and subjectification (Henriques et al., 
1998/1984: 3). Yet, the Althusserian pseudo-subject ± LH WKH µ,¶ ZKR FRPHV LQWR H[LVWHQFH 
through discourse and narrative, through being cited, named, interpellated; the subject who, 
temporally speaking, neither precedes nor succeeds discourse, but rather emerges within it ± poses 
some serious problems, which, I would argue, are not less problematic than those posed by the 
µ&DUWHVLDQSHUVRQ¶,QGHHGLQRUGHUWREHFDOOHGDQGUHFRJQLVHKHUVHOIZLWKLQWKHV\PEROLFGRPDLQ
this subject, needs to be ± physically speaking ± already constituted. And, it is precisely this 
physicality which is not adequately accounted for in the linguistic turn. 
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Having said that, I wish now to develop the above arguments and outline in more detail the 
insights to retain and the pitfalls to avoid of the linguistic turn. To do so I will discuss first 
)RXFDXOW¶VDQGWKHQ%XWOHU¶VWKHRULVLQJ7KHILUVWWKHRULVWSRLQWV out that the causal powers of the 
immaterial dimension of mind are not minor to those of the material dimension of the body, while 
the second emphasises the inextricable link between language and corporeality. Nevertheless, by 
privileging the first term of the relationships they are concerned with, both theorists ultimately set 
mind and body in opposition.  
 
2.2 The Foucauldian Body ± The Immaterial Dimension of Embodiment  
 
A historian of ideas, throughout his work Foucault interrogates how, historically, our everyday 
intelligibility has taken form, how certain intellectual structures have become familiar to us, and 
how taken-for-granted frameworks of thought operate within strategies of oppressive power. 
Motivated to unveil the conditions, constraints, and possibilities of our thought, and the power 
strategies shaping what can, or cannot be, thought about, Foucault (1992/1985: 9) is interested in 
understanding:   
[T]o what extent it might be possible to think differently, instead of legitimating what is already 
NQRZQ >7@R ZKDW H[WHQW WKH HIIRUW WR WKLQN RQH¶V RZQ KLVWRU\ FDQ IUHH WKRXJKW IURP ZKDW LW
silently thinks, and so enable it to think differently.  
Thus)RXFDXOW¶VSUHRFFXSDWLRQVDUHORFDWHGDWWKHV\PEROLFGLPHQVLRQRIGLVFRXUVH± concerned 
with thought and the immaterial dimension of embodiment. He points out that the subjugation and 
objectification of the body is often accomplished through a type of knowledge which does not 
GLUHFWO\UHODWHWRERGLHV¶ELRORJ\SK\VLRORJ\DQGPDWHULDOLW\5DWKHUWKHERG\FDQEHVXEMXJDWHG
and objectified through an elusive form of mastery, which is not possessed by particular 




In this respect, Foucault (1991/1977: 29-30, my emphasis) suggests that from the 18th century 
there was a gradual shift of the penal systems towards much more intangible yet effective and far-
reaching technologies of disciplines:  
Rather than seeing this soul as the reactivated remnants of an ideology, one would see it as the 
present correlative of a certain technology of power over the body. It would be wrong to say that 
the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is 
produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised 
on those punished ± and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over 
madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and 
VXSHUYLVHGIRUWKHUHVWRIWKHLUOLYHV>«@7KLV real, non-corporeal soul is not a substance, it is the 
element in which are articXODWHGWKHHIIHFWVRIDFHUWDLQW\SHRISRZHU>«7@KHVRXOLVWKHSULVRQRI
the body. 
Hence, the technology of the immaterial mind/soul was employed to control, manipulate, and 
imprison the material body ± LQ )RXFDXOW¶V (1991/1977: 17) words, ³>W@KH DSSDUDWus of punitive 
MXVWLFHPXVWQRZELWHLQWRWKLVERGLOHVVUHDOLW\´ 
7KLV , EHOLHYH LV WKHPRVWYDOXDEOHRI)RXFDXOW¶V FRQWHQWLRQVRSSUHVVLYHSRZHU FDQDOVRZRUN
WKURXJK WKH ERG\¶V REMHFWLILFDWLRQ DQG WUDQVSRVLWLRQ RQ DQ DEVWUDFW GLVFXUVLYH DQG LPPDWHULal 
level. Here, rather than being two separate substances, the immaterial dimension of the symbolic 
UHDOPUHVRQDWHVZLWKWKHPDWHULDOGLPHQVLRQRIWKHERG\¶VIOHVK± in other words, the immaterial 
mind is not less actual or possessing less causal power than the material body. It is in this way that 
)RXFDXOW¶V WKHRULVLQJFDQKHOSXV WREULQJ WRJHWKHUPLQGDQGERG\<HWXQVDWLVIDFWRU\DFFRXQWV
DQG GXDOLVWLF VSOLWV DULVH ZKHQ )RXFDXOW¶V DQDO\VHV DUH QRW LQWHJUDWHG ZLWK WKH SK\VLFDO DQG
phenomenological aspects of our embodied condition ± the lacuna which the present study intends 
to address.   
In fact, as Foucault (1998/1978: 151-152) seems to conceive the biological and the historical as 
intertwined, his ultimate goal appears to be consistent with the current UHVHDUFK¶VFRQFHUQVZKHQ
he states that:   
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[T]he purpose of the present study [i.e. The History of Sexuality: 1] is in fact to show how 
deployments of power are directly connected to the body ± to bodies, functions, physiological 
processes, sensations, and pleasures; far from the body having to be effaced, what is needed is to 
make visible through an analysis in which the biological and the historical are not consecutive to 
one another, as in the evolutionism of first sociologists, but are bound together in an increasingly 
complex fashion in accordance with the development of modern technologies of power that take 
OLIHDVWKHLUREMHFWLYH+HQFH,GRQRWHQYLVDJHDµKLVWRU\RIPHQWDOLWLHV¶WKDWZRXOGWDNHDFFRXQWRI
bodies only through the manner in which they have been perceived and given meaning and value; 
EXWDµKLVWRU\RIERGLHV¶DQGWKHPDQQHULQZKLFKZKDWLVPRVWPDWHULDODQGPRVWYLWDOLQWKHPKDV
been invested. 
However, despite his good intentions, Foucault exclusively concentrates his efforts on the socio-
cultural structures of discourse ± i.e., on the immaterial dimension of mind and external 
environments of embodiment. As a result, the Foucauldian body is exclusively an objectified, 
discursive, and represented body, rather than also being a sensing, lived, phenomenal body. 
According to Foucault (1991/1977: 25), in power relations and political struggles the body is 
always present ± yet, this is a body which is shaped but does not shape, is passive but not active, is 
object but never subject: 
[I]t is always the body that is at issue ± the body and its forces, their utility and their docility, their 
GLVWULEXWLRQDQGWKHLUVXEPLVVLRQ>«@7KHERG\LV>«@GLUHFWO\LQYROYHGLQDSROLWLFDOILHOGSRZHU
relations have an immediate hold upon it; they invest it, mark it, train it, torture it, force it to carry 
out tasks, to perform ceremonies, to emit signs.  
What appear to be neglected here are the internal environments of embodiment ± i.e., the 
capacities and constraints of the body as a corporeal entity. However, these are neglected but not 
negated, in the sense that they are thought of as non-existent. For example, when discussing 
revolts in prisons, Foucault (1991/1977: 30) notes that, although involving a discursive realm, they 





LQYROYHG LQ PLOLWDU\ WUDLQLQJ )RXFDXOW   REVHUYHV WKDW ³>L@Q WKH H[HUFLVH WKDW LV
imposed upon it and which it resists, the body brings out its essential correlations and 
VSRQWDQHRXVO\UHMHFWVWKHLQFRPSDWLEOH´ 
Nevertheless, thHVH DUH UDUH LQVWDQFHV LQ )RXFDXOW¶V ZRUNV DQG WKH ERG\¶V SK\VLFDO JHQHUDWLYH
capabilities and limitations are never addressed as such. The second (1992/1985) and third 
 YROXPH RI )RXFDXOW¶V The History of Sexuality are exemplary in this respect. 
7KURXJKRXWWKHVHYROXPHVWKHERG\¶VFDSDFLWLHVDQGFRQVWUDLQWVDUHPHUHO\DQDO\VHGDVGLVFRXUVHV
as if the physicality of a body engaging in extreme alimentary or sexual practices (the examples 
discussed by Foucault) would be irrelevant. The same applies to the material environment in which 
a body is embedded. When Foucault (1990/1986: 99-GLVFXVVHVIRULQVWDQFH*DOHQ¶VPHGLFDO
V\VWHPLWLVDVLIWKHERG\¶VPDWHULDOSURSHUWLHVWKHUK\WKPRIWKHFKDQJLQJVHDVRQVDQGH[WUHPH
cold or heat, were merely abstract discourses.  
To be sure, even our feelings of hunger, sexual arousal, or perception of external temperature are 
always discursively mediated, and certainly our body cannot escape the marks of culture and 
history. However, there are some physical limits which exceed the semiotic and historical 
dimensions ± above or below certain temperatures a human being cannot survive, independently of 
the discourses which are or are not available to her, or of the historical period in which she lives. 
MoreovHU ERGLHV¶ OLPLWV FRQVWUDLQWV DQG FDSDFLWLHV GR DOVR VKDSH VRFLHW\ ± they are not only 
shaped by it (Shilling, 2005). Yet, as noted by the Centre for Contemporary Studies Education 
Group (LQ+HQULTXHVHWDORULJLQDOHPSKDVLV³)oucault retains a place in 
theory for relations or forces that exist outside the discourses he describes, but in his histories these 
DUHUDUHO\HODERUDWHG>«@,QVXFKZRUNZHVWD\inside GLVFRXUVHV´ 
,WLVXSWRXVWRLQWHJUDWHKLVLQVLJKWVZLWKERWKWKHVXEMHFW¶VHPERGLHGH[SHULHQFHVDQGWKHERG\¶V
physical properties ± both of which possess causal powers. That is, we need to include the body 
which can be recalcitrant to cultural imperatives, subject, agent, and generator of our social life ± a 
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body made of flesh and blood, organs and physiological system, which moves, senses, and makes 
the existence of our cultural world possible in the first place.  
In addition, if we take as valid (as I intend to) FRXFDXOW¶VVXJJHVWLRQWKDWWKHV\PEROLFV\VWHPKDV
D SRZHUIXO JULS RQ WKH ERG\¶V FRUSRUHDOLW\ WKHQ ZH QHHG WR PHDQLQJIXOO\ UH-conceptualise the 
representational and discursive body in its intimate relationship with the sensuous, carnal, and pre-
objective body ± exactly how do particular discourses and discursive practices come to constitute 
our corporeal properties? And exactly how, in turn, do these properties and the structure of human 
embodiment shape discourse? Foucault provides only partial answers to the first of these two 
questions (Barad, 2007), and does not address the second at all (Shilling, 2012/1993).  
Left unanswered, in turn, these questions leave a gap ± indeed, a Cartesian gap: that between 
language and corporeality. It is therefore to this language-corporeality relationship which I will 
QRZ WXUQ E\ VFUXWLQLVLQJ KRZ LW KDV EHHQ GHDOW ZLWK E\ RQH RI WKH PRVW QRWDEOH RI )RXFDXOW¶V
FRQWHPSRUDU\IROORZHUV%XWOHU5DWKHUWKDQGHYHORSLQJ)RXFDXOW¶VZRUNWRLQFOXGHWKHFRUSRUHDO
dimension of the body, Butler stubbornly remains on a discursive level of analysis, and despite her 
best intentions of avoiding the mind-body opposition and bridging the gap between language and 
corporeality, she reproduces an account of our embodied condition where everything is explained 
by discourse and the lived experience of the embodied agent is reduced to an irrelevant 
phenomenon.  
 
2.3 The Discursive Body ± Language that Matters  
 
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, by questioning the ontological bases of sexual 
GLIIHUHQFHVZKDWKDVEHHQGXEEHGµWKLUGZDYHIHPLQLVP¶DLPHGWRJREH\RQGWKHJDSEHWZHHQWKH
material body and the socio-cultural representations of it (Colebrook, 2004). The goal here was to 
transcend the mind-body dualism, the distinction between language and corporeality, and thus that 
between sex and gender. For Judith Butler (1990/1999: 50) ± perhaps the theorist who has taken 




(or discourse) of gender which generates that of sex ± i.e., it is not only gender that is socially and 
culturally prescribed, but sex as well.  
Put simply, within this perspective, once we start talking, thinking, and theorising about the body, 
ZHDUHDOUHDG\GRLQJVRZLWKLQDGLVFXUVLYHUHDOP,Q%XWOHU¶VZRUGVWKHUHLVQR
body ³WKDWKDVQRWDOZD\VDOUHDG\EHHQLQWHUSUHWHGE\FXOWXUDOPHDQLQJV´,WLVLQVXFKFRQWH[WWKDW
on the one hand, Butler rightly argues that the body cannot escape cultural signification while, on 
the other, she regrettably falls into a Cartesian reductionism which reduces the body to an object of 
the mind. I will first outline the aspects of her contentions which I intend to retain and then will 
highlight the pitfalls in her arguments which I wish to avoid.  
To begin with, I certainly agree with Butler (1999/1990, 1993) when she argues that to overcome 
the Cartesian dualism we must not separate the way we theorise and think of our bodies from the 
way we experience and live them ± each is mutually implicated in the other. On this ground, Butler 
wishes to avoid reductionism and explaining our experiences and actions by recurring to either the 
body or the mind ± RQH RI WKH WZR &DUWHVLDQ µVXEVWDQFHV¶ 7KH IRUPHU VROXWLRQ LV D W\SH RI
materialism, such as that characterising popular neurophysiological accounts which reduce 
consciousness to complex neural activity. The latter is a form of idealism, as in the classic 
interpretations of Platonic philosophy, where matter is a denigrated manifestation of the Idea, and 
the world we experience becomes a product of our mind.  
Promisingly, Butler (1993: 66, original emphasis) distances herself from those social 
constructionism reductionisms which have often been blamed for falling into idealistic positions: 
The materiality of the body ought not to be conceptualised as a unilateral or causal effect of the 
psyche in any sense that would reduce that materiality to the psyche or make of the psyche the 
monistic stuff out of which that materiality is produced and/or derived. This latter alternative would 





an idealist or a reductionist would be based not only on a misunderstanding of her thought, but 
indeed on the very dualistic assumptions which underpin these accusations and set language and 
matter in opposition. %XWOHUVWDWHVWKDW³ODQJXDJHDQGPDWHULDOLW\DUHIXOO\HPEHGGHGLQHDFKRWKHU´
DQG WKHUHIRUHFDQQRWEHFRQFHLYHGRI VHSDUDWHO\³>O@DQJXDJHDQGPDWHULDOLW\DUHQRW
opposed, for language both is and refers to that which is material, and what is material never fully 
HVFDSHVIURPWKHSURFHVVE\ZKLFKLWLVVLJQLILHG´Lbid.: 68).  
According to Butler, rather than opposed, language and matter are intertwined in the contingency 
of the same historical process ± in the words of Miriam Fraser and Monica Greco (2005: 45-46, 
RULJLQDOHPSKDVLVIRU%XWOHU³as a process, materialization must necessarily be temporal. Hence, 
PDWWHUGRHVQRW µH[LVW¶ LQDQGRI LWVHOI IRU all the time, but is instead repeatedly produced over 
WLPHWKURXJKSHUIRUPDWLYLW\´+HUHWKHQRWLRQRISHUIRUPDWLYLW\LVFRQFHLYHGRIDVWKHUHLWeration 
RI VSHHFK DFWV VRFLDO SUDFWLFHV DQG FXOWXUDO QRUPV ZKLFK SURGXFH DQG UHSURGXFH µUHDOLW\¶ ± 
including material and immaterial dimensions ± as we experience it (Butler, 1999/1990, 1993).  
,Q%XWOHU¶VZRUGV³SHUIRUPDWLYHLVWKDWGLVFXUsive practice that enacts or produces that 
ZKLFKLWQDPHV´,QWKLVZD\IRU%XWOHU³>R@QHLVQRWVLPSO\DERG\>UDWKHU@RQHGRHVRQH¶VERG\´
(1988: 521), which thus acquires its materiality (as well as both gender and sex) in the IRUPRI³D
legacy of sedimented acts rather than a predetermined or foreclosed structure, essence or fact, 
ZKHWKHU QDWXUDO FXOWXUDO RU OLQJXLVWLF´   7KHUHIRUH PDWWHU LWVHOI LV SHUIRUPDWLYHO\
SURGXFHGLQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWLVWKHSURGXFWRI³a process of materialisation that stabilizes over time 
to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we call matter´ %XWOHU   RULJLQDO
emphasis).  
7KXV VR IDU WKHUH LV D FRPPRQ JURXQG EHWZHHQ %XWOHU¶V DQG WKLV VWXG\¶V DLPV LH WKRVH RI
avoiding dualism(s) and setting in opposition mind and body or language and corporeality. Here, 
mind, discourse, and the semiotic dimension are not less actual than matter or possessing less 
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agentic powers than the material body. Yet, Butler also makes a mistake which the present 
research wishes to avoid and does not seem to achieve her aim. That is, rather than making a 
distinction between the ontological unity of language and corporeality and the different properties 
possessed by the material and symbolic aspects of embodiment at the epistemological level, she 
ultimately produces an account where everything is reduced to discourse.  
In this way, it does not come as a surprise that Butler (1993: 8) appears to have trouble with 
defining the relationship between an extra-discursive material realm and a symbolic domain: 
)RUWKHUHLVDQµRXWVLGH¶WRZKDWLVFRQVWUXFWHGE\GLVFRXUVHEXWWKLVLVQRWDQDEVROXWHµRXWVLGH¶DQ
ontological thereness that exceeds or counters the boundaries of discourse; as a constitutive 
µRXWVLGH¶LWLVthat which can only be thought ± when it can ± in relation to that discourse, at and as 
its most tenuous borders. 
In a similar vein, below Butler (1993: 69) struggles to qualify the language-materiality 
relationship: 
[C]hiasmic in their interdependency, but never fully collapsed into one another, i.e., reduced to one 
another, and yet neither fully ever exceeds the other. Always already implicated in each other, 
always already exceeding one another, language and materiality are never fully identical nor fully 
different. 
3HUKDSVWKHUHDGHUPD\EHZRQGHULQJµLVWKHUHRULVWKHUHQRWDQRXWVLGHWRGLVFRXUVH"¶2UµZKDW
WKHQ LV WKH FKDUDFWHU RI WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ ODQJXDJH DQG PDWHULDOLW\"¶ :KLOH WKHVH DUH
questions which, as it will become clear later, can be more easily answered by explicitly 
acknowledging the chiasmic, paradoxical, and dual character of embodiment (which Butler only 
hints at), at the moment it suffices to note that, in the words of the physicist and feminist theorist 
Karen Barad, althRXJK %XWOHU DWWHPSWV WR DPHQG ³)RXFDXOW¶V >«@ IDLOXUH WR WKHRUL]H WKH
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ GLVFXUVLYH DQG QRQGLVFXUVLYH´   ³LW LV QRW DW DOO FOHDU WKDW %XWOHU
succeeds in bringing the discursive and the material into closer proximity [and therefore the 
q]uestions about the material nature of discursive practices seem to hang in the air like the 
41 
 
SHUVLVWHQW VPLOH RI WKH &KHVKLUH FDW´ LELG  8QDEOH WR TXDOLI\ LQ GHWDLO WKH GLVFRXUVH-
materiality relationship, according to Barad (ibid.), when conceptualising such a relationship, 
Butler would still favour one element over the other, namely language over corporeality, and mind 
over body.  
,QIDFW%XWOHUL[KHUVHOIDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWHYHU\WLPHVKHWRXFKHVRQERGLHV¶PDWHULDOLW\
she ends up recurring to the discursive domain to explain it. Seen from the multidimensional 
approach endorsed by the present study, Butler, like Foucault, is only addressing the symbolic 
dimension of our embodied experiences, while ignoring altogether the corporeal properties of the 
ERG\DQGWKHHPERGLHGDJHQW¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOZRUOG+HQFHGespite her defence, it is difficult 
not to see the spectre of idealism, and, unsurprisingly, this reduction of the material body to the 
immaterial symbolic realm has been noted by many, and Butler, as Foucault, has been repeatedly 
criticised for disregarding the materiality of the body as such.  
$OOLQDOO,LQWHQGWRWDNHRQERDUG)RXFDXOW¶VDQG%XWOHU¶VPRVWKHOSIXODUJXPHQWV2QHLVWKDWZH
must not set the material and the discursive in opposition. Linked to this, it is equally crucial to 
acknowledge that discourse is not less actual than matter when it comes to bringing about change 
in the world. At the same time, however, we need to avoid reducing the multidimensional richness 
of our embodied character to the sole symbolic dimension of mind, and acknowledge that mind 
and body possess different properties. In terms of temporality, for instance, a body does not come 
into existence at the same time and speed as a discourse ± despite the fact that the two are 
LQH[WULFDEO\ OLQNHG $V SRLQWHG RXW E\ ,DQ %XUNLWW   ³>W@KH V\PEROLF UHDOP LV DOZD\V
integrated with the material, and while it is impossible to separate them, they should not be 
FROODSVHGWRJHWKHU´ 
In addition, there is the issue of the neglect of phenomenological life of the embodied agent. Here 
discourse is only considered from an outer perspective and never from an inner standpoint. In this 
way, there is a disregard of the inner world of the embodied agent and of internal environments of 
embodiment ± a common ground shared by the major approaches to embodiment, in spite of their 
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considerable differences. On this ground, if not developed further, the insights of the linguistic turn 
can only lead to a Cartesian landscape and to theorising the body only as a passive object of social 
and cultural practices rather than also as a generator of them. In fact, it seems clear that Butler 
RULJLQDOHPSKDVLVXOWLPDWHO\FRQFHSWXDOLVHV³WKHVRFLDODJHQWDVDQobject rather than 
WKHVXEMHFWRIFRQVWLWXWLYHDFWV´ 
Indeed, since the early 1990s, within the so-called corporeal turn, a number of body theorists 
raised criticisms of the discursive/linguistic conception of embodiment in a vein not too dissimilar 
to that outlined above. The corporeal turn aimed at bringing together mind and body, the 
objectified and pre-objective body, and language and corporeality ± at including, in other words, 
both immaterial and material dimensions of our embodied condition. Importantly, a number of 
authors involved in this turn appear to suggest a multidimensional view of embodiment as a 
phenomenon possessing a paradoxical, chiasmic, and dual character. As I have done with the 
linguistic turn, also with the corporeal turn I will outline the contributions to take on board and 
will point out the dead ends to eschew.  
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Chapter 3: THE CORPOREAL TURN   
 
3.1 Bringing Mind and Body Together 
 
In the middle of the 1990s the discursive approach to the body of the linguistic turn was already 
being criticised in one of the major journals dedicated to the body in social theory ± Body and 
Society ,Q LQWURGXFLQJ WKH MRXUQDO¶V ILUVW LVVXH ZKHQ WKH HGitors Mike Featherstone and Bryan 
7XUQHU   REVHUYHG WKDW LW ³LV GLIILFXOW WR DYRLG WKH SUHVHQFH RI WKH ERG\ DV D VLJQ DQG
V\PERORIVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOSURFHVVHV´ WKH\FDSWXUHG WKHPDQQHU LQZKLFKWKHERG\KDGEHHQ
considered since becoming promiQHQWLQWKHILHOG$QGZKHQWKH\UHPDUNHGWKDW³>D@VHFRQGDUHD
which has been relatively underdeveloped, is the analysis of the active role of the body in social 
OLIH´)HDWKHUVWRQHDQG7XUQHULELGDOVRDFNQRZOHGJHGDQLPEDODQFHLQVRFLRORJLFDOLQWerests 
towards the objectified and discursive body at the expense of the lived and phenomenal body.  
Linked to this, Featherstone and Turner (ibid: 3) also warned us of the danger of creating a fracture 
between these two approaches to the body, and noted tKDW³>D@OOWRRRIWHQLQWKHUHFHQWVRFLRORJLFDO
literature on the body these two aspects are presented as mutually exclusive analytical divisions 
IURP ZKLFK ZH PXVW FKRRVH´ :LWKLQ WKH VDPH MRXUQDO¶V LVVXH 1LFN &URVVOH\   DOVR
appeared motivated to bring together these two strands of body studies ± what he calls the 
µVRFLRORJ\RIWKHERG\¶DQGµFDUQDOVRFLRORJ\¶± LQRQHXQLILHGDQGLQWHJUDWHGµFDUQDOVRFLRORJ\RI
WKHERG\¶ 
If sociology is to take the body seriously, I contend, then it must embrace both of these perspectives 
and it must understand them to be twin aspects of a single problematic: the carnal sociology of the 
body. This is necessary because both perspectives, on their own, have the potential to dissociate and 
externalize the body and the social world, reifying both and, thereby, constituting a dualistic and 




words) character of embodiment, Crossley (1995: 3, original emphasis) urges us to address both 
³ZKDWLVdone to the body [and] what the body does´ 
Arguments like those above came to be identified as part of the corporeal turn in the social 
sciences (see Sheets-Johnstone, 2009), which stemmed from the acknowledgement that within the 
cultural inscription model corporeality is replaced by signs and symbols and is therefore never 
addressed as such (Blackman, 2008). That is, if only WKHRULVHG ZLWKLQ GLVFRXUVH WKH µDFWXDO¶
material, and corporeal body ± as we experience it ± disappears to be substituted by a metaphor or 
a text (Cromby & Nightingale, 1999). Moreover, these criticisms also share a view of a body that, 
despite being moulded and constrained by dominant discourses and discursive practices, has a 
generative potential (McNay, 1999).  
$V DUJXHG E\ 5DHZ\Q &RQQHOO   ERGLHV FDQ EH ³UHFDOFLWUDQW WKH\ GLVUXSW DQG
VXEYHUWWKHVRFLDODUUDQJHPHQWVLQWRZKLFKWKH\DUHLQYLWHG´,QDVLPLODUYHLQ&KULV6KLOOLQJDQG
Philip A. Mellor (1995: 2, original emphasis) contended that:  
[3@HRSOH¶V H[SHULHQFHV RI DQG UHVSRQVHV WR VRFLDO VWUXFWXUHV DUH VKDSHG E\ WKHLU sensory and 
sensual selves. These variables are important as they can exert an important impact on whether 
people feel at eDVH ZLWK DQG WHQG WR UHSURGXFH WKH µUXOHV¶ DQG WKH µUHVRXUFHV¶ PRVW UHDGLO\
DFFHVVLEOHWRWKHPRUVHQVRULO\H[SHULHQFHWKHVHµVWUXFWXUHV¶DVXQSOHDVDQWXQGHVLUDEOHDQGZRUWK\
of transformation.  
What is, Shilling and Mellor ask, the role of the body when people endorse certain discourses and 
resist others? Here the paradoxical character of the body is brought to the fore: the body both 
constitutes and is constituted by society, it is both subject and object of social practices, both a 
natural and cultural phenomenon, and we are both sensuous and social beings ± multidimensional 
embodied beings (Burkitt, 1999, Shilling, 2012/1993).  
If it seems to be correct to argue that, as Foucauldians would contend, the discursive realm 
mediates if not regulates our epistemological horizons, we need to acknowledge that the sensuous 
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body is, however, our original source of knowledge. As observed by Burkitt (1999: 94) when 
FRPPHQWLQJ RQ %XWOHU ³GHVSLWH DOO WKH GLVFRXUVH DERXW WKH ERG\ RQH QHYHU JHWV WKH VHQVH RI D
liveGPDWHULDOERG\´ ,QGHHG ODQJXDJHERWKPHGLDWHV DQGJLYHV DFFHVV WRRXU OLYHG H[SHULHQFH
and the body both constitutes and is constituted by discourse.  
Therefore, the corporeal turn sought to meaningfully bring together mind and body, the objectified 
and the pre-objective body, and language and corporeality. And it is to these two latter dimensions 
of embodiment which I will first turn my attention by outlining the arguments of Csordas, who 
notes that language and corporeality are not separate from one another. Following this, I will 
GLVFXVV*URV]¶VFDOO IRUQRYHOFRQFHSWXDO WRROV WRDGGUHVVWKHSDUDGR[LFDOFKDUDFWHURI WKHERG\
and I will elucidate Merleau-3RQW\¶VFKLDVPLFDQGGXDOSHUVSHFWLYHRIHPERGLPHQW7KHQ ,ZLOO
conclude with a critique of actor-network theory ± an influential theoretical framework which, 
regrettably, tends to conflate the different dimensions of embodiment. My aim here is to first 
highlight the arguments to retain and then the pitfalls to avoid of the corporeal turn.   
 
3.2 The Objectified Body and the Pre-Objective Body ± The Disclosing Nature of 
Language  
 
In line with corporeal theorists, Csordas (1994) contends that in most extant approaches the body 
is still conceptualised as a product of mind ± i.e., a Cartesian, objectified, and represented body. 
<HW&VRUGDVLELGRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVQRWHV³RXUERGLHVDUHQRWRULJLQDOO\REMHFWVIRUXV>EXW
rather] the ground of perceptual processes that end LQREMHFWLILFDWLRQ´,QIDFWIRU&VRUGDVLELG
³WKHSOD\EHWZHHQSUHREMective and objectified bodies within our own culture is precisely what 
LVDWLVVXHLQPDQ\RIWKHFRQWHPSRUDU\FULWLTXHV´,QWXUQVXFKSOD\ERLOVGRZQWRWKH&DUWHVLDQ
paradigm which, Csordas points out, is not to blame for the very phenomenological distinction 
between mind and body, but rather for reifying the body as a mere object in the world.  
In this respect, Csordas cites a conversation that occurred between the missionary anthropologist 
Maurice Leenhardt (1979/1947, in Csordas, 1994: 6) and an indigenous Canaque philosopher. 
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:KLOH /HHQKDUGW VXJJHVWHG WKDW WKH QRWLRQ RI DQ LPPDWHULDO µVSLULW¶ ZDV LQWURGXFHG LQ 1HZ
Caledonian culture by the Christian missionaries, the aged sage held the opposite view: the 
concept of the spirit had always been salient in Canaque culture; what had been imported by a 
:HVWHUQDQGPDWHULDOLVWLFSHUVSHFWLYHZDVWKHQRWLRQRIµWKHERG\¶LQDFXOWXUHZKHUH LQVWHDGRI
being bodily self-contained, a person was distributed among other persons and things within a 
socio-mythic and psychophysical realm. According to Leenhardt (ibid.: 7):  
>µ7KHERG\¶@KDGQRH[LVWHQFHRILWVRZQQRUVSHFLILFQDPHWRGLVWLQJXLVKLW,WZDVRQO\DVXSSRUW
But henceforth the circumscription of the physical being is completed, making possible its 
objectification. The idea of a human body becomes explicit. This discovery leads forthwith to a 
discrimination between the body and the mythic world.   
And, Csordas (1994) observes, the reification of the body as an object in the world as any other 
also underpins a long series of dualisms, such as that between subject and object, culture and 
biology, the theoretical and the practical, textuality and experience, and language and corporeality. 
By highlighting that the first term of these relationships is that privileged in the study of the body, 
&VRUGDV LELG  DVVHUWV WKDW WKHUH LV D ³GRPLQDQFH RI VHPLRWLFV RYHU SKHQRPHQRORJ\ >DQG
therefore of] the problem of representation over the problem of being-in-the-ZRUOG´ ,Q RWKHU
words, for Csordas, the dominant view of language as a dimension unable to provide access to our 
corporeal dimension is an outcome of the Cartesian objectification of the body.  
By not conceptualising language and our phenomenological world on two separated planes, 
&VRUGDVLELGLQWHQGVWRJREH\RQGWKHWULWHDUJXPHQWHQWDLOLQJWKDW³>\@RXFDQQRWUHDOO\VWXG\
experience, because all experience is mediated by language ± therefore one can only study 
ODQJXDJHDQGGLVFRXUVH LH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ´$VRSSRVHG WR WKLV&DUWHVLDQDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVW
YLHZ RI ODQJXDJH E\ HYRNLQJ +HLGHJJHU &VRUGDV LELG  QRWHV WKDW ³ODQJXDJH QRW RQO\
UHSUHVHQWV RU UHIHUV EXW µGLVFORVHV¶ RXU Eeing-in-the-ZRUOG´ 7KXV ODQJXDJH UHVHPEOHV WKH
paradoxical character of the lived body, which is both D UHSUHVHQWHGERG\ LH D ³UHDGDEOH WH[W




Aiming to counterbalance the dominance of semiotic over phenomenological analyses, Csordas 
LELGXUJHV³DPRUHUDGLFDOUROHIRUWKHERG\´LQUHVHDUFKZKLFKZRXOGHQWDLOUHWDNLQJLQto 
VHULRXVFRQVLGHUDWLRQWKHQRWLRQRIHPERGLPHQW&UXFLDOO\IRUWKLVVWXG\¶VDLPV&VRUGDV¶LELG
proposal of starting from the notion of embodiment is not an attempt to get rid of the linguistic 
model, but rather ± precisely consistent with the concept of embodiment ± an effort to 
PHDQLQJIXOO\FRQFHSWXDOLVHWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQODQJXDJHDQGFRUSRUHDOLW\E\³using the body 
DVDPHWKRGRORJLFDOVWDUWLQJSRLQW´,WLVWKLVVSHFLILFSUHRFFXSDWLRQZLWKWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
language and the body, anG KLV HPSKDVLV RQ ODQJXDJH¶V DELOLW\ WR DFFHVV FRUSRUHDOLW\ ZKLFK
distinguishes Csordas from other corporeal theorists, and which I wish to take on board in my re-
conceptualisation of embodiment.   
,Q IDFW , ZLOO JR EDFN WR &VRUGDV¶ FRQWHQWLRQV ZKHQ UH-discussing the language-corporeality 
relationship in the case study. At the moment, however, I wish to outline the arguments of a 
theorist who seems to be particularly concerned with the mind-body dualism. This is Grosz, who, 
by making especially visible the paradoxical character of embodiment, evokes novel conceptual 
WRROV WR DGGUHVV WKH ERG\¶V HOXVLYH QDWXUH DQG WKXV PRYH IURP DQWL-Cartesian to post-Cartesian 
territories.  
 
3.3 The Paradoxical Body ± The Need for Novel Conceptual Tools  
 
Rather than eschewing it, vilifying it, or explaining it away, Grosz (1994: 7) appears to be one of 
the few body theorists who faces the mind-body dualism head-on ± as she points out, the long-
term significance of the mind-body relationship should warn us against reductionisms and any 
form of dualism:  
'XDOLVP >«@ SRVHV LUUHVROYDEOH SKLORVRSKLFDO SUREOHPV >DQG@ HVWDEOLVKHV DQ XQEULGJHDEOH JXOI
between mind and maWWHU>«@7RUHGXFHHLWKHUWKHPLQGWRWKHERG\RUWKHERG\WRWKHPLQGLVWR
leave their interaction unexplained, explained away, impossible.  
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Like the current thesis does, Grosz (1994) notes that we are still conceptually trapped within the 
Cartesian paradigm, and lack the conceptual tools to theorise our embodied condition without 
UHVRUWLQJWRHLWKHURQHRUWKHRWKHURIWKHVHWZRµVXEVWDQFHV¶WKHPDWHULDOERG\DQGWKHLPPDWHULDO
mind. To move on from this impasse, she puts forward novel conceptual tools which can account 
for the paradoxical character of embodiment. For instance, to explicate the elusive nature of the 
body, Grosz (ibid.) employs the metaphor of a flame. The living organism ± the embodied agent ± 
is here conceptualised as a process, a flame, which however keeps its permanence, its unity and 
µLGHQWLW\¶GHVSLWHEHLQJFRQWLQXRXVO\UH-constituted by novel material. Here the body is both many 
and one, open and closed, a process and a structure ± i.e., it is paradoxical by nature.  
I am using thHDGMHFWLYHµSDUDGR[LFDO¶KHUHLQWKHFODVVLFDOVHQVH,QGHHG*URV]¶VPHWDSKRURIWKH
flame very much resembles a well-known classical paradox: The Ship of Theseus, a paradox 
written by Plutarch (in McGilchrist, 2010/2009: 138). As they decayed, the old planks of the ship 
which took Theseus back to Athens from Crete were continuously replaced by new and stronger 
ones, to the point at which none of the original planks were still in place (ibid.). As with a flame 
that keeps on burning different material while maintaining its identity, one could legitimately ask: 
is the entirely restored ship the same ship on which Theseus returned to Athens?  
&OHDUO\7KHVHXV¶VKLSFRXOGEHDQ\ OLYLQJERG\ZKLFKDWPROHFXODU OHYHOOHWDORQHDWRPLFDQG
sub-atomic levels) changes all the time yet ± paradoxically ± maintains its identity. Pre-platonic 
SKLORVRSKHUVVXFKDV+HUDFOLWXVIRULQVWDQFHZHUHLQQRZD\SHUWXUEHGE\WKHVHW\SHVRIµLOORJLF¶
examples, which were employed precisely to show the limits of an either/or and linear logic (ibid.) 
TXDQWXP SK\VLFV EHLQJ D FRQWHPSRUDU\ GHPRQVWUDWRU RI WKHVH OLPLWV IURP WKH QDWXUDO VFLHQFHV¶
perspective ± see Barad, 2007; for quantum physics applied to social sciences, see also Wendt, 
2015). 
In a similar vein, Grosz (1994) also borrows the concept of the Möbius strip from Jacques Lacan 
as a further and helpful metaphor to account for mind and body, and internal and external 
dimensions of embodiment, without conceiving of them as separate entities. The Möbius strip is a 
49 
 
continuous closed surface which can be formed by rotating one end of a rectangular strip 180° and 
attaching it to the opposite end. The result is a three-dimensional figure of eight which, if 
imaginarily walked upon along its entire length ± i.e., along both surfaces ± would return the 
walker to the initial point without her crossing any edge of the strip. As one side of the strip 
µEHFRPHV¶ WKH RWKHU ZLWKRXW WKH QHHG WR FURVV DQ\ HGJH LW LV DV LI WKHUH ZHUH QR ERXQGDULHV
between the two surfaces of the strip.   
Similarly, external environments of embodiment enfold into internal environments, and vice versa. 
Likewise, Grosz (ibid.) asserts, mind and body would twist into each other ± i.e., one dimension 
would become more prominent than the other ± without the need to cross any actual gap. 
Moreover, as in a domino effect, Grosz (ibid.) adds, once we employ this metaphor, the other 
dualisms underpinning Western thought, such as individual-society, agency-structure, intellect-
affect, culture-nature, and language-matter, can also break down and come to constitute dynamic 
unities without involving conflation between the two terms of these relationships.  
,PSRUWDQWO\IRUWKHSUHVHQWVWXG\¶VDUJXPHQWVLQWKLVZD\ZHFDQPRYHEH\RQGWKHOLPLWVRIDQ
either/or logic, and we can therefore retain both an analytical distinction between two terms and 
acknowledge that they cannot be considered as ontologically separate from each other. In addition, 
these types of metaphors can help us to avoid the dangers not only of idealistic or materialistic 
reductionist shortcuts, but also of sterile one-dimensional forms of holism or monism ± all of them 
may end up explaining away the Cartesian dualism rather than proposing valid alternatives. 
Furthermore, Grosz (ibid.) points out that, after all, metaphors and models are merely heuristic 
devices, and as such are not able to fully account for the elusive character of our bodies and the 
enigmatic mind-body relationship. While I would agree with her contention here, with the present 
research I also intend to show that, although unable to provide definite answers to what are 
fundamentally ultimate questions, useful metaphors and conceptual strategies can nevertheless 




[The] most peculiar thing, for it is never quite reducible to being merely a thing; nor does it ever 
quite manage to rise above the status of thing. Thus it is both a thing and a nonthing, an object, but 
an object which somehow contains or coexists with an interiority, an object able to take itself and 
others as subjects, a unique kind of object not reducible to other objects. 
In the above quotation Grosz draws on the phenomenology of Merleau-Ponty, whose view of 
embodiment as a phenomenon caught between a pre-individual and an individuated dimension is 
one of the major theoretical influences which this study draws on. In addition, the 
phenomenological nuances involved in our embodied condition are extremely significant for the 
self-cultivation practices employed by this thesis as a case study, which aim at tapping into the 
depths of the tacit knowledge of the body.  
Therefore, I will momentarily suspend my chronological outline of body studies to discuss the 
relevant aspects of Merleau-3RQW\¶VWKHRULVLQJRIWKHERdy. Although, differently from Foucault, 
issues of power and social inequality do not seem to be addressed by the French phenomenologist, 
DV6KLOOLQJQRWHVLQUHIHUULQJWR&URVVOH\¶VZULWLQJV³>L@WLVWKHSKHQRPHQRORJ\
of Merleau-3RQW\>«@WKDWKDVEHHQPRVWLQIOXHQWLDOLQVKDSLQJFDOOVIRUDµFDUQDOVRFLRORJ\¶WKH
IRXQGLQJ DVVXPSWLRQ RI ZKLFK ZDV WKDW µVHOI¶ µVRFLHW\¶ DQG µV\PEROLF RUGHU¶ DUH FRQVWLWXWHG
WKURXJKWKHZRUNRIWKHERG\´ 
 
3.4 The Chiasmic Body ± The Dual Character of Embodiment 
 
For Merleau-Ponty (2002/1962), the body is not as any other object in the world for the embodied 
agent. Rather, the body is what fundamentally brings about a world for the subject. One cannot 
move away from her own body, or observe it from different angles or distances. The body of the 
subject is always there ± WKHERG\LVRQH¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHZRUOG$WWKHVDPHWLPHKRZHYHU
the body can also be an object for the subject ± when one, for instance, touches her own body. In 
this way, the body possesses an ambiguous and paradoxical character ± it is both subject and 
object. And it continuously shifts between these two modes, which can become more or less 
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salient. The metaphor provided by Merleau-Ponty (2002/1962: 106) of two hands touching each 
other is a classic example in this respect: 
The two hands are never simultaneously in the relationship of touched and touching to each other. 
When I press my two hands together, it is not as a matter of two sensations felt together as one 
perceives two objects placed side by side, but of an ambiguous set-up in which both hands can 
DOWHUQDWH WKH UROHV RI WRXFKLQJ DQG EHLQJ WRXFKHG >«3@DVVLQJ IURP RQH UROH WR WKH RWKHU , FDQ
identify the hand touched in the same one which will in a moment be touching. In other words, in 
this bundle of bones and muscles which my right hand presents to my left, I can anticipate for an 
instant the incarnation of that other right hand, alive and mobile, which I thrust towards things in 
RUGHU WR H[SORUH WKHP 7KH ERG\ FDWFKHV LWVHOI ZKLOH EHLQJ WRXFKHG DQG LQLWLDWHV µD NLQd of 
UHIOHFWLRQ¶ZKLFKLVVXIILFLHQWWRGLVWLQJXLVKLWIURPREMHFWV 
Here we can fully appreciate the unceasingly shifting nature of our body revealing its dual 
character ± the touching and the being touched, the subject and the object, mind and body, are 
inextricably linked and yet distinguished. Hence, the terms of these relationships are neither 
separated nor conflated ± there is, rather, a unity in their divergence. Merleau-Ponty (1968: 141) 
uses again the metaphor of the two hands touching each other to elucidate this: 
When one of my hands touches the other, the world of each opens upon that of the other because 
the operation is reversible at will, because they both belong (as we say) to one sole space of 
consciousness, because one sole man [sic] touchHVRQHVROHWKLQJWKURXJKERWKKDQGV>«0@\WZR
hands touch the same things because they are the hands of one same body. And yet, each of them 
has its own tactile experience. 
This is reiterated by Grosz (1994: 100) when she observes that:  
Between feeling (the dimension of subjectivity) and being felt (the dimension of objectuality) is a 
gulf spanned by the indeterminate and reversible phenomenon of the being touched of the touching, 
the crossing over of what is touching to what is touched, the ambiguity which entails that each hand 
is in the (potentially reversible) position of both subject and object, the position of both phenomenal 
and objectual body. 
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It is by means of this ambiguous space, of this reversibility and unity in opposition of the 
µSKHQRPHQDO DQG REMHFWXDO ERG\¶ RI WKLV GXDO QDWXUH RI HPERGLPHQW WKDW RXU OLYHG H[SHULHQFH
takes place. For Merleau-Ponty (1968: 123), our perception of the world is the outcome of the 
diverging character of the body ± in his words:  
When I find again the actual world such as it is, under my hands, under my eyes, up against my 
body, I find much more than an object: a Being1 of which my vision is a part, a visibility older than 
my operations or my acts. But this does not mean that there was a fusion or coinciding of me with 
it: on the contrary, this occurs because a sort of dehiscence opens my body in two, and because 
between my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching, there is 
overlapping or encroachment, so that we may say that the things pass into us, as well as we into the 
things. 
$JDLQRXUHPERGLHGFRQGLWLRQLVWKHµRYHUODSSLQJRUHQFURDFKPHQW¶RIWZRPRGHVIURPZKLFKWKH
relationships between subject and object, self and world, open and closed, one and many, 
immaterial and material, and mind and body, are generated ± there is no absolute distinction 
between these pairs, but neither are they exactly the same.  
Therefore, for Merleau-Ponty (2002/1962: 451) the ambiguous, paradoxical, and dual body which 
enacts our world is not a body-object, but rather is a lived body, a process which expresses our 
OLYHGH[SHULHQFHWKURXJKZKLFKWKHZRUOGUHYHDOVLWVHOIWRXV³>R@XUERG\>«@LVLQVHSDUDEOHIURP
DYLHZRIWKHZRUOGDQGLVWKDWYLHZLWVHOIEURXJKWLQWRH[LVWHQFH´,QWKLVZD\WKHVXEMect and the 
world are co-constituted. The lived body acts upon the world and the world acts upon the body ± 
they mutually shape each other and are in fact ultimately inseparable. For Merleau-Ponty 
(2002/1962: 499), being an embodied agent means being-in-the-world:2  
                                                          
1
 It is worth noticing that Merleau-3RQW\XVHVWKHWHUPµ%HLQJ¶WRLQGLFDWHZKDWLQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\LVFDOOHG
µ%HFRPLQJ¶ 
2




The world is inseparable from the subject, but from a subject which is nothing but a project of the 
world, and the subject is inseparable from the world, but from a world which the subject itself 
projects. The subject is a being-in-the-world.  
Indeed, as is explained by social anthropologist Tim Ingold (2011: 12), for Merleau-3RQW\³RXU
perception of the world is no more and no less, than the world perception of itself ± in and through 
XV´ 
In his last and unfinished work ± The Visible and the Invisible ± Merleau-Ponty (1968) was facing 
the paradoxical nature of the body and the inexplicable mind-body and subject-object 
relationships. In this work he advanced the notion of the flesh to explicate how our embodied 
condition is both brought about by and EULQJVDERXWRXUZRUOG0RVWLPSRUWDQWO\IRUWKLVVWXG\¶V
arguments, with the flesh, Merleau-Ponty places, grounds, or envelops all relationships ± including 
mind and body ± in one immanent dimension.  
,Q IDFW WKH³IOHVK LVQRWPDWWHU >Q@RU VRPH µSV\FKLF¶PDWHULDO´ 0HUOHDX-Ponty, 1968: 139), and 
therefore both immaterial and material experiential dimensions, as well as all the shades and 
µWKLQJV¶ LQ-between, are the product of a chiasm in the flesh. As reiterated by Grosz (1994: 95), 
³¶WKHIOHVK¶>Ls] a term providing the pre-conditions and the grounds for the distinctions between 
PLQGDQGERG\ VXEMHFW DQGREMHFW DQG VHOI DQGRWKHU´ ,Q D VLPLODUYHLQSKLORVRSKHU$WKHUWRQ
/RZU\QRWHVWKDW³WKHIOHVK>«@LVWKHILHOGZKHUHWKLQJVWDNHRQGLPHQVLRQV´ 
Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, all things in the world are the outcome of a process that at the same time 
reveals and conceals ± i.e., the flesh opening onto itself by means of the phenomenon of 
embodiment, which possesses therefore a dual characWHU $JDLQ LQ *URV]¶V   ZRUGV
³>I@OHVK LV EHLQJ¶V UHYHUVLELOLW\ LWV capacity to fold in on itself, a dual orientation inward and 
RXWZDUG´ +HUH HPERGLPHQW LV D chiasm between a pre-individual (the invisible) and an 
individuated (the visible) dimension ± it is a process involving these two dimensions. This same 
point is well restated by Lowry (1979: 296):  
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[A] convergence of opposites where the two sides of this single experience, namely flesh as sensing 
and the flesh sensed, simultaneously embrace each other in one and the same movement. Each side 
reverses itself and becomes the other as an intertwining of opposites which twist round one another 
>«@7KHIOHVKLVWKHILHOGZKHUHWKLQJVKDSSHQZKHUHWKH\EHFRPHYLVLEOHDQGUDGLDWHRXWRIWKHLU
dimensionality. Precisely because [things] disclose themselves in this field they take on flesh. 
While Merleau-3RQW\UDUHO\XVHVWKHWHUPµFKLDVP¶WKLVPHWDSKRULVFOHDUO\ZKDWKHKDGLQ
mind when he was thinking of the process by means of which the flesh takes on dimensions. The 
concept of the flesh is in fact outlined in the influential chapter of The Visible and the Invisible 
WLWOHGµ7KH,QWHUWZLQLQJ± 7KH&KLDVP¶%HLQJFDXJKWRUEHLQJDPHGLDWRUEHWZHHQWZRPRGHV
WKHERG\³LVD WZR-GLPHQVLRQDOEHLQJ´ 0HUOHDX-Ponty, 1968: 136) ± a chiasm opening into the 
texture of the flesh, from which our phenomenological life emerges. It is through this 
µFRQYHUJHQFHRIRSSRVLWHV¶which the world is disclosed to us as meaningful, and thus any form of 
knowledge produced.  
And it is the chiasm ± i.e., the emergence of our phenomenological world ± Merleau-3RQW\¶V
target. Yet, his investigation into the roots of our lived experience does not lead him to the 
&DUWHVLDQFRQFOXVLRQRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDµWKLQNLQJWKLQJ¶DPLQGZKLFKWUDQVFHQGVWKHPDWHULDO
world and yet is inexplicably able to have an influence upon the body, but rather to the existence 
of an immanent ongoing process, a chiasmic body opening into the flesh ± i.e., the world 
becoming conscious of, or actualising, itself. Here mind and body are intertwined and part of the 
same process which brings about the multidimensional richness of our lived experienced.  
Moreover, and importantly, for the continental philosopher, tapping into the chiasm does not imply 
WKH H[LVWHQFH RI DQ H[SHULHQFH ZKLFK LV µDXWKHQWLF¶ µUHDO¶ RU µXQFRQWDPLQDWHG¶ E\ ODQJXDJH
culture, and social life. Merleau-Ponty (2002/1962: xvi) acknowledges the implications of our 
lived experience with the socio-cultural world, and therefore for him the notion of an experience 
untouched by the social ± a thoroughly pre-individual or pre-discursive experience ± is highly 
proEOHPDWLFEHFDXVH³RXUH[LVWHQFHLVWRRWLJKWO\KHOGLQWKHZRUOGWREHDEOHWRNQRZLWVHOIDVVXFK
DW WKH PRPHQW RI LWV LQYROYHPHQW´ <HW GLIIHUHQWO\ IURP )RXFDXOW DQG %XWOHU 0HUOHDX-Ponty 
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recognises the limits of analyses which neglect the immediacy of our lived experience and see it as 
merely constructed through language and culture. For Merleau-Ponty (2002/1962: 44, original 
emphasis): 
The intellectualist process of self-discovery does not penetrate as far as this living nucleus of 
perception because it is looking for the conditions which make it possible or without which it would 
not exist, instead of uncovering the operation which brings it into reality, or whereby it is 
constituted.  
7KXV WR XQYHLO KRZ RXU OLYHG H[SHULHQFH LV EURXJKW µLQWR UHDOLW\¶ Merleau-Ponty (2002/1962) 
neither intends to take our lived experience for granted, i.e. taking it at face value, such as in the 
SRVLWLYLVW DFFRXQWV RI ZKDW KH FDOOV µHPSLULFLVPV¶ QRU HQGRUVH WKH H[WUHPH VXVSLFLRQ RI WKH
immediate knowledge of our sensuoXV ERG\ RI ZKDW KH FDOOV µLQWHOOHFWXDOLVPV¶ %RWK ZRXOG EH
equally inconclusive and dogmatic positions. Rather, his purpose is to address the disclosure of our 
lived experience to the limits of our phenomenal world, to this elusive in-between space where our 
experiences are lived out but not reflectively known and amenable to being put into words.  
There is therefore an ambiguous tension between the visible and invisible, the pre-individual and 
the individuated ZKDW ZH FDQ DQG FDQQRW FRQVFLRXVO\ NQRZ µRXWVLGH¶ RI ODQJXDJH JDPHV D
struggle to conceive of an extra-semiotic domain, which somewhat resonates with %XWOHU¶V
WURXEOHVZKHQVKHDWWHPSWVWRTXDOLI\WKHµRXWVLGHRIGLVFRXUVH¶VHHchapter 2.3). These problems 
appear to be particularly evident in the working notes of The Visible and the Invisible, where 
Merleau-Ponty (1968: 170-171, original emphasis) is confronting the difficulties (if not 
impossibilities) of conceptualising a subjectivity without language ± LH RI HQYLVDJLQJ D µWDFLW
FRJLWR¶ 
7KH&RJLWRRI'HVFDUWHVUHIOHFWLRQLVDQRSHUDWLRQRIVLJQLILFDWLRQV>«@,WWKHUHIRUHSUHVXSSRVHVD
pre-UHIOHFWLYH FRQWDFW RI VHOI ZLWK >«@ D WDFLW FRJLWR >«@ 7KLV LV KRZ , UHDVRQHG LQ Ph. P. 





form the transcendental attitude, that I constitute the constitutive consciousness.  
By realising that the phenomenological project to get to an unmediated experience might be in fact 
impracticable, Merleau-Ponty seems to recognise that language does need to be part of the whole 
picture ± a contention taken into serious consideration by the present study. While in earlier 
WKHRULVLQJKHDUJXHVWKDW³>O@RRNLQJIRUWKHZRUOG¶VHVVHQFHLVQRWORRNLQJIRUZKDWLW is as an idea 
once it has been reduced to a theme of discourse; it is looking for what it is as a fact for us, before 
DQ\WKHPDWL]DWLRQ´0HUOHDX-Ponty, 2002/1962: xvii), in his last unfinished endeavour, he appears 
to be more dubious and affirms that he is not looking for: 
[T]he return to the immediate, the coincidence, the effective fusion with the existent, the search for 
an original integrity, for a secret lost and to be rediscovered, which would nullify our questions and 
even reprehend language. If coincidence is lost, this is no accident; if Being is hidden, this is itself a 
characteristic of Being, and no disclosure will make us comprehend it. A lost immediate, arduous to 
restore, will, if we do restore it, bear within itself the sediment of the critical procedures through 
which we will have found it anew; it will therefore not be the immediate. If it is to be the 
immediate, if it is to retain no trace of the operations through which we approach it, if it is Being 
itself, this means that there is no route from us to it and that it is inaccessible by principle (Merleau-
Ponty, 1968: 122). 
$VRFFXUUHGZKHQGLVFXVVLQJ%XWOHU¶VµRXWVLGHRIGLVFRXUVH¶WKLVWLPHWKHUHDGHUPLJKWDJDLQDVN
µGRZHWKHQKDYHDFFHVVRUQRWWRDSUH-GLVFXUVLYHUHDOP"¶RUµFDQZe attain an unmediated/pre-
LQGLYLGXDOH[SHULHQFHRUQRW"¶$VWKHVHH[WUHPHO\GLIILFXOWTXHVWLRQVDUHLPSRUWDQWIRUWKHFXUUHQW
study concerned with the tacit knowledge of the body (and its relationship with language), I will 
explain in more detail Merleau-3RQW\¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOSURMHFWEHORZ 
 
3.5 The Phenomenological Approach ± Riding the Cusp  
 
A productive starting point to understand in what way the phenomenological approach is endorsed 
by the present research is to clarify the phenomenological insight into the indissoluble relationship 
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between lived experience and world. As noted by the philosopher Evan Thompson (2007), 
IRFXVLQJRQWKLVUHODWLRQVKLSGRHVQRWLPSO\WKDWWKHUHLVQRµUHDOLW\¶H[LVWLQJLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIRXU
mind. That is, phenomenology, at least in the way I am reading it here, is not an 
idealistic/solipsistic philosophy. Rather, the phenomenological approach presupposes the existence 
RIDµUHDOZRUOG¶LQGHSHQGHQWRIDQGXQNQRZDEOHE\RXUPLQGZKLFKRQO\GLVFORVHVLWVHOIWRXVDV
meaningful by means of our lived body ± ³RXU JHQHUDO PHGLXP IRU KDYLQJ D ZRUOG´ 0HUOHDX-
Ponty, 2002/1962: 169). As posited by Thompson (2007: 21, original emphasis), although we are 
XQDEOHWRNQRZ³what things are [we have access to] the ways in which things are given´ 
+HQFH DOWKRXJKZHGRQRWKDYH DFFHVV WR µUHDOLW\¶ WKH.DQWLDQ WKLQJ-in-itself, as I am using it 
here), we do have direct access to what literary critic Katherine Hayles (1997/1991, in Timeto, 
  FDOOV WKH µFXVS¶ EHWZHHQ XV DQG WKH µIOX[¶ ± the flux being that which exists 
unknowably by and independently of our mind: a truly pre-individual dimension,Q+D\OHV¶ZRUGV
(1995, in Timeto, 2011: 159-³>L@ILWLVWUXHWKDWµUHDOLW\LVZKDWZHGRQRWVHHZKHQZHVHH¶
WKHQLWLVDOVRWUXHWKDWµRXULQWHUDFWLRQZLWKUHDOLW\LVZKDWZHVHHZKHQZHVHH¶´ 
Consistently with the notions of the flesh and its chiasm, more than a partial/limited version of 
µUHDOLW\¶ LPSO\LQJ D PRQROLWKLFVWDWLFGLVHPERGLHG FRQFHSWLRQ RI WKH µUHDO¶ µZKDW ZH VHH¶ LV
SUHFLVHO\ ZKDW LV EURXJKW DERXW E\ RXU FRQWLQJHQW LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK WKH µIOX[¶ ,W LV WKHQ RQ our 
interaction with the flux ± that is, on the cusp, this in-between space ± that according to Hayles 
(1997/1991, in Timeto, 2011: 157) we should concentrate our epistemological attention: 
Thinking only about the outside of the cusp leads to the impression that we can access reality 
directly and formulate its workings through abstract laws that are universally true. Thinking only 
about the inside leads to solipsism and radical subjectivism. The hardest thing in the world is to ride 
the cusp, to keep in the foreground of consciousness both the active transformations through which 
we experience the world and the flux that interacts with and helps to shape those transformations. 
In a similar fashion, Grosz (1994: 94) notes that: 
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Merleau-3RQW\ >«@DWWHPSWV WR WDNHXS DQGXWLOL]H WKH VSDFH LQEHWZHHQ WKH µQR-PDQ¶V ODQG¶RU
gulf separating oppositional terms. This impossible, excluded middle predates and makes possible 
the binary terms insofar as it precedes and exceeds them, insofar as it is uncontainable in either 
term.     
As discussed earlier, for the French philosopher this space is not a divide; rather it is a space which 
distinguishes between the subject and the world while, at the same time, providing the continuity 
between them (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993/1991). Even if we do not have access to a purely 
pre-discursive experience ± LH WR ZKDW µUHDOO\¶ H[LVWV WKH WKLQJ-in-itself ± we can however 
investigate our lived experience as a disclosure, middle way, entre-deux (ibid.). This is the 
territory where the transcendent becomes immanent ± LW LV ³D mode of givenness´ 7KRPSVRQ
2007: 27).  
And, as already noted above, the way phenomenology seeks to explore such an entre-deux (or 
µULGHWKHFXVS¶LQ+D\OHV¶WHUPVLVQRWE\WDNLQJIRUJUDQWHGWKHZRUOGas we experience it ± this 
ZRXOGPHDQIDOOLQJLQWRQDwYHUHDOLVP7KRPSVRQ1RULVLWGRQHE\GHQ\LQJWKHµUHDOLW\¶RI
our experience altogether ± this would be a solipsistic and equally dogmatic position (ibid.). It is 
instead done by means of the SKLORVRSKLFDO SURFHGXUH NQRZQ DV µSKHQRPHQRORJLFDO UHGXFWLRQ¶
(ibid.). Instead of being doubted, considered illusionary, or naively accepted as genuine, our lived 
H[SHULHQFHLVDQDO\VHGH[DFWO\DVSHUFHLYHGLELG ,Q7KRPSVRQ¶V LELGRULJLQDOHPSKDsis) 
ZRUGV SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO UHGXFWLRQ LV ³LQWHUHVWHG QRW LQ what things are in some naïve, mind-
independent or theory-independent sense, but rather in exactly how they are experienced, and thus 
DV VWULFW UHODWLRQDO FRUUHODWHV RI RXU VXEMHFWLYLW\´ 7KLV GRes not imply suspending, doubting, or 
erasing our subjective experience, but rather re-living it with a renewed awareness (ibid.).   
7KH +XVVHUOLDQ QRWLRQ RI µWUDQVFHQGHQFH ZLWKLQ LPPDQHQFH¶ PD\ KHOS WR FRQVROLGDWH WKHVH
arguments in more phenomenological terms. Consistent with the above, as we are unable to 
contain the world within our lived experience (unless we want to fall into an idealistic and 
solipsistic conception of subjectivity where the world is the product of our mind), it follows that, 
in this sense, the world is transcendent ± i.e. beyond the grasp of our consciousness (as with 
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+D\OHV¶ IOX[+RZHYHURQFH WKHZRUOG LVFRQVWLWXWHGE\JLYHQRUGLVFORVHG WRRXU LQWHQWLRQDO3 
consciousness by means of our lived body, its transcendence is, in the process of becoming 
PHDQLQJIXOWRXVDOVRLPPDQHQWDVZLWK+D\OHV¶FXVSWRRXUOLYHGH[SHULHQFH± it is part of it. As 
explicated by Thompson (ibid.: 27, original emphasis): 
[T]ransFHQGHQFHZLWKLQLPPDQHQFH>«@GRHVQRWPHDQWKDWZKDWDSSHDUVWREHEH\RQGRURXWVLGH
the sphere of mental activity is really contained within the mind (in some idealistic or internalist 
sense). Rather, the crucial point is that the transcendent is given as such by virtue of the intentional 
activities of consciousness. Thus it falls within the sphere of what is phenomenologically 
constituted (disclosed or brought to awareness by consciousness). Clearly, this point makes sense 
only at transcendental level, for at this level the transcendent is understood as a mode of givenness 
RUGLVFORVXUHRQHFKDUDFWHULVLQJWKLQJVLQWKHZRUOGEXWQRWRQH¶VRZQFRQVFLRXVQHVV7KXV>«@
what is really or genuinely transcendent is also phenomenologically immanent.  
I hope that the above can provide at least partial answers to the questions related to the possibility 
of knowing (or not knowing) an extra-semiotic realm, as well as to the nature of the relationship 
between a pre-individual and an individuated dimension. While a truly transcendent, non-
differentiated, and pre-individual domain, that where the mind-body/subject-object divergence has 
not yet taken place, appears to be indeed unknowable, we can nevertheless attempt to tap into the 
moment of its origin, conversion, and disclosure ± i.e., into the opening of the chiasm. In Merleau-
3RQW\¶V   ZRUGV ³>S@KHQRPHQRORJ\ LV >«@ D VWXG\ RI WKH DGYHQW RI EHLQJ WR
FRQVFLRXVQHVV´ 
I invite the reader to bear in mind these clarifications as I will go back to these issues both when 
GLVFXVVLQJWKHWXUQWRDIIHFWDQGWKHFDVHVWXG\¶VVHOI-cultivation practices. That said, I wish now to 
move on to a perspective which appears to go exactly in the opposite direction of the 
phenomenological approach: actor-network theory (AN7,QIDFWWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFK¶VFRQFHUQV
                                                          
3
 :LWKLQ WKH SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO WUDGLWLRQ WKH WHUP µLQWHQWLRQDOLW\¶ UHIHUV WR WKH RSHQ FKDUDFWHU RI RXU
consciousness, which always aims beyond itself (Thompson, 2007). In a narrower sense, our consciousness 
is intentional as, if we are conscious, we are always conscious of something (ibid.). 
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with the complexities of the relationship between mind and body neatly clash with those of actor-
network theorists.  
As argued by one of the main architects of ANT, Bruno Latour (2005/1999: 16), these interests are 
SUHFLVHO\WKHXQVROYHGLVVXHVZKLFK³VKRXOGQRWEHRYHUFRPHEXWVLPSO\LJQRUHGRUE\SDVVHG´As 
shown in what follows, ANT shares with the corporeal turn and the current study an interest in 
bringing together material and immaterial dimensions of embodiment. However, as the present 
research intends to engage with (rather than overcome, ignore, or bypass) unsolved issues in body 
studies, ANT is also exemplary of the problematics I wish to avoid.  
 
3.6 The Distributed Body ± Conflating the Dimensions of Embodiment 
 
As the name suggests, actor-network theory focuses on networks. It originated within the field of 
science and technology studies and aimed at mapping out connections and patterns between people 
(e.g., scientists) and the concepts, materialities, and technologies with which they work (e.g., in 
laboratories). The elements composing a network can only exist in relation to one another, and are 
FDOOHG µDFWDQWV¶ $FWLRQV SUDFWLFHV DQG WKHLU RXWFRPH DUH WKXV FRQFHLYHG RI DV WKH SURGXFW RI
networks of actants, which, in turn, can have material and semiotic connotations.  
Like the current research, ANT is therefore concerned with bringing together the semiotic and 
material dimensions of social practices, and endorses an ontology of relations, processes, and 
enactments. In the words of John Law (2009: 141):  
Actor network theory is a disparate family of material-semiotic tools, sensibilities, and methods of 
analysis that treat everything in the social and natural worlds as a continuously generated effect of 
the webs of relations within which they are located. It assumes that nothing has reality or form 
outside the enactment of those relations. Its studies explore and characterize the webs and the 
practices that carry them. Like other material-semiotic approaches, the actor network approach thus 




ideas, organizations, inequalities, scale and sizes, and geographical arrangements. 
This relational emphasis and descriptive commitment concerned with the processual, open-ended, 
and multiple aspect characterising the phenomenon under analysis applies to the body too, which 
therefore bHFRPHVDµERG\PXOWLSOH¶ 0ROGLVWULEXWHGDORQJDOO WKHµQRGHV¶ LPSOLFDWHG LQ
WKH QHWZRUN $V QRWHG E\ 6KLOOLQJ   $17 ³HPSKDVLVHV KRZ WKH ERG\ LV
LQFUHDVLQJO\µRSHQ¶WRWKHFRQQHFWLRQVPDGHE\WHFKQRORJ\LGHDVDQGRWKHULPPDWHULDO PDWWHU´ 
Yet, while the present study views the body as possessing a dual character ± i.e., as being both 
open-ended and many and differentiated and one ± actor-network theorists appear to only 
acknowledge the former aspect while utterly neglecting the latter. However, recognising the 
fundamentally relational and processual character of embodiment ± i.e., in the words of Annemarie 
0RORULJLQDOHPSKDVLVVXEVFULELQJWR³DUHDOLW\WKDWLVdone and enacted rather 
WKDQREVHUYHG´± does not neHGWRLPSO\WKHQHJDWLRQRIDERG\¶VLGHQWLW\VWUXFWXUHDQGUHODWLYHO\
enduring proprieties. Indeed, if we wish to address the dual character of embodiment, both aspects 
need to be considered ± as previously argued by Grosz, the body is a paradoxical phenomenon 
which, like a flame, keeps on transforming itself while maintaining its identity.  
Indeed, the recognition of both the processual and structural aspects of embodiment ± at least at an 
implicit level ± emerges in the following extract taken from a study Mol and Law (2004: 57, 
original emphasis) conducted on hypoglycaemia:  
You do not have, you are not, a body-that-hangs-together, naturally, all by itself. Keeping yourself 
whole is one of the tasks of life. It is not given but must be achieved, both beneath the skin and 
beyond, in practice.   
+RZHYHULIZHIRUHJURXQGWKHSUDFWLFHVIRUGHDOLQJZLWKUHDOLW\DQGGRVRSHUVLVWHQWO\WKHERG\¶V
µRUJDQLF ZKROHQHVV¶ LV QR ORQJHU VHOI-evident. But this does not imply that the body we do is 
fragmented, the converse of being whole. If we were to do our bodies in ways that fragmented 
them, death would quickly follow. The body we do is neither a whole, nor fragmented. Instead it 
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has a complex configuration. There are boundaries around the body we do: it is Miriam T. [i.e., one 
RI WKH VWXG\¶V SDUWLFLSDQWV@ ZKR VKLYHUV ZKHQ VKH KDV D K\SR LQ WKH QLJKW DQG QRW -RVHI KHU
husband. But these boundaries are semi-SHUPHDEOH-RVHIPD\IHHO0LULDP7¶VK\SRIRUKHUDQG
the sweet yoghurt she eats stops her hypo. So long as it does not disintegrate, the body-we-do hangs 
together. It is full of tensions, however. 
+HQFHDOWKRXJKWKHVHDUHµVHPL-SHUPHDEOH¶0RODQG/DZGRUHFRJQLVHWKDWWKHUHDUHµERXQGDULHV¶
to our body. These boundaries both unite the body with, and separate it from, the network in which 
LV ORFDWHG ,I WKHVH ERXQGDULHV FHDVH WR H[LVW WKHQ µGHDWK ZRXOG TXLFNO\ IROORZ¶ 1HYHUWKHOHVV
WKHVHDFNQRZOHGJPHQWVUHPDLQUDUHLQVWDQFHVLQ$17VWXGLHVDQGUDWKHUWKDQFRQFOXGLQJWKDWµWKH
body we do LV QHLWKHU D ZKROH QRU IUDJPHQWHG¶ , VXJJHVW WKDW LW PLJKW EH PRUH SURGXFWLYH WR
theorise the body as being both a whole and fragmented, both differentiated and open-ended, both 
one and many ± LQIDFWEHLQJµIXOORIWHQVLRQV¶DQGSRVVHVVLQJDGXDOFKDUDcter.  
As an outcome of the exclusive focus on external environments of embodiment and abstract maps 
of connections, the neither/nor conclusion ultimately yields a conflated/flat/one-dimensional 
DFFRXQW ZKHUH ERWK WKH ERG\¶V PDWHULDOLW\ DQG LPPDWHULDOLW\ Gisappear, and with them also the 
HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V FRUSRUHDOLW\ DQG LQQHU OLIH ,Q IDFW $17 LV FKDUDFWHULVHG E\ D VWURQJ DQWL-
humanist stance entailing that non-human actants, including mundane everyday objects, have the 
same weight of humans in the analyses of social practices. As explained by Jim Johnson4 (1988), 
ZLWKLQ$17¶VSHUVSHFWLYHWKHUHLVQRGLVFULPLQDWLRQEHWZHHQKXPDQVDQGQRQ-humans, and living 
and non-living beings, and therefore a mechanical door-FORVHU WKH H[DPSOH XVHG LQ -RKQVRQ¶V
paper) is thought to be endowed with the same agentic powers of a human being.  
Surely, however, objects do not have the same degree of agency of humans, who are conscious and 
sensuous beings with feelings, desires, affective states, as well as being capable of engaging in 
self-reflective processes and bringing about creativity and novelty in the milieu from which they 
emerged (Ingold, 2011; Shilling, 2012/1993). In this way, as observed by Shilling (2012/1993: 
100, original emphasis), with the ANT approach we have breadth at the expense of depth: 
                                                          
4
 Here Jim Johnson is a pseudonym employed by Latour in this ANT seminal article. 
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ANT is typically highly descriptive, tracing the potentially endless links, connections and 
assemblages involving bodies. This often results in accounts possessed of impressive scope and 
breadth, but rarely deals with the depth of the corporeal as an emergent and causally significant 
phenomenon in its own right. 
By conflating any qualitative difference between all the elements of an assemblage, Shilling points 
out, ANT utterly ignores the difference which differences can make.  
In a similar vein, Ingold (2011) contends that with its exclusive preoccupation with the 
architectural structure of a network and the neglect of the qualitative differences of its components, 
ANT eventually produces abstract, static, and lifeless sociological accounts, which, ultimately, end 
XSHUDVLQJWKHDFWXDOPDWHULDOLW\WKH\LQWHQGWRDGGUHVV$LPLQJDWUHWDLQLQJ$17¶VIRFXVRQWKH
relational and material aspects of embodiment, while, however, injecting it with life, experience, 
and qualitative differences, Ingold adopts the web of a spider as a metaphor of a network endowed 
with life, and imagines a philosophical debate between two fictional characters: ANT and 
SPIDER.5 
ANT theorises the busy yet coordinated activity of his colony as emerging from the complex 
assemblage made up by individual ants, each being a node of the network ± ³DQact-DQW´,QJROG
RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV$V$17H[SODLQVWR63,'(5³WKHLQGLYLGual act-ant is not an agent. 
Rather, agency ± i.e., what makes things happen in the colony ± is distributed throughout the 
QHWZRUN´ LELG  RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV +RZHYHU EHOLHYLQJ WKDW LW LV YHU\ GLIIHUHQW IURP WKH
network which makes up the activity in $17¶VFRORQ\63,'(5H[SODLQVWKDWKHUZHELVPDGHXS
of materials spun from her own body, laid down as she moves around. Hence, rather than being 
abstract lines merely connecting points, these are the material lines along which she senses and 
lives in the world.  
For instance, when a fly is caught in the web, it is first felt and then reached by SPIDER by means 
of her web. Therefore, she observes:  
                                                          
5
 ANT is a caricature of one of the main actor-network theorists ± Latour, while SPIDER is Ingold himself. 
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The lines of my web are not at all like those of your network. In your world there are just bits and 
pieces of diverse kinds that are brought together or assembled so as to make things happen. Every 
µUHODWLRQ¶LQWKHQHWZRUNWKHQLVDFRQQHFWLRQbetween one thing and another. As such, the relation 
KDVQRPDWHULDOSUHVHQFH>«@)RUH[DPSOH,NQRZZKHQDIO\KDV landed in the web because I can 
feel the vibrations in the lines through my spindly legs, and it is along these same lines that I run to 
retrieve it. But the lines of my web do not connect me to the fly. Rather, they are already threaded 
before the fly arrives, and set up through their material presence the conditions of entrapment under 
which such connections can potentially be established (ibid.: 91, original emphasis) 
By starting from the premise that life is defined by the coupling of action and perception or 
movement and feeling (more on this in the case study), Ingold points out the important qualitative 
distinction between living and non-OLYLQJEHLQJV$V63,'(5H[SODLQV WR$17 ³WKH HVVHQFHRI
DFWLRQ >«@ OLHV LQ WKH FORVH FRXSOLQJ RI ERGLO\ PRYHPHQW DQG SHUFHSWLRQ´ LELG  RQH
informing the other in a two-way process of co-determination. Such a circular process, SPIDER 
goes on, involves the development and embodiment of skills, which attune the organism to its 
environment. Such attunement, in tuUQ DOORZV WKH RUJDQLVP¶V JURZWK WR LQFUHDVH IXUWKHU DQG
develop and embody more sophisticated skills.   
+HQFHDVFRQFOXGHGE\63,'(5³>W@RDWWULEXWHDJHQF\WRREMHFWVWKDWGRQRWJURZRUGHYHORSWKDW
consequently embody no skill, and whose movement is not therefore coupled to their perception, is 
OXGLFURXV´LELG7RWKLV$17FRXOGRQO\UHSO\³>Z@HOO\RXZRXOGVD\WKDWZRXOGQ¶W\RX"
>«@ <RX DUH 63,'(5 DQG \RX VWDQG IRU WKH SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW Skilled Practice Involves 
Developmentally Embodied ReVSRQVLYHQHVV´ LELGRULJLQDO HPSKDVLV7KHUHIRUH LW LV RQO\
living, sensuous, and sentient beings, characterised by the coupling of bodily movement and 
perception, and the consequent development and embodiment of skills attuned [with/at the level 
of?] the environment, which can exercise agency and bring about novelty in the context they are 
located. Objects, however, do not develop and embody skills, become attuned with the 
environment, and grow, and, therefore, cannot be attributed with agency.  
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In fact, peculiar embodied skills can make a difference within different networks ± as posited by 
Shilling (2012/1993: 100-101), embodied agents can retain and carry out peculiar characteristics 
which are, albeit only in part, located within their bodies:  
Skills may not be contained entirely in the body, for example, but it would be wrong to overlook 
the habitual, creative physical capacities that distinguish expert practitioners from lay people 
irrespective of the networks they operate within. [And therefore ANT] does not provide a sense of 
>«@KRZDWDQ\RQHWLPHSDUWLFXODUERGLHVSRVVHVVSDUWLFXODUFDSDFLWLHVIRUDFWLRQV 
7KHUHIRUH E\ QRW WDNLQJ LQWR DFFRXQW WKH GXDO FKDUDFWHU RI HPERGLPHQW $17¶V IRFXV LV
exclusively narrowed on an external, relational, and open-ended dimension ± i.e., only on the 
networks along which the embodied agent is distributed, rather than also on the embodied agent as 
such, i.e., with her own phenomenological life, properties, and ability to bring about novelty in the 
world. In fact, within this perspective, each element of a network ± whether it is a sentient being or 
a non-sentient object ± is endowed with the same degree of agency. It is in this way that ANT 
appears to be prone to the conflation of the experiential dimensions and analytical categories of 
embodiment. Complexity is addressed, but only on an abstract and disembodied level of 
explanation, where, ultimately, neither the material nor the immaterial dimension are taken into 
account, and where the depths characterising human embodiment are ignored. 
All in all, the corporeal turn appeared unable to adequately address the problems vexing body 
studies from its inception. Despite a multidimensional approach and an at least implicit 
acknowledgment of the dual character of embodiment, what acquired currency in this academic 
turn are flat accounts of our embodied condition, which, with ANT, take the form of a clear 
example of conflation where all the qualitative differences constituting each element of a network 
and each dimension of an assemblage are erased. In addition, the two interrelated problematics of 
the exclusive focus on the open-ended dimension and the reduction of our phenomenological life 
to an epiphenomenon do not seem to have been dealt with. In fact, these obstacles to further 
developments in body studies will also persist in the latest turn in body studies: the affective turn. 
As shown below, the affective turn yields a perspective which, despite its helpful insights, is prone 
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to the risk of an inverse Cartesianism separating mind and body, and assigning the privileged role 




Chapter 4: THE AFFECTIVE TURN   
 
4.1 Materiality as More than Matter   
 
Opposed to a static perspective of the world as composed by discrete entities interacting between 
WKHP WKH DIIHFWLYH WXUQ FRQVROLGDWHG D UHODWLRQDO RQWRORJ\ DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK HYHU\ µWKLQJ¶
HPHUJHVIURPLWVHQWDQJOHPHQWZLWKRWKHUµWKLQJV¶ZLWKLQDSURFHss of continuous transformation, 
an ongoing becoming, where the terms of a relation do not pre-exist their interrelating (Blackman 
	 9HQQ  VHH DOVR %DUDG  6LPLODU WR $17 UDWKHU WKDQ µWKLQJV¶ ZKDW LV FRQVWDQWO\
WUDQVIRUPLQJKHUHDUHµUHODWLRQV¶+RZHYHUGLIIHUHQWO\IURP$17DQGFRQVLVWHQWZLWKWKHSUHVHQW
research, within this perspective matter is conceived of as lively, sentient, and possessing agency.  
Here Whitehead and his animist ontology, where experience is conceived of as immanent to 
matter, are often evoked (e.g., Stenner, 2011; Stenner & Greco, 2013; see also Fraser, Kember & 
Lury, 2005; Greco, 2005; Manning, 2010; Venn, 2010). In this respect, the affective turn is 
DVVRFLDWHGZLWKQHZPDWHULDOLVPVZKHUHWKHXVHRIWKHSUHIL[µQHZ¶LQWHQGVWRHPSKDVLVHWKHQHHG
and desire for forms of materialism able to account for immaterial phenomena, and thus 
conceptualise materiality as something more than mere matter (Blackman, 2014; Coole & Frost, 
2010; Grosz, 2011, 2017). By borrowing the terminology of Whitehead (1985/1978), I call this 
worldview a process-oriented ontology ± indeed, the theoretical framework of this thesis.  
In contrast with the post-structuralist/linguistic tendency to conceptualise the body as an inert, 
passive, and docile surface, a tabula rasa on which culture is inscribed, the concept of affect 
intends to emphasise the dynamic, living, and moving body. Here the body becomes a source of 
sensations and feelings, and acquires an active and crucial role ± indeed the crucial role for many 
affect theorists ± in socio-cultural phenomena. By also considering what the body can do, rather 
than only what the body is, and by also stressing its processual nature, rather than only its 
structural aspects, affect theories conceive of the body as endowed with generative potential, 
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agency, and thus capable of being recalcitrant to discursive imperatives and dominant ideologies 
(Blackman & Venn, 2010). 
Affect also expresses what cannot be put into words ± what exceeds a discursive account (ibid.). 
Here the sensing and sentient body acquires its own embodied meanings and knowledge which are 
conveyed through tacit, corporeal, and extra-linguistic forms of communication (ibid.). Hence 
language is not the only way to communicate and exercise power ± communication and the 
exercise of power also take place according to inter-corporeal, extra-semiotic, non-
representational, and non-linear processes (Henriques, 2010; Massumi, 2002). Emerging from, or 
enacted within, a contingent process, bodies cannot be conceived of as separate from their milieu, 
or from each other (Henriques, 2010; Manning, 2010). Always in the process of becoming, here 
bodies are envisaged as never finished and open systems, permeable to each other, which can only 
be defined by their capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies (Blackman & Venn, 2010; 
Massumi, 2002).  
According to this perspective, relationships such as those between mind and body, cognition and 
affect, language and corporeality, are not fixed but rather open to transformation, and make sense 
only in light of notions such as co-determination rather than interaction between their terms 
(Blackman & Venn, 2010; Massumi, 2002). In addition, albeit implicitly, affect theorists appear to 
recognise the chiasmic and dual nature of the body as a phenomenon caught between a pre-
individual and an individuated dimension, and aim at tapping into the in-between space both 
separating and unifying these two realms in a manner which overlaps with phenomenological 
approaches. Indeed, in relation to a pre-individual and an individuated dimension, a number of 
scholars within the affective turn (e.g., Blackman, 2008, 2012; Manning, 2010; Massumi, 2002) 
seem to acknowledge two main levels of explanation ± a non-linear logic addressing the 
processual nature of the phenomenon under analysis, and a linear logic concerned with its 
structural aspects.   
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While all the features described above are taken on board in the re-conceptualisation of 
embodiment proposed by this thesis, I also intend to avoid the pitfalls related to the way the notion 
of affect has often been employed in contemporary theorising. In this respect, although when 
turning to affect a shift occurred from a symbolic to a material domain, our inner life seems to be 
still seen as an analytical category to avoid, and the open-ended dimension of embodiment seems 
to be still emphasised over questions regarding how the embodied agent maintains a degree of 
continuity (Blackman, 2008, 2012). In this way, there is both a rupture and a consistency with the 
linguistic turn (Clough, 2008).  
,QGHHG WKH VKDUHG QHJOHFW RI WKH VXEMHFW¶V LQQHU OLIH DQG WKH H[FOXVLYH IRFXV RQ DQ RSHQ-ended 
dimension is not the only common ground between the affective turn and the linguistic 
perspectives, as both approaches are characterised by an inherent idiosyncrasy. That is, by 
unveiling the ways power works through language practices, the discursive approach intends to 
IDFLOLWDWH WKH VXEMHFW¶V FULWLFDO UHIOH[LYH FDSDFLWLHV \HW QHYHU DFWXDOO\ H[SORUHV ZKDW these 
FDSDFLWLHVDUHRQO\LQ)RXFDXOW¶VLQWHUYLHZVDUHWKH\H[SOLFLWO\DFNQRZOHGJHG± see chapter 2.1). 
Similarly, while within the turn to affect there is an emphasis on other aspects of the embodied 
DJHQW¶VLQQHUOLIH± i.e. embodied experiences, feelings, and sensations which tend to exceed the 
representational and symbolic level ± these are rarely addressed from the perspective of the subject 
(Wetherell, 2012).  
5DWKHUZLWKLQWKHDIIHFWLYHWXUQWKHIRFXVDSSHDUVWRH[FOXVLYHO\UHPDLQRQPDWWHU¶Vcapacities for 
self-organisation at a pre-individual level (Clough, 2008). In this respect, the notion of the pre-
individual is often cited in relation to Simondon and his concept of individuation (e.g., Manning, 
2010; Venn, 2010). As explained by Blackman and 9HQQ³>L@QGLYLGXDWLRQLVDFRQFHSW
developed by Simondon that offers a reformulation of the problematic of subjectivity; it radically 




,ZLOOGLVFXVV6LPRQGRQ¶VDQG6SLQR]D¶VWKHRU\RILQGLYLGXDWLRQODWHU± a theory which entails a 
field enveloping and thus exceeding the embodied agent and her phenomenal life, but which 
certainly does not disregard the individual and her lived experience. At the moment, however, it is 
important to note that, as affect theorists appear to narrow their interests exclusively on a truly pre-
individual dimension ± i.e., what cannot be felt or experienced by the subject at all ± affect tends to 
be viewed as a force underpinning our actions only operating beneath the level of the embodied 
DJHQW¶VFRQVFLRXVQHVVwhich is thus reduced to the status of epiphenomena.  
All in all, rather than developing the insights of the corporeal turn, with the turn to affect the 
acknowledgment of embodiment as possessing a paradoxical, chiasmic, and dual character remains 
on an implicit, partial, and ultimately sterile level. That is, while affect theorists seem to recognise 
both pre-individual and individuated dimensions, and non-linear and either/or logics of 
embodiment, they nevertheless only concentrate their efforts on the first terms of these 
relationships. In this way, the relationships between the experiential dimensions of the embodied 
agent are never qualified, affect is conceptualised as a force which can act upon us but which 
cannot be acted upon, and the Cartesian gap ± an inverse type this time, where the body becomes 
the privileged term over the mind ± is left untouched.  
$V,KDYHGRQHZLWKWKHSUHYLRXVVWUDQGVRIERG\VWXGLHVLQZKDWIROORZVE\UHODWLQJ0DVVXPL¶V
theorising to those of Merleau-Ponty, I will first highlight the useful arguments of affect theorists ± 
i.e., the implicit acknowledgment of the dual character of embodiment, and the concern with 
tapping into in-between space between a pre-individual and an individuated dimension. Then I will 
point out the problems present in the turn to affect ± i.e., a conceptualisation of affect as always cut 







4.2 Affect and Phenomenology ± Tapping into the Chiasm 
 
,QIOXHQWLDO RQ WKH WXUQ WR DIIHFW LQ VRFLDO WKHRU\ 0DVVXPL¶V   RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV ERRN
Parables for the Virtual, begins with a phenomenological observation:  
When I think of my body and ask what it does to earn that name, two things stand out. It moves. It 
feels. In fact, it does both at the same time. It moves as it feels, and it feels itself moving. Can we 
think a body without this: an intrinsic connection between movement and sensation whereby each 
immediately summons the other?   
Thus, the intertwinement between movement and sensation ± which we have already encountered 
with Ingold (see chapter 3.6) and will encounter again in the case study ± plays a pivotal role here. 
A body which moves and feels (a phenomenal body), and where movement and feelings co-
constitute each other, Massumi (ibid.) argues, is not a discursive (represented) body. For Massumi 
(ibid.: 3), the post-VWUXFWXUDOLVWVWUHVVRQODQJXDJH³FDWFhes the body in a cultural freeze-frame [and 
W@KHQRWLRQRIPRYHPHQWDVTXDOLWDWLYHWUDQVIRUPDWLRQLVODFNLQJ´ 
As Massumi (ibid.: 2) notes, in many socio-cultural analyses, the phenomenological concern with 
movement and sensation has often been discredited as being unable to directly address the 
structure of the social system, power relations, or strategies of resistance ± as previously seen, the 
linguistic turn exclusively focused on external environments of embodiment, and on ideological, 
symbolic, and discursive spheres:  
Earlier phenomenological investigations into the sensing body were largely left behind because 
they were difficult to reconcile with the new understanding of the structuring capacities of culture 
and their inseparability both from the exercise of power and the glimmers of counter power 
incumbent in mediated living. It was all about a subject without subjectivism: a subject 
µFRQVWUXFWHG¶E\H[WHUQDOPHFKDQLVPVµ7KH6XEMHFW¶ 
In addition, as the current study does, Massumi (ibid.: 7) acknowledges that a critique of linguistic 
models exclusively based on discourse, representation, and inscription does not imply that these 
DQDO\WLFDO FDWHJRULHV ³QHHG WR EH WUDVKHG´ 0DVVXPL UHFRJQLVHV WKDW D GLVFXUVLYH DSSURDFK LV
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indeed effective at unveiling the subtle but pervasive work of language, the oppressive web of 
power relations, and the ways discursive practices shape our lived experience, subjectivity, and 
ERG\ <HW IRU 0DVVXPL WKHVH PRGHOV RQO\ DGGUHVV RQH OHYHO RI H[SODQDWLRQ ³RQH SDUWLFXOar 
GLPHQVLRQRIWKHUHDOWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFKWKLQJVFRLQFLGHZLWKWKHLURZQDUUHVW´LELG± i.e., a 
linear either/or logic; while another sphere, the non-linear realm of paradox, the processual aspect, 
WKH G\QDPLF YLWDOLW\ RI ³PRYHPHQW VHQVDWLRQ DQG TXDOLWLHV RI H[SHULHQFH´ LELG  RULJLQDO
emphasis) is left out. 
,QIDFW0DVVXPL¶VFRQFHUQZLWKPRYHPHQWDQGVHQVDWLRQDQGKLVUHFRJQLWLRQRIWZRGLPHQVLRQV
RIµWKHUHDO¶DQGRIWZRUHODWHGOHYHOVRIH[SODQDWLRQGHPRQVWUDWHVWKDWWKHUHLVDFRPPRQJround 
between affect theorists and phenomenologists such as Merleau-Ponty (Blackman & Featherstone, 
2010). That is, Massumi (2002: 75; see also Manning, 2010) too appears to conceptualise 
embodiment as a chiasmic phenomenon, functioning as an interface between a pre-individual and 
an individuated dimension ± LQ KLV ZRUGV ³>W@KH ERG\ ILJXUHV QRW DV DQ REMHFW RQH VXEVWDQWLDO
element among others, but as a part-REMHFW D FRQYHUVLRQ FKDQQHO D WUDQVGXFHU´ 7KHVH SUH-
individual and individuated dimensions are identified by Massumi (ibid.) as the virtual and the 
actual. The virtual is what is not yet actualised, a field of potential, which has an unknowable, non-
representational, and formless character, still unexpressed in the three-dimensional space and 
linear time of the actual (ibid.). The in-between space between the virtual and the actual is the 
territory of emergence where the transcendent becomes immanent, the subject-object bifurcation 
occurs, and the phenomenon of embodiment takes place.  
It is precisely within this elusive yet crucial space that, according to Massumi (ibid.), consolidated 
societal structures can be undone, dominant cultural norms can be unsettled, qualitative 
transformations can be brought about, and thus change can occur. And, for Massumi (ibid.: 32-33), 
DIIHFWLVDFRQFHSWXDOWRROZKLFKFDQKHOSXVWDSLQWRWKLVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDOµELIXUFDWLRQSRLQW¶ 
$IIHFW>«@LVDNLQWRZKDWLVFDOOHGDFULWLFDOSRLQWRUDELIXUFDWLRQSRLQWRUVLQJXODUSRLQWLQFKDRV
theory and the theory of dissipative structures. This is the turning point at which a physical system 
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paradoxically embodies multiple and normally mutually exclusive potentials, only one of which is 
selected. 
Therefore, Massumi (ibid.: 35) is interested in tapping into the emergence of the phenomenon of 
embodiment ± LHLQWRWKLV³WZR-VLGHGFRLQ´WXUQLQJSRLQWFULWLFDOLQWHUIDFHEHWZHHQSRWHQWLDOLW\
and actuality. Resembling Merleau-3RQW\¶V DUJXPHQWV VHH chapters 3.4 & 3.5), this is the 
undefinable territory between what we can consciously experience, and what we cannot ± the land 
of GLVFORVXUHWKHPLGGOHZD\EHWZHHQWKHVXEMHFWDQGWKHZRUOG,Q0DVVXPL¶VLELGRULJLQDO
emphasis) words: 
:KDWLVEHLQJWHUPHGDIIHFW>«@LVSUHFLVHO\WKLVWZR-sidedness, the simultaneous participation of 
the virtual in the actual and the actual in the virtual, as one arises and returns to the other. Affect is 
this two-sidedness as seen from the side of the actual thing, as couched in its perceptions and 
cognitions. Affect is the virtual as point of view.    
$JDLQDIIHFW¶VµWZR-VLGHGQHVV¶DSSHDUVWRUHIOHFWWKHFKLDVPLFFKDUDFWHURIWKHERG\± i.e., a body 
mediating between two dimensions, and thus possessing a dual character. Hence, affect points to 
the territory of the phenomenological mode of givenness, where and when the world is disclosed 
to us, and becomes actual and experienced. In Merleau-3RQW\¶VWHUPV WKLVLV WKHIOHVKWDNLQJRQ
dimensions, transcendence in the process of becoming immanence by means of our body, and the 
space where the tacit knowledge of the body can be undone.  
Stressing the primacy of a non-linear/paradoxical level of analysis, Massumi (ibid.: 30) argues that 
³WKH ERG\ LV DV LPPHGLDWHO\ YLUWXDO DV LW LV DFWXDO´ DQG DIIHFW LV WUDQVFHQGHQWDO DV QRW \HW
actualised, but is also immanent, as it is a constitutive part of our lived experience. Drawing on 
Gilles Deleuze, Massumi (ibid.: 33, my emphasis) clarifies this point by making a subtle 




Although the realm of intensity [or affect6@ WKDW 'HOHX]H¶V SKLORVRSK\ VWULYHV WR FRQFHSWXDOL]H LV
transcendental in the sense that it is not directly accessible to experience, it is not transcendent, it is 
not exactly outside experience either. It is immanent to it ± always in it but not of it. Intensity and 
experience accompany one another like two mutually presupposing dimensions or like two sides of 
a coin. Intensity is immanent to matter and to events, to mind and body and to every level of 
bifurcation composing them and which they compose.  
HeUH QRW RQO\ GRHV 0DVVXPL LELG  VHHP WR HQYLVDJH WKH H[LVWHQFH RI µWZR PXWXDOO\
SUHVXSSRVLQJGLPHQVLRQV¶ZLWKWZRGLIIHUHQWOHYHORIDQDO\VLV± i.e., an either/or and a non-linear 
logic ± but he also hints at an engagement with phenomenological relationships, which appear to 
be grounded in a broader non-linear logic and amenable to change. In fact, consistent with this 
VWXG\¶VDSSURDFK0DVVXPL VHHPV WR VXJJHVW WKDW WKH WHUPVRI UHODWLRQVKLSV VXFKDVPLQG-body, 
subject-object, culture-nature, cognition-affect, or language-FRUSRUHDOLW\ ³FRXOG EH VHHQ QRW DV
ELQDU\RSSRVLWLRQVRUFRQWUDGLFWLRQVEXWDVUHVRQDWLQJOHYHOV´LELG³G\QDPLFXQLWLHV´LELG
ZKLFK³IHHGIRUZDUGDQGEDFNLQWRHDFKRWKHU>«@LQUHFLSURFDOEHFRPLQJV´LELG 
Yet, 0DVVXPL¶V LPSOLFLW DFNQRZOHGJPHQW RI WKH GXDO FKDUDFWHU RI HPERGLPHQW WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ
between different levels of analysis and experiential dimensions, and the engagement with 
dynamic relationships, are never developed further or brought to the fore. And this is the lacuna 
which the present research aims to address. That is, rather than reifying dualism(s), this study 
contemplates the possibility of employing them as dualities, as conceptual tools to account for our 
experiential world, and advance our understanding of embodiment. How can we avoid either 
holding a dualistic ontological stance and reducing the mind to the body, the body to the mind, or 
conflating the two into a sterile monism? How can we, put another way, conciliate the pluralism of 
our experiences with a monist perspective?  
I believe my preoccupations appear to be best elucidated by two authors Massumi heavily draws 
on ± philosopher Gilles Deleuze and psychoanalyst Félix Guattari (2013/1988: 21, original 
uppercase): 
                                                          
6
 Massumi (2002) uses the terms affect and intensity interchangeably. 
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No, this is not a new or GLIIHUHQWGXDOLVP>«@:HLQYRNHRQHGXDOLVPRQO\ LQRUGHUWRFKDOOHQJH
another. We employ a dualism of models only in order to arrive at a process that challenges all 
models. Each time, mental correctives are necessary to undo the dualisms we had no wish to 
construct but through which we pass. Arrive at the magic formula we all seek ± PLURALISM = 
MONISM ± via all the dualisms that are the enemy, an entirely necessary enemy, the furniture we 
are forever rearranging.  
Importantly, here Deleuze and Guattari urge us to engage with dualisms to actually overcome 
dualism itself ± a strategy which we will see later employed by both Spinoza and DIA 
practitioners. It is this failure to tackle dualism(s) directly which appears to render Massumi prone 
to the risks of an inverse Cartesianism, where the body has a primacy over the mind, which 
therefore becomes a mere epiphenomenon. In fact, many affect theorists appear to only stress 
DIIHFW¶V capacities for bypassing consciousness, without however considering how conscious 
deliberations can in turn shape affective patterns (Hemmings, 2005; Wetherell, 2012). I will show 
below that the risk of conceptualising affect as irremediably cut off from our conscious 
deliberations animates contemporary debates in body studies concerned with the over-emphasis on 
pre-individual, anti-intentionalist, and autonomous character of affect.  
 
4.3 Bypassing Consciousness ± The Danger of an Inverse Cartesianism  
 
A clear example of an over-emphasis on the pre-individual and anti-intentionalist aspect of affect 
is provided by non-representational theory (NRT), a perspective mostly associated with cultural 
geographer Nigel Thrift. As is given away by its name, non-representational theory rightly rejects 
a cognitivist and representationalist framework. Yet, along with rejection of the Cartesian person 
and representationalism, NRT appears to reject the embodied agent and her agentic powers 
6WHQQHU,Q7KULIW¶VZRUGV³QRQ-representational theory is resolutely anti-
biographical and pre-individual. It trades in modes of perception which are not subject-EDVHG´ 





to me to be a VWHSWRRIDU´LELGLWLVFOHDUWKDW157H[FOXVLYHO\IRFXVHVRQWKHSUH-cognitive ± 
LHRQWKDW³UROOLQJPDVVRIQHUYHYROOH\V>«ZKLFK@SUHSDUHWKHERG\IRUDFWLRQLQVXFKDZD\WKDW
intentions or decisions are made before the conscious self is awarH RI WKHP´ LELG  +HUH LW
seems that the locus of knowledge, including intentions and decisions, is always distributed across 
an open-ended dimension, which we appear unable to address.  
Therefore, with NRT we have at the same time an interest in experiences and modes of 
perceptions, and a disinterest in how they are phenomenologically lived by the subject. In this 
ZD\ WKH VXEMHFW¶V SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO OLIH GRHV QRW SOD\ DQ\ FDXVDO UROH LQ Ker actions and/or in 
making a difference in the world, and it appears to be determined by external environments of 
embodiment in a one-way fashion (Leys, 2011; Wetherell, 2012). That is, our sensations, feelings, 
and reflexive capacities emerge from material assemblages and spatial sets of configurations in 
which the embodied agent is located, but are, however, never able to act upon this milieu ± here 
our phenomenological life is conceived of as an irrelevant epiphenomenon. In 7KULIW¶V
words:  
A person becomes a shifting ensemble of states that are received and passed on, states over which 
that person rarely has much in the way of direct control but which can be modulated in the passing 
in such a way as to produce nuances or even, at the limit, quite new forms of going on. 
<HW WKH LPSRUWDQW UROH SOD\HG E\ WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V FRQVFLRXV H[SHULHQFHV DQG UHIOH[LYH
FDSDFLWLHV LQ WKLV µPRGXODWLRQ LQ WKHSDVVLQJ¶ DQG LQ\LHOGLQJ µQHZ IRUPVRIJRLQJRQ¶GRHVQRW
seem to be considered (Wetherell, 2012). For instance, Thrift (2008/2007: 75-88) argues that the 
rise of automobility, as well as other numerous technological innovations, have radically changed 
WKHZD\FLWLHV¶VSDFHVDUHDVVHPEOHGDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\DOWHUHGWKHDYDLODEOHPRGHVRIH[SHULHQFHV
in metropolitan areas. As noted by social psychologist Margaret Wetherell (2012: 20), here our 
OLYHGH[SHULHQFHVHHPVWREH³DXWRPDWLFDOO\WULJJHUHGE\WKHZD\VFLW\VFDSHVDUHHQJLQHHUHGDQG
EXLOW´DQGWKHUHIRUHRXUHPERGLHGH[SHULHQFHVUHIOH[LYHFDSDFLWLHs, and agency (if we can call it 
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so in this theoretical context) appear to be entirely determined by pre-cognitive phenomena upon 
which we appear unable to act.  
7KULIW¶VDUJXPHQWVUHIOHFWDFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQRIDIIHFW as that force which makes us move and has 
an influence on us, but which is always nonconscious (e.g., Blackman & Venn, 2010; Henriques, 
2010; Manning, 2010; Massumi, 2002). For most affect theorists, cognition always comes after 
affect as a mere accompaniment of it. In other words, these authors seem to stress only those 
LQVWDQFHVZKHUHRXUERG\¶VPRYHPHQWVSUHFHGHDQGDUHVRPHZKDWQRWDWWXQHGZLWKRXUFRQVFLRXV
awareness, without also considering not only those occurrences where this does not happen, but, 
more importantly, our capacities to shape these pre-reflective (re)actions.  
And Massumi (2002) does not seem to be immune from this tendency, as appears evident from the 
title of one of his most well-known essays ± µ7KH $XWRQRP\ RI $IIHFW¶ ± where the Canadian 
theorist advances his arguments in favour of the primacy of the affective on the cognitive. To do 
so, Massumi employs a German experimental study in cognitive science which took place in the 
eighties and revolved around a short film shown to groups of nine-year-old children in three 
versions. The first was without words. In the second version ± WKH µIDFWXDO¶ YHUVLRQ ± a voice 
describing the events was added. The third version ± WKHµHPRWLRQDO¶YHUVLRQ± only differed from 
the second in the fact that the voice accompanying the images had a more emotional connotation. 
As Massumi (ibid.: 23) summarises, the plot was rather simple: 
A man builds a snowman on his roof garden. It starts to melt in the afternoon sun. He watches. 
After a time, he takes the snowman to the cool of the mountains where it stops melting. He bids it 
good-bye and leaves. 
The emotional reactions of the children were tested at i) a physiological level ± i.e. heartbeat, 
breathing, and galvanic skin response (the level of electric conductance of the skin which increases 
with heightened activity of the autonomic nervous system); and ii) a verbal-cognitive level ± i.e. 
the children had to rate the individual scenes of the film on two scales: one was a happy-sad scale, 




The emotional version was instead the most remembered, and rated just slightly less pleasant than 
the first, wordless version, which resulted in being the most pleasant.  
0RUHRYHUDQGDV0DVVXPLFRPPHQWV HYHQPRUHVWUDQJHO\ WKHVFHQHV MXGJHGPRVW µVDG¶ZHUH
DOVR WKHPRVW µSOHDVDQW¶7KLVRGG OLQNEHWZHHQVDGQHVVDQGSOHDVDQWQHVV0DVVXPLDUJXHVZDV
not due to the fact that the physiological arousal caused by the emotion of sadness was interpreted 
by the children as a pleasant event (as, at times, might be the case in these types of experiments), 
DV WKH FKLOGUHQ¶V SK\VLRORJLFDO UHVSRQVHV UHODWHG WR KHDUWEHDW DQG EUHDWKLQJ were higher in the 
factual version ± the most unpleasant and least remembered. On the other hand, the first, non-
verbal version was that which yielded the greatest galvanic skin response.  
From all the above, Massumi (ibid.: 24, original emphasis) concludeG WKDW WKH FKLOGUHQ ³ZHUH
SK\VLRORJLFDOO\ VSOLW >«DQG WKDW WKH UHVXOWV VKRZHG@ the primacy of the affective in image 
UHFHSWLRQ´,QDGGLWLRQDQGPRUHUHOHYDQWO\IRUWKLVWKHVLV¶FRQFHUQZLWKWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
the representational and the non-representational, Massumi (ibid.: 24, original emphasis) asserts 
WKDWVXFK³SULPDF\RIWKHDIIHFWLYHLVPDUNHGE\ a gap between content and effect: it would appear 
WKDWWKHVWUHQJWKRUGXUDWLRQRIDQLPDJH¶VHIIHFWLVQRWORJLFDOO\FRQQHFWHGWRWKHFRQWHQWLQDQ\
VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG ZD\´ 7KHUHIRUH LW DSSHDUV WKDW WKHUH LV D GLVFRQQHFWLRQ D µVSOLW¶ EHWZHHQ D
reflective/semiotic content and an affective/physiological effect.  
7KDWVDLGVWUDLJKWDIWHUWKHDERYHTXRWDWLRQ0DVVXPLLELGP\HPSKDVLVDGGV³>W@KLVLVnot 
to say that there is no connection and no logic >«@ :KDW FRPHV RXW KHUH LV WKDW WKHUH LV QR
correspondence or conformity between qualities and intensities. If there is a relation, it is of 
DQRWKHUQDWXUH´7KXVLVWKHUHDUHODWLRQRUQRWEHWZHHQWKHV\PEROLFDQGLQWHQVLW\RUFRJQLWLRQ
and affect)? And, if yes, what is its nature? Such vagueness in 0DVVXPL¶VDUJXPHQWVDSSHDUV WR
HYRNH%XWOHU¶VWURXEOHVZKHQTXDOLI\LQJ WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ ODQJXDJHDQGFRUSRUHDOLW\VHH
chapter 2.3), or, indeed, the difficulties encountered by Merleau-Ponty when making sense of the 
relationship between the tacit cogito and the cogito (see chapters 3.5 & 3.6). 
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As will become clear later when re-reading the relationships between language and corporeality, 
and the representational and the non-representational through the dual lens of the present research, 
the experiential dimensions constituting them can be characterised by both a connection and a 
separation ± i.e., these are dynamic relationships amenable to change. And, in fact, this appears to 
be recognised by Massumi (ibid.: 25) when noting that the intertwinement between language and 
intensity might entail mutual reinforcement, restrainment, or a prevalence of one element over the 
other, always in resonations and interactions which operate at multiple levels, each level with 
different logics, rules, and dynamics:   
/DQJXDJH>«@LVQRWVLPSO\LQRSSRVLWLRQWRLQWHQVLW\,WZRXOGVHHPWRIXQFWLRQGLIIHUHQWLDOO\LQ
UHODWLRQ WR LW >«@7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ WKH OHYHOVRI LQWHQVLW\DQGTXDOLILFDWLRQ LVQRWRQHRI
conformity or correspondence but rather of resonation and interference, amplification or 
dampening.  
Yet, by not explicitly acknowledging the dual character of embodiment, Massumi only emphasises 
one term of the dualism(s) he engages with, and therefore falls into an inverse Cartesian dualism as 
he ultimately only considers affect as a dimension cut off from our conscious awareness ± i.e., as 
always being autonomous, pre-individual, and anti-intentional. And it in this way that he reduces 
our consciousness to a mere epiphenomenon.  
However, as historian of science Ruth Leys (2011: 437) contends, it would be untenable to 
conceive of affect as a separate realm, belonging to a transcendent dimension, which has nothing 
to do with discourse, ideology, and conscious awareness ± in her words, in much of the 
contemporary theorising of affect: 
The affects must be viewed as independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology ± that is, 
prior to intentions, meanings, reasons, and belief ± because they are nonsignifying, autonomic 
processes that take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning.  
Consistent with my critique, Leys (2011) contends that by conceptualising affect and discourse as 
belonging to two sharply distinct domains, and exclusively stressing the unmediated, autonomous, 
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and self-organising body, affect theorists fall precisely into the mind-body dualism ± albeit 
µinverse¶ DV LQ WKLV LQVWDQFH WKH ERG\ ZRXOG EH SULYLOHJHG RYHU WKH PLQG ± that they strive to 
avoid.  
Leys (ibid.) asserts that neglecting the discursive realm, giving affect precedence over ideology 
and political content, or assigning to affect the chief role in determining our behaviour, would not 
only disregard the ideological domain, which is clearly salient in our socio-cultural lives, but, more 
importantly, the neat separation of affect from cognition and language would (re)present once 
more all the problematics related to the Cartesian dualism, especially those concerned with the 
inexplicable way in which mind and body (and thus affect and cognition, and matter and language) 
would resonate with each other. According to Leys (ibid.: 457, original emphasis), Massumi is 
mistaken:  
[W]hen he commits himself to the (essentially metaphysLFDOLGHDWKDWIRUVRPHWKLQJWREHµHOLFLWHG¶
RULQWHQGHGLWPXVWEHµIXOO\¶FRQVFLRXVDQGWKDWVLQFHQRWDOOH[SHULHQFHFDQEHGHVFULEHGLQWKRVH
terms (but can any µH[SHULHQFH¶EHVRGHVFULEHG"WKHRQO\DOWHUQDWLYHLVWRUHJDUGLWDVFRUSRUHDORU
material.  
In this way, Leys argues, Massumi separates affect (and the material) from the conscious mind 
(and the immaterial). For Leys (ibid.; see also Lane, 2012) this type of dualist theorising seems to 
ignore the insight of the phenomenological tradition, which entails that every action, even when 
not consciously experienced, is always intentional. In fact, for Merleau-Ponty (ibid.; see also 
Dewey, 1896), our actions, as well as their meaning and meaningfulness, rather than being the 
outcome of a mechanical reaction to external stimuli, or the disembodied reflexive acts of a 
transcendent mind ± both of which would be conclusions falling into the Cartesian paradigm or an 
inverse version of it ± are purposeful and pragmatic bodily engagements emerging from the 
contingency of the situation. As Merleau-3RQW\   DUJXHV ³>Z@H FDQQRW UHODWH




Hence, what we call reflexive acts are those of embodied beings and, as such, need to be 
contextualised within a specific contingency ± they emerge out of, and are only possible within, a 
specific milieu. This latter claim, I wish to emphasise, does not preclude the agency of the subject, 
as these reflexive acts, which in turn are grounded in the body and then in the world, do make a 
difference within that contingency in which they are embedded ± it could not be otherwise 
precisely because, rather than separate from the milieu they emerge from, they are part of it. In the 
words of Merleau-3RQW\³P\PRYLQJERG\PDNHVDGLIIHUHQFHLQWKHYLVLEOHZRUOG
EHLQJ D SDUW RI LW´ ,Q WKLV ZD\ WKH FRJLWR XQIROGV IURP D FRUSRUHDO GLUHFW DQG LPPHGLDWH
connection to the world ± i.e., by means of what Merleau-Ponty (2002/1962: 468, original 
HPSKDVLVFDOOHG³XQVSRNHQ>RU@WDFLWcogito´+HUHWKHWDFLWFRJLWRFRQVWLWXWHVWKHEDFNJURXQGIRU
the cogito, or, put another way, the cogito is enveloped by the tacit cogito.  
Of course, the above arguments do not preclude that cognition and affect, or mind and body, can 
EH H[SHULHQFHG DV µVSOLW¶ ± i.e., as two different dimensions severed from each other. Indeed, 
experiencing mind and body as separate can take several forms (see Leder, 1990), not just those 
related to the experimental setting described by Massumi. As observed by Spinoza (1996/1994: 
103, EIIIP59S), even mundane instances like uncontrollable laugher or trembling demonstrate that 
our body can be experienced as cut off from our mind. Different examples of mind/body 
phenomenological separation can be provided by several of our everyday actions, which can be 
FDUULHGRXWLQµDXWRSLORW¶PRGHLQDPDQQHUZKLFKFDQDFWXDOO\DOORZRXUPLQGWRZDQGHURIILQLWV
immaterial world of thought.  
However, these mind/body split instances do not imply that a) our mind and body are two different 
entities, b) the fundamental unity of mind and body cannot be experienced by the embodied agent, 
and c) our conscious deliberations and reflexive capacities cannot tap into and shape the tacit 
knowledge of the body. For example, when driving a car, we can show an unexpected, fast, and 
effective response to a sudden obstacle on the road, and avoid an accident by means of a reaction 
which bypasses our conscious realisation of the occurrence itself. However, this can occur because 
we have learned to drive ± i.e., we have shaped a pre-reflective level of knowledge and have 
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embodied the skill of driving ± by also using our reflexive capacities. In fact, in this learning 
process we have shifted from an initial experience of mind/body split ± where our mind was not 
coordinated with the movements of our body on the pedals, the gears, and steering wheel ± to an 
instance of mind-body-world unity, where in fact we are able to become one with the car and the 
road itself, and can act in perfect attunement with the changes, even if sudden, occurring in the 
surrounding environment.  
While issues related to addressing the tacit knowledge of the body and to instances of attunement 
or disattunement between mind and body will be dealt with in more depth when outlining the case 
study, at the moment it is relevant to note that affect theorists like Thrift and Massumi only 
consider the mind/body and cognition/affect split but never the mind-body and cognition-affect 
integration, nor the agentic power of our conscious awareness. And this appears to be very peculiar 
for theorists who clearly wish to address social change and are concerned with the emancipation of 
the embodied agent from oppressive incorporations of culture ± as aptly suggested by feminist 
WKHRULVW&ODUH+HPPLQJV³DIIHFWPLJKWin fact be valuable precisely to the extent that 
LWLVQRWDXWRQRPRXV´ 
To conclude, many of the arguments advanced within the affective turn seem to be particularly 
helpful for the perspective of embodiment I am sketching with this study. That is, within a 
process-oriented ontology entailing matter endowed with an experiential dimension and agentic 
powers, the body is envisaged as caught between a pre-individual and an individuated dimension, 
RUWRHPSOR\0DVVXPL¶VWHUPV WKHYLUWXDODQGWKHDFWXDO,QWurn, this conceptualisation hints at 
the dual character of the body and implies two different logics when theorising embodiment ± i.e., 
an either/or binary logic concerning embodiment as a phenomenon possessing a structure, and a 
paradoxical non-linear logic able to capture the fundamental processual nature of embodiment.  
Furthermore, affect theorists rightly point out that an approach to issues of power relations only 
based on language, discourse, and ideology is doomed to fail, or, at least, to be incomplete. What 
also needs to be addressed, and cannot be neglected, is the sphere of emergence, the foundations of 
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our subjectivity, which concerns the extra-GLVFXUVLYHDVSHFWVRIRXUOLYHGH[SHULHQFHWKHVSDFHµLQ-
EHWZHHQ¶± that which Merleau-Ponty intended to tap into. It is here that the tensions between the 
pre-objective and objectified body are played out, and, therefore, the dynamism, vitalism, and 
potential of qualitative transformation of social actors are enacted. In turn, this proposition 
suggests an implicit engagement with phenomenological relationships ± such as those constituted 
by mind and body, representational and non-representational, language and corporeality ± which 
do not appear to be conceived of as fixed, but, rather, amenable to change.  
Nevertheless, the turn to affect has also brought with it a number of problematics. First of all, there 
remains an inherent contradiction in these new materialist/affective perspectives, as while 
materiality and the body are thought to be alive, sentient DQG µPRUH WKDQ PDWWHU¶ WKH
phenomenological/immaterial dimensions of the embodied agent, and indeed the embodied agent 
as such, are still neglected. In this way, there is the reproduction of an exclusive focus on an 
external dimension of embodiment and the related neglect of its individuated character ± an issue 
we have already encountered in previous strands of body studies.  
Linked to this, rather than developing the insights of the corporeal turn and bringing together mind 
and body, and the immaterial and the material dimensions of embodiment, the affective turn ended 
up in an inverse Cartesian dualism where the body rather than the mind becomes the privileged 
term, and our phenomenological life is stripped by any causal power. This is evident when the just 
acknowledgment of the primacy of the affective is associated with the jettisoning of our conscious 
deliberations; or when there is an exclusive focus on instances where affect is able to bypass 
consciousness without considering the important question of how our reflexive capacities can 
address and shape affective patterns.  
In this way, affect is mistakenly theorised as belonging to a separate realm, a transcendent 
dimension, which has nothing to do with discourse, ideology, and conscious awareness. In turn, 
this theorising leaves a gap between what appear to be irreconcilable worlds: cognition and affect, 
representational and non-representational, language and corporeality, indeed, mind and body. How 
84 
 
are they implicated? How do they interact? How can we conceptualise their relationship? It is in 
fact the aim of the present research to provide some answers to these questions and ameliorate this 




Conclusion ± The Persistence of the Cartesian Dualism(s)  
 
Overall, I hope that my (inevitably selective) review of the last thirty years of body studies has 
highlighted some of the obstacles preventing further developments in the field. We have seen that 
a just critique of the Cartesian ontology and its dramatic divides between mind and body, subject 
and object, and experiencer and experienced has dominated contemporary sociological theories of 
the body. Yet, by asking to what extent the notion of embodiment has transcended the mind-body 
dualism, I have exposed the persistence of the Cartesian paradigm in the very theorising which 
aims at challenging it. That is, I have shown that Cartesianism seems to be imbued in the anti-
Cartesian theorising of the authors reviewed here while, at the same time, the mind-body 
relationship is rarely mentioned or addressed, let alone explained.  
As I have illustrated with exemplary impasses (e.g., Butler and Massumi), this state of affairs is 
reflected in the inability of body theorists to spell out in detail other and crucial relationships 
related to the mind-ERG\¶VHJWKRVHEHWZHHQODQJXDJHDQGFRUSRUHDOLW\DQGWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO
and non-representational), and thus leaves the field of body studies vexed by Cartesian gaps. 
Hence, despite their anti-Cartesian commitment, each of the main approaches to the body tends to 
either set mind and body in opposition by emphasising one of the two poles of the Cartesian 
dualism at the expense of the other (e.g., the linguistic and affective perspective), or deliberatively 
ignore the qualitative and analytical distinctions between the two (e.g., actor-network theory).  
At the same time, while each approach appears to stress different features of embodiment, there 
seems to be an unproductive common ground shared by all the theoretical perspectives analysed 
here. That is, all the major theories of embodiment appear to share a unidirectional concern with 
the external environments of embodiment, while the inner/phenomenological dimension of the 
subject and her own emergent properties are neglected as irrelevant phenomena. Thus, the 
untenable transcendental, disembodied, and cognitivist knower of an external world appears to 
have been set aside at the cost of jettisoning the embodied agent and her lived experience.  
86 
 
<HW , VXJJHVW WKDW WKH µVDFULILFH¶ RI WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW DQGKHU SKHQRPHQDOZRUOG LV QRW RQO\
unnecessary but in fact in contrast with one of the chief axioms of the anti-Cartesian/anti-
cognitivist standpoint, that which entails that experiencing and knowing the world means changing 
it &RQWUDU\ WR 'HVFDUWHV¶ FRQWHQWLRQ KHUH ZH GR QRW KDYH D VXEMHFW UHSUHVHQWLQJ DQ µH[WHUQDO¶
world in her mind, but an embodied agent who acts in and experiences the world at the same time. 
Experiencing is doing, and knowing is an ongoing dynamic and transformative process equally 
involving the knower and the known. It is precisely because mind and body are not two separate 
entities inhabiting separate worlds, and because experience and knowledge emerge from the 
sustained engagement of the embodied agent with the wider context in which she is embedded 
that, rather than being epiphenomena, our sensations, feelings, affective states, and reflexive 
deliberations are inextricably linked to the changes occurring in our world.  
Thus, reducing the body to the mind, the mind to the body, or conflating the two, can only result in 
DUHGXFWLRQLVWµIODW¶DQGone-dimensional account of the embodied agent which, I contend, is in 
stark contrast with the complexities, varieties, and nuances involved in the paradoxical, processual, 
and dual character of human embodiment. In this respect, as I am here endorsing a 
multidimensional perspective of embodiment entailing multiple ways of getting to know and 
acting in the world ± all of which possess causal powers ± I recognise that each of the influential 
approaches scrutinised in this thesis emphasises key aspects of our embodied condition. However, 
to avoid a distorted, reductionist, and certainly incomplete account of the nature of embodiment, 
extant perspectives need to be integrated and thus transcended, rather than taken on their own.  
As advocates of the linguistic turn rightly assert, the human body cannot escape cultural 
signification. Our knowledge and experiences cannot be separated from the socio-linguistic 
practices in which they occur ± they are generated by means of relations and interdependencies 
within a community of speaking subjects. Moreover, our reflexive capacities are mostly enacted in 
a symbolic domain ± a significant feature of our phenomenological world that can be experienced 
as an immaterial dimension. Unveiling discursive configurations has proved to be an effective 
strategy for shedding light on, and thus yielding change in, the structure of the social system. Yet, 
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while it is inadvisable to separate language from matter, it is equally untenable to reduce 
everything to the symbolic dimension. Hence, we need to avoid the danger of an idealistic 
reductionism, where the knowledge of the world obtained through our body is not reliable, 
sensations are the mere product of our intellect, and discourse is thought of as the precondition 
through which matter is constituted.  
On the other hand, as is especially stressed by both actor-network and affect theorists, our internal 
conversations and conscious deliberations do not take place inside our head in an undefinable 
place where our consciousness is located, but involve all our corporeality, and arise from the 
temporal and spatial co-assembly of multiplicities of material and semiotic conditions which 
certainly exceed the physical boundaries of our body. Acts of reflection and reflexivity are not 
those of a disembodied subject, but rather always contingent on/embedded in specific events, 
emerging from extra-discursive forces, processes, and dynamics of which we are not, and indeed 
can never be, fully aware.  
Yet, we need to be careful of generating abstract, flat, and above all lifeless accounts, where 
everything can be reduced to entanglements, connections, and networks, as occurs with ANT. 
Indeed, while the symbolic realm and the material domain cannot be separated at the ontological 
level, these two dimensions of embodiment possess different properties and therefore should not 
be conflated with one another at the epistemological level. In addition, the stress on the pre-
conditions of our experiences ± i.e. the emphasis on the pre-individual, the pre-linguistic, and pre-
cognitive ± does not need to entail the abandonment of either the linguistic dimension, or the 
FDXVDOSRZHUVRIWKHHPERGLHGDJHQW¶VFRQVFLRXVDZDUHQHVV, as regrettably occurs with a number 
of affect theorists.  
A focus on one dimension and its peculiar properties ought not to obscure the others. For instance, 
if it is true that, as affect theorists point out, our consciousness and the symbolic realm are a late 
arrival on the scene of our experiences, this, I believe, does not imply their redundancy. On the 
contrary, it is through these higher-order degrees of experience and the discursive dimension that 
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our body enacts novelty and creativity, and thus brings about change in the world. It is precisely by 
adding the symbolic domain, consciousness, and life itself to the picture that we can obtain a richer 
notion of materiality, which can exceed matter itself and account for our mind, feelings, 
imaginations, meanings, and thus all the qualitative differences of our phenomenological world. 
Conceptualising affect as separate from language and consciousness can only (re)produce an 
inverse Cartesian paradigm and, once again, set mind and body in opposition.  
FurthHUPRUH DQGFUXFLDOO\ZLWK WKH FRUSRUHDO WKHRULVWV¶ HIIRUWV WREULQJ WRJHWKHU WKHREMHFWLILHG
and pre-objective body, we started realising that the objectified and pre-objective aspects of 
embodiment not only seem to be associated with the phenomenological truths related to the mind-
body relationship, but also reflect the very character of our condition as embodied beings. 
Especially in light of the arguments of Merleau-Ponty and then Massumi, embodiment began to 
take the shape of a chiasm between two dimensions. The first, the most fundamental, is a pre-
individual dimension where the subject-object distinction is not salient, and, as such, is therefore 
ultimately unknowable. The second, instead, unfolds from the first by means of a process also 
involving the subject-object bifurcation and the emergence of our lived experience. On this 
ground, addressing and thus shaping the tacit knowledge of the body means tapping into the core 
of this unfolding process ± i.e., into the emergence of our phenomenological life. 
Therefore, as a mediator, an interface, or a transducer between two dimensions, embodiment 
appears to possess a dual character. To address this dual nature, I have highlighted the implicit 
arguments of Massumi, and suggested employing both a linear either/or level of analysis and a 
non-linear or paradoxical logic. The former can help us to capture the structural aspects of the 
body, as a differentiated and self-organised system. The latter appears necessary if we want to 
address the body as an open-ended, distributed, and processual phenomenon, which can only exist 
in relation to other bodies.  
Yet, it seems important to reiterate that I am in no way advocating a further type of Cartesianism 
or a dualistic ontology, but rather pointing out the multiplicities involved in the ways we get to 
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know and act in the world. In fact, I believe that our embodied condition is far more complex than 
what can be accounted for by only recurring to two dimensions or two levels of analysis. In this 
respect, I am endorsing an approach that is epistemologically pluralist and ontologically monist, 
rather than Cartesian and dualist. In other words, the pre-individual and individuated dimensions 
of embodiment I am referring to here ± which from now on I will identify as the non-dichotomous 
mode of embodiment of the Becoming and the dichotomous mode of the Being respectively ± only 
represent a point of departure from which to explore the multidimensionality of our embodied 
condition and move into post-Cartesian territories. Having said that, before embarking on this 
H[SORUDWRU\ MRXUQH\ ZLWK WKH SUHVHQW UHVHDUFK¶V FDVH VWXG\ EHORZ , RXWOLQH WKH PHWKRGRORJ\



















Part II: METHODOLOGY ± ENVELOPING DUALISM(S) 
 
 
Introduction ± 6WXG\¶V5DWLRQDOH$LPV&RQFHSWXDO6WUDWHJ\DQG0HWKRGV 
 
It would indeed be foolish to embark on the exploration of novel and unknown territories without 
some sort of preparation involving, for example, maps, strategies, and a careful choice of 
equipment. Yes, it is true that it is not known exactly what one will encounter, but, as will be 
evident below, other explorers adventured on very similar non-dualist routes (e.g., Spinoza, 
Nishida, the Daoist tradition) ± what do their accounts look like? How can their experiences help? 
And, of course, there must be some level of expectation if one decides to travel ± what does one 
wish to gain from the journey? Part II of this thesis ± the methodology ± intends to answer these 
TXHVWLRQV ,Q WKH VXEVHTXHQW FKDSWHUV  DQG  , HOXFLGDWH WKH SUHVHQW VWXG\¶V UDWLRQDOH DLPV
conceptual strategy, and methods.   
,EHJLQE\RXWOLQLQJWKHUHVHDUFK¶VUDWLRQDOHDQGDLPVLQFKDSWHU+HUH,VXJJHVWWKDWLWLVRQO\E\
confronting the mind-body relationship that we can address the deeply ingrained habits 
constituting the background of our embodied actions, experiences, and identities. I subsequently 
LGHQWLI\ 6KLOOLQJ¶V ERG\ SHGDJRJLFV DV D IUXLWIXO H[DPSOH RI DQ DSSURDFK DLPLQJ DW EULQJLQJ
together the insights of different perspectives of the sociological study of the body. However, I 
argue that a meaningful integration of the different strands in the field would require a 
paradigmatic shift when theorising embodiment. That is, I suggest that, if we wish to move in 
post-Cartesian territories, rather than integrating them, we need to aim at transcending extant 
approaches in a manner which can allow us to endorse a process-oriented ontology while also 
accounting for the causal powers of an individuated dimension.  
Following this, I introduce the conceptual strategy I employ in my exploration: namely that of 
enveloping all dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context and thus turning them into dualities in 
unity. Stemming from my initial distinction between mistaken ontological conclusions and evident 
epistemological truths related to the mind-body relationship, this strategy involves an explicit 
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acknowledgment of the dual character of embodiment, as well as of two related modes according 
to which we get to know and engage with the world. One is a dichotomous mode of embodiment 
where the mind-body dualism is phenomenologically salient ± I call this mode the Being, which is 
sustained by an either/or logic. The other is a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment where the 
mind-ERG\ GXDOLVP YDQLVKHV IURP RQH¶V SKHQRPHQRORJLFDO ILHOG DQG PLQG DQG ERG\ DUH 
experienced in their ontological unity ± I call this mode the Becoming, which is underpinned by a 
paradoxical logic.  
I furthermore introduce the two self-FXOWLYDWLRQSUDFWLFHVZKLFKFRPSRVH WKLV WKHVLV¶FDVHVWXG\
'DRLVW ,QWHUQDO $UWV ',$ DQG 6SLQR]D¶s Practical Philosophy (SPP). I employ the latter as a 
theoretical lens to analyse the former, which I am using as an ethnographic empirical arena. Both 
practices employ the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) to bring about a radical shift from the 
dichotomous Being to the non-dichotomous Becoming.  
After this introductory account, I illustrate in what ways the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) is 
HVSHFLDOO\ VLJQLILFDQW LQ -DSDQHVH SKLORVRSKHU 1LVKLGD .LWDUǀ¶V EDVKR WKHRU\ +HUH , VKRZ WKDW
rather than bridging the dualist gap, Nishida overwhelms it with a wider non-dualist context. He 
engages with dualities without either conflating their terms or falling into dualism(s), and is 
therefore able to account for the causal powers of an individuated dimension within a process-
RULHQWHGRQWRORJ\,QWXUQ1LVKLGD¶VEDVKRWKHRU\OHDGVWRDQRYHUYLHZRI'DRLVWFRVPRORJ\DQG
Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), which theoretically inform DIA.  
And it is with DIA that I begin chapter 6. Here I explain that I use this umbrella term to encompass 
a variety of overlapping practices such as neigong, qigong, and tai chi chuan. In this respect it is 
important to make clear that the present research is not concerned with DIA per se, i.e., as an 
object of study. Rather, this Eastern tradition, which I investigate in a Western context, is 
employed as a pragmatic exemplification of a practice concerned with bringing about change in 
human embodiment from a dichotomous to a non-dichotomous mode. Accordingly, the outcome 
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of the case study is discussed within the context of contemporary body studies and with the 
support of Western thinkers, rather than in relation to Eastern philosophies and in Daoist terms.  
I subsequently turn my attention to the epistemological issues involved in the present study, whose 
aim also includes a contribution to expanding the notion of the empirical in sociological and 
embodied research. Here I explain that this thesis endorses a phenomenological approach which 
DLPVWRµZDONWKHOLQH¶EHWZHHQWKHPRGHRIHPEodiment of the Being and the Becoming ± i.e., to 
take into account both modes and the two related logics. Linked to this I outline the methods 
employed, which intend to address the multidimensionality of embodiment, the tacit knowledge of 
the body, and the dynamics involved in the relationship between pre-reflective and reflective 
H[SHULHQWLDOGLPHQVLRQV,WKHQSUHVHQWDQDFFRXQWRIWKHUHVHDUFK¶VEDFNJURXQGTXDOLI\WKHGDWDLQ














Chapter 5: TRANSCENDING DUALISM(S) 
 
5.1 Study Rationale ± Accounting for Individuation Within a Process-Oriented 
Ontology 
 
When reviewing extant literature, I have argued that although the field of body studies emerged 
from a strong anti-Cartesian stance, we have nevertheless witnessed shifts of emphasis along the 
terms of the Cartesian dualism. That is, rather than having been meaningfully related to one 
another in a non-dualist manner, mind and body appear to have been set in opposition or conflated. 
In other words, my analysis of three decades of body studies has indicated that a just anti-Cartesian 
commitment has not yet developed into a truly and consolidated post-Cartesian scenario. In fact, 
rather than turns, it seems that in the field we have witnessed re-turns of long-standing 
philosophical questions, which fundamentally boil down to the nature of the relationship between 
our mind and body.  
2QWKLVJURXQGUDWKHUWKDQµVROYLQJ¶ZKDWDUHXOWLPDWHTXHVWLRQV,ZLVKWRSURYLGHDFRQWULEXWLRQ
to understanding the character of, and the dynamics involved in, the mind-body relationship, so 
WKDWZHFDQPRUHHIIHFWLYHO\µGHDO¶Zith it and thus overcome the persistence of a Cartesian and 
dualistic way of thinking. My contention is that only by addressing the mind-body relationship in a 
direct manner can we transcend extant approaches to the body, advance our understanding of other 
related crucial relationships still salient in social theory (e.g., those between language and 
corporeality, the representational and non-representational, and internal and external environments 
of embodiment), and be able to stick to a process-oriented and relational ontology while not 
QHJOHFWLQJWKHFDXVDOSRZHUVRIWKHHPERGLHGDJHQW¶VHPHUJHQWSURSHUWLHV 
I am here concerned with change. And, as I share the view of those numerous social and cultural 
theorists who see embodiment as the locus where the reproduction and the transformation of 
society and culture takes place, a concern with change also means addressing the pre-reflective 
aspects of our embodied condition ± that which Merleau-Ponty calls the tacit knowledge of the 
body: i.e., deeply ingrained habits, sedimented in the very materiality, anatomy, and physiology of 
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the body, which constitute the background of our conscious awareness and capacities for 
reflexivity.  
In fact, this concern too is a long-standing preoccupation, which is shared by two apparently 
distant ± in both space and time ± perspectives: that of a Western and enlightenment philosopher 
such as Spinoza, and that of an Eastern and ancient tradition such as Daoism. Understanding pre-
reflective/reflective dynamics is crucial to bring about change in modes of embodiment, which, 
regardless of geographical and historical contexts, shaped by material, social, and cultural 
environments, can enhance or constrain the way we get to know and act in the world.  
As highlighted by Shilling (2017:  ³>W@KH SRZHU UHODWLRQVKLSV LPSOLFDWHG LQ ZKR LV DEOH WR
direct consciously the pre-FRQVFLRXVFXOWXUDOOHDUQLQJRIRWKHUVLVDQLPSRUWDQWVRFLRORJLFDOLVVXH´
In sociological terms, the concern with the interaction between reflective and pre-reflective types 
RI NQRZOHGJH LV SHUKDSV EHVW H[HPSOLILHG E\ GHEDWHV RQ WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ %RXUGLHX¶V
notion of habitus and our reflexive capacities. In fact, the habitus is a further long-standing theme. 
A notion which can be traced back to Aristotle and subsequently to the Christian theologian 
7KRPDV $TXLQDV %RXUGLHX¶V KDELWXV constitutes the basis of our subjectivity and being-in-the-
world (Crossley, 2001). The habitus shapes the way we think, judge, and act in social 
environments, which therefore also involves our outlook, tastes, desires, and the way we talk, 
walk, or sit (Bourdieu 2014/1990).  
,Q%RXUGLHX¶VZRUGVLELGRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVKDELWXVDUH³V\VWHPVRIGXUDEOH WUDQVSRVDEOH
dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures, that is, as 
SULQFLSOHV ZKLFK JHQHUDWH DQG RUJDQL]H SUDFWLFHV DQG UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV´ 6WUHVVLQJ WKHUHIRUH PRUH
the pre-reflective and the non-representational (and the body) rather than the reflective and the 
representational (and the mind), as well as the symmetry between embodied dispositions and 
social structures (rather than the emergent properties and creative capacities of the embodied 
agent), the habitus is a form of tacit knowledge, which comes to suffuse the body through 
socialisation, reiteration of sociocultural practices, and the material and symbolic contingencies 
available to the individual.  
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Yet, although it does shape them, the notion of the habitus does not seem to provide a satisfactory 
theoretical account of our cognitive capacities and conscious awareness (Shilling, 2004). In fact, 
always attuned with LWV µKDELWDW¶ ± i.e., the location of the subject in a field of social relations 
(Sayer, 2005) ± the habitus appears to be closely related to the notion of affect (Blackman, 2013; 
Lane, 2012). Consequently, habitus-related debates are animated by questions very much 
resembling those we encountered in the affective turn: Is the tacit knowledge of the habitus 
impermeable to our conscious deliberations? Are our actions mainly guided by our conscious 
deliberations or by the corporeal sedimentation of social practices? Can we reduce the embodied 
agent to her dispositions and the social structures in which she is embedded? While some attribute 
the key role in guiding our actions to reflexivity (e.g., Archer, 2007, 2010; Giddens, 2004/1991), 
most theorists see both habitus and reflexivity as being necessary for enabling embodied agents to 
make choices and competently navigate socio-cultural environments (e.g., Crossley, 2001; 
Mouzelis, 2008; Sayer, 2010; Shilling, 2012/1993, 2005).  
However, if we do not adequately conceptualise the relationship between the two concepts ± 
habitus and reflexivity ± we risk ending up in a vicious circular process where society, the habitus, 
and our cognitive faculties are always symmetrical. In this way, there is no room for agency, 
creativity, and novelty, and our conscious awareness is once more reduced to an epiphenomenon. 
Conversely, an over-emphasis on our conscious deliberation is likely to yield disembodied 
accounts where, once again, there is a transcendent and active mind acting upon an objectified and 
passive body. We risk, in other words, continuing to reproduce either a sterile monism where two 
dimensions of embodiment are conflated, or an improbable dualism with an unbridgeable gap 
between two different types of knowledge. While, when theorising the habitus, Bourdieu himself 
and many more after him have acknowledged the role of reflexivity in our course of actions (for an 
exemplary publication in this respect, see Wacquant, 2014), as argued by Shilling (2004: 489), this 
KDVEHHQGRQHE\ UHVRUWLQJ WR³µUHVLGXDOFDWHJRULHV
 >«@ZKLFKFRXOGQRWEHGHGXFHGIURPDQG




Moreover, the notion of the habitus and the concern with the pre-reflective/reflective dynamics 
also brings to the fore other relationships, such as those between internal and external, outer and 
inner, and relational and individuated dimensions of embodiment. Despite the at-times dramatic 
divergences between extant approaches to the body, we have seen that the shared anti-Cartesian 
stance has produced what I argue is an unnecessary common ground constituted by an aversion to 
FRQVLGHULQJWKHHPERGLHGDJHQW¶VLQQHUOLIH7 and an exclusive focus on external environments of 
embodiment. As observed by Shilling (2007: 8-9), in contemporary social theory, although 
³HPERGLPHQW >LV@ VLJQLILFDQW >LW LV@ RQO\ DQDO\VHG LQ WHUPV of its ties and interdependence with 
RWKHUSKHQRPHQD´$QGWKLVWUHQGLVUHIOHFWHGDOVRE\WKHVRFLRORJLFDOHPSOR\PHQWRIWKHKDELWXV
$JDLQLQ6KLOOLQJ¶VRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVZRUGV 
>%RXUGLHX¶V@FRQFHSWLRQRIhabitus places the reproduction of the external environment at the very 
heart of his conception of action [and therefore] the problem with this is that embodied action 
appears predetermined ± it both echoes and replicates existing structures ± leaving those who 
oSHUDWLRQDOLVH %RXUGLHX¶V ZRUN LQ WKHLU UHVHDUFK HPSOR\LQJ VWUDWHJLHV WR PRGLI\ LWV UHSURGXFWLYH
logic.  
Similar to the inverse Cartesianism characterising some theorising on affect, here the pre-reflective 
and socially structured bodily knowledge of the habitus appears to pre-determine our course of 
action leaving in this way little room for innovation ± here, once again, our conscious awareness 
only plays a marginal epiphenomenal role. A fruitful path leading to the amelioration of this state 
of affairs is indicated by Shilling (ibid.), who suggests re-evaluating the insights of American 
pragmatists such as John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and William James to advance our 
understanding of the relationship between social practices, bodily changes, and embodied actions. 
For Shilling, while acknowledging the ontological primacy of a collective, relational, and open-
                                                          
7 It appears to be helpful to make clear that I am here referring to Merleau-3RQW\¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIRXUOLYHG
H[SHULHQFHDVDQRSHQLQJUDWKHUWKDQFORVLQJRQWRWKHZRUOG7KHUHIRUHE\µLQQHUOLIH¶,DPQRWUHIHUULQJWR
DQH[SHULHQFHRFFXUULQJVRPHZKHUHµLQVLGH¶WKHHPERGLHGVXEMHFWDVZLWKLQDFRJQLWLYLVWUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVW
framework. Rather I mean the fact that we experience a world, a body, affective states, thoughts, inner 
conversations; the fact that we are conscious and have a sense of self, which has an exclusively personal 
character and is inaccessible to other people, but which nevertheless is part of the wider milieu constituted 
by our body embedded in material, social, and cultural worlds. That said, my conceptualisation of an inner 
dimension as an opening will become more evident in part III of this thesis dedicated to the case study.  
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ended dimension, pragmatists did not disregard the internal environment of human embodiment, 
an individuated dimension DQG WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V FRQscious deliberations, which are 
irreducible to the social context ± here the internal and external dimensions are always considered 
in conjunction, yet they are not conflated.  
,Q WKLV UHVSHFW ZKHQ FRPPHQWLQJ RQ 'HZH\¶V WKHRULVLQJ 6KLOOLQJ LELG  RULginal emphasis) 
notes:  
The external environment (in its social and physical dimensions) is for pragmatism essential for 
understanding embodied action. The generalised standards that develop with regards to 
communicative acts, for example, affect our appearance, diet and action, while the social shaping of 
SHRSOH¶VLGHQWLWLHVGRHVQRWRFFXUµLQDYRLG¶EXWWKURXJKµSURORQJHGDQGFXPXODWLYHLQWHUDFWLRQV¶
ZLWKWKHSHFXOLDULWLHVRIWKHLUSK\VLFDOHQYLURQPHQW6LPLODUO\WKHERG\¶VVFKHPDSRVWXUHVPXVFOH
tensLRQV WHFKQLTXHV DQG WH[WXUHV DOVR GHYHORS DV D UHVXOW RI XV µEXPSLQJ LQWR¶ DQG XQGHUWDNLQJ
navigations through our physical milieu. Having recognised the significance of the external 
environment, however, pragmatism is also concerned with the internal environment of bodily 
EHLQJDQGDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIWKHERG\¶VHPHUJHQWQHHGVDQGSRWHQWLDOLWLHV 
Hence, for Shilling (ibid.), addressing both the internal and external dimensions of embodiment, as 
has been done by pragmatists, means to grant to the pre-reflective, the social, and our habits the 
role of background for our embodied actions, but also acknowledge that our individuated 
dimension ± involving our physical necessities (e.g., need for water, food, shelter, etc.) and mental 
capacities (e.g., the ability to reflect and act upon the milieu of which we are part) ± brings about 
FKDQJH LQ WKH FROOHFWLYH GLPHQVLRQ LQ ZKLFK LW LV HPEHGGHG ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV SUDJPDWLVP ³LV
sensitive to continuity and FKDQJH´ 6KLOOLQJ   RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV RU LQ WKLV WKHVLV¶
terms, to structural and processual aspects of embodiment.   
To be sure, accounting for what I have called the individuated dimension of embodiment ± and 
thus the emergent properties of the embodied agent and her capacities to bring about novelty ± 
ought not to be misinterpreted as an individualistic, cognitivist or indeed Cartesian standpoint. 
While this dimension will be discussed in detail in the case study, it is important to reiterate that 
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the fundamental tenet of this thesis is the acknowledgement that we live in a world of 
entanglement, interconnectedness, and mutual implication, where there is no place for self-
contained, independent, and transcendent entities ± as previously stated (see chapter 4.1), the 
present research subscribes to what is fundamentally a process-oriented ontology. 
(YHU\µWKLQJ¶LQFOXGLQJRXUERGLHVDQGPLQGVGRHVQRWSUH-exist its relation with other things but 
rather comes to be through such relation ± HYHU\ µWKLQJ¶ FDQ be because it is related to another 
µWKLQJ¶ <HW WKH DSSUHFLDWLRQ WKDW WKLQJV KDYH DQ LGHQWLW\ QRW EHFDXVH RI D VXEVWDQWLDO SULQFLSOH
internal to them but because they are embedded in a wider collective milieu does not need to imply 
that such things ought to be ignored as irreleYDQW ,QGHHGD µWKLQJ¶ LVDQHPHUJHQWSKHQRPHQRQ
ZKLFKPDNHVDGLIIHUHQFHSUHFLVHO\EHFDXVHLWLVUHODWHGWRRWKHUµWKLQJV¶ 
Therefore, while the disregard of the individuated dimension is understandable in light of the 
preoccupation of social and cultural theorists with avoiding the cognitivist and disembodied 
accounts which have for too long dominated social theory, if we want to avoid erasing the subject 
altogether and an inverse Cartesianism where our phenomenological life becomes an 
epiphenomenon, rather than disregarding it, we need to re-think an individuated dimension in a 
non-transcendent, non-Cartesian, and non-epiphenomenal fashion. In other words, we need to be 
able to address both internal and external environments of embodiment in a non-dualist manner. It 
is in light of these considerations that I suggest that a productive task for contemporary social 
theory is to account for an individuated dimension possessing its own phenomenal world, power of 
acting, and emergent properties within a non-dualist, relational, and process-oriented ontology. It 
is in this direction that the present study intends to go.  
Hence, far from advocating a Cartesian worldview, I am attempting to move from a mere anti-
Cartesian stance towards what political theorists Diane Coole and Samantha Frost (2010) envisage 
as a post-Cartesian ontology. The former has been a necessary starting point; the latter, I contend, 
is needed to move on from a certain impasse in contemporary body studies. The just objection to 
the Cartesian paradigm has enormously advanced the understanding of our embodied subjectivity, 
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and has successfully challenged the self-contained, rational, transcendent knower who finds herself 
VRPHKRZSDUDFKXWHGLQWRDQH[WHUQDOZRUOG<HWDVDSWO\SXWE\6WHQQHU³>L@QUHFHQW
µUDGLFDO¶ VRFLDO WKHRU\ LW VHHPV WKH EDE\ RI VXEMHFWLYLW\ LV DW ULVN RIEHLQJ WKURZQ RXW Zith the 
bathwater of representationalism, leaving only the hollow remainder of a reactive ensemble of 
µERG\SDUWV¶´ 
All in all, while in social theory the mind-body dualism appears to underpin a series of crucial 
issues, at the same time in contemporary theorising the nature of the relationship between mind 
and body seems to be more avoided than discussed, more forgotten than confronted, more vilified 
than re-considered. In this way, it seems as if the issue has already been settled by simply 
acknowledging the untenability of the Cartesian worldview. However, as rightly contended by 
Grosz (see chapter 3.3), moving beyond the mind-body dualism does not mean denying it. 
Choosing reductionist shortcuts, such as those of reducing the mind to the body, the body to the 
mind, or sterile forms of monism, means more explaining the Cartesian dualism away than 
advancing the understanding of our embodied condition. As suggested by Shilling, rather than 
HVFKHZLQJ³WKHRUHWLFDOFRQFHUQV>DQGRQO\SURYLGLQJ@SDUWLDOYLHZVRIHPERGLPHQW´
 ³>W@KH VRFLRORJ\ RI WKH ERG\ QHHGV WR VD\ VRPHWKLQJ DERXW WKH PLQG-ERG\ UHODWLRQVKLS´
(ibid.: 16) ± in this respect, below I will show that indeed Shilling offers a number of useful 
arguments.  
 
5.2 Study Aims ± Transcending Extant Approaches   
 
Shilling (2012/1993) points out that the tendency of body theorists to stress certain features of the 
body while neglecting others, rather than combining them into a coherent conceptual framework, 
seems to result in a stalemate of the sociology of the body. In fact, authors who concentrate their 
efforts on accommodating different perspectives in one coherent framework of the body seem to 





approaches we have examined into a more comprehensive framework that avoids their 
OLPLWDWLRQV´ Working towards this project of integration, Shilling conceptualises modes of 
embodiment as the outcome of particular body pedagogics ,Q6KLOOLQJDQG0HOORU¶V 
original emphasis) words:  
[B]ody pedagogics refers to the central means through which a culture seeks to transmit its main 
corporeal techniques, skills, dispositions and beliefs, the experiences typically associated with 
acquiring these attributes, and the actual embodied changes resulting from this process. 
In this way, the body pedagogics approach is multidimensional as it takes into account the 
material, social and cultural connotations of modes of embodiment, and, even more importantly 
IRUWKLVWKHVLV¶FRQFHUQZLWKRXUSKHQRPHQRlogical life, the experiences related to specific changes 
in modes of embodiment. Here the biological and the social are more than the mere sum of their 
SDUWV DQGKXPDQHPERGLPHQW LV D FRPSOH[SKHQRPHQRQZKLFKQHHGV WREHDGGUHVVHGDV³as a 
whole (body anGPLQGIHHOLQJDQGFRJQLWLRQ´0HOORU	6KLOOLQJ$WWKHVDPHWLPHDV
Shilling and Mellor (2007: 533) make clear, considering embodiment as a whole does not 
necessarily entail a one-dimensional form of monism as all the aspects involved ± the material, the 
sensual, the experiential, the cognitive, the symbolic ± DUH³DQDO\WLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWHDFKLQLWVRZQ
right [so that] the concept of body pedagogics can facilitate analyses which explore how these 
factors interact and shape each other without engaging in discursive reductionism or other forms of 
FRQIODWLRQLVP´ 
A body pedagogics approach, in other words, avoids conflation by retaining analytical distinctions 
between different dimensions of embodiment without, however, falling into forms of dualism. 
Distinctions can be made, for instance, between bodies and social systems, or different types of 
experiences and ways of acting ± each with their own properties, which cannot be reduced to each 




FRJQLWLRQ SUDFWLFDO DQG VHQVRU\ NQRZOHGJH´ LELG  RU ³EHWZHHQ QRHWLFFRQVFLRXV DQG
anoetic/pre-conscious knoZOHGJH´LELG 
Crucially, not only are all these analytical categories and levels of analysis not conflated, but they 
are also not set apart or in opposition. Differently from Massumi (see chapter 4.3), Shilling (2017: 
18) recognises that the tacit knowledge of the body can be both sealed from, and aligned with, our 
conscious awareness. Here the relationship between mind and body and/or between different types 
of knowledge, rather than being fixed, is amenable to change. Again drawing on the pragmatist 
DSSURDFK6KLOOLQJLELGUHPLQGVXVWKDW³'HZH\LVFOHDUWKDWWKLQNLQJDQGVHQVLQJQRHWLFDQG
DQRHWLFNQRZOHGJHFDQFRPSOHPHQWHDFKRWKHUEXWFDQDOVREHXQHYHQDQGFRPSDUWPHQWDOL]HG´ 
Hence, every culturally structured activity (e.g., occupational, religious, or sporting practices) to 
be successfully performed requires the meaningful convergence of different types of embodied 
NQRZOHGJH0RUHRYHUWKHHPERGLHGDJHQW¶VQRHWLFDQGDQRHWLFIRUPVRINQRZOHGJHDOVRQHed to 
be attuned with external material and semiotic environments. Conversely, a fracture between pre-
reflective and reflective dimensions or between internal and external environments of embodiment 
poses serious challenges to the effectiveness of the emboGLHG DJHQW¶V DFWLRQ ZLWKLQ D VSHFLILF
cultural practice. Indeed, the success of a cultural practice involves the alignment of all the 
GLPHQVLRQVWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWE\ERG\SHGDJRJLFV LH³>WKH@VRFLDOWHFKQRORJLFDODQGPDWHULDO
means through which cultural practices are transmitted, the varied experiences of those involved in 
this learning and the embodied outcomes RIWKHVHSURFHVVHV´6KLOOLQJLELGRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV
It is only with such mind-body-world alignment in place that a cultural practice can be 
successfully carried out.  
It is, again, in this way that we can retain analytical distinctions while at the same time avoiding a 
dualist stance. All the dimensions considered, rather than irremediably cut off, are ultimately 
related to one another in dynamic relationships where they can be more or less attuned. For 
instance, while language can abstract us from our corporeality, it can also tap into it. In reference 
to a study conducted by Potter on contemporary dance training, Shilling (ibid.: 6) notes that:  
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[C]ontemporary dance teachers employ verbal communication to stimulate particular experiences. 
3KUDVHVLQFOXGLQJµPHOWLQWRWKHIORRU¶µIHHOWKHZHLJKWRIWKHKHDG¶DQGµDQFKRUWKH>KHDY\@SHOYLV
LQWRWKHJURXQG¶SURPSWGDQFHUVWRUH-centre oQWKHµERG\¶VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKJUDYLW\¶ 
Therefore, in this particular instance, rather than stressing a gap between affect and discourse, 
6KLOOLQJLELGRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVHPSKDVLVHVWKH³affective weight RIFRQFHSWVDQGV\PEROV´,W
is on the ground of all the above that the body pedagogics approach appears to offer a fertile 
sociological terrain on which to develop a view of embodiment which can account for its dual and 
multidimensional character. 
In addition, and significantly for this thesis, the need to theorise thought and cognition in body 
studies in both a non-epiphenomenal and non-dualistic way is identified by Shilling (ibid.) as the 
current priority in the body pedagogics agenda. He notes that the role of thought and cognition in 
the incorporation of culture and in the shaping of particular modes of embodiment is only 
implicitly acknowledged in the majority of studies concerned with the embodied transmission and 
acquisition of cultural practices. Hence, as this role appears to be undeveloped at the theoretical 
level, more research is needed to fill this gap (ibid.).  
Indeed, I believe that it is precisely by being able to theorise cognition as not opposed to the 
ERG\¶V WDFLW NQRZOHGJH WKDW ZH FDQ PRYH WRZDUG D SRVW-Cartesian worldview. Furthermore, in 
agreement with the outcome of my literature review showing the tendency to neglect of the inner 
dimension of the embodied agent, I would suggest re-thinking not only the role of cognition and 
thought, but of our lived experience as a whole, whose immaterial features can be mistakenly 
FRQVLGHUHGDVOHVVµDFWXDO¶WKDQWKHPDterial registers of our embodied condition.  
All in all, it seems to be clear that despite their limitations, each of the influential approaches to the 
body reviewed by the present research emphasises crucial aspects of the multidimensional 
phenomenon of embodiment. That is, the symbolic, the corporeal, the pre-reflective, and the fields 
of relations and possibilities from which the embodied subject emerges, are all facets that cannot 
be left unaddressed when theorising and researching the body and its relation to society and 
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culture. However, as arguHGE\6KLOOLQJ³>Z@LWKLQHDFKRIWKHVHDQDO\VHVWKHVSRWOLJKW
UHVWVRQFHUWDLQDVSHFWVRIWKHERG\ OHDYLQJRWKHUVREVFXUHG´$QGLQIDFWDV ,KDYHFRQWHQGHG
these analyses still appear to be located in a Cartesian landscape.  
It is in this respect that I contend that, rather than simply putting together their most valuable 
insights, there is a need for a type of integration able to transcend extant approaches. That is, I 
believe that a true integration can only be achieved by a paradigmatic shift in the way we think of 
human embodiment ± i.e., from a Cartesian to a post-Cartesian perspective. It is therefore in light 
of all these arguments that the present research intends to provide a contribution towards an 
approach to theorising and researching embodiment which can: 
1. Transcend extant linguistic, corporeal, and affective approaches in body studies.  
2. Engage with the analytical distinction related to the different experiential dimensions of 
embodiment ± e.g., mind and body, internal and external environments of embodiment, 
language and corporeality, representational and non-representational forms of knowledge 
± without conflating or setting these in opposition.  
3. Advance our understanding of how the relationships between these different experiential 
dimensions come to be and change. 
4. Retain a fundamentally process-oriented, open-ended, and relational framework, while 
accounting for the causal powers of our phenomenological life and individuated 
dimension.  
 
But how can such a contribution be provided? In what follows, I will first introduce the conceptual 
VWUDWHJ\,LQWHQGWRHPSOR\ZLWKWKHKHOSRI1LVKLGD¶VEDVKRWKHRU\DQGWKHQSURJUHVVWRRXWOLQH





5.3 The Conceptual Strategy ± Enveloping Dualism(s)  
 
As suggested at the beginning of this thesis, a fruitful starting point to address the Cartesian 
paradigm is that of making a distinction between the Cartesian ontological claim of mind and body 
belonging to two different realms and the basic epistemological distinction between material and 
immaterial experiences. That is, a distinction between the qualitative differences characterising our 
phenomenological life at the epistemological level and their reification at the ontological level. In 
turn, it is this distinction which can allow us to embrace an ontologically monist yet 
epistemologically pluralist theoretical framework. As argued by Williams and Bendelow (1998: 3, 
original emphasis), this also means making a distinction between µGXDOity and dualism¶ ± a 
GLVWLQFWLRQ ZKLFK LV UHPLQLVFHQW RI 'HOHX]H DQG *XDWWDUL¶V HTXDWLRQ 3/85$/,60   021,60
(see chapter 4.2):  
µ'HVWDELOLVLQJ¶RSSRVLWLRQDOFDWHJRULHV LQ WKLVZD\GRHVQRWKRZHYHUPHDQ WKDWZHFDQGLVSHQVH
with them altogether. Rather, their analytical potential must be acknowledged and engaged with, so 
WKDWWKHQHZWHUPVDQGGLIIHUHQWFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNFDQEHIRXQGLQRUGHUWRµVWHSRXWVLGH¶WKHVH
WUDGLWLRQDO ELQDU\ GLYLVLRQV DQG GHEDWHV >«@ Embodiment, we suggest, a term which lies 
DPELJXRXVO\ DFURVV WKHQDWXUHFXOWXUHGLYLGH SURYLGHV MXVW DPHDQVRIGRLQJ VR >«@8OWLPDWHO\
KRZHYHU DV ZH UHDGLO\ DFNQRZOHGJH WKHUH LV QR µVLQJOH¶ RU µILQDO¶ VROXWLRQ RI WKLV NQRWW\
SKLORVRSKLFDOSUREOHPHYHQWKHLGHDRIµJRLQJEH\RQG¶WKHEinary divide sets up its own duality 
(i.e. dichotomous versus non-dichotomous modes of thought). It is this central paradox, and the 
opportunities and constraints it affords, which fascinates us. 
Nevertheless, while on the one hand employing dualities does necessarily entail a commitment to 
dualism, on the other, dualities and dualism(s) are separated by a very fine line. As Williams and 
Bendelow note, the danger here is to set up further dualisms, such as that between a dichotomous 
and a non-dichotomous mode of thought. Yet, there is a conceptual strategy that has been long 
employed across Western and Eastern traditions to walk this fine line which, rather than providing 
D µVLQJOH RU ILQDO solution of this NQRWW\ SKLORVRSKLFDO SUREOHP¶, might help us deal with our 
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problem ± it can, in other words, help achieve our aim of theorising and researching embodiment 
without neither conflating nor setting in opposition mind and body.  
Such a strategy consists of emplacing, grounding, or enveloping dualism(s) ± including that 
between mind and body ± in a wider non-dichotomous context. Here dualist gaps ± including the 
dichotomous/non-dichotomous ± rather than bridged, are overwhelmed by a greater framework 
and, in this way, from dualism(s) they turn into dualities in unity. Likely due to the concern with 
DYRLGLQJ'HVFDUWHV¶VSHFWUHRULQVWHDGSHUKDSVGXHWRWKHVXEWOHSHUVLVWHQFHRIKLVSDUDGLJPWKLV
way of (re)conceptualising dualism(s) has never been developed in the rather consistent bulk of 
literature constituting body studies. However, it is this strategy that the present research intends to 
explore by bringing to the fore the dual character of embodiment that has implicitly emerged from 
reviewing extant literature, and relate it to two different ways to get to know and engage with the 
world, which I call the Being and the Becoming.   
The Being is a dichotomous mode of embodiment, where one tends to experience the world 
according to an either/or linear logic, as a structure made up by individuated and separated entities, 
and where dualisms like mind and body, subject and object, internal and external, or you and I, are 
phenomenologically salient. The Becoming is a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment where one 
experiences the world according to a circular logic of paradox, as a changing, evolving, open-
ended event, where there is no distinction between mind and body, subject and object, internal and 
external, you and I ± i.e., here dualism(s) tend to disappear from the phenomenological field and 
are experienced as dualities in unity.  
In support of my endeavour, I will not only draw on the extant discursive, corporeal, and affect 
theories reviewed in this study, but also on a number of sources from the natural sciences (e.g., 
Maturana and Varela, 1980/1972, 1992/1987; McGilchrist, 2010/2009). Indeed, the need to 
overcome the suspicion with which social sciences traditionally regard biological and 
neuroscientific approaches to the body has been stressed by several scholars (e.g., Blackman & 
Venn, 2010; Cromby, Newton & Williams, 2011; Fraser & Greco, 2005; Weber, 2006). In 
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addition, I will re-engage with a number of philosophers who have been increasingly acquiring 
currency in contemporary body studies (e.g., James, 1996/1912; Simondon, 1992, 2006/2001; 
Whitehead, 1968/1938, 1985/1978). However, all these sources will be located in the non-dualist 
landscape provided by two self-cultivation practices.  
One is offered by one of the first and most eminent anti-&DUWHVLDQV6SLQR]D¶V3UDFWLFDO3KLORVRSK\
(SPP), which will therefore constitute the theoretical structure of my sketch of a re-
FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI HPERGLPHQW $V VXFK 6SLQR]D¶V YLHZ RI KXPDQ HPERdiment and of the 
relationship between mind and body will be discussed in detail in the case study section. At the 
moment it suffices to say that in his major work, the Ethics, Spinoza (1996/1994) advances a self-
cultivation practice aiming at accessing the non-dichotomous mode of embodiment I call the 
Becoming. As observed by Foucault (2005: 15, see also Deleuze, 2013/1992), Spinoza aims to 
provide his readers with the instruments to achieve non-dichotomous modes of embodied 
knowledge, action, and identity where dualism(s) vanish(es) DQG WKH VXEMHFW ³PXVW EH FKDQJHG
WUDQVIRUPHGVKLIWHGDQGEHFRPHWRVRPHH[WHQWDQGXSWRDFHUWDLQSRLQWRWKHUWKDQKLPVHOI´ 
In fact, this is also the aim of the other self-cultivation practice, that which will constitute the 
empirical arena where the strategy of turning dualism(s) LQWR GXDOLWLHV LQ XQLW\ ZLOO EH µWHVWHG¶
That is, at the empirical level I will employ an ethnographic case study of Eastern self-cultivation 
practices now also popular in Western countries: neigong, qigong, and tai chi chuan. I will refer to 
these as Daoist Internal Arts (DIA). Having roots in the Daoist tradition which employs dualities 
in unity rather than dualism(s), DIA involve a type of training which targets the tacit knowledge of 
the body to obtain a radical transformation of the entire person ± body and mind. In fact, the DIA 
SUDFWLWLRQHU¶VDLPLVWRDFWXDOO\HPERG\GXDOLWLHVUDWKHUWKDQGXDOLVP(s) ± again, to achieve a non-
dichotomous mode of embodiment.  
By identifying these Eastern practices as a promising empirical ground, I am also being sensitive 
to the calls of many authors at a transdisciplinary level (e.g., Barad, 2007; Grosz, 1994; Lefebvre, 
2013/2004; Varela et al., 1993/1991) who have pointed out that, as both natural and human 
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sciences seem to be dominated by Western/Cartesian thought, we would benefit from a serious re-
evaluation of non-Western traditions in the production of knowledge.  
However, before providing more information on DIA and the related Daoist tradition, I wish to 
dwell a little more on the pivotal conceptual strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-
dualist context. While this strategy is adopted by both the self-cultivation practices used by the 
present research, it seems to be especially significant in the approach to the body advanced by 
Nishida. In addition, aiming to integrate the two perspectives, Nishida is a philosopher who 
engages with both Western and Eastern philosophical traditions, and can therefore help us to safely 
consolidate the common ground I identify between DIA and SPP. It is for these two main reasons 
WKDWEHORZ,ZLOOSURYLGHDQRYHUYLHZRIDNH\QRWLRQLQ1LVKLGD¶VSKLORVRSK\EDVKR 
 
5.4 Basho ± Overwhelming the Gap   
 
1LVKLGD¶VZRUNVDUHXQGHUSLQQHG by a motivation which is very much consistent with the present 
UHVHDUFK¶VKHLQWHQGHGWRDFFRXQWIRUWKHPLQG-body relationship and an individuated dimension 
within an open-ended, relational, and process-oriented ontology. As noted by philosopher James 
HHLVLJ 1LVKLGD LQWHQGHG³WRVKRZERWK WKHXQLW\RI LQGLYLGXDOFRQVFLRXVQHVVDQG LWV
SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ DQ XQIROGLQJ SURFHVV EH\RQG LQGLYLGXDO FRQVFLRXVQHVV´ ,Q WKLV ZD\ 1LVKLGD
employs an ontologically monist and yet epistemologically pluralist theoretical framework. 
Determined to avoid flat/conflated/one-dimensional forms of monism (à la ANT, for instance), 
Nishida (1966/1958: 163) argues that:   
[W]hen things are thought as parts of the whole, it means that the concept of acting things is lost, 
that the world becomes static and that reality is lost. The world of reality is essentially the one as 
well as the many; it is essentially a world of the mutual determination of single beings. 
To pursue his goal of stepping outside dualism(s) but not jettisoning dualities and analytical 
distinctions, Nishida integrated Western (especially Kantian, Jamesian, and phenomenological 
traditions) and Eastern perspectives (including Daoist, Zen Buddhist, and Indian thought) 
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(Krummel, 2012). In this light, he becomes particularly helpful in identifying the common ground 
between the Western philosophers the current study draws on and the Eastern tradition constituting 
the empirical arena. 
Resonating with Merleau-3RQW\¶VWKHRULVLQJ1LVKLGD¶VERG\IXQFWLRQs as an interface 
between a pre-individual and an individuated dimension, and, as such, possesses a dual character. 
,Q IDFW IRU 1LVKLGD WKH ZRUOG ZH H[SHULHQFH LV ³D chiasma ± i.e., a cross-configuration or 
intersection ± RIPXOWLOHYHOVRUGLPHQVLRQV´.Uummel, 2012: 42, original emphasis). In this way, 
for Nishida the relationship between the embodied agent and the world is characterised by creative 
interpenetration and structural reciprocity ± the embodied agent makes the world and, 
simultaneously, is maGHE\LW)RU1LVKLGD³>Z@HKDYHRXUERG\LQDQGZLWKWKH
formed; i.e., we are historical-ERGLO\´ +HUH WKH ERG\ FRQVWLWXWHV DQG LW LV FRQVWLWXWHG E\ WKH
material, social, and cultural milieu in which it is located, and therefore for Nishida embodiment is 
a multidimensional phenomenon which is more than the mere sum of biological and cultural 
factors. As philosopher Joel Krueger (2008: 221) explains:  
[For Nishida] our body is always embedded in shifting biological and cultural contexts that both 
sustain and constrain our activities, as well as giving them meaning and significance. Moreover, the 
different forms of our worldly engagement become the vehicles by which we achieve embodiment 
in all its dimensions. 
<HWZKLOH1LVKLGD¶VSKLORVRSKy shows a consistency with the arguments of many of the authors 
employed by this study (i.e., Merleau-Ponty, Spinoza, James, Simondon, and Whitehead), the 
strategy of enveloping dualism(s) ± what the Japanese philosopher calls a theory of basho ± plays 
the crucial role in his project of theorising the causal powers of an individuated dimension within a 
process-oriented ontology. But what is basho? As explained by philosopher John Krummel (2012: 
5-EDVKRµSODFH¶LQ-DSDQHVHLV³WKHµSODFHGQHVV¶RUµLPSODFHPHQW¶RIRXUOLYHGH[SHULHQFHLQ
the whole of its dynamic structure, that grounds cognition and whence the bifurcation into subject-





see constituting a common ground shared by a number of diverse perspectives ± i.e., relationships 
like those between mind and body, internal and external environments of embodiment, language 
and corporeality, or representational and non-representational, are conceptualised as dynamic 
dualities amenable to change and always located within a wider and ultimately non-dualist context. 
In turn, this allows basho to accommodate the structure of a particular phenomenon within a 
processual perspective which also accounts for the emergent properties of an individuated 
dimension.  
Starting from the premise that the asymmetrical coexistence between the body and the world 
grounds the possibility of embodied experience and action, Nishida (2012) appears to be interested 
in mapping out how exactly the phenomenon of human embodiment emerges from its 
emplacement in the world. While this concern might resonate with that of some actor-network 
theorists, it greatly differs from it. That is, Nishida does not exclusively focus on an open-ended 
dimension at the expense of an individuated one. Rather, albeit considering the former the ground 
of the latter, he is concerned with both these dimensions, which in his philosophy need to be 
considered in conjunction ± once more, we are here reasoning in terms of dualities in unity.  
If for Nishida our lived experience is the distinction between two dimensions, one unfolding from 
the other, this also implies that it needs to involve both of them. Ultimately, with his theory of 
basho, Nishida intends to develop a sophisticated tool to analyse the ways we get to know and act 
in the world in great detail, and achieve a non-dichotomous form of embodiment ± what he calls 
action-LQWXLWLRQ WKH%HFRPLQJ LQ WKLV WKHVLV¶ WHUPV+HUH WKHUH LVQRDEVHQFHRIFRQVFLRXVQHVV
but rather another type of consciousness, an awareness of, or in, the action itself. In these 
LQVWDQFHV DV REVHUYHG E\ 9DUHOD   ³>Z@KHQ RQH LV WKH DFWLRQ QR UHVLGXH RI VHOI-
FRQVFLRXVQHVVUHPDLQVWRREVHUYHWKHDFWLRQH[WHUQDOO\´ 
Basho (place) is therefore important because, for Nishida, the dynamic coupling between the body 
and the world raises the question of what kind of work is performed by the body in relation to the 
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whole, or, what place the activity of the embodied agent has in relation to the historical-social 
world (Krummel, 2012). To answer this question, basho theory employs multiple registers, levels, 
or degrees of analysis (in a manner very similar to TCM, which I will illustrate shortly). That is, 
1LVKLGDHPSOR\VGLIIHUHQWµEDVKRV¶ZKLFKFRQstitute a structuring of emplacement which 
envelops, surrounds, encloses, and grounds an increasingly more restricted structure of 
relationships ± including that between mind and body. However, these different degrees of 
analysis are not hierarchical but rather co-dependent with one another in their mutual interactions 
within a monist ontological system (ibid.).  
In this way, always with an emphasis on her agency and capacities for acting upon the world with 
reflexive and creative abilities, for Nishida the embodied agent is at the same time dependent, 
independent, and interdependent (Krummel, 2012). For example, the embodied agent is dependent 
on the world as its expression but also independent in her creativity and capacities for reflexivity 
and acting upon the world (ibid.). At the same, time embodied agents are also interdependent with 
one another through their interactions, which, in turn, resonate on more enveloping (for instance, 
society and culture) or more restricted structures (for exDPSOH WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V PLQG-body 
relationship) (ibid.).  
I believe that Krummel (2012: 29, original emphasis) beautifully sums up the Japanese 
SKLORVRSKHU¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH PLQG-ERG\ GXDOLVP ZKHQ KH VD\V WKDW ³>U@DWKHU WKDQ HUHFWLQJ D
bridge to cross over WKHGXDOLVWLFJDS1LVKLGD¶Vbasho-theory thus points us to a greater sea that 
RYHUZKHOPVWKHJDS´,QWKLVZD\EDVKRFDQKHOSXVWRUHWDLQDSURFHVV-oriented ontology while not 
jettisoning useful analytical distinctions. Or, once again, basho theory offers a theorising which 
can allow us to endorse monism at the ontological level while accounting for pluralism at the 
epistemological level. In fact, such an ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist 
framework, along with the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context and 
thus turning them into dualities in unity, characterise Daoist philosophy and Traditional Chinese 
Medicine (TCM). As these two intertwined traditions underpin DIA practices, below I will provide 




5.5 Daoist Cosmology and Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) 
 
Perhaps the principles of Daoist philosophy and TCM are best represented by the famous Taijitu 
diagram, which symbolises the universal forces giving rise to all differences and phenomena: yin 
and yang, or, as embodying a duality in unity where the terms cannot be pulled apart, yinyang 
(Wang, 2012). Relevantly to this study, therefore, these two forces can be considered according to 
both a dichotomous either/or logic as yin and yang, or to a non-dichotomous non-linear logic as 
yinyang. Diagram 1 represents the traditional Taijitu, while diagram 2 depicts the modern version 
of it, that with which most of us are familiar in the West. 
 
                                   




Diagram 2: The simplified, modern yin-yang symbol (source: Allen-Sherwood, 2015)  
In the traditional representation, starting from the top, we can see an empty red circle which 
represents the world before creation ± the Non-Ultimate (wuji) (Bidlack, 2006; Wang, 2012). The 
second circle represents the Non-Ultimate unfolding in the Great Ultimate (Taiji) and in all 
dualities like yin and yang, respectively represented by the black and white colours, while the red 
circle in the middle functions as a reminder that all the dualities are characterised by a fundamental 
unity (ibid.). The third section represents the dualities further unfolding into the five phases (which 
will be qualified shortly below), whereas the last two circles represent the rising of the plurality of 
DOO SKHQRPHQD LELG WKH µ QDWXUDO NLQGV¶ PHQWLRQHG LQ WKH ZHOO-known Tao Te Ching 
(Laozi, 2009).  
In the more modern depiction of the Taijitu, we can instead clearly see the interlocking patterns of 
Yin (black) and Yang (white) (or yinyang as a duality in unity) ± the first stage of the expression 
of the universe. While the literal meanings of yin and yang originally simply indicated the shady 
and sunny slope of a mountain, they then acquired a more general connotation denoting the 
complementary aspect of all phenomena, including the social and cultural domains (Porkert, 
1979/1974; Wang, 2012). As can be evinced by this more recent depiction of the Taijitu, there is a 
continuous, unbroken, and gradual transition between the two polarities. Each polarity, when 
manifesting itself at its maximum quantitative gradation, collapses into the other, starting the cycle 
again, according to a circular rather than linear logic.  
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This is what sinologist Manfred Porkert (1979/1974) calls quantitative gradations. That is, as the 
diagram shows, there is never an absolute yin or yang ± as explained by philosopher Robin Wang 
  ³\LQ DQG \DQJ PDUN SRLQWV LQ UHODWLRQV DFURVV D VSHFWUXP DQG ILHOG´ 7KXV \LQ
continuously changes into yang and vice versa, and thus each polarity always contains the seeds of 
the other (Porkert, 1979/1974; Wang, 2012). The diagram also symbolises what is fundamentally a 
process-oriented ontology where all things are entangled and in continuous transformation. More 
importantly, the two polarities are enveloped within the outer circle ± once more, they are dualities 
in unity within a wider non-dualist context.  
While the challenging task of addressing the meaning of yin and yang or yinyang is far beyond the 
scope of the present research, some brief and exemplary qualifications appear to be necessary as 
these are crucial concepts in DIA training. As Porkert (1979/1974) explains in his comprehensive 
accounts of TCM, in their polarity yin and yang respectively comprise the meanings of:  
Stasis±Setting in Motion 
Consolidation±Inducing Change/Transformation 
Awaiting Organisation yet Determinate±Dissolution, Dispersion, Determining yet Indeterminate 
Contractive±Expansive 
Centripetal±Centrifugal 
Intrasusceptive (absorbing into or within the individual)±Extraversive (bringing to the surface) 
There are, in addition, a virtually infinite number of correspondences related to yin and yang 
which stretch from a cosmological dimension to body parts and senses ± to give the reader a taste:  
Moon±Sun 
Autumn, Winter±Spring, Summer 
The Hours between Noon and Midnight±The Hours between Midnight and Noon 
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Cold, Coolness±Heat, Warmth 
The Lower part±The Upper part 
The Abdomen±The Back 
Sour and Pungent±Sweet and Bitter 
Even Numbers±Odd Numbers  
In short, any phenomenon has its own yin and yang dynamics (Wang, 2012). Furthermore, all 
these distinctions also need to be thought of in terms of dynamic qualitative overlaps. Here by 
qualitative overlaps Porkert (1979/1974) means that within, let us say, a phenomenon which we 
identify as yang, we can then distinguish between yin and yang aspects, and within them new yin 
and yang aspects, and so on ad infinitum. The following diagram depicts this well: 
 
Diagram 3: The qualitative overlaps of yin and yang (source: Hilty, 2010) 
Of course, and crucially, within a process-oriented ontology identifying something as yang or yin 
is merely a heuristic device ± these are analytical categories employed to pin down the nature of a 
specific pattern involved in the specific process one wishes to consider at any given time (Wang, 
2012). Hence distinguishing between yin and yang is a fictive yet instrumental analytical exercise 
which aims to capture and act upon complex dynamic patterns.  
Importantly, to achieve this aim TCM does not employ only dualities in its analyses. For instance, 
the body-mind duality can be broken down into the tripartite and more nuanced body-mind-spirit 
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GLVWLQFWLRQ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH µWKUHH WUHDVXUHV¶ jing, qi, and shen (Beaupre, 2011; Frantzis 
2006/1993; Wang, 201 ,Q DGGLWLRQ \LQ DQG \DQJ IXUWKHU XQIROG LQWR WKH µ)LYH (YROXWLYH
3KDVHV¶ZKLFKUHSUHVHQWGLIIHUHQWTXDOLWDWLYHPDQLIHVWDWLRQVRIFKL7KHVHDUH:DWHU:RRG)LUH
Earth, and Metal. As shown by diagram 4, these phases are linked to each other through cycles of 
production, conquest, and violations. For instance, water produces wood, but then is conquered by 
earth, and, can also rebel against wood, inverting the cycle in violation (Porkert, 1979/1974).  
 
 
Diagram 4: The five interrelated elements of TCM (source: White Tiger Healing Arts, 2018) 
At this point, it is perhaps obvious to the reader that each phase has its own yin-yang dynamics 
(Porkert, 1979/1974). So, for instance, water has its own yin and yang (ibid.). Moreover, each 
phase (or element) is part of a system of correspondences cutting across material and immaterial 
experiential dimensions. Water is linked, for example, to winter, to cold, to north, to the time 
between 3pm to 7pm, to the colour black, and so on (ibid.). Importantly, however, each phase is 
also linked to the materiality of the body, to the senses, and to embodied dispositions and body 
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movements. Thus water is linked to ears and hearing, to the organs of bladder (yang) and kidney 
(yin), to the bones, to shaking, to moaning, and to the affect of fear (which in turn can be yin or 
yang ± e.g., fear can make one freeze or run away) (ibid.). This sophisticated system goes on to the 
twelve meridians, the twenty-four meridians ± the meridians being the vessels, channels, or 
conduits permeating the whole body through which the chi flows ± and so on down to the 
hundreds of acupuncture points (ibid.).  
In fact, along with yin and yang, and the five phases, the notion of chi (or qi or ki) is the other key 
concept in TCM. Chi is the notion which injects dynamism into all the dualities, phases, and 
DQDO\WLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQV:KLOHWKHOLWHUDOWUDQVODWLRQRIWKHWHUPPLJKWEHFORVHWRWKH(QJOLVKµDLU¶
µEUHDWK¶RU µYDSRXU¶ WKHDFWXDOPHDQLQJRI WKH WHUP LVGLIILFXOW WRJUDVS +VX&KL LV LQ
fact, the stuff permeating the universe, which has agency and brings about transformation (ibid.). 
Chi manifests itself in different qualitative modes and on different registers, from a macrocosmic 
dimension related to meteorological, climatic, and immunological effects, to a microcosmic level 
concerned with functional relationships within the body as outlined above (Porkert, 1979/1974). In 
simpler terms, chi is a psychophysical energy which has a simultaneous effect on both mind and 
body (Yuasa, 1993).  
On the ground of the above, Porkert (1979/1974) argues that TCM is a medicine of systematic 
correspondences primarily based on a synthetic and inductive epistemological model. By 
inductivity Porkert (ibid.) means a mode of knowledge which identifies a connection between two 
effective positions taking place at the same time but in different places in space. This contrasts 
with the logic of causality which deals with the link between two effective positions given at 
different times but in the same place in space (ibid.). This is reiterated by Wang (2012: 4) when 
VKH QRWHV WKDW ZLWKLQ 'DRLVW FRVPRORJ\ ³>D@Q HYHQW RU DFWLRQ KDSSHQLQJ RU SHUIRUPHG LQ RQH
domain affects corresponding factors in another domain. This cosmology is not based on linear 
causality between distinct entities but rather on making a connection between entities and 
SKHQRPHQD´ ± WKLV ORJLF DV WKH UHDGHU ZLOO UHDOLVH ODWHU DOVR XQGHUSLQV 6SLQR]D¶V SULQFLSOH RI
mind-body correspondence.  
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All in all, despite their holistic connotation, these Eastern traditions avoid conflationisms or 
reductionisms by employing several analytical categories which, although always grounded in a 
wider relational framework, have their significance in their own right, and are able to effectively 
address pragmatic issues and concrete situations. Here nuanced analytical distinctions are fictive 
yet functional tools to get to know and change patterns and dynamics within a world conceived of 
as an ongoing relational process ± as observed by Wang (2012: 10): 
Each element influences and shapes the other. If yin and yang are interdependent and mutually 
LQFOXVLYH WKHQ D FKDQJH LQ RQH ZLOO QHFHVVDULO\ SURGXFH D FKDQJH LQ WKH RWKHU >«@ 7KLV PXWXDO
resonance is crucial to yinyang as a strategy because it entails that one can influence any element 
by addressing its opposite, which in practice most often takes the form of responding to yang 
through yin.  
This is, once more, an ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist conceptual framework, 
where all dualisms are enveloped in a wider non-dualist context, and where there is a clear 
distinction between ontological conclusions and epistemological truths ± DJDLQLQ:DQJ¶V
49, original emphasis) words:  
This oneness or unity is built on the oppositional forces of reality. There would be no point in 
emphasizing the one if differentiation were not already assumed, and there would be no way for the 
Dao to explain the movements and patterns of singular things.   
This conceptual landscape is of course reflected in the way the body is conceived of, which 
appears to be consistent with the dual character suggested by the present study. That is, on the one 
hand, the body is thought of as a process at the ontological level. In this respect, sinologist Nathan 
6LYLQ¶V [LY VHHDOVR3RUNHUWDUJXPHQWV Vtrongly resemble Deleuze and 
*XDWWDUL¶V  %RG\ ZLWKRXW 2UJDQV ZKHQ KH GHVFULEHV 7&0¶V ERG\ DV XOWLPDWHO\ D
³IXQFWLRQDOV\VWHPZLWKRXWSK\VLFDORUJDQV´2QWKHRWKHUKDQGGHWDLOHGDQDO\WLFDOGLVWLQFWLRQVDUH
crucial to address the structural aspect of the body, and achieve what is the aim of both the Daoist 
sage and the Chinese traditional doctor: the balance between the internal and external flows of chi 
%LGODFN  RU LQ WKLV WKHVLV¶ WHUPV WKH DWWXQHPHQW EHWZHHQ LQWHUQDO DQG H[WHUQDO
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environments of embodiment ± being this internal/external distinction one of the key analytical 
distinctions within these Eastern perspectives (Wang, 2012).  
It is therefore in this light that one needs to interpret the notion of wu wei RU DFWLQJ DV µD VHOI
ZLWKRXW EHLQJ D VHOI¶ VLPLODU WR 1LVKLGD¶V DFWLRQ LQWXLWLRQ ZKLFK DV REVHUYHG E\ 6KLOOLQJ DQG
0HOORU RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV³UHIHUVWRQRWLQWHUIHULQJZLWKWKHQDWXUDOZRUNLQJVRIDOO
things, to not expending unnecessary effort, and to acting in line with the nature of things´+HUH
illness occurs when one acts not in line with the nature of things and internal and external 
environments of embodiment are disattuned. Conversely, a human being flourishes and culturally 
structured practices are effectively performed when the mind-body-world alignment occurs ņ it is 
on these principles that DIA practices are based.  
That said, after having outlined the theoretical ground on which the current research is located ± 
i.e., its rationale, aims, and conceptual strategy ± in what follows, I wish to address more practical 
matters. That is, in the next chapter I turn my attention to the empirical arena of this thesis ± i.e., 
the ethnographic case study of DIA, the epistemological issues involved, the methods employed, 
the research background, and the data collected.  
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Chapter 6: THE EMPIRICAL ARENA  
 
6.1 7KH&DVH6WXG\¶V(PSLULFDO&RPSRQHQW± Daoist Internal Arts (DIA)   
 
As its empirical component, the current research employs an ethnographic investigation of Eastern 
self-cultivation practices rooted in the ancient Daoist tradition: neigong, qigong, and tai chi chuan 
(or simply tai chi) ± all referred to here as Daoist Internal Arts (DIA). As DIA are an 
exemplification of a culturally structured practice aiming to foster non-dichotomous modes of 
embodiment, conducting an empirical investigation on people seeking to develop a non-
dichotomous way of experiencing and engaging with the world can help us to understand in detail 
how the shift from the Being to the Becoming occurs (or does not occur). In other words, DIA can 
help us to understand the conditions fostering the embodiment of dualism(s) and/or dualities.  
Hence, in light of its aim(s) (see chapter 5.2), the present research investigates the strategies DIA 
practitioners employ, the struggles they engage with, and the problems they encounter, in shifting 
from dichotomous to non-dichotomous modes of embodiment. To do so, the current study asks: 
1. How do DIA practitioners talk about their minds, their bodies, and inner and outer 
dimensions?  
2. What are the discursive, corporeal, and affective resources they draw on in their 
endeavour? 
3. What are the roles of conscious deliberations and tacit knowledge of the body in DIA 
embodied practices? 
4. How are the symbolic dimension and verbal communication employed to stimulate 
particular embodied experiences and embodied outcomes in DIA practices? 
Before proceeding to outline DIA, it appears to be important to clarify that the present research 
investigates them within the complexity of globalisation processes. Having been mostly developed 
by oral transmission, the wide range of variations of Daoist self-cultivation practices within their 
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original Eastern context already baffle contemporary researchers (Wang, 2012). Such variety is 
perhaps even more accentuated in the Western context where practices like tai chi have acquired a 
particularly hybrid character (Ryan, A., 2008). Nevertheless, the basic features I am outlining here 
appear to be present in the vast majority of studies already undertaken on these practices (for a 
recent review, see Channon & Jennings, 2014), as well as in the empirical outcome of the present 
research (as will be evident in the case study section).  
Despite this variety, emphasis can vary between two main polarities (Ryan, A., 2008, see also 
Wang, 2012), which somehow mirror the crucial distinction between external and internal 
environments of embodiment. One is that which stresses the martial and combat aspects of DIA, 
the so-called external technical elements (ibid.). The other ± considered more fundamental ± is the 
internal aspect which aims at making significant changes in the mode of embodiment of the 
practitioner (ibid.). This includes longevity practices which spHFLILFDOO\DGGUHVVWKHSUDFWLWLRQHU¶V
posture, joints, ligaments, tissues, internal organs, and blood and chi flow (Frantzis, 2006/1993) ± 
in other words, these are practices which directly target the tacit knowledge of the body and deeply 
embodied habits.  
Although the features of neigong, qigong, and tai chi appear to overlap, it is neigong which refers 
WR SUDFWLFHV ZKHUH WKH HPSKDVLV LV RQ FKDQJHV LQ WKH ERG\¶V SK\VLRORJ\ DQG HQHUJHWLFV LELG
More specifically, in neigong these changes take place following a direction that goes from the 
inside of the body outwards. This pattern reverses with qigong, which works on a more superficial 
level by mobilising chi on the surface of the skin to then address more internal dynamics (Frantzis, 
2010/2008). Finally, tai chi is a martial art that employs neigong and qigong techniques to improve 
its effectiveness (Frantzis, 2006/2003). Nevertheless, beyond the actual overlap, the terms in the 
West are often used interchangeably, with neigong rarely employed, qigong more used in relation 
to health issues, and tai chi indicating either a health exercise or self-defence training.  
According to Daoist teacher Bruce Frantzis (2006/1993, 2006/2003), neigong constitutes the 




be more or less stressed. In the UK, the National Health Service (NHS) uses the term tai chi (rather 
than neigong oUTLJRQJWRLQGLFDWHKHDOWKH[HUFLVHV$FFRUGLQJWRWKH1+6ZHEVLWH³7DL
chi, also called tai chi chuan, combines deep breathing and relaxation with flowing movements. 
Originally developed as a martial art in 13th-century China, tai chi is today practised around the 
world as a health-SURPRWLQJH[HUFLVH´ 
That said, however, in line with the Daoist tradition, the ultimate target of DIA is to achieve and 
actually experience a psychophysical alignment of the embodied agent with forces constituting the 
material, social and cultural environments in which she is embedded ± i.e., an attunement of the 
internal and external flows of energy. It is in this way that for the practitioner dualism(s) turn into 
dualities in unity. 
As the way I have chosen to identify neigong, qigong, and tai chi ± i.e., Daoist Internal Arts ± 
gives away, it is this internal aspect that this thesis narrows its focus on. In turn, this also means 
that neigong is, among the three, the practice more emphasised in the case study. In fact, despite a 
proliferation of investigations in Daoist as well as other types of Eastern practices in the last 
decade (Channon & Jennings, 2014), extant studies have mainly addressed the martial/combat 
aspect involved in these types of bodywork, and only very few have explicitly focused on 
embodied practices aiming at a radical transformation of modes of embodiment (e.g., Beaupre, 
2011; Brown & Leledaki, 2010). In this respect, an explicit invitation to investigate Daoist self-
cultivation practices and understand the body pedagogics involved in those comes from Shilling 
and Mellor (2007).  
'UDZLQJRQ+HLGHJJHU¶VDUJXPHQWRQWHFKQRORJLFDOµHQIUDPLQJ¶6KLOOLQJDQG0HOORULELGQRWH
that human embodiment has been increasingly shaped by modern technological innovations. 
&RQWH[WXDOLVHG ZLWKLQ WKH FXUUHQW VWXG\¶V SHUVSHFWLYH LI RQH DGGV WR +HLGHJJHU¶V 
predominance of instrumental rationalism and mastery over nature the arguments of Elias 
(2000/1994) on the increased rationalisation of bodies and on the detachment from our sensuous 
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and carnal condition, it could be argued that the modern era has been characterised by the 
development of dichotomous modes of embodiment where dualisms like mind and body have 
become phenomenologically salient (see also McGilchrist, 2010/2009).  
On this ground, Shilling and Mellor (2007) ask, what kind of loss is involved in a technological 
FXOWXUH ZKHUH HPERGLHG VXEMHFWV DUH RIWHQ SRVLWLRQHG DV D µVWDQGLQJ UHVHUYH¶ IRU WKH HIILFLHQF\
required in contemporary society? In order to answer this question, they contend, it might be 
helpful to look at cultural contexts where these non-dichotomous modes of embodiment are not 
fostered. As exemplary of those, Shilling and Mellor (ibid.) suggest looking at the Daoist tradition 
and practices such as tai chi or qigong, where rather than a stress on efficiency and production, 
ZKDW LV SURPRWHG LV WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V DOLJQPHQW ZLWK PDWHULDO VRFLDO DQG FXOWXUDO
environments.  
When commenting on the notion of wu wei and evoking Deleuze and Guattari, Shilling and Mellor 
(ibid.: 539, original emphasis) appear to envisage a non-dichotomous experiential dimension 
which very much resonates with the Becoming ± WKH\FDOOLWµEHLQJ¶LQVWHDG 
If the cultivation of actionless action [i.e., wu wei] and its various techniques constitute the central 
body pedagogic means through which Taoist culture is transmitted, we can characterise the major 
experience associated with this form of learning as being; a process in which embodied subjects 
achieve the sense of an increasing connection to, and interdependence ZLWKWKHLUVXUURXQGLQJV>«@
The result or outcome of this experience of being associated with Taoist body pedagogics is that the 
embodied subject is turned not into an instrumental object, a standing reserve for efficiency, but 
exists in a state of immanence with respect to the environment. This notion of bodily immanence 
has not been subject to much exploration. Deleuze and Guattari (1988) approach part of what is 
involved here in developing their concept of tKH µ%RG\:LWKRXW2UJDQV¶ D PHWDSKRULFDO ZD\RI
talking about how the relations we establish as organic beings are not limited by our material 
bodies. More specifically, the immanence experienced by the embodied subject of Taoism involves 
an alignment with the energies and forces that constitute all social and natural phenomena; an 
alignment that facilitates an emboldening of the individual enabling them to develop the full 
potentialities of their embodied self.   
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In light of all the above, DIA seem to be a particularly promising empirical ground to understand 
the nuances involved in body pedagogics fostering non-dichotomous ways of knowing and 
engaging with the world. In wider terms, and thus in relation to the dynamics involved in the 
LQFRUSRUDWLRQ RI FXOWXUHV WR HPSOR\ 0HOORU DQG 6KLOOLQJ¶V   RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV ZRUGV
once more, this Eastern self-cultivation practice can help us to map out:  
[T]he mutual interactions and co-constitutions that occur among our physiological responses to 
stimuli, the culturally variable manner in which we feel those responses, and our own interpretive 
classification of and reflections on such feelings, as well as on our existence in the world and 
cosmos more generally. 
Consistent with the Daoist tradition and TCM, rather than eschewing the mind-body relationship, 
or setting mind and body in opposition, DIA actively engage with these terms and exploit the 
analytical potential of mental and physical experiential dimensions. In this way, DIA are 
underpinned by an ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist conceptual framework 
within a psychophysical worldview. Indeed, such framework constitutes a common ground for 
Eastern self-cultivation practices, which, as observed by Yuasa (1999, in Nagatomo, 2006), pursue 
a shift from commonsensical/disjunctive/Cartesian dualism (and an either/or logic) to a correlative 
dualism (and a paradoxical logic), where the terms constituting dualism(s) become attuned, and 
one can actually experience their ontological unity. 
In fact, differently from a Western standpoint of a given, constant, and universal relationship 
between mind and body ± the mind-body problem or the mind-body relationship ± an Eastern 
perspective would conceive of the relationship between mind and body as variable among different 
people, variable within the same individual, and indeed amenable to change through specific 
HPERGLHG SUDFWLFHV <XDVD  2Q WKLV JURXQG WKH W\SLFDO :HVWHUQ TXHVWLRQ µZKDW LV WKH
relationship EHWZHHQPLQGDQGERG\"¶ZRXOGQRWPDNHPXFKVHQVHDQGZRXOGLQVWHDGEHUHSODFHG
E\WKHTXHVWLRQµKRZGRHVWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHPLQGDQGWKHERG\FRPHWREH"¶RUµKRZ
does the mind-ERG\UHODWLRQVKLSFKDQJH"¶LELG7KDWVDLGZKLOH,ZLOOUHWXUQto these arguments 
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in more depth as the case study unfolds, at the moment I wish to discuss the epistemological issues 
involved and the methods employed in my empirical endeavour.  
 
6.2 Epistemological Issues ± Expanding the Empirical  
 
If one starts from the premise that embodiment is the ground of any type of experience and 
knowledge, then researching embodiment itself is an extremely challenging endeavour (Brown et 
al., 2011). Even more difficult is to envisage methods capable of grasping and conveying the 
LPPHGLDF\ RI OLYHG H[SHULHQFH LELG <HW WKHVH ZKLFK DSSHDU WR EH µLPSRVVLEOH¶ WDVNV LELG
could turn out to be an opportunity for the discipline of sociology concerned with expanding its 
empirical repertoire.  
In fact, within sociology, the last decade has been characterised by both a crisis and a return to the 
empirical (Adkins & Lury, 2009). On the one hand, the distinctiveness and expertise characterising 
social research for half a century is jeopardised by the seemingly more efficient methodological 
tools employed by private and public institutions outside academic circles (Savage & Burrows, 
2007). On the other hand, the empirical has returned to occupy a central role in the field, and rather 
than as a mere tool to obtain data and advance our understanding of the social world, it is also 
YLHZHGDVDPHDQVWRPDNHDµUHDO¶GLIIHUHQFHLQVRFLHW\/DZ	8UU\/XU\	:DNHIRUG
2012; see also Barad, 2007). In line with the non-GXDOLVW D[LRP µNQRZLQJ LV GRLQJ¶ UHVHDUFK LV
thought of as a performative endeavour, also in terms of the production of novel concepts capable 
of envisaging and bringing about positive change in society (Kincheloe, 2005; Pink, 2009; see also 
Deleuze & Guattari, 2013/1992).   
Overall, as pointed out by LiVD$GNLQVDQG&HOLD/XU\³WKHVSHFLDOUHODWLRQVKLSWKDWVRFLRORJ\KDV
ZLWK WKHHPSLULFDO LVFKDQJLQJ´ DQG WKLV VWDWHRIDIIDLUV LV WREHDWWULEXWHG WRFKDQJHV
ERWKLQWKHVRFLDOUHDOLW\DQGLQRXUXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI³what the empirical is and how it matters´




RI OLVWHQLQJ¶ %DFN  7KDW LV E\ Geveloping an attentiveness to what often escapes the 
empirical accounts produced both inside and outside the discipline ± i.e., to what concerns the 
multi-sensual and more-than-textual.  
As it has been argued that social sciences methods have resulted in an extremely limited range of 
attention (Law & Urry, 2004), producing new concepts and imagining new possible futures for 
sociological research also means tapping into novel sensual/sensuous worlds and their possibilities 
(Back & Puwar, 2012). Many urge, in other words, the adoption of an expanded empiricism, 
which, along with (rather than in contrast to) discursive/ideological/structural analyses, is able to 
extend the borders of empirical investigations to the limit of the phenomenal ± to the lived 
immediacy of actual experience (Clough, 2009).  
Rather than on the senses per se, here the focus is on the sensual as a portal to access what remains 
unsaid and therefore goes unnoticed in research (Harris & Guillemin, 2012). In the words of 
cultural anthropologist Elizabeth Hsu (2008: 433), this means conceiving of the senses as a 
PHGLDWRU³EHWZHHQPHDQLQJDQGPDWHULDOLW\>DV@LQWHUIDFHEHWZHHQERG\DQGPLQGDQGEHWZHHQ
WKHµVXEMHFWLYH¶DQGµREMHFWLYH¶´$WWKHVDPHWLPHWKLVVWXG\DFNQRZOHGJHVWKDWWKHQRWLRQ of the 
VHQVHVDVDµZLQGRZWRWKHZRUOG¶LVDQLQKHULWDQFHRIWKH&DUWHVLDQWUDGLWLRQDQGWKDWWKXVZHVWLOO
appear to lack adequate conceptual tools to address the mind-body dualism in sociological research 
(Hsu, 2008; Nettleton, 2010).  
It is in the context of the above debates that the present study aims to provide an original 
contribution to the expansion of the notion of the empirical in sociology. In more detail, the 
current research intends to be particularly attentive to neglected phenomenological dimensions, 
such as those regarding the internal environments of embodiment, and the range of ways we can 
experience and act in the world. Differently from most contemporary approaches to wider 
sociological issues and to embodiment more specifically, the current study intends to take into 
account two different types of knowledge: a non-dichotomous form of knowledge underpinned by 
a non-linear logic, and a dichotomous form of knowledge sustained by an either/or logic.  
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Linked to this, I have suggested retaining an analytical distinction between an ontological and 
epistemological level of analysis, while at the same time bearing in mind the fictive character of 
this, as well as other, analytical distinction(s). It is in this light that I would like to take on board 
FULWLFDO SHGDJRJLVW -RH .LQFKHORH¶V  -330) observation on the ³ILFWLYH GLPHQVLRQ RI
research findings [and his assertion that] there are fictive elements to all representations and 
QDUUDWLYHV´$VZLOOEHFRPHFOHDUHULQWKHFRXUVHRIWKHFDse study, despite their fictive character, 
representations, narratives, and levels of analysis can be nevertheless effective heuristic devices to 
get to know, and bring about change in, the world.  
Furthermore, by being unapologetically theory driven, the present study explicitly acknowledges 
something which is nevertheless inevitable in any research endeavour ± i.e., the employment of 
theory or a worldview as a lens through which the data are analysed (Brown et al., 2011; Finlay 
2009; Kincheloe, 2001, 2005). Again Kincheloe (2005: 329) puts this well when he says that: 
³>)@DFWV´QHYHUVSHDNIRUWKHPVHOYHV>«@ZKHWKHUZHOLNHLWRUQRWDOOUHVHDUFKHUVDUHGHVWLQHGWR
be interpreters who analyze the cosmos from within its boundaries and blinders. To research, we 
must interpret; indeed, to live, we must interpret. 
At the same time, as noted by integrative psychotherapist Linda Finlay (2009: 13), this 
acknowledgement does not preclude a:  
µ>3@KHQRPHQRORJLFDOSV\FKRORJLFDO¶DWWLWXGHDVDSURFHVVRI UHWDLning a reductive openness to the 
world while both restraining and using preunderstandings [so that] the researcher engages a 
dialectic movement between bracketing preunderstandings and exploiting them reflexively as a 
source of insight. 
As observed by Kincheloe (2005) by evoking singer/songwriter Johnny Cash, this is a matter of 
walking the line ± a (fictive) line separating a more detached from a more engaged way of getting 
WRNQRZDQGDFWLQJLQWKHZRUOG7KLVLVDOVR³WKHOLQH>ZKLFK@VHSDUDWHVWKHGHFRQtextualization of 
the idiosyncrasy of the personal from the unreflective, authoritarian voice of truth of the 
128 
 
UHGXFWLRQLVWLF UHVHDUFKHU´ .LQFKHORH   3XW DQRWKHU ZD\ RQH PXVW ZDON WKH OLQH
separating naïve subjectivism and the inverse mistake of positivist objectivism.  
That is, while the researcher needs always to be made visible in the production of knowledge, such 
FRQFHUQGRHVQRWQHHGWRWXUQLQWRDQH[FHVVLYHHPSKDVLVRQWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VRZQOLYHGH[SHULHQFH
which would move the focus away from the empirical arena and the theoretical discussion, thus 
ultimately failing to situate the whole research process in the specific material, social, and cultural 
contexts in which it takes place (Carrington, 2008). Reiterated through the theoretical lens of the 
present research, the above also means walking the line separating an either/or, mediated, and 
dichotomous and a non-linear, immediate, and non-dichotomous mode of conducting research ± 
i.e., finding a balance between the Being and the Becoming.  
In turn, considering both these modes involves the attunement between theory and practice. In 
other words, the theoretical aspect of the present research needs to reflect our phenomenological 
world ± i.e., to the actual ways we get to know and act in the world. In this respect, by 
acknowledging the primacy of experience in any theoretical speculation, this thesis takes into 
VHULRXVFRQVLGHUDWLRQ-DPHV¶RULJLQDOHPSKDVLVUDGLFDOHPSLULFLVP 
To be radical, empiricism must neither admit into its constructions any element that is not directly 
experienced, nor exclude from them any element that is directly experienced. For such a 
philosophy, the relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced relations, and as 
any kind of relaWLRQ H[SHULHQFHG PXVW EH DFFRXQWHG DV µUHDO¶ DV DQ\WKLQJ HOVH LQ WKH V\VWHP. 
Elements may indeed be redistributed, the original placing of things getting corrected, but a real 
place must be found for every kind of thing experienced, whether a term or relation, in the final 
philosophical arrangement.       
+HQFH -DPHV¶   ³>U@DGLFDO HPSLULFLVP >«@ LV IDLU WR ERWK WKH XQLW\ DQG WKH
GLVFRQQHFWLRQ´ ± i.e., to both the relational and detached character of embodied research. Or, 
reiterated in the prHVHQWVWXG\¶VWHUPVWRERWKWKH%HFRPLQJDQGWKH%HLQJ 
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Finally, I wish to make clear that my endorsement of a phenomenological approach ought not to be 
equated to a relativist or idealist claim and the denial of the existence of a world independent from 
my mind (see also chapter 3.5). I am, rather, advocating what Colin Bell and Howard Newby 
GHILQHDV³DFRQVWUXFWLYHVFHSWLFLVPDQGHWKLFDODQGORJLFDOVFUXSXORXVQHVV´DQGWKXV
positioning myself within a critical realist landscape (e.g., Sayer, 2006/2000; Shilling, 2012/1993, 
2005). Having outlined the epistemological issues involved, we can move to the more pragmatic 
aspects regarding the methods employed.  
 
6.3 Methods ± A Multidimensional Approach 
 
As already stated, the present research comprises a case study of two self-cultivation practices: 
'DRLVW ,QWHUQDO$UWV ',$DQG6SLQR]D¶V3UDFWLFDO3KLORVRSK\ 633 FRQVWLWXWLQJ WKH HPSLULFDO
and theoretical components respectively. In this sense, the methods outlined below only relate to 
WKH FDVH VWXG\¶V HPSLULFDO FRPSRQHQW ± i.e., DIA. DIA practices are explored by means of an 
ethnographic investigation utilising the following set of interrelated and overlapping methods 
which aim to account for the multidimensional character of embodiment: 
 Participant Observation 
 Auto-Phenomenology  
 In-depth Semi-structured Interviews 
 Drawing as Research Method 
 Multimodal Discourse Analysis 
 
As it offers an extremely flexible approach which nevertheless can provide a comprehensive, 
holistic, and yet in-depth and detailed insight into a specific and complex issue in context, in the 
last forty years, case study research has become common practice across a great number of 
disciplines (Harrison et al., 2017).  
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Ethnography is a practice aiming at communicating the knowledge acquired and evoking the 
experiences lived during an empirical investigation to others. According to social anthropologist 
Sarah Pink (2009: 22):  
Ethnography is a process of creating and representing knowledge (about society, cultures and 
LQGLYLGXDOV WKDW LV EDVHG RQ HWKQRJUDSKHUV¶ RZQ H[SHULHQFHV ,W GRHV QRW FODLP WR SURGXFH DQ
objective or truthful account of reality, but shoXOG DLP WR RIIHU YHUVLRQV RI HWKQRJUDSKHUV¶
experiences of reality that are as loyal as possible to the context, negotiations, and 
intersubjectivities through which the knowledge was produced. 
3LQN¶V DUJXPHQWV DSSHDU FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKRVH RI )LQOD\¶V   ZKR REVHUYHV WKDW ³>W@KH
ultimate aim of phenomenological research is to explicate and express in language embodied 
experience, and to do so in a way that captures the ambiguous layers of meaning as fully as 
SRVVLEOH´,QWKLVUHVSHFWDQGUHVRQDWLQJZLWK1LVKLGD¶VEDVKRWKHRU\WKHFXUUHQWVWXG\HQGRUVHV
³DQ HPSODFHG HWKQRJUDSK\ WKDW DWWHQGV WR WKH TXHVWLRQ RI H[SHULHQFH E\ DFFRXQWLQJ IRU WKH
UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQERGLHVPLQGVDQGWKHPDWHULDOLW\DQGVHQVRULDOLW\RIWKHHQYLURQPHQW´3LQN
2009: 25).  
A crucial part of the ethnographic process is participant observation. Participant observation 
allows the ethnographer access to the way the world is experienced by other people. This involves 
joining participants in the same practical activity and thus learning to attend to things and 
understand what is possible or not to afford in the practice one is engaged in, as any novice 
practitioner would do (Ingold, 2014; Pink, 2009).  
While any ethnographic activity should always involve particular attention to the body, the senses, 
and those feelings which tend to escape verbalisation ± LH LW VKRXOG DOZD\V EH D µVHQVRU\
HWKQRJUDSK\¶ 3LQN± this attention acquires an even stronger significance for the present 
research investigating DIA, whose target is precisely that of addressing the tacit knowledge of the 
body. In this respect, the ethnographic approach employed in this thesis is particularly sensitive to 
WKH DUJXPHQWV RI /RȧF :DFTXDQW  YLLL RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV ZKHQ KH SURSRVHV ³D
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 ³WKH PHWKRG WKXV WHVWV WKH WKHRU\ RI DFWLRQ´ LELG  $JDLQ LQ :DFTXDQW¶V LELG 
original emphasis) words:  
µ>*@RQDWLYH¶EXWgo native armed, that is, equipped with your theoretical and methodological tools, 
with the full store of problematics inherited from your discipline, with your capacities for 
reflexivity and analysis, and guided by a constant effort, once you have passed the ordeal of 
initiation, to objectivize this experience and construct the object, instead of allowing yourself to be 
naively embraced and constructed by it. 
7KDW VDLG µH[WUD¶ DWWHQWLRQ WR VHQVRU\ UHJLVWHUV WKH ERG\ DQG ERGLO\ FKDQJHV LV DGGHG E\
employing an auto-phenomenological approach. Auto-phenomenology (or auto-ethnography) 
(Ellis, Adams & Bochner, 2010) includes detailed phenomenological description of the 
UHVHDUFKHU¶VOLYHGH[SHULHQFHRI',$SUDFWLFHVDVZHOODVRIWKHUHODWHGHPERGLHGRXWFRPHV 
In relation to Eastern perspectives of the body, auto-phenomenology has been deployed in a small 
study of Shiatsu ± D WKHUDS\ RI -DSDQHVH RULJLQ EXW EDVHG RQ 7&0¶V SULQFLSOHV 0DVXQDJD 	
Ohashi, 2001/1977) ± by anthropologist Glyn Adams (2002). By attending to both the represented 
(and socio-culturally situated) and the non-representational (and multi-sensory) aspects of a 
Shiatsu session, the study carried out by Adams (ibid.) demonstrated that auto-phenomenology can 
tap into that elusive intertwinement between the affective and corporeal nature of DIA training, 
and the symbolic/discursive connotation attached to it. By tapping into this intertwinement, auto-
phenomenology can also provide a sensitivity intended to address the reflexivity issues involved in 
conducting research (Spry, 2001). 
Despite their limitations, particularly in terms of accessing the tacit knowledge of the body, in-
depth semi-structured interviews DUH DQ HVVHQWLDO WRRO IRU JDLQLQJ LQVLJKW LQWR LQIRUPDQWV¶
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experiences, as well as for the creation of an intersubjective and relational space where informants 
actively co-participate in the research process (Burman, 1994). The semi-structured character of 
interviews with open-ended questions provides the necessary flexibility for an epistemic strategy 
to hiJKOLJKWDQG IROORZXS WKHFRPSOH[LWLHVDQG LQFRQVLVWHQFLHVRI WKH LQIRUPDQWV¶DFFRXQWVDQG
their sense-making of the practice of DIA.  
In fact, faithful to a phenomenological and multidimensional approach, this study intends to 
endorse what pedagogist Charlotte Svendler Nielsen (2009) calls multi-modal interviewing. In her 
DSSURDFK WR LQWHUYLHZLQJ 6YHQGOHU 1LHOVHQ GUDZV RQ WKH µIRFXVLQJ WHFKQLTXH¶ DGYDQFHG E\
psychotherapist Eugene T. Gendlin (1978/2003). This therapeutic practice aims at bringing to 
consciousness, and thus in a representational form, embodied experiences initially blurred and 
difficult to verbalise ± LHZKDW*HQGOLQLELGFDOOV³IHOWVHQVH>ZKLFK@GRHVQ¶WFRPHWR\RX
in the form of thoughts or words or other separate units, but as a single (though often puzzling and 
YHU\FRPSOH[ERGLO\IHHOLQJ´ 
,QVKRUW*HQGOLQ¶VWHFKQLTXHDLPVDWWDSSLQJLQWRWKHHPHUJHQFHRIRXUOLYHGH[SHULHQFHLQWKHLQ-
EHWZHHQWHUULWRU\³RIWKHLPSOLFLWQRW-\HWLQLWVLQWHUVHFWLRQZLWKWKHH[SOLFLW´*ODQzer, 2014: 49). 
$VQRWHGE\SV\FKRORJLVW'DYLG*ODQ]HU  IRU*HQGOLQ³WKLVHQFRXQWHUKDSSHQVDW WKH
µHGJH¶DQGH[SHULHQFLQJDWRIWKHHGJHKHFDOOVWKHµIHOWVHQVH¶´1RWRQO\GRHVWKLVUHVRQDWHZLWK
+D\OHV¶FDOOWRµULGHWKHFXVS¶VHHchapter 3.5), but it also appears to be consistent with a research 
SKHQRPHQRORJLFDODSSURDFKDLPLQJDW³RXUH[SHULHQFLQJDWWKHµERUGHU]RQH¶EHWZHHQZKDWZHDUH
FRQVFLRXVRIDQGZKDWZHDUHQRWTXLWHDZDUHRI´)LQOD\ 
Svendler Nielsen (2009) expands on *HQGOLQ¶VWHFKQLTXHE\LQWHJUDWLQJLWZLWK$UQROG0LQGHOO¶V
work on shifting channels in our ways of experiencing the world ± indeed an acknowledgement of 
the multidimensionality of our embodied condition as well as of different ways to get to know and 
act in the world. That is, Mindell (1985, 1997, in Svendler Nielsen, 2009: 89) acknowledges that 
we continuously switch between different experiential dimensions such as, for instance, the visual, 
auditory, or kinaesthetic. Therefore, in her investigation of FKLOGUHQ¶V HPERGLHG H[SHULHQFHV
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Svendler Nielsen (2009) employs a range of strategies í including metaphors, colours, sound, 
PXVLF DQG WKH ERG\¶V PRYHPHQW ± to allow her participants to represent their felt sense. For 
instance, she asks children to describe a particular sensation by employing a single word, a musical 
LQVWUXPHQW RU D SDUWLFXODU JHVWXUH 6LJQLILFDQWO\ 6YHQGOHU 1LHOVHQ¶V PXOWL-modal interviewing 
includes also the use of drawing, the fourth research method employed by the present research. 
$OUHDG\XWLOLVHGWRDFFHVVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶H[SHULHQFHVRIFRPSOHPHQWDU\DOWHUQDWLYHPHGLFLQH&$0
therapies, including TCM (e.g., Morgan et al. 2009), drawing (Guillemin 2004) has been identified 
in the last decade as a valuable, yet still underused, empirical resource for complementing more 
µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ PHWKRGV LQ VRFLDO UHVHDUFK %\ HQDEOLQJ WKH UHVHDUFKHU WR H[SORUH KRZ SDUWLFLSDQWV
make sense of their experiences beyond the use of spoken or written words, drawing appears to be 
particularly fruitful for WKHFXUUHQWUHVHDUFK¶VDLPV$VVXJJHVWHGE\0DULO\V*XLOOHPLQDQG
FRQVLVWHQWZLWK6YHQGOHU1LHOVHQ¶VPXOWL-modal interviewing, the use of drawing is best combined 
ZLWKLQWHUYLHZVDQGSDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKHLURZQGUDZLQJV 
That is, IROORZLQJ*XLOOHPLQ¶VLELGSURFHGXUHGXULQJRUDIWHUDQLQWHUYLHZWKHUHVHDUFKHUDVNV
the participant to draw a quick sketch expressing a particular sensation, feeling or embodied 
experience that emerged as salient from the interview process. This request is then ideally 
IROORZHG E\ D GLVFXVVLRQ RI WKH SDUWLFLSDQW¶V FKRLFH RI LPDJH FRORXU FRPSRVLWLRQ DQG OD\RXW
Despite remaining a form of representation, analysing drawings with participants helps research 
probe the interrelation between experience and symbolism, and thus enables us to go beyond the 
limitations of previous analyses that have focused on one or the other, or conflated them, or set 
them in opposition. Interviews and drawing commentaries are audio-recorded, transcribed, and 
analysed through multimodal discourse analysis, and subsequently integrated with the critical 
visual methodology elaborated by Guillemin (ibid.) for drawings.  
By emphasising the importance of emplacement in the complex interactions between language, 
gestures, actions, physical layout, and time in the production of discourse and discursive practices, 
Multimodal discourse analysis (De Saint-Georges, 2004; Norris, 2004, Scollon & Levine, 2004) 
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intends to overcome the limitations of a more traditional kind of discourse analysis (e.g., Potter & 
:HWKHUHOO  3URPLVLQJ IRU WKH SUHVHQW UHVHDUFK¶V FRQFHUQV DQG FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 3LQN¶V
emplaced ethnography), these approaches attend to how the material and the symbolic are 
intertwined in a symbiotic relationship wherein they inform, transform, and shape one another.  
Conceiving of the body as a point of mediation in the material and symbolic constructions of 
identities, the insights of methodologies like these appear suitable for integration with empirical 
approaches which focus on the senses and corporeal aspects ± indeed neglected in multimodal 
discourse analysis. In fact, all the methods outlined above will help to understand how 
representational meanings affixed to the body and the pre-reflective meaning enacted by the body 
interlace to produce emergent meanings, experiences, and changes in modes of embodiment.  
 
6.4 Researcher and Research Background 
 
In hindsight, it seems fair to say that the current research project has roots in my background as a 
Zen Shiatsu therapist. Zen Shiatsu (Masunaga & Ohashi, 2001/1977) is a Japanese and modern 
form of complementary and alternative medicine (CAM) drawing on the Buddhist tradition, Daoist 
principles, and TCM. In line with the Zen tradition, in Zen Shiatsu treatment the lived experience 
is more significant than words, and verbal interaction is traditionally kept minimal and limited to 
the social encounter pre- and post-treatment. Zen Shiatsu uses finger, thumb, elbow, knee, and foot 
pressure, as well as gentle manipulations and stretches aimed at bringing about change in the flow 
of chi in the energy channels/meridians located on the surface of the body ± those same that are 
employed in acupuncture. By operating merely on a tacit and intercorporeal level, the practitioner 
is meant to show the embodied patient ways of negotiating the mind/body/environment 
relationships which would promote well-being and keep disease at bay.  
0\ QHDUO\ IRXU \HDUV¶ WUDLQLQJ LQ WKLV W\SH RI &$0 DOVR LQYROYHG WKH VWXG\ RI 7&0 DQG WKH
GHYHORSPHQWRI D VHQVLWLYLW\ WRGHWHFWLQJFKL LQ VRPHRQHHOVH¶VERG\ , OHDUQHG WR IHHODQG WKXV
identify the TCM channels/meridians, and along these, yang and yin points. However, my training 
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in Shiatsu did not prepare me for Daoist practices like neigong, which, in contrast with the 
superficial level of Shiatsu, works on internal energy channels at a deeper level in the body. 
Moreover, and differently from a Shiatsu patient, in DIA the conscious deliberations of the 
practitioner play a crucial role ± i.e., at any given moment when practising, the DIA practitioner 
needs to be fully aware of what she is doing and of the changes taking place or not taking place in 
her body. On this ground, I identified DIA as a promising empirical arena to help me advance my 
understanding of the relationships this thesis addresses: those between mind and body, internal and 
external environments of embodiment, language and corporeality, representational and non-
representational.   
<HWLWZDVQRWHDV\WRILQG',$FODVVHVZKLFKµPDGHVHQVH¶WRPH5HIOHFWLQJH[WDQWUHVHDUFKLQWKH
field, within the Kent and London areas, I came across classes where the emphasis was merely on 
the combat aspects of practices like tai chi; or, at the opposite end, I attended qigong classes that 
were all about relaxation, mental visualisations, and new age discourses. Equipped with my 
training in Shiatsu and study of TCM, I was instead looking for practices that could effectively tap 
into the pre-reflective knowledge of the body and bring about change in modes of embodiment. 
When I found a suitable instructor ± Brian (a pseudonym) ± I then stuck to his classes of neigong, 
qigong and tai chi. I only later realised that Brian had trained with one of the most popular teacher 
RI ',$ LQ WKH :HVWHUQ ZRUOG %UXFH )UDQW]LV ,QVWHDG ZKDW LQLWLDOO\ LPSUHVVHG PH LQ %ULDQ¶V
classes was his knowledge of the Daoist tradition and the ability of his students to both mobilise 
FKLLQWKHLUERGLHVDQGGHWHFWFKLPRELOLVDWLRQRFFXUULQJRUQRWLQVRPHRQHHOVH¶VERG\ 
 
6.5 The Data ± The Sources 
  
$FFRUGLQJO\DVLJQLILFDQWSDUWRIWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFK¶VGDWDLVUHODWHGWR%ULDQ¶VFODVVHVDQGWKXV
to the teaching of Bruce Frantzis. At times, this also happened indirectly, as I unwittingly ended up 
interviewing DIA practitioners and instructors contacted outside the circle of the classes I was 
attending who were somehow related to Frantzis (something that I only realised during 
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interviews). Overall, I interviewed fifteen participants, who appeared to reflect the typology of 
people engaging in DIA found in past studies within a Western context. The majority of them were 
females. Most participants had a middle-class background and were educated to degree level or 
above (indeed, four of them were or had been academics). Only one participant ± an experienced 
DIA teacher ± had a working-class background. All the participants were British apart from two 
Italians, a Chilean, and a Korean.  
Furthermore, my research expanded its scope through the internet ± a source that most participants 
appeared to draw on in different guises. Therefore, in addition to in-depth semi-structured 
interviews, online videos and DIA-dedicated websites were also analysed. While this research is 
not specifically concerned with the relationship between digital/cyber technology and embodiment 
(for an account of it, see for instance, Featherstone & Burrows, 1995), it seems worth noting that 
data have supported the argument that, in relation to a specific practice, it is possible to identify 
common narratives across various sources (e.g., interviews, websites, literature) (Elliott & 
&RULQQH,QIDFW LWEHFDPHDSSDUHQWWKDW)UDQW]LV¶WHDFKLQJDW OHDVW LQLWV core principles, 
was representative of that of other DIA pedagogics in the West across all the media analysed by 
the current research.   
Participants were recruited from the DIA classes I attended, as well as through adverts, leaflets and 
the snowball sampling technique. BSA (2017) ethical guidelines were followed. In order to ensure 
UHVSRQGHQWV¶ DQRQ\PLW\ DQG FRQILGHQWLDOLW\ D SVHXGRQ\P UHSODFHG UHVSRQGHQWV¶ QDPHV DSDUW
from the name, no personal data were collected ± rather, further information was gathered during 
interview). Electronic files of the data were password protected while hard copies were locked 
DZD\LQDILOLQJFDELQHW3DUWLFLSDQWV¶SHUVRQDOGHWDLOVZHUHGHVWUR\HGDIWHUWKHFRPSOHWLRQRIWKH
project. Participants were asked to read the information sheet and sign a consent form before 
taking part in the research. The information sheet was kept by the participants.  
There were no particular risks involved in taking part in this project. The general risks of 
participating in an interview are the potential to become upset by a particular question or topic. A 
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debriefing at the end of interviews was designed to identify and address such situations in case 
they arose ± this however never occurred. Participants were told that they could decline to answer 
questions and could stop the interview any time they wished. In addition, for any query/concern 
WKDWSDUWLFLSDQWVZLVKHGWRGLVFXVVWKHUHVHDUFKHU¶VH-mail address was provided in the information 
sheet.  
Data were not analysed with qualitative data analysis software (QDAS). Without going into the 
details of debates discussing whether QDAS constitutes an appropriate tool for a 
phenomenological approach (Davidson & di Gregorio, 2011) or is unable to aid phenomenological 
insight (van Manen, 2014), due to the particular character of the research (addressing the 
relationship between the reflective and pre-reflective, and thus concerned with the more-than-
textual) and to my past positive experience at undergraduate level, I have opted not to use 
computer software for my analysis. Armed with paper, pencils, and removable adhesive index 
flags, as well as through extensive note taking, I have instead aimed to become familiar with the 
text while at the same time relating it to the auto-phenomenological process. Here, rather than on 
WKH PRUH µWUDGLWLRQDO¶ FRGLQJ , KDYH LQVWHDG IROORZHG YDQ 0DQHQ¶V   VXJJHVWLRQ RQ
WKUHHOHYHOVRIUHDGLQJµZKROLVWLF¶µVHOHFWLYH¶DQGµIRUGHWDLO¶DOZD\VDQGDJDLQZDONLQJWKHOLQH







                   Diagram 5: Summary of study data and participants
Study Data 
 Interview transcriptions:        15             ± about 156,494 words 
 Video transcriptions:              21             ± about 90,289 words 
 Extracts from DIA-dedicated websites   ± about 49,149 words 
 Auto-phenomenological diary                 ± about 40,000 words 
_____________________________________________________ 
List of Participants 
1. Alice                                  9. Hannah 
2. Brian                                10. Helena 
3. Caroline                           11. Jane 
4. Catherine                         12. Jennifer 
5. Chris                                13. JI-A 
6. Danielle                           14. Michael 





Conclusion ± Ready to Set Off 
 
I have therefore done my best to prepare for the journey ahead. That is, I have studied the maps of 
the adjacent territories, like those already explored by Shilling with his body pedagogics approach, 
by Nishida with his theory of basho, and by ancient traditions like Daoism and TCM. More or less 
explicitly, all these previous explorations appear to be grounded in a perspective of embodiment as 
possessing a dual character, and adopt the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist 
context.  
I have furthermore equipped myself with a case study of two self-cultivation practices ± i.e., 
'DRLVWLQWHUQDODUWV',$DQG6SLQR]D¶V3UDFWLFDO3KLORVRSK\633± which aim to shift from the 
dichotomous mode of embodiment of the Being to the non-dichotomous mode of the Becoming. 
Moreover, I have chosen my modus operandi ± i.e., a phenomenological approach aiming at 
walking the line between the Being and the Becoming, and I have selected a number of useful 
tools ± i.e., a set of methods which can help me to address the multidimensionality of embodiment 
and the relationship between pre-reflective and reflective forms of knowledge.  
Overall, my hope is that by following this dual8 path I will arrive in post-Cartesian territories, 
where I will be able to theorise our embodied condition by accounting for its individuated, 
differentiated, and structural aspects while at the same time being faithful to a process-oriented 
ontology. Put another way, I am about to embark on a journey which I hope will take me from the 
                                                          
8
 7KHHPSOR\PHQWRI WKH WHUPµGXDO¶ WRUHSUHVHQW WKHFKDUDFWHURIHPERGLPHQWHPHUJLQJIURPWKHSUHVHQW
study is an issue that deserves more space, which is not available here. However, albeit briefly, I believe it is 
worth touching on it.  
µ0XOWLGLPHQVLRQDO¶µFKLDVPLF¶µSURFHVVXDO¶DQGDERYHDOOµSDUDGR[LFDO¶DUHRWKHUWHUPVWKDWSRLQWWRWKH
meaning I wish to convey, and which I use in this thesis.  
Yet, when LWFDPH WR WKHFKRLFHRIRQO\RQH WHUP,ZDVFDXJKWEHWZHHQ µGRXEOH¶DQGµGXDO¶ ,HYHQWXDOO\
RSWHGIRUµGXDO¶DVLWLVDWHUPZKLFKDSSHDUVWRPHXQDIUDLGWRHQJDJHZLWKGXDOLVPVLQDGLUHFWPDQQHU
and which constitutes the etymological root of both µdualLVP¶ DQG µdualLW\¶ WKXV DGGUHVVLQJ ERWK WKH
analytical distinction between the two and the shifting nature of embodiment.  
As will become clearer in the approaching part III of this thesis, I contend that language cannot fully grasp 
HPERGLPHQW¶V FKDUacter but only indicate or evoke what needs to be experienced first-hand ± it is in this 




Being to the Becoming ± the account of this exploration is provided in the third and last part of 







Part III: CASE STUDY ± TURNING DUALISM(S) INTO DUALITIES  
 
Introduction ± Revisiting Dualism(s)  
 
On the premises of i) the analytical distinction between mistaken ontological conclusions and 
evident epistemological truths related to the mind-body relationship, ii) the dual character of 
embodiment as a phenomenon caught between a pre-individual and an individuated dimension, 
and iii) the conceptual strategy whereby dualism(s) are enveloped in a wider non-dualist context 
and turned into dualities in unity, I explore a post-Cartesian perspective of embodiment with a case 
study constituted by two self-FXOWLYDWLRQ SUDFWLFHV DLPLQJ DW WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V UDGLFDO VKLIW
from the dichotomous mode of the Being to the non-dichotomous mode of the Becoming. These 
self-FXOWLYDWLRQSUDFWLFHVDUH'DRLVW ,QWHUQDO$UWV ',$ZKLFK ,XVHDV WKH UHVHDUFK¶VHmpirical 
DUHQDDQG6SLQR]D¶V3UDFWLFDO3KLORVRSK\633ZKLFK,HPSOR\DVDWKHRUHWLFDOOHQVWRUHDGWKH
data.  
The case study analyses the modes of embodiment of the Being and the Becoming, alongside four 
exemplary phenomenological relationships: those between mind and body, internal and external 
environments of embodiment, language and corporeality, and representational and non-
representational forms of knowledge. These relationships emerge from my investigation as 
regulated by a Spinozian principle of dynamic correspondence according to which what occurs on 
one of the two terms is paralleled on the other. Ontologically, this principle of correspondence 
implies that the experiential dimensions constituting these relationships are not conceived of as 
two distinct entities. Epistemologically, however, this correspondence is not fixed, but amenable to 
change, so that the terms of each relationship can be experienced by the embodied agent distinct or 
united according to dichotomous and non-dichotomous modes of embodiment respectively. 
On this ground, the aim of both the DIA practitioner and Spinoza is to actively engage with these 
phenomenological relationships (i.e., those between mind and body, internal and external 
environments of embodiment, language and corporeality, and representational and non-
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representational forms of knowledge), attune their terms at the phenomenological level, and 
actually experience their ontological unity. It is in this way that the mode of the Becoming and its 
paradoxical logic acquires an ontological primacy, envelops the fictive yet functional mode of the 
Being and its binary logic, and dualism(s) are turned into dualities. In this respect, the very 
ontological/epistemological distinction initially made by the current research is also ultimately a 
fictive yet functional analytical distinction.  
Overall, re-conceptualised as a dynamic process of individuation whereby an immanent dimension 
self-actualises by bringing about novelty in the world, I propose a view of embodiment as a 
phenomenon which can shift between different modes, each possessing different degrees of 
emergent properties and capacities for agency. As such, the outcome of this case study provides a 
contribution to a post-Cartesian perspective on embodiment which is faithful to a process-oriented 
ontology while also being able to account for the causal powers of our phenomenological world 
and individuated dimension. 
I elucidate the above arguments by discussing the modes of the Becoming and Being and each 
phenomenological relationship first within the empirical context of DIA practice, and then 
theoretically from a Spinozian perspective. This layout intends to make particularly evident the 
iterative and mutually illuminating dialogue between the empirical and theoretical components of 
the present study. Moreover, as becomes evident later, this repeated alternation resembles what 
occurs in DIA training itself, where there is an ongoing dialogue between lived experiences and 
reflexive deliberations, each informing the other in a circular process. That said, however, towards 
the end of the case study the conceptual component will become more prominent with the 
theoretical elaboration of notions such as processes of individuation, agency, affect, and degrees. 
In other words, to FRQWH[WXDOLVH WKHUHVHDUFK¶VRXWFRPHLQFRQWHPSRUDU\GHEDWHV WKURXJKRXWWKH
case study there will be a progressive drift towards theory. 
In more detail, in chapter 7 I shed light on the modes of embodiment I have called the Becoming 
and the Being and on the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context. Here I 
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illustrate that DIA practitioners actively and instrumentally engage with the experiential 
dimensions of their phenomenological world, the related dichotomous analytical distinctions, and 
with an either/or, binary, and linear logic, to bring about emergent properties so that another ± non-
dichotomous/non-linear/circular ± mode of embodiment can become salient.  
This empirical evidence is then re-read and thus consolidated theoretically through the lens of SPP. 
I show that these two modes of getting to know and acting in the world have a long history, of 
ZKLFKWKHPRVWFRQWHPSRUDU\DFFRXQWLVSRO\PDWKQHXURVFLHQWLVW,DQ0F*LOFKULVW¶VH[SODQDWLRQRI
the asymmetry of our brain hemispheres ± each attending one of these two modes. Following these 
LQWURGXFWRU\KLVWRULFDODQGSK\VLRORJLFDODFFRXQWV,IRFXVRQ6SLQR]D¶VWDNHRQQRQ-dichotomous 
and dichotomous modes, including their detailed description provided by Deleuze and Guattari. 
Here, I show that, similarly to the Daoist tradition, Spinoza acknowledges the fictive character of 
the Being and the ontological primacy of the Becoming, and employs the former as an instrument 
to access the latter. Therefore, I illustrate how Spinoza, along with philosophers like William 
James, Gilbert Simondon, and Alfred North Whitehead, by accounting for both modes of 
embodiment is able to ground his theorising in a process-oriented ontology without, however, 
neglecting an individuated dimension and its causal powers. 
Once the Being and the Becoming and the attached linear and circular logics have been qualified, I 
take a closer look at how the shift from one mode of embodiment to the other is achieved in 
practice in DIA. Starting with mind and body, in chapter 8 I illustrate how, when training, this 
relationship is regulated by a principle of dynamic correspondence. Here I show that, aiming to 
attune mind and body, the DIA practitioner is looking for the peculiar feeling corresponding to the 
specific movement she aims to perform. According to a circular logic, novel feelings yield novel 
movements, which yield novel feelings and so on, so that changes are amplified on both material 
and immaterial dimensions of embodiment, and the relationship between movement and feeling 
turn from dualism(s) to a duality in unity. In this way, the immaterial dimensions of our 
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phenomenological world are endowed with causal powers, rather than being reduced to 
epiphenomena.  
In the related theoretical discussion, I will illustrate that Spinoza too conceives of the relationship 
between mind and body as characterised by a dynamic correspondence, rather than an interaction. 
In this way, he eschews not only the Cartesian hierarchy positioning the mind over the body, but 
also its inverse standpoint, where the body plays the privileged role over the mind. Hence, for 
Spinoza, like for the DIA practitioner, the immaterial dimension of the mind and the material 
dimension of the body possess equal causal powers when it comes to bringing about change in the 
world.  
The common ground shared by the DIA practitioner and Spinoza with regard to the relationship 
between mind and body functions as a template for the other relationships considered by the 
present study. Therefore, in relation to internal and external environments of embodiment, in 
chapter 9 I explain that, in line with the principle of dynamic correspondence, the DIA practitioner 
wishes to widen the range of her phenomenological field inside the body to obtain a corresponding 
phenomenological expansion in outer environments, and ultimately attune the two experiential 
dimensions so that their relationship is turned from dualism(s) to a duality in unity. 
Moving to the theoretical terraLQWKHVHDUJXPHQWVOHDGWR6SLQR]D¶VWKHRU\RILQGLYLGXDWLRQDQGWR
TXDOLI\LQJZKDW E\ERUURZLQJ6LPRQGRQ¶V WHUPLQRORJ\ , FDOO SURFHVVHVRI LQGLYLGXDWLRQ ± i.e., 
acts of differentiation according to which the Becoming unfolds into the Being. With the 
aGGLWLRQDO VXSSRUW RI FRJQLWLYH VFLHQWLVWVELRORJLVWV +XPEHUWR 0DWXUDQD DQG )UDQFLVFR 9DUHOD¶V
notion of autopoiesis, I explain that for Spinoza individuation means to be attuned with the world, 
rather than being separate from it ± it is in this way that the relationship between internal and 
external environments of embodiment is conceptualised in a non-dualist fashion.  
After having discussed the crucial internal-external relationship, in chapters 10 and 11 I show that 
LQERWK',$WUDLQLQJDQG6SLQR]D¶VWKHorising, language can both conceal and reveal corporeality, 
and the representational can be both disconnected and connected to the non-representational. In 
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this respect, it is crucial for both the DIA practitioner and Spinoza not to reify language and the 
representational as dimensions cut off from the corporeal and the non-representational ± their 
ultimate aim here is to attune language and corporeality, the representational and the non-
representational, and to tap into the tacit knowledge of the body, rather than remaining on an 
abstract, fictive, and disembodied dimension.  
Furthermore, the theoretical discussion of the relationship between non-representational and 
representational forms of knowledge leads us to re-turn to the controversial notion of affect. Here I 
expand my theoretical discussion to show that Spinoza intends to bridge, rather than emphasise, 
the disattunement between cognition and affect. Therefore, his aim is to consciously address 
affective dynamics so that change can occur at the level of the tacit knowledge of the body and 
RQH¶Vcapacities for agency can be increased.   
In chapter 12 I then complete my sketch of a post-Cartesian perspective of embodiment with a 
discussion of a simple yet useful conceptual device ± that of the notion of degrees. Here, I 
LOOXVWUDWH WKDW LQ ERWK ',$ WUDLQLQJ DQG 6SLQR]D¶V WKHRULVLQJ WKH SURFHVV OHDGLQJ IURP D
dichotomous to a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment is not conceived of as a single event, but 
rather as taking place according to different degrees, each characterised by different modes of 
embodied knowledge and action, emergent properties, and capacities for agency.  
In addition, I suggest that the use of the notion of degrees is particularly helpful to theorise 
dynamic relationships and dualities in unity. That is, the notion can be an effective antidote to 
sharp divides between, or the reification of, dichotomous and non-dichotomous modes of 
embodiment, as well as the other experiential dimensions/analytical categories employed in the 
present study ± again, these are all conceived of as fictive yet useful instruments, which can be 
IOH[LEO\HPSOR\HGDFFRUGLQJWRRQH¶VVSHFLILFWUDLQLQJJRDOVRUWKHRUHWLFDOSXUSRVHV 
I conclude the thesis with an epilogue where the perspective of embodiment advanced here is 
briefly discussed in relation to the concrete socio-cultural phenomenon of youth leisure practice, 
rather than DIA. In this respect, it is important to remind the reader once more that the present 
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research does not investigate DIA per se, but rather employs them as an empirical arena to provide 
a wider theoretical contribution to body studies and social theory. Having introduced the 
arguments which follow, it is finally time to actually embark on my exploration of post-Cartesian 












Chapter 7: THE BEING AND THE BECOMING   
 
7.1 Shifting from a Dichotomous to a Non-Dichotomous Mode of Embodiment 
 
Diary ± Evening, 13th February 2017: 
,DPµVLQNLQJ¶,DPVHHNLQJDUDGLFDOVKLIW LQWKHZD\,JHWWRNQRZDQGDFWLQWKHZRUOG,KDYH
embarked on a journey which I hope can take me from the Being to the Becoming. It begins by 
standing still and shifting the focus of my awareness from external to internal environments of 
embodiment. I am using my mind to scan my body from the top of my head to the soles of my feet 
± first at the skin level, and then moving inside the body to an increasingly deeper level. I have 
EHHQWDXJKWWRORRNIRUVHQVDWLRQVRIµVWUHQJWKWHQVLRQFRQWUDFWLRQDQGDQ\WKLQJWKDWGRHVQRWIHHO
TXLWHULJKW¶,FDQIHHOLWVRPHWKLQJJRLQJGRZQDQGVLQNLQJGRZQLQWRP\IHHWDQGEHORZWKHP 
When my mind is dwelling around that area, my righWHDUUHOHDVHVDQG,FDQKHDUDµSRSSLQJ¶QRLVH
in it. I keep on scanning down ± my neck, throat, shoulders. I can feel phlegm moving down 
through my trachea ± everything is opening up. My arms feel like they are extending ± my entire 
body feels like it is expanding, and so my awareness. I am now focusing on my pelvis and 
something unexpected occurs. I can simultaneously feel another movement in the opposite 
direction: something going up, raising through my spine to the top of my head and above. From the 
perspective of an external observer, it looks like I am not moving. Internally, however, it seems that 
there is a lot going on. I am mobilising chi. I am sinking, and thus shifting: from the Being to the 
Becoming. A lifelong journey, according to the Daoist tradition. 
Dualism(s) become dualities. I can distinguish two flows of chi through my body: going up and 
down. At the same time, however, I am somehow aware that one cannot exist without the other ± 
the more it goes down, the more it goes up. It is like being immersed in water and having two 
currents going in opposite directions through my body. I try to remain in touch with the flow(s) ± 
are there two or is it only one circular flow of chi? My body feels heavy and light at the same time. 
This is a non-linear logic ± a circular logic of paradox. Here, going down means going up. 
Becoming heavier means becoming lighter. Mind and body are two but are also one. My mind is 
my body, and my body is my mind ± I cannot distinguish them, yet I can. I can still make a 
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distinction, but in a manner which is strikingly different from before starting sinking ± how can I 
verbalise it? Everything is entangled with everything else. Where once there was separation now 
there is connection. I keep on sinking. 
An imperceptible adjustment in my tail bone spontaneously takes place. It has a dramatic domino 
effect throughout my body and mind. Somehow my body becomes less substantial and my mind 
stiller. My feet feel like they are fused to the floor. I feel the lower part of my spine releasing and 
my buttocks slipping down the back of my thighs ± it must be a tiny movement, or perhaps there is 
no physical movement at all? Yet, it feels significant, like an opening of several inches between 
vertebrae. Simultaneously, my back opens up, my shoulder blades widen, my chest becomes even 
softer, my breathing expands further in my belly, and my arms raise a couple of inches with no 
effort whatsoever nor conscious intention on my part. I am not making all this happen. I am letting 
it happen. I can feel chi flowing underneath my armpits, my jaws release, and I run out of words to 
describe the sensation at the top of my head ± it feels like a jet of very subtle vapour coming out of 
my crown9. In fact, all this is happening at the same time ± there is no past, present, and future. I am 
indeed one: mind-body-my living room-WKHZRUOG2ULVWKHUHQRµ,¶KHUH" 
In DIA, sinking is the very first step towards the lifelong journey leading to a radical 
WUDQVIRUPDWLRQRIRQH¶VPRGHRIHPERGLPHQWDQGLWLVLQitially achieved by means of a standing 
SRVWXUHFDOOHG-DQ-XDQJZKLFKLV LOOXVWUDWHGE\WKUHHRI%UXFH)UDQW]LV¶10 students in diagram 6 
and then by myself from different angles in diagram 7. 
I had been practising Jan Juang fairly regularly for nearly eighteen months when the above passage 
was written in my auto-phenomenological diary. And despite clear progress and having also 
engaged with more advanced DIA practices, I am still struggling with the very 
first/basic/fundamental step in DIA: sinking. Sinking is one of the many possible ways to render in 
English the Chinese term sung. Relaxation is also often used, and in many of the data extracts 
ZKLFKZLOOIROORZWKHUHDGHUZLOOILQGWKHWHUPVµUHOD[¶DQGµUHOD[DWLRQ¶WRLQGLFDWHsung.  
                                                          
9 7KHFURZQDWWKHYHU\WRSRIRQH¶VKHDGLVRQHRIWKHPDMRUSRLQWVHQHUJ\JDWHVLQTCM and DIA.  
10 As previously specified (see chapters 6.4 & 6.5), Frantzis is the founder of the DIA tradition whose 
guidelines I am following in my practice. My main instructor, Brian, had trained with Frantzis.  
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DIA instructor Paul Cavel (2016: 2, original emphasis) explains: ³>W@KH&KLQHVHWHUPsung is often 
WUDQVODWHGDVµUHOD[HG¶EXWWKLVLVDJURVVRYHUVLPSOLILFDWLRQRIWKHDFWXDOVWDWHEHLQJGHVFULEHG$
PRUHDFFXUDWHWUDQVODWLRQLVµXQERXQG¶DVWDWHLQZKLFKWKHERG\ORVHVDOOXQQHFHVVDU\ELQGLQJV
DOOUHVLVWDQFHVDOOWHQVLRQ´± this is a state which can grant access to the non-dichotomous mode of 
embodiment I call the Becoming. In relation to Jan Juang, the practice is designed to teach the 
practitioner to stand with the least possible effort.  




alignment of the body so that one becomes attuned with the force of gravity, as well as with the 
wider surrounding environment ± however, this is easier said than done. 
At times extremely frustrating, my struggle does not come as a surprise. Yet, the very first 
impression on a novice of DIA ± with a taste of the Becoming and the experience of novel and 
pleasant feelings ± might appear promising. DIA practitioner Caroline, vividly recalls her first 
experience with Daoist practices more than 15 years ago: 
&DUROLQH >«@, WKLQN WKH ILUVW WLPH WKDW ,ZHQW WR7DL&KL ,ZHQWHU WRDFODVVDQG LWPXVWKDYH
ILQLVKHG DERXW , GRQ¶W NQRZ DERXW KDOI-past-QLQH WHQ R¶FORFN TXLWH ODte they used to finish, 
5REHUW¶V>DSVHXGRQ\P@FODVVHVDQGWKHQ,ZHQWVKRSSLQJURXQG7HVFR¶VDQG,ZDVSXVKLQJWKLVW±, 
shopping trolley round <chuckles> just doing a bit of shopping, erm, and it was about half past ten 









However, despite what can be exciting initial experiences, endowed with what Spinoza would call 
µDQ LQFUHDVHGSRZHURIDFWLQJ¶PRUHRQ WKLV ODWHU IXUWKHUSURJUHVVGRHVQRWFRPHHDVLO\ ± one 
needs to practise and wait. Websites, books, instructors, and practitioners keep on saying that one 
needs decades to be able to master these practices, and thus make the shift happen, rather than wait 
for it to occur (as in the instance of my standing above). I point this out when interviewing my 
main DIA instructor Brian:  
Vittorio: You discover new things in the first two, three months ± there are lots of things changing. 
%XWWKHQWKHPRUH\RXJHWODXJKV!\RXNQRZ«LW¶VJHWWLQJKDUGHUDQGKDUGHUDQGHUP± 
Brian: Oh well sure, then, then gradually you begin to realise the Dao that you, you get a, you get a 
glimpse of certain things. 
Vittorio: Yes. 
Brian: But then to stabilise that ± 
Vittorio: Yeah, yeah. 
Brian: So that you can call it when you need it, that takes a bit PRUHSUDFWLFH>«@7KHWKHWKH«
the useful thing about practice is that over time it, it becomes repeatable and it becomes something 
that you can gain access to whenever you wish. 
Vittorio: Yeah. 





Therefore, if that described at the beginning was a particularly good session for me ± i.e., where an 
evident shift did occur ± it is a common experience among practitioners to alternate good and bad 
VHVVLRQVWKRVHZKHUHRQHPLJKWHYHQIHHOµPLVHUDEOH¶DV%ULDQSXWLW0\GLDU\VKRZVWKDWEHIRUH
the above standing I had very unproductive sessions for a few days, where my practice appeared to 
get worse rather than better. As Brian says, one might get a glimpse but then encouraging signs 
may not appear for a while. The shift between the Being and the Becoming is not something that 
suddenly happens and then remains stable, nor is it characterised by a progression occurring in a 
linear manner. Rather, it is an ongoing struggle with ups and downs, where the aim is to stay in the 
Becoming for as long as possible. This is made clear by Frantzis (2006/1993: 25) when he 
explains that:  
Popular opinion has it that once you have reached a state of emptiness [the Becoming], you stay 
there, but this idea is false. You merely become increasingly familiar with this state and learn how 
to spend more and more time there. As long as you live in a physical body, physical needs continue 
to exert demands, and dwelling completely in emptiness is not possible.   
The following extract from the auto-phenomenological diary is a typical example of a frustrating 
session ± unfortunately, a type of session which one would not have trouble finding in my field 
notes.  
Diary ± Morning, 9th August 2016:  
:HOO,FRXOGQ¶WUHDOO\JHWLQWRWKHVWDQGLQJWRGD\+RZIDU,DPIURPWKH%HFRPLQJ0\ERG\ZDV
SHUFHLYHGLQVRPDQ\GLIIHUHQWµSLHFHV¶6LPLODUO\P\PLQGZDVDOZD\VZDQGHULQJDZD\IURPP\
body. I focus on bringing the chi down but then I cannot pay attention to the upper part of my body. 
I focus on releasing my pelvis but then my quadriceps get tense. I focus on breathing in my belly 
and forget all the rest! I can only focus on one bit at a time and cannot feel everything as one: the 
feeling of a balloon in my chest, throat and under my armpits, feet grounded, not to mention the left 
and right balance and my stuck right hip joint! Not only mind and body but, in more prosaic terms, 
left and right are very disconnected and I ended my standing leaning to the left!  
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In this case, my shift was unsuccessful. I tended to remain on the dimension of the Being, a world 
RIGLVFUHWHHQWLWLHVZKHUHDVSDUWLFLSDQW+HOHQDSXWLW³P\EUDLQLVWKLQNLQJDERXW«LQWHllectual 
things, problem solving, listening to people, trying to analyse what they understand, what they 
GRQ¶W XQGHUVWDQG OLVWHQLQJ IRU WKH SLHFHV WKDW DUH PLVVLQJ´ +RZHYHU DV QRWHG E\ )UDQW]LV
(Smalheiser, 1989: 4), when practising tai chi: 
[T]here have to be 30 to 40 major considerations and the whole thing is that these things have to be 
happening simultaneously. These include such factors as: head straight, tongue at the roof of the 
mouth, weight shifted essentially onto one side or the other, opening and closing of the joints, how 
the internal organs are to be dropped.  
As the student did these things over and over, the factors were layered one on top of the other until 
you could do 20, 30, 40, or maybe 50 things at once without difficulty.  
But, how can one focus on all these details at once? Holding a degree in psychology, I learned that 
ZHFDQFRQVFLRXVO\NHHSWUDFNRIRQO\DIHZµWKLQJV¶DWDWLPH,DVN%ULDQDERXWLW+HVHHVLWDV
possible when a shift from a yang to a yin type of awareness has taken place11: 
Brian: , , WDONDERXW LWPRUH OLNH\LQPLQGVR\RX¶UH\RX¶UHDOORZLQJ\RX¶UHDOORZLQJ LQUDWKHU
WKDQORRNLQJRXW>«@<RXORRNDWD\RXORRNDWDSDLQWLQJDQGUDWKHUWKDQORRNLQJDWDOOWKHGHWDLOV
± WKDW¶V\DQJWKDW¶VIRFXVVHG± you doQ¶WVHH«HYHU\WKLQJ2U\RXVLWWKHUHDQG\RXVRDNLWLQ2U
\RXNQRZDODQGVFDSH\RXMXVWOHWWKHZKROHWKLQJFRPHLQWR\RX6R\RX¶UHSUHVHQWWRWKHZKROH
thing at once. >«,I@ you let the whole thing soak in, you can then begin to notice how various 
elHPHQWVLQWHUDFWZLWKRWKHUHOHPHQWV«LQDZD\WKDW\RXZRXOGQ¶WLI\RXZHUHMXVWORRNLQJDW± 
Vittorio: Yeah. 
Brian: ± that bit, that bit, that bit. 
Vittorio: <RXFDQQRWVHHWKHFRQQHFWLRQDJDLQ« 
                                                          
11
 Here it seems to be helpful for the reader to be aware that the view of a Western mind being prevalently 
yang as opposed to an Eastern mind being prevalently yin is a dominant discourse in DIA. 
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%ULDQ <RX FDQ¶W VHH WKH FRQQHFWLRQ $QG DQG WKH WKH ZD\ I, you know, so you may look at a 
SDLQWLQJDQGUHDOLVHWKDWDFHUWDLQELWRILWGRHVQ¶WZRUNEHFDXVHLW¶VDFWXDOO\QRWILWWLQJLQZLWK«
with, with the whole.  
7KLVLVZKDW%ULDQDOVRUHIHUVWRDVDµQRQ-GXDOVWDWH¶ ± what I call the non-dichotomous mode of 
embodiment of the Becoming. Reiterated in the words of Frantzis (Energy Arts, 2013a):  
><@RXUPLQGVWDUWVUHOD[LQJDQGLW MXVWHQFRPSDVVHVWKHHQWLUHVSDFHVRLW¶VLQHYHU\WKLQJWKDW\RX
can see all at once.  
$QGWKDWLQFOXGHV\RXUERG\DOODWRQFH7KHUH¶VQRSDUWRILWWKDW¶VQRWWKHUHVRWKDWDQ\WKLQJWKDW¶V
RIILVUHFRJQLVHGDVRSSRVHGWRRK,UHFRJQLVHWKLVEXWXUJKORVWLWORVWP\IHHWORVWP\EDFN,W¶V
my mind going for, this part of my mind is fine EXWWKHUHVWRILW¶VJRQHWROXQFK1RWKHPRUH\RX
UHOD[\RXUPLQGHYHU\WKLQJLVLQLWDWRQFH,W¶VDOOWKHUHVLPXOWDQHRXVO\ 
DIA instructor Lee Burkins (Kleiman, 2011a FDOOV LW ³4XLHW $ZDUHQHVV >ZKLFK@ LV D GLIIHUHQW
mode for your mind to be in, and you need that to understand your body, your mind, and your 
HQHUJ\7KHLQWHUQDODUWVDUHDOODERXWDFFHVVLQJWKLVPRGHDQGPDQLIHVWLQJLW´ 
A phenomenological description of the Becoming which seems to resonate with the arguments of 
the fictional philosopher SPIDER (i.e., Tim Ingold, see chapter 3.6), which we have previously 
discussed in relation to material-semiotic theories of embodiment, can be found on the website of 
an Australian tai-chi school (Brisbane Chen Tai Chi, 2016) ³7KH IHHOLQJ LV OLNH D VSLGHU-web. 
:KHQ LW PRYHV HYHU\WKLQJ ZLOO YLEUDWH´ 7KLV VSLGHU-web description bears similarities to the 
account provided by DIA practitioner Catherine, who, in turn, appears to be well acquainted with 







$QG « , LW¶V FRQIRXQGHG E\ D EXQFK RI RWKHU WKLQJV DQG UHDOLVDWLRQV DQG KDYLQJ UHDG D WRQ RI




rest of the world. 
For long-term DIA practitioner MichaeOLWIHHOVOLNH³EHLQJZLGHU>«@H[WHQG>LQJ@IXUWKHU>«@LW¶V
PRUHRID«DURXQGVRLW¶VLW¶VOLNHD«DOPRVWOLNHDILHOG´$OWKRXJKKHDVLQGHHGDQ\RWKHU
DIA practitioner) finds it difficult to put it into words, when asked to do so, Michael is able to 
draw a minimal yet effective representation of this experience. As shown in diagram 8, it does 
ORRNURXQGDQGOLNHDQH[SDQVLRQRIRQH¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOERG\LQZKDWDSSHDUVWREHDFLUFXODU
field, extending also, as Michael makes sure I understand, under the floor. 
 
'LDJUDP3DUWLFLSDQW0LFKDHO¶VH[SHULHQFHLQGUDZQIRUP 




QRWUDFNRI WLPH>«D@PXFKPRUHELJJHU>VLF@VHQVHRIP\VHOI´When I asked her to express it 
with a drawing, JI-A told me she already had some drawings done ± diagram 9 is my favourite, 
which depicts her resting after practice: 
 
 
Diagram 9: Participant JI-$¶VGHSLFWLRQRISRVW-practice 
As shown from JI-$¶VGUDZLQg, at the level of the Becoming, embodiment is both one and many, 
and it expands both inside and outside. Apart from the multiple bodies around the main one, the 
UHDGHUVKRXOGEHDEOHWRVSRWDVPDOOHUµSURMHFWLRQ¶RI-,-$¶VERG\ORFDWHGRSSRVLWHKHUPDLQbody 
RQWKHUHDGHU¶VULJKWKDQG0RUHRYHUDFLUFOHLQVLGHKHUPDLQERG\LQGLFDWHVWKDWWKLVH[SDQVLRQ
also goes in an inward direction. In light of my personal experiences with DIA, I believe that the 
drawing really gives a sense of those moments when one is practising and the boundaries 
separating the body from the world acquire different connotations, including those between 
external and internal environments of embodiment, which I will return to later. 
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The differences between two main modes of embodiment, which I call the Becoming and the 
Being, are furthermore described by resorting to several metaphors by DIA instructors. These 
appear to be particularly helpful also to elucidate the strategy of enveloping the dichotomous mode 
of the Being with the non-dichotomous mode of the Becoming, as well as the two logics 
underpinning each of the two modes of embodiment: a linear and a circular logic. As shown 
below, reflecting the fundamental relational, open-ended, and paradoxical character of 
embodiment, to the Becoming is granted what I call an ontological primacy. Yet, although the 
Being is considered ontologically fictive, it is however instrumentally employed at the 
epistemological level to shift to the Becoming.  
 
7.1.1 Linear and Circular Logics 
The ontological primacy of the Becoming and the fictive yet instrumental nature of the Being are 
crucial tenets in DIA training. In turn, these principles are reflected by the different logics attached 
to each mode ± respectively a circular/non-dichotomous and linear/dichotomous logic. That is, 
while the linear logic attached to the Being is a necessary instrument to access the circular logic of 
the Becoming, it must not be reified at the ontological level and become therefore an end rather 
than a means.  
To describe these two logics, DIA instructor Dan Kleiman resorts to comics. By citing the book 
Understanding Comics (McCloud, 1993, in Kleiman, 2013a), in one of the broadcasts of his 
Qigong Radio, Kleiman (2013a) compares Western and Japanese comics:  
>7@KHUH¶V WKLVRQHFRQWUDVW >«@ LQ WKHERRNEHWZHHQ-DSDQHVHFRPLFVDQG:HVWHUQ-style comics, 
and I always think of like the Batman comic or something where, where Batman punches 
somebody in the face and you see the punch, you see the fist in the air, you see the face in the next 
panel, the reaction and the POW and the whatever opening up, and if you look at that panel by 
SDQHO \RX¶UH JHWWLQJ VHTXHQWLDO DFWLRQ :HOO LW WXUQV RXW WKDW ZKHQ \RX ORRN DW RWKHU VW\OHV RI
comics, like some of these Japanese-styOHFRPLFV\RXGRQ¶WJHWSDQHOVRQDSDJHZKHUHHDFK
panel represents a s-, a sequential step in the action sequence. What you get instead is maybe two 
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panels, or one full page scene, and the scene is designed to evoke a mood, and the meaning is 
conveyeGWKURXJKWKHPRRGWKDW¶VVHWXSMXVWLQDVLQJOHVKRW6R\RXUHDGLWWRWDOO\GLIIHUHQWO\\RX
GRQ¶W JR VWHS  VWHS  VWHS <RX JR PRRG ODXJKV! ZKDW FRPHV DFURVV Z-, how is the leaf 
IDOOLQJ RII WKH WUHH DQG WKH 6DPXUDL¶V WKHUH ZLWK KLV KDQG MXVW VWarting to grasp the hilt of the 
VZRUG«DQGZKDWLVWKHORRNLQKLVIDFHDQGKRZDUHKLVH\HVJD]LQJRUVHWWOHGDQGZKHUHLVKH
standing, is he leaning, is he set back. Right? All these visual elements combine to convey 
VRPHWKLQJWKDW¶VQRWDFWLRQ-driven. Even, er, I think this goes even further to, to look at, like, erm 
« ZHOO QR , ZRQ¶W JR LQWR WKDW EXW LI \RX KDYH WKH KDYH WKH FKDQFH WR FKHFNRXW WKLV ERRN LW¶V
IDVFLQDWLQJDQGZKHQ\RXVWHSEDFNDQG\RXORRNDWD4LJRQJSUDFWLFHRQHZKHUHZH¶UHVWDQGLQg 
VWLOOULJKWVRPHRIWKHVHVDPHWHQVLRQVDUHWKHUH,¶PJRQQDWHOO\RXDERXWVRPHRIWKHVWXII\RXGR
LQ WKH SUDFWLFH DQG DW ILUVW LW¶V JRQQD VRXQG OLNH WKDW DFWLRQ VHTXHQFH GR RQH WKLQJ GR WKH QH[W
thing, do the next thing, but actually the place we wanna get to is we wanna set up a mood where 
WKLQJVFDQXQIROG:H¶UHJRQQD WDONDERXW VHWWLQJFRQGLWLRQVDQG WKHQ MXVW IHHOLQJ WKHFRQGLWLRQV
when the conditions are right the energetics will happen as they need to. And you become more of 
an a-, an, an observer to all this than a doer.  
In addition to the description of the two comic styles ± Western and Eastern, respectively 
representing the Being and the Becoming ± in the last part of the above extract, Kleiman hints at 
the fact that in DIA detailed instructions operating at an either/or logic level are not an end, but 
UDWKHUDWRROWRµVHWXSDPRRGZKHUHWKLQJVXQIROG¶DFFRUGLQJWRDQRQ-linear/circular/paradoxical 
logic ± the non-dichotomous logic of the Becoming. This is a crucial aspect of the nature of the 
relationship between these two modes of embodiment as conceived of in DIA ± reiterated in the 
FXUUHQW UHVHDUFK¶V WHUPV KHUH WKH %HLQJ LV FRQFHSWXDOLVHG DV DQ LQVWUXPHQW WR VKLIW WR WKH
Becoming.  
In a different context, but in a similar fashion, Kleiman (2011b, original emphasis) emphasises 
these arguments by comparing the ways he and his wife approach cooking ± respectively 
according to a linear/dichotomous and non-linear/non-dichotomous logic:  




What I do: I read every recipe word for word and line by line. 
What she does: She reads recipes like poetry and gets layers of meaning from the whole thing. 
Qigong Lesson: At first, you need to learn your forms and the basics of your qigong set, but 
HYHQWXDOO\ \RX KDYH WR JHW D IHHO IRU WKH ZKROH RU \RX¶OO QHYHU JHW WUXO\ HQHUJL]HG IURP WKH
practice. 
What I do: ,UDFHEDFNDQGIRUWKIURPWKHFRXQWHUWRWKHFRRNERRNWKLQNLQJµZDVWKDWDOHPRQRU
DOLPH"¶ 
What she does: She stops and LPDJLQHVDWDVWHWKLQNLQJµZKDWNLQGRIFLWUXVZLOOFRPSOLPHQWWKHVH
RWKHULQJUHGLHQWV"0D\EH,¶OOXVHDQRUDQJHLQVWHDG¶«DQGVKH¶VXVXDOO\ULJKW 
Qigong Lesson: You need to develop a feel for your energy flows so that you know what kind of 
practicing you need to do on any given day or any time of day.  
What I do: ,IUHDNRXWZKHQWKHWLPHUJRHVRIIEHFDXVHWKHUHFLSHVDLGPLQXWHVEXWLW¶VEHHQ
RUDQG,FDQ¶WWHOOLILW¶VGRQH\HW 
What she does: The recipe calls for a specific cook-time? She knows those are vague guidelines 
DQGVKH¶OOVQLIISLQFKRUSXVKRQWKHIRRGWRNQRZH[DFWO\ZKHQLW¶VUHDG\ 
Qigong Lesson: 7KH H[HUFLVHV \RX SUDFWLFH DOO KDYH SUHVFULEHG WLPHV DQG UHSV EXW WKH\¶UH MXVW
WKHUHVRWKDW\RXOHDUQZKDWµGRQH¶IHHOVOLNHHQHUgetically. 
So, if you want your qigong practice to be as nourishing as a delicious, healthy meal, practice like 
my wife cooks: go a few layers deeper than your thinking mind and access your intuition. Learn to 
practice by feel. Otherwise, your practice will always be like reading out of a cookbook. When was 
the last time you got full from reading a recipe? 
Therefore, a good recipe book cannot automatically turn anyone into a good cook. When cooking, 
Kleiman remains at the level of the either/or logic of the Being ± his goal is that of following the 
recipe instructions. For his wife, instead, WKHUHFLSH¶VJXLGHOLQHVDUHDPHUHLQVWUXPHQWWRDFKLHYH
her goal of cooking a delicious meal. However, to integrate or attune all the recipe ingredients in 
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such a manner which brings about the emergent properties of a delicious meal, ultimately, she 
QHHGVWRVKLIWIURPWKHPRGHRIWKH%HLQJWRWKDWRIWKH%HFRPLQJDQGJRµE\IHHO¶ 
To be sure, however, this does not imply that an analytical focus is an irrelevant issue in DIA, and 
that the emphasis in these Daoist practices is only on feelings, the sensuous, or a non-
representational level. As Kleiman (2011cZDUQVLQKLVEORJ³,FDUHMXVWDVPXFKDERXWµKRZ\RX
SUDFWLFH¶ DV µZKDW \RX SUDFWLFH¶ $W D FHUWDLQ SRLQW \RX should be paying attention to both 
HTXDOO\´$VGLVFXVVHG LQ UHODWLRQ WR7&0VHH chapter 5.5), refined over thousands of years of 
empirical investigations, fine analytical details are crucial in DIA. For example, the following are 
only some of the instructions (including a drawing) provided by Frantzis (2006/1993: 96-104, 




Begin by standing with the outer edges of your feet somewhere between hip- and shoulder-width 
apart, wherever you find it most FRPIRUWDEOH>«@ 
7KHNQHHVVKRXOGEHVOLJKWO\EHQWDQGWKHIHHWSDUDOOHO>«@ 
<RXUWDLOERQHVKRXOGEHSHUSHQGLFXODUWRWKHIORRU>«@ 
Your spine should be straightened by 1) gently rolling your hips under, and 2) using your inner 
back muscles to push the kidneys slightly back. Together these two processes will make the lower 
SDUWRI\RXUVSLQHWRWDOO\VWUDLJKW>«@ 
The neck and the head need to be held straight; the crown of the head is straight up so that a line 
drawn straight up from the crown would be perpendicular to the ground. As the neck and shoulders 
relax, quite commonly the head we want to tilt. It is preferable that the head remain upright, but 
although a slight forward tilt is acceptable, any backward tilt is not. Also, it is important to gently 
lift the occiput from the atlas vertebra (that is, lift the skull gently off the neck bone) to reduce 
compression of the neck vertebrae. The Chinese liken this to the feeling of lifting a hat off a coat 
rack. [This is called] dingRUUDLVLQJWKHKHDG>«@ 
,QVWDQGLQJ\RXUH\HVVKRXOGEHNHSWLQLWLDOO\FORVHGWRIDFLOLWDWH\RXUJRLQJLQZDUG>«@%HJLQQHUV
usually need all their concentration to keep track of what is occurring internally, without attending 
the external environments.  
The tongue should be kept WRXFKLQJWKHURRIRIWKHPRXWKEHKLQGWKHIURQWWHHWK>«@ 
Ba bei refers to the raising of the spine. The lungs need to expand and open in order to breathe. 
[T]he raising of the spine (back) in neigong causes two things to occur. 
First, the spine physically rises up, as if it were being pulled upwards. This takes some of the curve 
out of the upper back. The term ba in Chinese means to pluck something up, like pulling grass or a 
plant out of the ground. So as the chest is moving downwards, the back and spine are raising 
upwards, which allows the lungs plenty of room on a vertical plane.  
Second, on the horizontal plane, the back becomes totally rounded. Instead of the shoulder blades 
coming together as they do in the military posture, they relax downward, spread far apart as 
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possible, so that the lungs expand backwards towards the spine. When the two principles are 
combined with the straightening of the lower back, the net result is a series of yin/yang balances 
that are the opposite of the standard military V-shaped posture. 
Even more importantly, Frantzis (2006/1993: 237) lists 16 fundamental neigong components 
which need to be activated in any DIA practice ± each component has within it different levels of 
complexity. These are: 1) breathing methods, 2) feeling, moving, transforming and transmuting 
internal energies along the descending, ascending and connecting energy channels of the body, 3) 
precise body alignments, 4) dissolving physical, emotional and spiritual blockages, 5) moving 
energy through the body's meridian channels and energy gates, 6) bending and stretching the body, 
from the inside out and the outside in, along the yang and yin meridians, 7) opening and closing all 
parts of the body's tissues, including the joints, muscles, soft tissues, internal organs, glands, blood 
YHVVHOV FHUHEURVSLQDO V\VWHP DQG EUDLQ DV ZHOO DV DOO RI WKH ERG\¶V VXEWOH HQHUJ\ DQDWRP\ 
manipulating the energy of the external aura, 9) generating circles and spirals of energy inside the 
body, controlling the body's spiralling energy currents, and moving chi in the body at will, 10) 
absorbing and projecting energy to and from any part of the body, 11) controlling energies of the 
spine, 12) controlling the body's left and right energy channels, 13) controlling the body's central 
energy channel, 14) using the body's lower dantien12, 15) using the body's upper and middle 
dantien13, and 16) integrating the previous 15 component into one unified process. 
Once again, all the above detailed instructions and analytical categories following the either/or 
logic of the Being are essential to access the experiential mode I call the Becoming, where, 
however, these distinctions ultimately vanish at the phenomenological level. That is, when I 
happen to have a good standing and have managed to shift towards the Becoming, I am ceasing to 
focus on all the above points ± they become as one. Conversely, a bad standing is one where I am 
unable to move beyond the instructions and remain stuck in trying to unsuccessfully keep track of 
                                                          
12 The dantien, or tantien or lower tantien, ³LV ORFDWHG LQ WKH FHQWUDO FRUHRI WKHERG\ DERXW WZRRU WKUHH
LQFKHV EHORZ WKH EHOO\ EXWWRQ >DQG@ LV WKH VLQJOH PRVW LPSRUWDQW JDWH ZLWK UHJDUG WR SK\VLFDO KHDOWK´
(Frantzis, 2006/1993: 138).  




all the neigong components, the body alignments, and the related feelings without ever putting all 
the pieces coherently together. Thus, on the one hand, the shift could not occur in the first place 
without the knowledge and implementation of detailed instructions. On the other hand, once the 
VKLIWKDVRFFXUUHG,IRFXVRQWKHµIHHO¶DQGWU\WRVWD\ZLWKLWDVORQJDV,FDQ 
In this respect, Cavel makes a distinction between juggling and integrating ± the former remains 
on a linear and binary logic, while the latter has moved to a circular and non-binary logic. The 
following extract is taken from a chat between Kleiman (2013b) and Cavel:  
.OHLPDQ,JXHVVZKDW,¶PZRQGHULQJDERXWWKRXJKLVZKHQ\RXVD\LQWHJUDWLRQVRZLWKWKHSLWIDOO
that I often experience with this, let me put it this way, is that I see a list of 16 neigong and I think, I 
think about it like juggling and I know, okay. 
Cavel: Aha.  
Kleiman: One ball at a time, I can do two. 
Cavel: Right. 
.OHLPDQ7KUHH¶VDOLWWOHELWGLIIHUHQWNow how do I get, keep 16 balls in the air?  




&DYHO $QG WKHUH¶V D ELJ GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKH WZR ,QWHJUDWLRQ LV ZKHQ OHW¶V VD\ OHW¶V WDNH
something very simple ± the alignments, your tissue stretch is the initial lengthening of the soft 






>«@ WKHUH¶V VRPHWKLQJ WKDW¶V D OLWWOH ELW GLIIHUHQW WKDQ MXVW RK ,¶YH DFFXPXODWHG VHYHUDO GLIIHUHQW
SK\VLFDOVNLOOVWKDWDOOFRPHRQOLQHDWRQFH,WVHHPVWRPHOLNHWKHUH¶VD,GRQ¶WNQRZWKHULJKWZD\
WRVD\LWLW¶VDPLQGVHWRUVRPHWKLQJ\RX¶UHGRLQJZLWK\RXUDZDUHQHVs that allows you to be aware 
of them simultaneously. 
This circular logic of integration ± that which I can only glimpse during good DIA sessions ± 
becomes salient when one shifts to the Becoming. Indeed, we have already come across the 
HSLWRPHRIWKLVSDUDGR[LFDOORJLFZLWKWKHQRWLRQRIZXZHLDFWLQJDVµD VHOIZLWKRXWEHLQJDVHOI¶
RUµDFWLRQOHVVDFWLRQ¶VHHchapters 5.5 & 6.16LPLODUO\µVHHNLQJVWLOOQHVVLQPRYHPHQW¶LVRIWHQ
indicated as the ultimate aim of tai chi in DIA discourses. As explained by DIA instructor Don 
Myers (Theosophical Society, 2016):   
µ6HHNVWLOOQHVVLQPRYHPHQW¶6RRQHRIWKHWKLQJVZLWKWKHVHSKUDVHVLVDLVDOLWWOHELWRIDSDUDGR[
± how do you move and be still? How do you be still and move? 
[This only becomes possible when one accesses] the place where Yin and Yang arise and are 
XQGLIIHUHQWLDWHG6RHVVHQWLDOO\LW¶VLW¶VDSODFHZKHUHWKHUHLVQRGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWKLQJVWKDWZH
would normally consider opposites. 
As observed by Cavel (2016: 10) when referring to higher-order levels of tai chi: 
At this stage of play, your forms can become sublime because the effort that was required in the 
early years vanishes without a trace. The body feels empty yet full at the same time ± a paradox on 
which only direct perception can shed light. You play the form and, equally, the form plays you. 
Several times during my DIA classes, I heard Brian effectively summing up this logic with the 
paradoxical mathematical formula: 1+1=1. That is, integrating all the components of a practice 
does not mean assembling them one on top of the other, but rather attuning them in a way that they 
become less distinguishable, or, can be distinguished according to a different type of awareness ± 




Basho theory, it seems evident that DIA employs the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider 
non-dualist context to pragmatically achieve a shift from the Being to the Becoming. That is, while 
dualism(s), an either/or logic, and analytical distinctions, are considered ontologically fictive, they 
are instrumentally, practically, and productively engaged with by DIA practitioners.  
When I reveal to him the significance for the present research of the strategy of enveloping 
analytical dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context, Giuan-Giu ± a DIA instructor with 40 years of 
experience ± seems to convincedly approve and make very clear that what is ontologically valid is 
the non-linear/non-dichotomous logic of the Becoming (rather than the linear/dichotomous logic of 
the Being): 




opposite is also true. 
>«@ 
Vittorio: Actually, I call this a logic of paradox, in the sense that it is a paradox if two things that 
are the opposite are both true or both false. 
Giuan-Giu: Well done ± WKDW¶VFRUUHFW 
9LWWRULR:KDW\RXMXVWVDLGUHIOHFWVZKDW,DPGRLQJZLWKP\UHVHDUFK«LQWKHVHQVHWKDWLWVHHPV
to me that they [DIA instructors/practitioners] employ the typical Western logic, an either/or logic, 
\RXNQRZ"(LWKHUZKLWHRUEODFN>«@EXWWKHQWKLVORJLFLVHQYHORSHGLQDORJLFRISDUDGR[«ZKHUH
in practice there is a unity of all things and so you cannot make distinctions anymore and hence 
everything LVWUXHDQGHYHU\WKLQJ« 




Giuan-Giu: And to move within this [monist] reality you need the opposites [dualisms] 
9LWWRULR<HDK\HDKWKDW¶VULJKW 






Giuan-Giu: Otherwise you get lost in it. 
Therefore, DIA training involves the acknowledgment of two main ways of getting to know and 
acting in the world: a dichotomous mode ± the Being, and a non-dichotomous mode ± the 
Becoming. Following the strategy of enveloping dualism(s) in a non-dualist context, the DIA 
practitioner aims to shift from the former to the latter. On this ground, training takes place with the 
SUDFWLWLRQHU¶VDZDUHQHVVWKDWWKHELQDU\ORJLFDWWDFKHGWRWKH%HLQJLVDILFWLYHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOWRRO
employed to access the mode of embodiment of the Becoming, where a non-
dualist/relational/process-oriented ontology is actually experienced and not only merely theorised. 
If, instead, the DIA practitioner misunderstands the instrumentality of an either/or logic as an end 
rather than a tool, that is, if she reifies the dichotomous mode of the Being at the ontological level, 
she will never be able to move from a linear to a circular logic, and thus bring about the emergent 
properties characterising the shift to the non-dichotomous Becoming. It is on this ground that the 
DIA practitioner is able to be ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist.  
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Having introduced the Becoming and the Being and their relationship as conceived of and lived 
out within DIA training, I wish now to shed more light on these two modes of embodiment from a 
theoretical perspective. The acknowledgment of a dichotomous and non-dichotomous way to 
experience and engage with the world, and the strategy of enveloping the former mode with the 
latter, constitutes a common ground which, albeit in different forms, has been shared by diverse 
philosophical traditions for thousands of years. However, with the additional aid of McGilchrist¶V
neuroscience, I will narrow my attention to some of the thinkers who sustain contemporary body 
studies debates, such as James, Simondon, Whitehead, Deleuze and Guattari, and, of course, 
Spinoza, who provides the chief theoretical structure for the present study.  
In what follows I will show that, differently from some extant interpretations, rather than yielding 
a sterile, flat, and one-dimensional approach to our embodied condition, the process-oriented 
ontologies shared by these theorists appear to offer a theoretical framework able to account for the 
complexities, nuances, and paradoxes involved in the study of the body. In this way, they maintain 
an emphasis on the open-ended and relational mode I dubbed the Becoming without, however, 
neglecting the fictive yet instrumental mode of differentiation and individuation I named the 
Being. Hence, all these thinkers are, once more, ontologically monist and yet epistemologically 
pluralist.  
 
7.2 Two Modes of Getting to Know and Acting in the World 
 
The idea that we can experience and engage with the world in two main different ways has a very 
long transcultural history which cannot be surveyed here. In the Daoist tradition, for example, this 
appears to be best exemplified by a yin (Becoming) and yang (Being) way to get to know and act 
in the world (Wang, 2012). In the West, we can find similar distinctions between dichotomous and 
non-dichotomous ways of getting to know and acting in the world in Heraclitus, Aristotle, and 
Plato (Pieper, 2009/1963). Closer in time to us, the scholastic tradition of the Middle Ages 
distinguished between two main forms of knowledge: ratio and intellectus. The following 
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description of this medieval distinction provided by philosopher Josef Pieper (2009/1963: 28, 
original emphasis) strikingly resonates with what I have been taught and told by Brian (see chapter 
7.1) in relation to yang and yin modes of embodiment: 
Ratio is the power of discursive, logical thought, of searching and examination, of abstraction and 
drawing conclusions. Intellectus, on the other hand, is the name for the understanding in so far as it 
is the capacities of simplex intuitus, of that simple vision to which truth offers itself like a landscape 
WRWKHH\H7KHIDFXOW\RIPDQPDQ¶V>VLF@NQRZOHGJHLVERWKRIWKHVHWKLQJVLQRQHDFFRUGLQJWR
antiquity and the Middle Ages, simultaneously ratio and intellectus; and the process of knowing is 
the action of the two together. The mode of the discursive thought is accompanied and impregnated 
by an effortless awareness, the contemplative vision of the intellectus, which is not active but 
passive, or rather receptive, the activity of the soul in which it coQFHLYHVWKDWZKLFKLWVHHV>«@ 
3LHSHU¶VDFFRXQWKLJKOLJKWVWKHintertwinement and ultimately fictive analytical distinction between 
these two modes and hints at the desirability of an integration between the two. Moreover, it 
makes clear that intellectus is an effortless and receptive (rather WKDQ µSDVVLYH¶ D WHUPZKLFK ,
would argue, can be misleading in this instance) manner of knowing and engaging with the world.  
In a similar fashion, philosopher Maria Zambrano believes a split occurred in the post-Platonic 
West between the way of knowing and acting of the poet and that of the philosopher. In short, the 
poet understands the world in a non-dichotomous/direct manner and according to a non-
linear/circular logic, while the philosopher does so in a dichotomous/detached fashion by 
employing a linear either/or logic. According to Zambrano (2009):  
[There are] two sides of man [sic]: the philosopher and the poet. The whole person is not found 
under philosophy; the totality of the human is not found with poetry. In poetry we directly 
encounter the concrete, individual human. In philosophy the human in his universal history, in its 




Poetry, amidst everything, pursued the scorned multiplicity, the under-appreciated heterogeneity 
>«@:LWK WKLVZH WRXFKXSRQ WKHSHUKDSVPRVWGHOLFDWHSRLQWRIDOO WKDWZKLFKGHULYHV IURP WKH
FRQVLGHUDWLRQµXQLW\-KHWHURJHQHLW\¶ 
The philosopher wants oneness, because he wants everything, we have said. And the poet does not 
want precisely everything, for fear that in this all not every one of the things and their matrices are 
in play; the poet wants one, but each one of the things without restriction, without abstraction nor 
any renunciation. He wants a whole in which each thing is possessed, furthermore not 
understanding by "thing" a unity built on subtractions. A thing for a poet is never the conceptual 
object of thought, but instead the very complex and real thing, the phantasmagoric and dreamed 
thing, the invented, that which was and that which will never be. He wants reality, but the poetic 
reality is not simply what there is, what exists; but instead what is not; it balances being and 
nothingness in admirably charitable justice, for everything, everything has the right to be until it 
FDQQRWEHDQ\PRUH>«@ 
What they would never agree upon would be the method. Poetry is unmethodical, because it wants 
HYHU\WKLQJ DW WKH VDPH WLPH >«@ ,W ZDQWV ERWK WKLQJV DW RQFH ,W GRHs not distinguish, just as it 
cannot distinguish between being and appearance. It does not distinguish because it does not 
decide, because it does not decide to choose, to split anything: neither the appearances, of being; 
nor the things that exist, from their origins; nor its own being from where it might emerge. 
Hence, Zambrano hints at a dual character of the embodied agent, emphasises the tension between 
XQLW\DQGKHWHURJHQHLW\LQRXUNQRZOHGJHRIWKHZRUOGRUPRQLVPDQGSOXUDOLVPLQWKLVVWXG\¶V
termV DQG JUDQWV WKH RQWRORJLFDO SULPDF\ WR WKH SRHW¶V H[SHULHQFH LQ FRQWUDVW ZLWK WKH
SKLORVRSKHU¶VILFWLYH\HWLQVWUXPHQWDOHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHZRUOG 
That said, I wish however to dwell a little longer on a contemporary account of these two modes of 
embodiment as it associates two ways of getting to know and acting in the world to the 
actual/material structure of the body. This is provided in the book The Master and His Emissary 
by McGilchrist (2010/2009), who, by noticing the structural asymmetry of our brain hemispheres, 
sustains that we attend, apprehend, and engage with the world by continuously switching between 
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two different but interdependent modes: one is pre-reflective, non-representational, immediate, and 
lived ± this is the world of the right hemisphere (the Becoming); the other is reflective, 
representational, mediated, detached ± this is the world of the left hemisphere (the Being).  
Significantly, for McGilchrist (ibid.), these two forms of knowledge are two ways of being in the 
world ± two different types of engagement between the embodied agent and the world. In fact, if 
one bears in mind that, according to the phenomenological tradition, the hyphens signify the 
intLPDWHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHWHUPVµEHLQJ¶µLQ¶DQGµZRUOG¶VHHchapter 3.4), it is tempting 
WRVD\WKDWRQHPRGHLVDZD\RIµEHLQJ-in-the-ZRUOG¶DQGWKHRWKHUDZD\RIµEHLQJLQWKHZRUOG¶± 
indeed, according to McGilchrist (ibid.), the former mode LVDZRUOGRIµEHWZHHQQHVV¶WKHODWWHULV
QRW7KHUHIRUHDV³WKHUHLVOLWHUDOO\DZRUOGRIGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQWKHWZRKHPLVSKHUHV´ibid.: 2), 
phenomenologically speaking, the embodied agent inhabits two different worlds thus possessing a 
dual character.   
,PSRUWDQWO\KRZHYHUKHUHZHGRQRWKDYHDUHGXFWLRQLVWRUGXDOLVWDUJXPHQWRIWKHOLNHRIµRQH
KHPLVSKHUHGRHVHPRWLRQZKLOH WKHRWKHU ODQJXDJH¶ µRQH LV LUUDWLRQDODQG WKHRWKHU UDWLRQDO¶RU
ZRUVHµRQHLVIHPLQLQHDQGWKHRWKHUPDVFXOLQH¶5DWKHU, carefully avoiding these pitfalls as well 
as sharp divides, McGilchrist argues that both hemispheres are involved in any type of experience 
or function. For McGilchrist (ibid³WKHKHPLVSKHUHVDUHHYROXWLRQDU\WZLQVWKH\GLVSOD\D
remarkable degreHRIDSSDUHQWRYHUODSRUUHGXQGDQF\RIIXQFWLRQ´1HYHUWKHOHVVWKHUHVHHPVWREH
D VXEWOH \HW FUXFLDO GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ WKHP ZKLFK LV QRW WR EH IRXQG LQ WKH µZKDW¶ EXW LQ WKH
µKRZ¶ 
,Q0F*LOFKULVW¶Vibid.: 174-175, original emphasis) words: 
The left hemisphere is always engaged in a purpose: it always has an end in view, and downgrades 
whatever has no instrumental purpose in sight. The right hemisphere, by contrast, has no designs on 
anything. It is vigilant for whatever is, without preconceptions, withRXWDSUHGHILQHGSXUSRVH>«@
The world of the left hemisphere, dependent on denotative language and abstraction, yields clarity 
and power to manipulate things that are known, fixed, static, isolated, decontextualized, explicit, 
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disembodied, general in nature, but ultimately lifeless. The right hemisphere, by contrast, yields a 
world of individual, changing, evolving, interconnecting, implicit, incarnate living beings within 
the context of the lived world, but in the nature of things never fully graspable, always imperfectly 
known ± and to this world it exists in a relationship of care. The knowledge that is mediated by the 
left hemisphere is knowledge within a closed system. It has the advantage of perfection, but such 
perfection is bought ultimately at the price of emptiness, of self-reference. It can mediate 
knowledge only in terms of a mechanical rearrangement of other things already known. It can never 
UHDOO\µEUHDNRXW¶WRNQRZDQ\WKLQJQHZEHFDXVHLWVNQRZOHGJHLVRILWVRZQUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRQO\
Where WKH WKLQJ LWVHOI LV µSUHVHQW¶ WR WKH ULJKW KHPLVSKHUH LW LV RQO\ µUH-SUHVHQWHG¶ E\ WKH OHIW
hemisphere, now become an idea of a thing. Where the right hemisphere is conscious of the Other, 
ZKDWHYHULWPD\EHWKHOHIWKHPLVSKHUH¶VFRQVFLRXVQHVVLVRILWVHlf.   
Accordingly, the degree of predominance of one hemisphere in a particular experience will subtly 
influence how VXFKH[SHULHQFHLVOLYHGRXW,Q0F*LOFKULVW¶Vibid.: 10, original emphasis) words:  
[A]t the level of experience, the world we know is synthesised from the work of the two 
hemispheres, each hemisphere having its own way of understanding the world ± LWVRZQµWDNH¶RQ
it. This synthesis is unlikely to be symmetrical, and the world we actually experience, 
phenomenologically, at any point in WLPHLVGHWHUPLQHGE\ZKLFKKHPLVSKHUH¶VYHUVLRQRIWKHZRUOG
ultimately comes to predominate. 
When the first of these two modes predominates, we experience the world in a non-dichotomous 
way ± according to the Becoming mode of embodiment. That is, we experience and conceive of 
the world as open-ended, where things are not known as separate entities, and a sense of 
connectedness of all things, and engagement with the surrounding environment, prevails (ibid.). 
This is a dynamic and living world of paradoxes and care (ibid 7KLV LV LQGHHG WKH µGHIDXOW¶
manner through which we experience the world ± i.e., the way which is significant every time we 




When we switch towards the second mode, we experience the world as a structure ± this is the 
mode of embodiment of the Being. That is, we experience and conceive of the world as made up 
by individuated and separated entities ± this is a static and lifeless world of either/or linear logic 
and manipulation (ibid.). This is a disembodied, decontextualised, instrumental, mechanic, and 
REMHFWLILHGZRUOGZKLFKSURYLGHVXVZLWKµDYLHZIURPDERYH¶ ibid.). This mode of experience 
clearly has some advantages. As McGilchrist (ibid.: 21) observes: 
[O]ur ability to stand back from the world, from our selves, and from the immediacy of experience 
>«@HQDEOHVXVWRSODQWRWKLQNIOH[LEO\DQGLQYHQWLYHO\DQGLQEULHIWRWDNHFRQWURORIWKHZRUOG
around us rather than simply respond to it passively.  
This is the mode of experience which is salient in this very moment, when both I and the reader 
are distinguishing between categories such as those of the Becoming, the Being, the linear logic, 
and the circular logic, which, albeit useful and functional, are ultimately fictive ± and, of course, 
one of the chief contentions of the current study is that such functionality should warn against the 
neglect of these categories. 
Significantly, the acknowledgment of both the fictivity and functionality of this mode of 
experience appears to be among the core concerns of McGilchrist (ibid.). In fact, McGilchrist 
identifies the right hemisphere with the master of his book title, while the role of the emissary is 
played by the left hemisphere: the master needs her emissary to be able to rule the vast land she 
possesses. Yet, McGilchrist (ibid.) argues, if the emissary abuses the power granted to him by his 
PDVWHU WKH PDVWHU¶V SURVSHURXV GRPDLQ LV OLNHO\ WR IDOO DSDUW ,Q WKLV UHVSHFW PLVWDNLQJ WKH
emissary for the master is not too dissimilar from mistaking instructions for an end rather than a 
means within the Daoist tradition ± in any case, if one acts as a master but is in fact an emissary, 
or, if one reifies the mode of the Being at the ontological level, whether it is a vast domain or a 
DIA practice, it will end up in ruins.  
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The underpinning morale of the metaphor is that it is the world of the right hemisphere which 
characterises the fundamentally relational and embodied nature of human beings14. As McGilchrist 
(ibid.: 460) points out, even within the scientific enterprise ± perhaps the most evident example of 
the functionality of the experiential dimension of the Being ± one cannot exclusively rely on this 
mode of knowledge. In fact, to be able to advance their innovative theorising, remarkable 
scientists, such as Einstein, Bohr, Planck, Heisenberg, and Bohm, had to move beyond a linear 
either/or logic and access a paradoxical type of thought (ibid.).  
Hence, consistent with the Daoist tradition, McGilchrist (ibid.: 176, original emphasis) grants the 
ontological primacy to the Becoming without, however, neglecting the importance of the Being:  
[T]he relationship between the hemispheres is not equal, and while both contribute to our 
knowledge of the world, which therefore needs to be synthesised, one hemisphere, the right 
hemisphere, has precedence, in that it underwrites the knowledge that the other comes to have, and 
is alone able to synthesise what both know into a usable whole.  
Of course, McGilchrist is not explicitly envisaging a theoretical framework constituted by two 
main dimensions with one enveloping the other, nor is he conceptualising embodiment as 
possessing a dual character. Nevertheless, his arguments appear to strongly resonate with those of 
the current research. This appears especially evident when he suggests that the two brain 
hemispheres and the two related modes of embodiment reflect the character of the world we live 
in, and, indeed, of our embodied condition. In the conclusion of his book, McGilchrist (ibid.: 460) 
asserts: 
I believe our brains not only to dictate the shape of the experience we have of the world, but are 
likely themselves to reflect, in their structure and functioning, the nature of the universe in which 
they have come about. 
                                                          
14 Interestingly, mirroring a dominant discourse in DIA envisaging a prevalence of a yang mind in Western 
contexts, McGilchrist views our culture as dominated by the left hemisphere. In turn, these contentions 




As shoZQ EHORZ KRZHYHU ',$ LQVWUXFWRUV¶ 3LHSHU¶V =DPEUDQR¶V DQG 0F*LOFKULVW¶V
observations find a more explicit expression in the contentions of philosophers often evoked in 
contemporary body studies such as James, Simondon, Whitehead, Deleuze and Guattari, and 
Spinoza ± below I will employ the former thinkers to support the arguments of the latter, who 
offers the theoretical framework underpinning this thesis.   
 
7.2.1 6SLQR]D¶V)LQLWHDQG,QILQLWH0RGHV 
6SLQR]D¶V ZRUOGYLHZ HQWDLOV WKH H[LVWHQFH RI RQO\ RQH VXEVWDQFH ZKLFK LV QHLWKHU
physical/material nor mental/immaterial, and which is identified by the Dutch philosopher as God 
or Nature. By expressing itself, this one substance gives rise to the plurality of all beings (Deleuze, 
2013/1992). Thus, far from proposing a sterile, flat, and one-dimensional form of monism, the 
Dutch philosopher provides a sophisticated account of the plurality involved in the expression of 
this one substance and of human embodiment. However, his pluralist account is grounded in a 
fundamental distinction between two chief modes reflecting two ways of getting to know and 
DFWLQJLQWKHZRUOG,QGHHGDVZLOOEHFRPHFOHDUHUODWHU6SLQR]D¶VSURMHFWRIKXPDQ
emancipation aims at a shift from a dichotomous to a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment, and 
at the achievement of a higher-order degree of capacities for agency for the embodied agent.  
7KURXJKRXW 6SLQR]D¶V ZULWLQJV WKHVH PRGHV KDYH EHHQ FDOOHG YDULRXV QDPHV µVXEVWance and 
PRGH¶µFUHDWRUDQGFUHDWXUH¶µnatura naturans and natura naturata¶RUµHVVHQFHDQGH[SUHVVLRQ¶
(Hallett, 1957). However, I will refer to them here as infinite mode and finite mode, which appears 
to be the terminology often employed by Spinozian scholars and by Spinoza (1996/1994) himself 
in his magnum opus, The Ethics. In the terminology I am employing in this study, the non-
GLFKRWRPRXV PRGH , QDPH WKH %HFRPLQJ LV 6SLQR]D¶V LQILQLWH PRGH ZKHUHDV WKH GLFKRWRPRXV
mode I call the Being is the finite mode. Moreover, one of these two modes ± the infinite 
mode/Becoming, envelops the other ± the finite mode/Being.  
That is, the immanent infinite mode/Becoming possesses an ontological primacy, while it is within 
the dimension of the finite mode/Being that the multidimensionality of our phenomenal world 
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unfolds, including the two experiential dimensions of mind and body, which Spinoza calls 
attributes: the attribute of Thought and the attribute of Extension. These attributes, however, have 
an instrumental yet fictive character as they are only two ways we get to know what is only one 
substance, which is in fact neither mental nor physical. It is in this way that Spinoza is able to be 
epistemologically pluralist, as he addresses the richness and multidimensionality of our lived 
experience, and ontologically monist, as such pluralism is ultimately enveloped within only one 
immanent dimension.  
Resonating with the Daoist Taijitu (see chapter 5.5), Merleau-3RQW\¶VFKLDVPVHHchapter 3.4), or 
0DVVXPL¶VYLUWXDOturning into actual (see chapter 4.2), for Spinoza the plurality of all beings is the 
actuality, self-actualisation, or self-determination of the one substance. As explained by 
SKLORVRSKHU +DUROG +DOOHWW   RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV ³>W@KH WZR SROHV RI Givine creation, 
Natura naturans and Natura naturata are indiscerptible, though not co-ordinate, transeunt, or 
alternative. Natura naturata is dependent upon and subordinate to Natura Naturans, which 
necessarily actualizes itself as Natura Naturata´ ,Q other words, the two Spinozian modes are 
FKDUDFWHULVHGE\D³GXDOLW\LQXQLW\´ibid.: 10).  
Hence, consistent with a relational theoretical framework, and despite their asymmetry, each mode 
can only be explained by resorting to the other ± i.e., the Becoming can only be understood by 
referring to the Being and vice versa. Indeed, one of the main aims of Spinoza is precisely that of 
accounting for the finite mode by locating (or enveloping) it within the infinite mode (ibid.). 
Reiterated in the current stud\¶V WHUPV RQH RI WKH FKLHI 6SLQR]LDQ FRQFHUQV LV WR FRQFHSWXDOLVH
processes of individuation within a process-oriented ontology where all things emerge out of their 
LQWHUUHODWLRQ,QWKLVZD\6SLQR]D¶VWKHRULVLQJQRWRQO\UHVHPEOHV1LVKLGD¶V%DVKRWKHRU\, but it 
DOVRVKDUHVDFRPPRQJURXQGZLWK-DPHV¶6LPRQGRQ¶VDQG:KLWHKHDG¶VDFFRXQWV 
)RU LQVWDQFH OLNH 6SLQR]D¶V RQH DQG WKH VDPH VXEVWDQFH pure experience is seen by James 
(1996/1912, see also Stenner, 2011) as an immanent principle, neither material nor immaterial ± a 
primordial, undifferentiated, chaotic, and pre-individual experiential flux, within which it evolves 
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the pluralism of more differentiated, ordered, and individuated phenomenological fields. In this 
way, for the American philosopher all dualisms are grounded in a wider relational framework ± 
i.e., they are enveloped in a non-dichotomous context. As James (1996/1912: 10) asserts, 
³µWKRXJKW¶DQGµWKLQJ¶± WKDWGXDOLVP>«@ LV VWLOOSUHVHUYHG LQ WKLVDFFRXQWEXW UHLQWHUSUHWHGVR
that, insteDG RI EHLQJ P\VWHULRXV DQGHOXVLYH LW EHFRPHV YHULILDEOH DQG FRQFUHWH´ $JDLQ LQ WKH
words of philosopher Russell Duvernoy (2016: 439):  
-DPHV¶VSRVLWLQJRI UDGLFDOHPSLULFLVPJLYHVDQHZIRUPWR WKHSHUHQQLDOSUREOHPRI WKHUHODWLRQ
between thoughts and things, reconceptualising it within a field of pure experience. Relations 
ZLWKLQ WKLV ILHOG DUH HYHQWVRU SURFHVVHV WKDW DUH FRQVWLWXWLYHRI ERWK µVXEMHFWLYH¶ DQG µREMHFWLYH¶
moments. This speculative hypothesis poses the relation in a new way and thus emphasizes 
differently what explanations are owed. The chief question now becomes how to account for 
individuation within the field of pure experience. 
6LPLODUO\6LPRQGRQ¶V-298, original emphasis) main concern is given away by the title 
of one of his best-known essays, The Genesis of the Individual ZKHUH KH DUJXHV DJDLQVW ³an 
ontological privilege to the already constituted individual´ 7KDW LV WR XQGHUVWDQG KRZ WKH
individual (and the world) is constituted, rather than taking the individual itself (the Being) as a 
point of departure, à la Descartes, Simondon intends to start from the wider processes from which 
LQGLYLGXDWLRQLVJHQHUDWHGWKH%HFRPLQJ,Q6LPRQGRQ¶VRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVZRUGV 
Instead of grasping individuation using the individuated being as a starting point, we must grasp 
the individuated being from the viewpoint of individuation, and individuation from the viewpoint of 
preindividual being. 
8VLQJµEHLQJ¶DQGµEHFRPLQJ¶ LQWKHRSSRVLWHZD\,XWLOLVHWKHWHUPV IRU6LPRQGRQ
original emphasis):  
What one assumes to be a relation or a duality of principles [e.g., mind-body, subject-object, 
individual-collective etc.] is in fact the unfolding of the being [the Becoming], which is more than a 
unity and more than an identity; becoming [the Being] is a dimension of the being [the Becoming]. 
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+HUH UDWKHU WKDQ EHLQJ GLVPLVVHG LQ 6LPRQGRQ¶V WKHRULVLQJ WKH VXEMHFW-object relation and the 
individual are located and accounted for within the broader context of which they originate. In this 
way for Simondon (2006/2001) individuation is being part of a collective ± indeed, the more one is 
part of a collective the more one is individuated. Mirroring the relationship between the Becoming 
and the Being, here the collective is constitutive of the individual and individuation is a process of 
self-determination of the collective (ibid.). Far from yielding an individualistic account, 
6LPRQGRQ¶VRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV³>L@QGLYLGXDWLRQ>«@QRWRQO\EULQJVWKHLQGLYLGXDOWR
light but also the individual-PLOLHXG\DG>«@Thus, individuation is here considered to form only 
one part of an ontogenetic process in the development of a larger entity´  
6LPRQGRQ¶V FRQWHQWLRQV EHDU DQ HYLGHQW UHVHPEODQFH ZLWK WKH UH-reading of Alfred North 
Whitehead provided by Stenner (2008), who contends that the employment of a process-oriented 
ontology and an anti-Cartesian stance does not require the jettisoning of the individual and her 
SKHQRPHQDOZRUOG6WHQQHUFULWLTXHVFHUWDLQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRI:KLWHKHDG¶VSKLORVRSK\
advanced by contemporary new materialist/affeFWWKHRULVWVDQGREVHUYHVWKDW³>L@QUHFHQWµUDGLFDO¶
social theory, it seems the baby of subjectivity is at risk of being thrown out with the bathwater of 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOLVP´5HLWHUDWHGLQWKHZRUGVRIPHGLDDQGFXOWXUDOWKHRULVW/LVD%ODFNPDQ
13 RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV ³ZH ZRXOG VWLOO EH ZLVH WR UHWDLQ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI DWWHQGLQJ WR WKH
concept of subjectivity, which refers to the ways in which individual VXEMHFWV DWWHPSW WR µKDQJ
WRJHWKHU¶DFRKHUHQWVHQVHRIVHOILQWKHIDFHRIPXOWLSOLFLW\´ 
It is true, Stenner (2008) argues, that for Whitehead the subject-object relation is ultimately a 
duality in unity enveloped in a process-oriented ontology. It is also true that within such theoretical 
landscape each term of the relation cannot exist without, and thus cannot be privileged on, the 
other (ibid.). Nevertheless, it is equally true that for Whitehead (1933/1935, in Stenner, 2008: 92) 
³WKH VXEMHFW±REMHFW UHODWLRQ LV WKH IXQGDPHQWDO VWUXFWXUH RI H[SHULHQFH´ )RU WKH (QJOLVK
philosopher, rather than being an epiphenomenon, our lived experience is what brings about 





Allowing for infinite multiplicities and intertwined levels of existence, but always faithful to our 
OLYHG H[SHULHQFH¶V SKHQRPHQRORJ\ :KLWHKHDG¶V  -70) analysis begins with two 
PDLQ PRGHV KH FDOOV µWKH W\SH RI DFWXDOLW\¶ WKH %HLQJ DQG µWKH W\SH RI SXUH SRWHQWLDOLW\¶ WKH
Becoming): 
[M]odes of reality require each other. It is the task of philosophy to elucidate the relevance to each 
other of various types of existence. We cannot exhaust such types because there are an unending 
QXPEHURIWKHP%XWZHFDQVWDUWZLWK>«@WZRW\SHVZKLFKWRXV>DUH@VHHQDVH[WUHPHVDQGFDQ
then discern these types as requiring other types to express their mutual relevance to each other.  
I do not affirm that these two types are fundamentally more ultimate, or more simple, than other 
derivative types. But I do maintain that for human experience, they are natural starting points for 
the understanding of types of existence.  
The two types in question can be named respectivel\µ7KH7\SHRI$FWXDOLW\¶DQGµ7KH7\SHRI
3XUH3RWHQWLDOLW\¶ 
These two types require each other, namely actuality is the exemplification of potentiality, and 
potentiality is the characterization of actuality, either in fact or in concept. 
Also the interconnections of the two extreme types involve the introduction of other types, namely 
type upon type, each type expressing some mode of composition.  
6WUHVVLQJERWKWKHIXQFWLRQDOLW\DQGILFWLYLW\RIDGLFKRWRPRXVPRGH:KLWHKHDGLVPRWLYDWHG³WR
generate a YLDEOHFRQFHSWRI µHQWLW\¶ZKLFK >«@GRHVQRWSUHFOXGHHQWLWLHVDOVREHLQJ IXQFWLRQV´
6WHQQHUDQGHQYLVDJHVDSV\FKRSK\VLFDOUHDOLW\ZKLFKDYRLGV³UHGXFLQJWKHXQLYHUVH
WRµGLVFRXUVH¶DQGµPDWHULDOLW\¶´6WHQQHUDQGZKHUHRXUH[SHULHQFH³LVWKHEHFRPLQJ




Actual occasions are precisely those occurrences or assemblages whereby the universe is self-
realising ± LH ³WKH ILQDO UHDO WKLQJV RI ZKLFK WKH ZRUOG LV PDGH XS >ZKLFK DOWKRXJK DUH
characterised by] gradations of importance, and diversity of function, yet in the principles which 
actuality exemplifiHVDUHDOORQWKHVDPHOHYHO´ibid,QWKLVVWXG\¶VWHUPVDFWXDORFFDVLRQV
are processes of individuation ± i.e., events through which the Being emerges out of the Becoming 
± which are therefore always located in a wider non-GLFKRWRPRXVFRQWH[WµWKHVDPHOHYHO¶ 
$V REVHUYHG E\ 6WHQQHU   RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV ³DQ DFWXDO RFFDVLRQ LV D SDVVDJH IURP D
state of disjunctive diversity to a state of conjunctive unity´ ,Q :KLWHKHDG¶V  
ZRUGVE\PHDQVRIDQDFWXDORFFDVLRQ³WKHPDQ\become one and are increased by one [by means 
RI WKH@ SURGXFWLRQ RI QRYHO WRJHWKHUQHVV´ 3XW DQRWKHU ZD\ DFWXDO RFFDVLRQV DUH FUHDWLYH DFWV
ZKHUHE\QRYHOW\LVEURXJKWDERXWLQWKHZRUOGWKHZRUOGLVµLQFUHDVHGE\RQH¶DQGDJDLQLQWKH
SUHVHQWVWXG\¶VWerminology, the Becoming unfolds into the Being.  
Overall, James, Simondon, and Whitehead offer a pluralist and multidimensional view of our 
embodied condition which is however enveloped in a wider non-dichotomous and ultimately 
monist context. Moreover, their accounts appear to be, more or less explicitly, grounded in two 
FKLHIPRGHVRIHPERGLPHQWZKLFKWRHYRNH:KLWHKHDGRQFHPRUHµWRXVDUHVHHQDVH[WUHPHV¶
Nevertheless, to obtain a more nuanced description of these two main modes of embodiment we 
need to refer to Deleuze and Guattari who, in turn, lead us back to Spinoza.  
Drawing on Spinoza, Deleuze and Guattari (2013/1988) identify the finite mode/Being and the 
infinite mode/Becoming respectively as two plan(e)s: the plan(e) of organisation (or development, 
or transcendence) and the plane of consistency (or composition, or immanence). However, 
following Spinoza, it is within the plane of consistency that the plan(e) of organisation unfolds. 
Hence, as put by Deleuze and Guattari (2013/1988: 309), rather than two planes, there is in fact 
RQO\ RQH SODQH DQG WKXV LW ZRXOG EH PRUH FRUUHFW WR WDON RI ³WZR ZD\V RI FRQFHSWXDOLVLQJ WKH
SODQH´ ± or, seen from the perspective of this study, the plane of consistency (the Becoming) 
envelops the plan(e) of organisation (the Being).   
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According to Deleuze and Guattari (2013/1988), the plan(e) of organisation (the Being) is the 
SODQHRIIRUPVDQGVWDWLFVWUXFWXUHVZKHUHZHFDQGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQGLVFUHWHµWKLQJV¶ZKLFKFDQ
retain their organisation and identity over time. This is the dimension of individuation, reflection, 
closed systems, and either/or logic. Conversely the plane of consistency (the Becoming) is the 
plane of pre-LQGLYLGXDOIRUPOHVVDQGG\QDPLFHYHQWVZKHUHHYHU\µWKLQJ¶LVLQWHUFRQQHFWHGZLWK
othHUµWKLQJV¶ZLWKLQDSURFHVVRIFRQWLQXRXVWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDQGZKHUHWKHWHUPVRIDUHODWLRQGR
not pre-exist their interrelating ± this is a pre-reflective, non-representational, and open-ended 
dimension where the logic of paradox is salient (see also Deleuze, 2013/1992). 
Like DIA instructors, Deleuze and Guattari utilise dozens of metaphors, analogies, and examples 
WR GHYHORS WKHLU DUJXPHQWV ,Q UHODWLRQ WR WLPH IRU LQVWDQFH µ&KURQRV¶ LV WKH OLQHDU WLPH RI WKH
%HLQJ³WKH WLPHRIPHDVXUH WKDWVLWXDWHV things and persons, develops a form, and determines a 
VXEMHFW´ibidµ$HRQ¶LQVWHDGLVWKHFLUFXODUWLPHRIWKH%HFRPLQJ³WKHLQGHILQLWHWLPHRI
WKHHYHQW>«@WKDWZKLFKWUDQVSLUHVLQWRDQDOUHDG\-there that is at the same time not-yet-here, a 
simultaneous too-late and too-early, a something that is both going to happen and has just 
KDSSHQHG´ibid.: 305).  
A further metaphor is that of the tree and the rhizome ± the tree represents the Being, the rhizome 
the Becoming. The former has a linear and genealogical structure with a beginning and an end. 
Without following any linear or genealogical unfolding, the latter lacks a definable structure, and 
LV GLVWULEXWHG DFURVV µWKLQJV¶ 7KH WUHH WHQGV WR UHSURGXFH LWV VWUXFWXUH 7KH UKL]RPH ODFNV DQ\
structure or pattern, and thus is disseminated in virtually infinite directions, cutting across the 
GLVFUHWHµWKLQJV¶RIWKH%HLQJ,Q'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL¶VibidZRUGV³>W@KHWUHHLVILOLDWLRQ
but the rhizome is alliance, uniquely alliance. The tree iPSRVHVWKHYHUEµWREH¶EXWWKHIDEULFRI
WKHUKL]RPHLVWKHFRQMXQFWLRQµDQG«DQG«DQG«¶´ 
Significantly for the present research, West and East provide a further analogy. Deleuze and 
Guattari (ibid.) note that the model of the tree has dominated Western cultural models, while that 
of the rhizome Eastern thought. To remain within botany, for example, according to Deleuze and 
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Guattari (ibid.: 18-19), the West has privileged the forest and the field, while the East, the steppe 
and the garden. Following a linear logic, in terms of sexuality, the West appears to be orgasmic 
and reproductively oriented. In the Eastern conception, instead, sexual activity does not necessarily 
aim at these ends, and its energy, rather than dissipated in orgasm and reproduction, can be 
oriented and redirected towards other, non-sexual activities according to a circular logic (ibid.: 19). 
Similarly, in relation to music, Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.: 315) assert that while Western music 
IROORZV WKH WUHH PRGHO DQG LV ³EDVHG RQ VRXQG IRUPV DQG WKHLU GHYHORSPHQW´(DVWHUQ PXVLF LV
³FRPSRVHGRIVSHHGVDQGVORZQHVVPRYHPHQWDQGUHVW´ 
Even more pertinent to the current study is the analogy made by Deleuze and Guattari (ibid.: 2, 34, 
46-49) between an organism and a Body without Organs (BwO). At the level of the 
Being/tree/plan(e) of organisation, the body is an organism, a structured, self-organised system, 
with a form, a substance and a linear/genealogical development ± here the body is a Being. At the 
level of the Becoming/rhizome/plane of consistency, the body is a Body without Organs, an 
unstructured, open-ended system, formless, an unsubstantial process, not following any 
linear/genealogical development ± here the body is a Becoming5HVHPEOLQJ)UDQW]LV¶REVHUYDWLRQ
on the unattainability of absolute emptiness (see chapter 7.1), for the French thinkers the BwO is 
an idealised notion, in the sense that it is never fully knowable or achievable ± in Deleuze and 
*XDWWDUL¶VZRUGVibid³>\@RXQHYHUUHDFKWKH%RG\ZLWKRXW2UJDQV\RX FDQ¶WUHDFKLW\RX
DUHIRUHYHUDWWDLQLQJLWLWLVDOLPLW´ 
:KLOH ZKHQ LQWHUSUHWLQJ 6SLQR]D¶V DUJXPHQWV 'HOHX]H DQG *XDWWDUL HQYLVDJH WZR PDLQ
modes/planes, the fact that usually only one of them ± the plane of consistency (the Becoming) ± is 
most often cited in contemporary social theory and body studies well reflects the over-emphasis on 
the open-ended dimension of embodiment (for the importance of considering both planes in 
'HOHX]H¶V WKRXJKWVHH/XQG\<HVFHUWDLQO\'HOHX]HDQG*XDWWDUL DQd Spinoza, James, 
Simondon, and Whitehead) intend to stress the ontological primacy of the non-dichotomous plane 
of consistency and, above all, reject the Cartesian, positivist, and cognitivist paradigm, where the 
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tables are turned upside down and it is the dichotomous plan(e) of organisation which is reified at 
the ontological level.  
However, following Stenner (2008; see also Burkitt, 1999), I contend that if not re-contextualised 
within a post-Cartesian ontology, this just emphasis risks producing a flat perspective of 
embodiment, rather than accounting for its multidimensional character ± once again, both modes 
need to be included in a non-reductionist account. In this respect, while the present research 
subscribes to the view according to which the world we live in, including human embodiment 
LWVHOI KDV DQ XOWLPDWHO\ UHODWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU LW DOVR UHFRJQLVHV WKDW µWKLQJV¶ FDQ DFTXLUH GLVWLQFW
identities and that, within an individuated dimension, the embodied agent is able to exercise a 
degree of agency and power of acting in the world, and therefore bring about change and novelty.  
In this light, taking into consideration the body as a self-RUJDQLVLQJV\VWHPDQGWKHVXEMHFW¶VLQQHU
life ± LQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\¶VWHUPVWDNLQJLQWRDFFRXQWDOVRWKHGLPHQVLon of the Being ± does not 
necessarily imply a Cartesian, cognitivist, or individualistic worldview. Hence, an emphasis on the 
Becoming does not need to be equated to the disregard of the Being. It is on these premises that I 
suggest that once we have firmly grounded our theorising of embodiment within the process-
oriented ontology of the Becoming, the next step needs to be a meaningful re-conceptualisation of 
the Being in a non-dualist manner. We need, in other words, to move from a mere anti- to a post-
Cartesian perspective.  
This is an extremely ambitious endeavour, which entails neither conflating differences nor falling 
into the Cartesian person. As noted by Duvernoy, following Spinoza, Deleuze intended to answer 
³WKH TXHVWLRQ RI KRZ WR DFFRXQW IRU LQGLviduated experience without relying on the ontological 
JLYHQQHVV RI WKH VXEMHFW´   DQG WKHUHIRUH ³>V@LQFH ZH FDQQRW DSSHDO WR WKH HVVHQWLDO
givenness of subjects or objects, we have to find a different way of accounting for conventional 
experienFHRIWKHLUH[LVWHQFHDQGVWDELOLW\´:KLOHRIFRXUVHWKLVVWXG\GRHVQRWDLP
at providing a definite answer to this ultimate philosophical conundrum, it however intends to 
offer a strategy ± namely that of enveloping all dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context ± which 
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can help us to pragmatically deal with our sociological concerns and ameliorate our understanding 
of how the phenomenology of a number of relationships we keep on encountering in contemporary 
body studies come to be and change.  
To provide a contribution towards this aim, in what follows I will analyse how the strategy of 
enveloping all dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context is pragmatically implemented by both 
DIA practitioners and Spinoza. I will show that the analytical distinctions/experiential dimensions 
between mind and body, internal and external environments of embodiment, language and 
corporeality, and the representational and the non-representational, are employed in an 
instrumental way to understand, and make a difference to, the dynamics involved in our embodied 
condition. My endeavour will begin with the mind-body relationship ± first contextualised within 














Chapter 8: THE PRINCIPLE OF MIND-BODY CORRESPONDENCE  
 
8.1 Merging Mind and Body  
 
,QWKHZRUGVRI%ULDQWKHµPHUJLQJRIPLQGDQGERG\LVWKHILUVWVWHS¶LQ',$WUDLQLQJ5HLWHUDWHG
LQWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFK¶VWHUPVWKHILUVWVWHSWRZDUGVWKHVKLIWIURPWKH%HLQJ to the Becoming is to 
attune the experiential dimensions of mind and body so that they can turn from dualism(s) to a 
duality in unity. This is very different from a typical Western training where the active mind acts 
XSRQWKHSDVVLYHERG\&RXQWOHVVWLPHV,KDYHKHDUG%ULDQVD\LQJ WKDWµWKHPLQGFDQQRW WHOO WKH
ERG\ ZKDW WR GR¶ ± a statement which might seem disorienting, but which, nevertheless, is 
fundamental in DIA training. Indeed, in DIA analytical distinctions like mind and body, internal 
and external environments of embodiment, language and corporeality, or the representational and 
the non-representational are all employed in a peculiar way.  
Faithful to a conceptual landscape which is ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist, 
while the two terms of the above relationships are considered ontologically inseparable, they are 
instrumentally used in training at the epistemological level. In practical terms, and in line with 
3RUNHUW¶VYLHZRI7&0DVDPHGLFLQHRIV\VWHPDWLFFRUUHVSRQGHQFHVVHHchapter 5.5), this means 
that for the DIA practitioner the above relationships are conceptualised in terms of a principle of 
dynamic correspondence, rather than an interaction. With regard to the mind-body relationship, 
this entails that what occurs on the physical dimension of the body has a correspondence on the 
mental dimension of the mind, and vice versa ± both dimensions possess causal power here.  
Yet, this principle of correspondence is not fixed, but rather dynamic and amenable to change at 
the phenomenological level, where the fundamental unity of the terms constituting these 
relationships can be experienced as more or less salient ± the former option is that sought by the 
',$ SUDFWLWLRQHU 2QFH DJDLQ LQ WKH SUHVHQW VWXG\¶V WHUPV ',$ DLP DW EULQJLQJ DERXW D
phenomenological shift from dualism(s) to dualities in unity (see also Yuasa in chapter 6.1).  
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Consistent with the above, DIA training involves both mind and body. That is, on the one hand, 
the target of the training is the ³physical body [which] is considered a tower to the heavens, a 
ladder to the heavenly realms´ (Neigong.net, 2016a). On the other, however, lived experience, 
mind, and cognition are fundamental in DIA as ³the movement of the body comes from mind 
cultivation´ (Neigong.net, 2016b 7KHUHIRUH ZKLOH LW VHHPV FOHDU WKDW ',$ DUH QRW DERXW µWKH
PLQGWHOOLQJWKHERG\ZKDWWRGR¶DWWKHVDPHWLme, the body does not appear to replace the mind 
as the privileged term of the relationship. In other words, there is no inverse Cartesianism here, 
and the mind and our phenomenological world are never reduced to an epiphenomenon.  
In fact, at the beginning of my explorations of DIA I was a little puzzled: the training focus was at 
times falling on the mind while other times on the body ± but which one plays the chief role? As 
Brian appeared elusive when I asked for clarifications on the matter, to obtain a more satisfactory 
answer, I took advantage of an interview with another DIA instructor ± Danielle. Below Danielle 
exposes the limitations of my either/or linear reasoning and makes clear the principle of 
correspondence between mind and body: what occurs at the physical and material level has a 
correspondence on the mental and affective level and vice versa:  
9LWWRULR(UXPDQRWKHUWKLQJ,IRXQGTXLWHWULFN\HUP«LVHUWKDWZLWKDOOWKHVHSUDFWLFHVWKH\V-, 
stress of course on the body. <Pause> 
Danielle: Mm. 






Danielle: Mm. Yeah, yeah. <chuckles> 
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Vittorio:  6R , IRXQG LW D ELW RI D FRQWUDGLFWLRQ \RX NQRZ LW LW¶V DERXW WKH ERG\ LW¶V DERXW WKH
PLQG« 
'DQLHOOH$JDLQ,WKLQNWKDW¶VWKDW¶VDJDLQHUOLke a bit of a Western separation. 
Vittorio:  Yeah. 
Danielle: So you have the body and the mind as separate entities so they have like a doctor that 
deals with the body, they have the doctor that deals with the mind. 
Vittorio: Yeah. 
Danielle: And I think in WKH(DVWWKH\GRQ¶WKDYHWKLVNLQGRIGLVWLQFWVHSDUDWLRQ$QGLI\RXWKLQN
DERXW LW DQ\WKLQJ WKDW \RXU LV KDSSHQLQJ LQ \RXU KHDG ZLOO DIIHFW \RX SK\VLFDOO\ VR LI \RX¶UH
stressed out maybe you start to lift your shoulders. There are various things. If sRPHWKLQJ«
VRPHWKLQJEDG KDSSHQV WR \RX WKHQ LW¶V DOPRVW OLNH \RX FDQEXLOGXS DQ DUPRXU OLNH \RX PLJKW
WHQVHDFHUWDLQPXVFOHDQGKROG\RXUVHOILQDFHUWDLQZD\LW¶VDOPRVWOLNHDNLQGRISURWHFWLRQDQG
then I think doing the physical work erm can just loosen it off and then that will affect the emotion 
LQWKHWKHKHDGDVZHOO6RWKDW¶VZK\,WKLQNLW¶VNLQGRILQWULQVLFDOO\OLQNHGZLWKWKHWKHPLQGDQG
WKHERG\HUP«VR LW¶V WKLQJV WKDW \RXPLJKWQRWHYHQQRWLFH\RX \RXGRQ¶WQRWLFH\RXUVHOIEXW
theQ \RX¶UHGRLQJ WKH H[HUFLVHV \RX PLJKW VWDUW WRQRWLFH D EORFNDJH LQ D FHUWDLQSODFH DQG WKHQ
ZRUNLQJRQWKDWXVLQJ\RXUFKLRUGRLQJVRPHSUDFWLFDOH[HUFLVHVFDQKHOSWRUHOHDVHWKDWHUP«DQG
then it does, it does have a profound effect on the, the emotiRQVDVZHOOWR«RQFH\RXVWDUWWRWR
GHDOZLWK WKRVHEORFNDJHV WKHQ LW MXVW VPRRWKHV LWRXWD ORWPRUHVR\RX¶UHQRWJHWWLQJ WKHVH OLNH
LQWHQVHHPRWLRQVZKHUH\RXNQRZNLQGRIDQJHUGHVSDLU OLNH>LQDXGLEOH@\RXFDQ«LW¶VDOPRVW
like you can roll witKWKHSXQFKHV6R\RXNQRZLIVRPHWKLQJ¶VKDSSHQLQJEXW\RXNQRZ\RX¶YH
still got your root into the ground. 
Vittorio: Yeah, yeah. 
'DQLHOOH7KDW¶VDQRWKHUVHQVHWKDW>LQDXGLEOH@JRRGOLNHWKLVWKLVURRWHGGRZQVRWKHIHHOLQJWKDW
\RX¶UH FRQQHFWHG DQG WKDW VRPHWKLQJ ZLOO FRPH WRZDUGV \RX DQG LW¶V QRW JRLQJ WR«\RXNQRZ
knock you over in a practical or mental sense. 
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Clearly, as it can direct the chi, the mind does not play a marginal epiphenomenal role here ± 
conscious awareness is key in DIA. Yet, not conceptualising mind and body in a hierarchical 
manner or as separate entities does not entail the conflation of the two dimensions. That is, in DIA 
there is also a clear acknowledgment that the material and immaterial experiential dimensions 
possess different properties. For instance, as pointed out by DIA instructor Bill Ryan (2008), the 
immaterial mind can move much faster than the material body: 
[T]he energy of your mind moves very fast. You can move your mind across the room incredibly 
quickly. You can look at and think about one corner of the room and then in an instant jump your 
mind across the room and think about the other corner. 
You can't move your physical body across the room so quickly.  
5\DQ¶V REVHUYDWLRQV UHVRQDWH ZLWK %ULDQ¶V QXPHURXV FDOls to slow down the mind to the same 
speed as the body ± i.e., to attune mind and body. Thus, while there seems to be no ontological 
GLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQWZRµWKLQJV¶ZKLFKKDSSHQDWWKHVDPHWLPH± i.e., one cannot occur without 
the other ± there is nevertheless a stress on the importance of distinguishing between them at the 
epistemological level. That is, we have the employment of a linear logic and of the related 
analytical categories as a pragmatic tool within the ontological primacy of a paradoxical logic ± all 
dualisms are enveloped in a wider non-dualist context. Once again, we are here in a conceptual 
landscape which is ontologically monist yet epistemologically pluralist.  
The phenomenology of the mind-body attunement sought by DIA practitioners is well described 
by Catherine below. Additionally, she is aware of the metaphor of the Cartesian Theatre (see 
chapter 1.1), and employs it to describe the disembodied/detached mode of embodiment of the 
Being, where mind and body feel separate. The latter instance, Catherine makes clear, is very 
different from the mind-body integration and expanded awareness of the Becoming which she 
previously described (see chapter 7.1):   




being aware of what was going on in my body. It was sort of more fine detail or less blockages 
between it and me. When I say it and me, that implies a duality that was kind of beginning to 
GLVDSSHDU«EXW«LI\RXZDQWDQRWKHUPHWDSKRUWKHVRUWRIEHIRUH«,VWDUWHGGRLQJLWLWNLQGRI
IHOWDVWKRXJKHUP«WKHPLQGLVVRUWRIDSLORWVLWWLQJLQDFRFNSLWVRUWRISXOOLQJRQWKHOHYHUV±  
Vittorio: Yeah.  
Catherine: - of a slightly crap kind of metal rod. 
Vittorio: The typical Cartesian, typical kind of metaphor. 
Catherine: Yeah, exactly, like sitting in the Cartesian Theatre like piloting a sort of big, mechanical 




Vittorio: Yeah.  
&DWKHULQH%XWVRUWRIIURPWKDW,NLQGRILQFUHDVLQJO\EHJDQWRIHHOOLNH«QRWMXVWWKDW,KDGILQH
control over my body but just that the whole system was working together. 
Vittorio: Mm. 
Catherine: And I was JHWWLQJ PRUH IHHGEDFN IURP HU « RU DERXW ERG\ SRVLWLRQ DQG DERXW WKH




sort of bobbing around on a string somewhere up there like a balloon. Not in a sort of spiritual 
astral body sort of way. 
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>«@$QG, LQ IDFW ,ZDQWHG WRPDNHDFOHDUGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQ WKHPLQG OLNHDEDOORRQEREELQJ
around experience and the thing we were talking about a few minutes ago about the dispersed self 
[inaudible] 
Vittorio: [inaudibOH@ EHFDXVH \RX DFWXDOO\ PDGH FOHDU LW¶V D QRQ-HV« VSLULWXDO H[SHULHQFH RU
mystical experience. 
&DWKHULQH<HDKLW¶VQRW LWGRHVQ¶WLQYROYHLW LQYROYHV«WKHGLVHPERGLHGEHLQJLQP\KHDGDQG
RXWVLGH P\ ERG\ GRHVQ¶W LQYROYH DZDUHQHVV RI WKH ZRUOG DURXQG PH DW DOO ,W¶V DOPRVW DV LI WKH
consciousness sort of goes off into a totally different plane. 
Vittorio: Yes.  






Vittorio: - WKLVWKLVHU« 
&DWKHULQH,W¶VQRWGHWDFKHGLW¶VPRUHDWWDFKHGWRWKHZRUOG 
&DWKHULQH¶VDUJXPHQWVDre reiterated by Cavel (Kleiman, 2013b): 
The way the neigong is taught, you have to become present to where your knees are when you turn, 
RWKHUZLVH\RXUNQHHVZLOOWZLVWRXWRIDOLJQPHQWDQG\RX¶OOVWDUWWRGDPDJHWKHPRYHUDORQJSHULRG
of time. The same with your spine, the same with your arms. You have to hone the mind to become 
SUHVHQWDQGDZDUHWR\RXUERG\DQGZKDWLW¶VGRLQJLQWKHVSDFHWKDW\RX¶UHPRYLQJ,I\RXGRQ¶WGR




What Cavel means when pointing out the possible disattunement between mind and body and the 
GDQJHURIEHFRPLQJDOHJHQGLQRQH¶VRZQPLQGLVWKat DIA training is not about mimicking the 
choreography of a movement ± WKDWZRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGµDQHPSW\IRUP¶SHUIRUPHGDFFRUGLQJWR
a dichotomous mode of embodiment where mind and body are separate. Rather, it is about 
experiencing that particular feeling corresponding to the actual physical change one wishes to 
make in the body. When practising, the practitioner seeks a specific feeling ± that feeling attached 
to the movement she aims to perform. In fact, I have never witnessed Brian showing us a new 
PRYH ZLWKRXW KLV DGGLQJ µ\RX¶UH ORRNLQJ IRU WKLV IHHOLQJ RI«¶ ,W LV E\ DWWXQLQJ IHHOLQJ DQG
movement that the attunement of immaterial and material dimensions is obtained.  
 
8.1.1 Feeling and Movement ± The Agency of Experience  
The aim of attuning feeling and movement implies the acknowledgment that the qualitative 
differences characterising our phenomenological world possess agentic powers and are able to 
bring about change also at the physical level. Put another way, here our lived experience is 
endowed with agency. As observed by Kleiman (2013c), by attuning feelings and movements:  
You develop a feedback loop at this stage where the more awareness you can bring to your body, 
the more the physical movements are amplified and at the same time, the smoother the body moves, 
the more the mind is calmed.  
In other words, attuning feeling and movement amplifies changes on both material and immaterial 
dimensions. As previously argued by Ingold/SPIDER (see chapter 3.6), this is a circular dynamic 
which is cruciaO IRU WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW¶V GHYHORSPHQW QRYHO IHHOLQJV EULQJ DERXW QRYHO
movements, which, in turn, bring about novel feelings, and so on. The following is a field note 
H[WUDFWGHVFULELQJP\H[SHULHQFHRIWUDLQLQJLQZKDWLQ)UDQW]LV¶WHDFKLQJLVFRQVLGHUHd the most 
advanced neigong set: Gods Playing in the Clouds. I was kindly granted permission to take part in 
the training by Brian to help me with my research. However, in addition to my difficulties in 
executing the movements required, the class discussion on the subtle distinctions between different 
types of feelings ± RIWHQ FDOOHG µIODYRXUV RI FKL¶ ± involved in the Gods was often beyond my 
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comprehension, as I had/have never experienced most of these feelings nor executed the attached 
movements in the first place: 
Diary ± Gods Playing in the Clouds class ± 5th May 2016: 
$WRQHSRLQWWKHUHZDVDGLVFXVVLRQLQWKHFODVVDERXWDVSHFLILFW\SHRIµZUDSSLQJIHHOLQJ¶WKDWRQH
should experience when standing, and somehow in a more significant manner when doing the kwa 
squat [a basic pelvis movement in DIA] during the Gods [Playing in the Clouds]. Brian was 
H[SODLQLQJ WKDW ZH QHHGHG WR DGGUHVV µD OD\HU LQ \RXU OHJ WKDW IHHOV VOLJKWO\ µIOXLG\¶¶ 6RPHRQH
asked if the feeling Brian was talking about was similar to the feeling attached to a particular 
movement present in the Wu style tai chi form (I could not grasp the name of the movement). Brian 
UHSOLHGµQRWKDWIHHOVPRUHµPDWHULDO¶¶ 
,QGHHGZKLOHWKHUHVWRIWKHFODVVDSSHDUHGWREHKDSS\ZLWK%ULDQ¶VFODULILFDWLRQZKHQWU\LQJWR
execute the movement I could not feel any layer LQP\OHJVOHWDORQHDPRUHµIOXLG\¶RUµPDWHULDO¶
feeling. Again, I seem to understand that here there is a play with a very wide range of feelings, and 
the range is expanded with practice. In turn, the more this range of feelings is expanded the more 
one is able to make changes at the physical level.  
,Q WKLV UHVSHFW , RIWHQ KHDUG %ULDQ WDONLQJ RI µWKH QHHG WR ILQG WKH IHHOLQJ¶ RU WKH µXQLW\ RI
NQRZOHGJH DQG DFWLRQ¶ 0RUHRYHU DJDLQVW D UHLILFDWLRQ RI D GHWDFKHG GLVFRQQHFWHG RU
disembodied style of NQRZOHGJHWKH%HLQJKHRIWHQZDUQHGXVµWRQRWPDNHLQWHOOHFWXDOREMHFWV¶
DQG WKDW µLQWHOOHFWXDODQDO\VLVEUHDNV WKLQJVGRZQEXW LVQRW UHDONQRZOHGJH¶:DUQLQJXVRI WKH
dangers of the abstractions of the mind and of an either/or logic, he also several times invited us to 
HQJDJHLQµGLUHFWSHUFHSWLRQ¶DQGWRµGURSWKHWKLQNLQJDQGUHWDLQWKHIHHOLQJ¶VRDVWRKDYHDFFHVV
WR WKH µUHDO LQIRUPDWLRQ KDSSHQLQJ EHKLQG WKH ZRUGV¶ WKH %HFRPLQJ 7KH H[SHULHQFH WKH
sensation, and the feeling of a performance are therefore at the centre of the DIA training and 
crucial to achieve mind-ERG\ LQWHJUDWLRQ ³)HHO LW ([SHULHQFH LW 'RQ
W WU\ WR ILJXUH LW RXW´
Frantzis (2012) says.  
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Similarly, Myers (Theosophical Society, 2015).) PDNHV FOHDU WKDW ³Feeling is really the most 
LPSRUWDQW ILUVWRQH WRGR&DQ\RXDFWXDOO\ IHHOZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJ LQ\RXUERG\ UDWKHU WKDQ MXVW
WKLQNLQJDERXW LW"´This stress on the experiential aspect, however, seems to be most explicitly 
expressed by DIA instructor Al Simon (2016a) with his so-called Chi Fusion approach, whose 
³JRDO>LV@WRPDNH>D@PRYHPHQWIHHOWKHVDPHZD\WR\RXDVLWGRHVWRD7DL&KLPDVWHU´2QKLV
website Simon (2016b, original emphasis) explains:  
ChiFusionTM Tai Chi and Qigong LV TXLWHGLIIHUHQW IURP WKHVH µFKRUHRJUDSK\¶ FODVVHV :HGRQ¶W
ZDQW \RXU PRYHPHQWV WR µORRN¶ OLNH \RXU LQVWUXFWRU¶V PRYHPHQWV $V D PDWWHU RI IDFW your 
movements should not look like your instUXFWRU¶VRUDQ\RQHHOVH¶VVLQFHZHDOOKDYHGLIIHUHQW
bodies, with different physical abilities, different strengths, and different weaknesses.  
In the ChiFusionTM SURJUDPZHFRQFHQWUDWHPRUHRQKRZ\RXUPRYHPHQWV µIHHO¶:HZDQW\RXU
movements to feel the same way to you that they feel to your instructor.  
It is therefore the attunement of feelings and movements that is one of the main strategies to 
achieve the merging of mind and body ± i.e., the shift of the mind-body relationship from 
dualism(s) to a duality in unity. Grounded in a principle of dynamic correspondence, this strategy 
avoids both an inverse Cartesianism, with the body substituting the mind as the privileged term, 
and a conflation of the two terms. In this way, the non-hierarchical relationship between mind and 
body grants agentic power also to immaterial experiential dimensions ± a standpoint which can 
DSSHDUFRXQWHULQWXLWLYH+RZHYHU LQZKDWIROORZV,ZLOOVKRZWKDWWKH',$¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKH
PDWWHULVLQOLQHZLWK6SLQR]D¶VQRQ-hierarchical principle of mind-body correspondence according 
to which our immaterial experiences are not less actual than those material, and, as they too 









Spinoza was a younger contemporary of Descartes and it is therefore inevitable that the Cartesian 
perspective greatly influenced his own thought (Morgan, 2002; Shein, 2013). Employed by both 
philosophers, the notion of attribute is exemplary in this respect. According to both Spinoza and 
Descartes, we can experience, know and understand the world in two main distinct ways: either as 
Thought, i.e. immaterial minds; or as Extension, i.e. material bodies (for these phenomenological 
distinctions see prologue). 
Yet, as is well known, beyond the common ground of the two attributes there are also fundamental 
differences between the two philosophers. Most notably, while for Descartes the two attributes 
reflect the existence of two different substances ± i.e., Thought and Extension, for Spinoza there is 
only one substance ± i.e., God or Nature. Therefore, and crucially, the chief disagreement between 
Descartes and Spinoza takes place on an ontological terrain, rather than at an epistemological 
level. Thus, ontologically, Descartes is a dualist while Spinoza is a monist; epistemologically, 
however, both philosophers acknowledge the experiential dimensions of Thought and Extension ± 
two ways we experience and understand the world.  
Furthermore, and similarly to what occurs in DIA training, both philosophers acknowledge that the 
distinction between mind and body can be experienced as more or less significant, or that mind 
and body can be more or less attuned. For instance, despite sustaining that mind and body are two 
different substances, Descartes acknowledges that the two terms can, however, be experienced in 
their unity. Yet, he stubbornly insists that this experience would be misleading, and that mind and 
body are in fact separate HQWLWLHV ,Q 'HVFDUWHV¶ ZRUGV ³HYHQ LI >«@*RGKDV
joined a physical substance to some such thinking substance so closely that they could not be more 
closely joined, and that he formed a single entity from the two substances, they are still really 
GLVWLQFW´ 
Conversely, despite conceiving of mind and body as one substance, Spinoza acknowledges that 
mind and body can be experienced as distinct. Yet, he makes clear that this perception would be 
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mistaken, and mind and body are ultimately onHVXEVWDQFH,Q6SLQR]D¶VEIP10S, 
RULJLQDOHPSKDVLVZRUGV³DOWKRXJKWZRDWWULEXWHVPD\EHFRQFHLYHGWREHUHDOO\GLVWLQFWLHRQH
may be conceived without the aid of the other), we still cannot infer from that that they constitute 
two beings, or WZR GLIIHUHQW VXEVWDQFHV´ +HQFH ZKLOH 6SLQR]D DFNQRZOHGJHV WKH TXDOLWDWLYH
differences between the immaterial and material experiential dimensions, he firmly rejects the 
Cartesian reification of two substances ± why does he do so?  
Spinoza was one of the first to highlight what still today is called the mind-body problem (see 
especially Chalmers, 1996). This problem arises from the particular account provided by Descartes 
(2000/1998) who, on the one hand, conceptualises mind and body as two separate substances, 
while on the other, recognises a causal link ± an interaction ± between them. According to 
Descartes, through the exercise of free will, the mind can act upon the body; conversely, the body 
influences the mind by providing sensory information, in turn processed by the mind into 
perceptual experience. In fact, as witness to the endurance of the Cartesian paradigm, most of us 
µQDWXUDOO\¶WHQGWRHQGRUVHWKLVYLHZDQGPLJKWWKHUHIRUHEHLQLWLDOO\SX]]OHGLID',$LQVWUXFWRU
H[SODLQV WKDW µWKH PLQG FDQQRW WHOO WKH ERG\ ZKDW WR GR¶ <HW LW ZDV SUHFLVHO\ 'HVFDUWHV¶
interactionist view which Spinoza found hard to digest. 
The Dutch philosopher saw the solutions proposed by the French ± i.e., those of identifying the 
pineal gland as the locus of interaction between these two incommensurable substances and the 
hand of God as an additional help ± as absurd (Spinoza, 1996/1994: 161-162, EVpreface). He 
recognised the causal interaction between an immaterial and a material world as an intractable 
problem (see also Velmans, 2009). From this, he advanced what today is identified as a type of 
dual-aspect theory: once more, there is only one infinite substance (neither material nor 
immaterial) which manifests itself to us according to different attributes (Thought and Extension).  
Recognising the causal interaction between an immaterial and a material substance as an insoluble 
problem, Spinoza advances a psychophysical view of the world where the interaction between 




EIIP7S, original emphasis) words:  
The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things.  
 >«7@KHWKLQNLQJVXEVWDQFHDQGWKHH[WHQGHGVXEVWDQFHDUHRQHDQGWKHVDPHVXEVWDQFHZKLFKLV
now comprehended under this attribute, now under that. So also a mode of extension and the idea 
of that mode are one and the same thing, but expressed in two ways. 
Here there is no need for any interaction as the infinite substance is only one, which is neither 
Thought nor Extension but, rather, expresses itself, or is comprehended by us, according to these 
two attributes. Put simply, to have an interaction we need at least two different things interacting ± 
if we have only one substance, such a substance obviously cannot interact with itself. Once more, 
while epistemologically they can be distinct, ontologically mind and body are not two separate 
entities.  
ImportantO\6SLQR]D¶VQRQ-interactionist move in turn yields crucial conceptual consequences of 
which the most pertinent to our discussion are a dramatic reassessment of the hierarchy between 
mind and body and a view of our experience as equal partner with the body in constructing the 
world. By conceptualising them in a parallel fashion, Spinoza neither sets mind and body in 
opposition, nor conflates the two terms, nor reduces any of them to an epiphenomenon.   
,QRSSRVLWLRQWR'HVFDUWHV¶YLHZRIWKHERG\DVDPHUH passive object of the mind, as observed by 
6WHYHQ %URZQ DQG 3DXO 6WHQQHU   6SLQR]D ³LV SHUIRUPLQJ DQ HPDQFLSDWRU\ DFW RI
DZDUGLQJ WKH ERG\ LWV IXOO DQG SURSHU VWDQGLQJ LQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI SHUVRQDO EHLQJ´ +RZHYHU
%URZQ DQG 6WHQQHU¶V REVHUYDWLRn should not lead us to conclude that Spinoza conceives of the 
mind as arising from the body, or that he considers the body, rather than the mind, the privileged 
term of the mind-body relationship. In other words, while there is no doubt that the reputation of 
the Dutch philosopher as emancipator of the body is merited, I would contend that to eschew what 
Spinoza surely intended to eschew ± i.e. both the Cartesian paradigm and an inverse Cartesianism 





of embodiment ± as rightly observed by Deleuze (1988: 90):  
It is not at all a matter of giving a privilege to the body over the mind; it is a matter of acquiring a 
knowledge of the powers of the body in order to discover, in parallel fashion, powers of the mind 
that escape consciousness.   
My contentions need to be clarified. If we conceive of mind as arising from the body, we are 
reasoning in terms of two different substances, with one generating the other, rather than one 
substance expressing itself, or being known by us, through two different attributes (Thought and 
Extension, or mind and body). In addition, by conceptualising the mind as a product of the body, 
we would merely swap the Cartesian privileged position of the mind with that of the body, and, as 
seen with new materialist/affective perspectives, we would fall into an inverse Cartesianism, 
where our consciousness becomes an irrelevant phenomenon.  
,QVWHDGWRVWLFNWR6SLQR]D¶VPRQLVWRQWRORJ\DQGSULQFLSOHRIFRUUHVSRQGHQFHDQGWKXVQRWVHWWKH
two terms in opposition, conflate them, or privilege one polarity over the other, we need to think of 
mind and body as proceeding in unison ± as mind arising with the body. Consequently, once we 
think of Thought and Extension as proceeding in a parallel fashion according to a circular logic, 
or, more pertinently, as being ultimately the same substance, it follows that, rather than bodies 
generating minds or minds bodies, all bodies are thinking bodies and all minds are embodied.  
Put crudely, there can be no body without a mind and no mind without a body ± we cannot 
separate Thought and Extension in the Spinozian system. As explained by philosopher Evald 
Ilyenkov (2014/1977: 17, original emphasis), with Spinoza we have a psychophysical view of the 
ZRUOGZKHUH³WKHUHDUHQRWWZRdifferent and originally contrary objects of investigation body and 
thought, but only one single object, which is the thinking body´,IZHGRQRWNHHSWKLVLQPLQG
that is, if we do not ultimately transcend the specifications of mind and body (and of idealism and 
materialism) with the notion of only one substance neither immaterial nor material, it becomes 
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extremely easy to slip into a Cartesian worldview with two separate substances interacting with 
each other.  
Instead, we need to conceive of mind and body as aspects, or experiential dimensions, 
characterising the mode of the Being which, however, unfolds from, or is enveloped by, the 
Becoming ± XOWLPDWHO\WKHRQO\H[LVWLQJVXEVWDQFH,QWKLVWKHVLV¶WHUPVZHQHHGWRFRQFHLYHRI
the mind-body relationship as a duality rather than dualism(s). As reiterated by philosopher Hans 
Jonas (1965: 52), for Spinoza there was: 
[A]n intrinsic belonging-together of mind and matter, which gave causal preference neither to 
matter, as materialism would have it, nor to mind, as idealism would have it, but instead rested their 
interrelation on the common ground of which they both were dependent aspects. 
+HQFHWKLVµFRPPRQJURXQG¶WKDWLVWKHRQHDQGWKHVDPHLQILQLWHVXEVWDQFHH[SUHVVHVLWVHOIDV
both physical and psycKLFDO ZKLOH XOWLPDWHO\ EHLQJ QHLWKHU RI WKHP +HUH WKH ZRUOG¶V VHOI-
GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WDNHV SODFH E\ PHDQV RI SURFHVVHV RI LQGLYLGXDWLRQ LQYROYLQJ HPERGLHG DJHQWV¶
mind and body. Hence, both mind and body play an active role in the wider process of self-
actualisation of the Becoming into the Being, and therefore the immaterial dimensions of feelings, 
affective states, and thoughts cannot be conceived of as epiphenomena. 
 
8.2.1 The Immaterial Action of Mind   
As explained by Brown and Stenner (2001: 84), SpinR]D ³FRXSOHV PRYHPHQWV LQ LGHDV WR
PRGLILFDWLRQV LQ WKH ERG\ >DQG WKHUHIRUH@ NQRZLQJ SURFHHGV LQ SDUDOOHO IDVKLRQ WR WKH ERG\¶V
SK\VLFDO HQJDJHPHQWV´ 7KHUHIRUH LPSOLHG LQ 6SLQR]D¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO V\VWHP WKHUH LV WKH
inextricable connection we saw particularly significant in DIA: this is the intertwinement between 
feeling and movement, or knowing and doing. Rather than representing an external world already 
in existence, our experience constructs the world ± indeed feeling is moving, or knowing is doing. 
While this is a well-acknowledged paradigm across sociological and cultural studies, which we 
have already discussed in different guises when considering the theorising of Butler (see chapter 
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2.3), Massumi (see chapter 4.2), and Merleau-Ponty (see chapters 3.4 & 4.3), I believe that 
Spinoza makes it particularly poignant.  
That is, transcending both materialism and idealism, Spinoza endows our thought and ideas with 
agency. Similar to DIA training, here our feelings, affective states, thoughts, ideas, and reflexive 
deliberations do bring about change in the world, including change at the physical level. In Brown 
DQG6WHQQHU¶VZRUGV 
[A]n idea is part of mind [which] is already affirmed to some degree. [...] Human physical being 
FRQVLVWVRIDµFRPSOH[ERG\¶PDGHXSE\WKHDOOLDQFHRIPDQ\VLPSOHERGLHV,QSDUDOOHOIDVKLRQ
mind, as idea of the body, consists of the ideas of all these simple bodies, as well the modifications 
WKDWPD\EHIDOOWKHP7KXVZKDWLVµDIILUPHG¶LQDQLGHDLVVRPHDFWXDOPRGLfication. 
,Q WKLV UHVSHFW 6SLQR]D VHHPV WR EH PDNLQJ D SRLQW ZKLFK LV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK )RXFDXOW¶V VHH
chapter 2.2) insight that ideas, concepts, and discourses are intimately implicated with the 
physicality of our body as well as with the wider material context in which the body is embedded ± 
again, the psychical and the physical are intertwined (see also Barad, 2007).  
Within the Spinozian psychophysical reality, as Extension has a physical energy, so Thought 
possesses a psychical energy (Wolf, 1972). As philosopher Abraham Wolf (ibid.: 23, see also 
Spinoza, 1996/1994: 58, EIIP43SH[SODLQV³ZHILQG6SLQR]DSURWHVWLQJDJDLQVW WKHYLHZZKLFK
SUHYDLOHGLQKLVWLPHDQGORQJDIWHUZDUGVWKDWLGHDVDUHOLNHµPXWHSLFWXUHVRQDWDEOHW¶>«@DQG
maintaining, on tKHFRQWUDU\WKDWWKH\DUHDFWLYHWKRXJKWVRUDVVHUWLRQV´,QDVLPLODUYHLQ+DOOHWW
  RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV DUJXHV WKDW IRU 6SLQR]D LGHDV DUH ³PHQWDO actions´ SRVVHVVLQJ DQ
³LQWULQVLFagency´3KLORVRSKHU/HQQ*RRGPDQUHLWHUDWHVWKHpoint when he says that: 
Consciousness is not the passive recipient of simulacra ± or sentences. It actively embraces its 
REMHFWV>«@6SLQR]DDOOEXWUHDFKHVRXWKHUHDQGVKDNHVWKHZRUGµFRQFHSW¶WRUHDZDNHQLWVGHHS
etymological sense as the name for something grasped and captured ± in, or as, a thought. 
It is precisely because the experiential dimension of Thought is not a transcendental phenomenon 
(à la Descartes), but rather intimately connected to Extension, that for Spinoza it possesses agency 
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and thus cannot be conceived of as epiphenomenal. To be sure, this is not a matter of an active 
mind which tells a passive body what to do ± this would take us back to the mind-body problem 
inherent in the Cartesian paradigm.  
Rather, in perfect agreement with Brian (see chapter 8.1) Spinoza (1996/1994: 71, EIIIP2 original 
HPSKDVLV DUJXHV WKDW ³>t]he body cannot determine the mind to thinking, and the mind cannot 
determine the body to motion, to rest, or to do anything else´ (YHQ WKRXJK WKH\ FDQ EH
experienced as separated, we know that thought and matter are entangled ± indeed, they are one 
thing. Mind neither acts upon the body, nor is it acted upon by the body; rather body and mind, 
thought and matter, are equal partners in bringing about the world.  
Although Spinoza does not go into the details provided by DIA instructors to foster the attunement 
of feelings and movements in order to amplify changes on both immaterial and material 
dimensions, it is clear that for him the mind is capable of a form of action ± DQµLPPDWHULDODFWLRQ¶
WR ZKLFK KRZHYHU D µPDWHULDO DFWLRQ¶ DOZD\V QHHGV WR FRUUHVSRQG 7KH IROORZLQJ H[WUDFW IURP
Ilyenkov (2014/1977: 19, original emphasis) sums up the above arguments well: 
[I]f thinking is always an action performed by a natural and so by a spatially determined body, it 
itself, too, is an action that is also expressed spatially, which is why there is not and cannot be the 
cause and effect relation between thinking and bodily action for which the Cartesians were looking. 
They did not find it for the simple reason that no such relation exists in Nature, and cannot, simply 
because thinking and the body are not two different things at all, existing separately and therefore 
capable of interacting, but one and the same thing, only expressed by two different modes or 
considered in two different aspects.  
In this way, any type of experience entails a change in the world, and any change in the world is a 
IRUP RI H[SHULHQFH )RU 6SLQR]D DV QRWHG E\ -RQDV   ³>W@KH DFW RI ZLOO DQG the 
PRYHPHQWRIWKHERG\DUHRQHDQGWKHVDPHHYHQWDSSHDULQJXQGHUGLIIHUHQWDVSHFWV´+HQFHLWLV
not only the body, but also the mind ± and thus feelings, concepts, and ideas ± which can do.  
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Having said that, as the very terminology I am using for the present case study ± Daoist Internal 
Arts ± suggests, a further strategy to achieve the mind-body integration and the attunement of 
feelings and movements is that of focusing on the inside of the body, as opposed to external 
environments. It is to the relationship between internal and external environments of embodiment 
which I will now turn my attention. Like that between mind and body, also this internal/external 
distinction is enveloped in a wider non-dualist framework and conceptualised in terms of 
correspondence ± broadening our awareness inwards expands it outwards.  
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Chapter 9: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENTS OF 
EMBODIMENT 
 
9.1 Expanding Sensory Awareness  
 
As the name Daoist Internal Arts hints at, expanding awareness into internal environments of 
embodiment plays a crucial role in Daoist practices. Kleiman (2012) compares the process of 
developing an internal sensitivity with Jan Juang to walking into a dark room and progressively 
increasing the amount of light available to illuminate it:  
The primary practice [of DIA] is the standing body scan, and so the experience of going through the 
standing practice is a little bit like walking into a dark room, and trying to shine your flashlight on 
all the different parts of the room. And at first you have a pretty small beam and a pretty weak 
signal, so you have to go right up to the wall ± ha ± s- go up to something really obvious in that 
room and shine the light right on it, and you still only see a little point. Over time, your light gets 
bigger and bigger, your internal awareness gets broader and broader until eventually when you do 
your standing practice you can turn the lights on in the house and the room lights up itself, and 
\RX¶UHQRWWKHUHZLWKWKHOLWWOHIODVKOLJKWDQ\PRUH\RX¶YHJRW-\RX¶YHJRWZLULQJ± haha ± \RX¶YH
got ± you can turn it on.  
While it should already be clear that this internal focus avoids an over-emphasis on external 
environments of embodiment, I intend to show in what ways, like that between mind and body, 
also this internal-external relationship is characterised by a dynamic correspondence ± here too, 
the aim is to turn this relationship from dualism(s) to a duality in unity. Consistently, and 
VRPHKRZ FRXQWHULQWXLWLYHO\ QDUURZLQJ GRZQ WKH UDQJH RI RQH¶V DZDUHQHVV ZLWKLQ WKRVH DUHDV
/HGHUFDOOVµFRUSRUHDOGHSWKV¶± i.e., our soft tissues, joints, bones, internal organs etc. ± 
brings about an overall increase of the sensory capacities along with the ability to modulate them.  
As a participant in a study conducted by neuroscientist and DIA practitioner Catherine Kerr (2002: 
435; see also Beaupre, 2011) explains, when increasing the awareness of the inside of the body, 




account, this emphasis on internal environments of embodiment also yields emergent properties 
and increased capacities for agency for the embodied agent.  
Kerr (Kleiman, 2014b; see also Kerr et al., 2008) reiterates the above during a radio interview with 
Kleiman ± focusing on the internal environments of embodiment rather than an external sensory 
VWLPXOXV FDQ DOWHU WKH µVHQVRU\ YROXPH NQREV LQ WKH EUDLQ¶ DQG WKXV H[SDQG RQH¶V VHQVRU\
awareness in a peculiar manner:  
.HUU$QGZHIRXQGLQRXU\RXNQRZLQRXUILUVWVWXG\WKDWSHRSOHZKR¶GSUDFWLFHGDORWRI7ai 
Chi had a much better, more developed sense of touch than very normal [sic] er healthy people who 
were active and even h-, did walking or various sports but they did not practice Tai Chi and their 
tactile acuity was worse. 
>«@ 
.HUU >,@W¶V pretty interesting because the previous studies that had looked at the sense of touch 
ORRNHGDWVD\ZKDWKDSSHQVLI\RXOHDUQWRUHDG%UDLOOHLI\RX¶UHEOLQGDQGWKRVHSHRSOHDOVRKDYHD
very developed sense of touch, but when I um thought about Tai Chi, and the folks that I tested, 
>«@ WKH\HUZHUHQRW OLNHSHRSOHZKR UHDG%UDLOOH7KH\GLGQRW WUDLQDQ\ WRXFKVHQVDWLRQVZLWK
WKHLUILQJHUWLSVEHFDXVHWKDW¶VW\SLFDOO\«ZKHQ\RXWKLQNDERXWXPHUDVHQVRU\PRGDOLW\RUDD
sensory ability being increased LW¶V EHFDXVH WKHUH¶V GLUHFW SUDFWLFH SXUSRVHIXO SUDFWLFH RI WKDW
VHQVRU\PRGDOLW\HUPDQG«VRLQ%UDLOOHUHDGHUVWKH\¶UHWRXFKLQJ%UDLOOHDOOGD\WKH\¶UHWRXFKLQJ
that rai-, those raised dots, and they get better at it than normal people, but when I talked to our Tai 
&KLSUDFWLWLRQHUVQRQHRIWKHPWRXFKHGDQ\WKLQJIRUWKHLUWUDLQLQJ>«@ 
Kerr: And so what we think our study shows is, this is really one of the first studies to show this, 
that just by paying attention to a sensory modality you can kind RIDPSOLI\WKDWSURFHVV<RXGRQ¶W
QHHGWRGRWKHGLUHFWVHQVRU\WUDLQLQJXPLQ\RXNQRZ\RXGRQ¶WQHHGWRGRWKHWKHHHHWKH





FRPSOH[TXHVWLRQEHFDXVH«HUZKHQ\RXSXW\RXUPLQG LQ\RXUERG\ LW¶VQRWH[DFWO\ WKH VDPH
thing as training yourself to feel Braille or to feel sandpaper or these other um very sort of simple 
touch processes that other neuroscientists have documented. Um, when you learn, start learning to 
SD\DWWHQWLRQWR\RXUERG\XP«Z-, w- WKHZD\WKDWZH¶UHPRGHOOLQJLW LVHU\RX¶UHOHDUQLQJWR
you can actually, by paying attention to your body and by paying attention to sensations in the 
ILQJHUV DQG WKH WRHV RU WKH SDOPV HYHQ ZKHQ \RX¶UH QRW WRXFKLQJ DQ\WKLQJ WKDW \RX¶UH DFWXDOO\
learning how to control the sensory volume knobs in the brain.  
>«@ 
.HUU>«:@HNQRZWKDW7DL&KLGRHVLPSURYHZRUNLQJPHPRry and cognition in some people, so 
just by, our theory is that just by learning how to control this attentional spotlight on, you know, 
learning how to control the tightness of the focus, so you can either have an, you know, very ± 
Kleiman: Mhm. 
Kerr: ± small, pointed focus or you can have a broad focus, and learning how to be flexible in how 
you direct that focus. 
Therefore, this focus on the internal environments of embodiment is in no way related to the 
Cartesian transcendental, disembodied, and cognitivist subject, nor does it have an individualistic 
FRQQRWDWLRQ+HUHWKHPRUHRQHH[SDQGVRQH¶VDZDUHQHVVLQWRRQH¶VERG\WKHPRUHRQHLVDWWDFKHG
to, rather than detached from, the world. Put another way, the focus on the inside of the body is 
more like an opening than a closing on the world ± an opening where, ultimately, the 
internal/external distinction disappears RULQWKLVWKHVLV¶WHUPVLWLVWXUQHGLQto a duality in unity. 
DIA practitioner Nadine puts it well:  
1DGLQH,GRQ¶WORRNDWWKHSUDFWLFHDVVRPHWKLQJRXWVLGHRIPH\RXNQRZOLNHVRPHWKLQJ,KDYHWR
get to do and I make time to do it, but I want to EH DEOH WR OLYH LQVLGH WKH SUDFWLFH VR WKDW «
everything is the practice.  
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>«@ :H DUH IRFXVVLQJ RQ WKH LQVLGH DQG WKH H[SDQVLRQ LV KDSSHQLQJ ZLWKRXW RXU NQRZOHGJH
EHFDXVHDVZHSUDFWLFHLWH[SDQGVWKHDZDUHQHVV« 
Again, broadening awareness inwards expands it outwards ± here there is an overall increase of the 
phenomenological field of the embodied agent. This view of the relationship between internal and 
external environments of embodiment as fundamentally characterised by a correspondence appears 
to be a further dominant discourse in DIA.  
For DIA instructor Robert Tangora (2015), for example, ³[w]ithin the external movements is an 
entire universe of internal experience and it is the internal experience which forms the foundation 
RI7DL&KL&K¶XDQDQGZKDt distinguishes it from external calisthenics´. Similarly, Myers (2015) 
explains that the Daoist body has different layers which expand both inside and outside of it: 
When you get into this area here, which is called the Eight Energy Bodies, which is the way that 
Taoists think of how the energy of er, of humans connect with the energy of the universe. And each 
one of these eight er energy bodies starts slightly deeper inside your body but extends farther out 
into the universe. 
Again, here, in line with a non-linear/circular/paradoxical logic, it is by broadening awareness into 
internal environments of embodiment that one can expand her phenomenological world and access 
a non-dichotomous way of experiencing and acting in the world. 
It is in this way that, like that between mind and body, also this internal/external distinction is 
enveloped in a wider non-dualist context. Once more, we are neither talking of opposition between 
two separate entities nor of internal/external conflations á la Bourdieu (see chapter 5.1).  Rather, 
while the inside and outside and the embodied agent and the environment in which she is 
embedded are conceived of as inseparable, the distinction between the two at the experiential and 






Frantzis (Energy Arts, 2017) expands on the above when explaining Dragon and Tiger, a qigong 
set specifically designed to address external environments of embodiment at the epistemological 
level, but which however resonates on internal environments too at the ontological level:  
>2@QHRI WKH WKLQJV WKDW¶VYHU\ LPSRUWDQWDERXW LW >'UDJRQDQG7LJHU@ LV WKLV\RXKDYHDQHWKHric 
ILHOGRXWVLGH\RXUERG\7KLVILHOGWKDW¶VRXWKHUHLVEHLQJFUHDWHGE\ZKDWLVLQVLGH\RXUERG\<RX
KDYHDEORRGYHVVHO WKDW¶VJRWDSUREOHPLWZLOOVKRZXSLQ\RXUHWKHULF ILHOG,WZLOOVKRZXSDV
something being messed up in your etheric field. But likewise, if you fix something in your etheric 
ILHOGLWZLOOEHJLQWRKHDOZKDW¶VLQVLGHRI\RXDQGLW¶VLPSRUWDQWWRUHDOLVHZKDW¶VLQVLGHRI\RXLV
JHQHUDWLQJ WKDWHWKHULF ILHOG6R WKH\¶UHQRW« WKH\¶UH VHSDUDWHEXW IURP WKHSRLQWRI YLHZRI«
materLDOUHGXFWLRQLVPZKDW¶VWKHSURRI" 
Consistent with the primacy of a paradoxical logic, there is a distinction and there is not a 
distinction between the internal and the external ± WKLV LV ZKDW LQ WKH FXUUHQW VWXG\¶V WHUPV LV
called a duality in unity. In this way, here we have a conceptual framework which is monist at the 
RQWRORJLFDOOHYHOZKLOHSOXUDOLVWDWWKHHSLVWHPRORJLFDOOHYHO,QWKLVUHVSHFWWKH',$SUDFWLWLRQHU¶V
aim is to attune the two experiential dimensions and actually experience their ontological unity. 
&DWKHULQH¶VDFFXUDWHSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOGHVFULSWLRQUHLWHUDWHVWKHDERYHZHOO 
$ZDUHQHVVNLQGRIDGYDQFHVRQDOOIURQWV<RXGRQ¶WKDYHWREH«\HDK«\RXGRQ¶WKDYHWRIRFXV
LQZDUGRUIRFXVRXWZDUG>«@,WKLQNVRUWRIWKHLGHDRIWKHERXndary almost kind of becomes less 
LPSRUWDQWEHFDXVH\RX¶YHNLQGRIJRWWKLVVRUWRIDUHDRIUHDOO\YLYLGDZDUHQHVVJRLQJRQLQVLGHDQG
then it sort of disperses outwards. 
$JDLQ WKH PRUH RQH¶V DZDUHQHVV H[SDQGV LQVLGH WKH PRUH LW H[WHQGV RXWVLGH DFFRUGLQg to a 
principle of correspondence, which, however, can be more or less significant at the 
phenomenological level. The attunement between the two dimensions yields an overall increase of 
the embodied agent phenomenological field as well as of the attached emergent properties. As will 
become clearer in the following theoretical discussion, these emergent properties also involve an 
LQFUHDVHRIRQH¶Vcapacities for agency.  
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The relationship between external and internal environments of embodiment is crucial also from 
WKH SUHVHQW UHVHDUFK¶V WKHRUHWLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH This is because this relationship is key to 
understanding in what way embodiment can be re-conceptualised so that we can retain a process-
oriented and relational theoretical framework, account for an individuated dimension, and thus 
eschew an over-emphasis on external environments. In fact, the theoretical engagement with this 
relationship will elucidate in more detail what I have so far called processes of individuation ± the 
processes by means of which what is fundamentally one substance expresses itself in its 
PXOWLSOLFLW\RULQWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFK¶VWHUPVWKH%HFRPLQJXQIROGVLQWRWKH%HLQJ 
'UDZLQJ RQ 6SLQR]D¶V FRQDWXV DQG UHO\LQJ RQ WKH DGGLWLRQDO KHOS RI 0DWXUDQD DQG 9DUHOD¶V
autopoiesis, in what follows I will show that, like in DIA, within these perspectives, the 
relationship between internal and external environments of embodiment is characterised by a 
dynamic correspondence, which envelops the two terms in a wider non-dualist context. My 
account will begin precisely with processes of individuation.  
 
9.2 Processes of Individuation 
 
3URFHVVHVRILQGLYLGXDWLRQUHIHUWRWKHPHDQVE\ZKLFKµWKLQJV¶DUHDFWXDOLVHG:KHQDSURFHVVRI
individuation takes place, a thing or a body acquires an identity and distinguishes itself from its 
surrounding environment and the physical laws governing it. For Spinoza (1996/1994) the laws 
through which the entire physical universe can be apprehended by us are those of motion and rest. 
Hence, once a process of individuation has occurred, a body acquires its own proportion of motion 
and rest, which also grants it a certain degree of idiosyncrasy and agency. According to Spinoza, it 
LV D ERG\¶V RZQ SURSRUWLRQ RI PRWLRQ DQG UHVW ± i.e. its organisation as a system ± which 
constitutes its identity. In turn, for Spinoza, what makes possible the endurance of a bod\¶V
organisation is its conatus ± i.e., the principle sustaining processes of individuation.  
$VREVHUYHGE\SKLORVRSKHU70)RUV\WKWKHFRQDWXVLV³WKHVHOI-affirmation of God 
[or Nature] in us, and is at once the affirmation of the individual self as a unique expression of the 
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infinite divine nature and its negation as a self-centred or self-VXIILFLHQW XQLW´ 5HPLQLVFHQW RI
*URV]¶V VHH chapter 3.3) flame, which keeps its identity despite always burning new material, 
while most of our cells are constantly destroyed and replaced, the conatus permits our bodies to 
maintain their organisation until death occurs (Saw, 1972).  
However, interpreting the conatus and the distinction between the individual and the world in a 
cognitivist or individualisWLFIDVKLRQZRXOGEHDVHULRXVPLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI6SLQR]D¶VWKHRU\RI
individuation. Resembling what occurs in DIA training, such distinction does not set the embodied 
agent apart from the environment in which she is located in a transcendental sense ± i.e., in the 
sense of bringing about two separated worlds, an inner and an outer dimension severed from each 
other. Rather, here the separation is paradoxical as the two terms are divided yet intimately united 
in the changes they undergo and in the novelty they bring about in the world. Here, the relationship 
between the embodied agent and the world is characterised by a dynamic correspondence, which 
envelops both terms in a wider non-dualist context.  
Moreover, in line with a circular logic, the more salient this correspondence becomes or the more 
one is attuned with the world, the more one is individuated. In this way, for Spinoza, the embodied 
DJHQW¶VGHJUHHRI LQGLYLGXDWLRQ UHIOHFWVKHUSRZHURI DFWLQJ ± i.e., her capacity to affect and be 
affected by other bodies, and bring about novelty in the world. This is a form of empowerment 
which unites rather than separates. Indeed, agency, freedom, and emancipation for Spinoza are 
conceptualised in terms of attunement of the embodied agent with her surrounding environments. 
This attunement ± i.e., this capacity to affect and be affected by other bodies ± appears to bear 
VLPLODULWLHVZLWKWKHH[SDQVLRQRIRQH¶VSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOILHOGVRXJKWE\WKH',$SUDFWLWLRQHU$V
argued by philosopher Martin Lenz (2017: 3, original emphasis), for Spinoza agency is a matter of 
³appropriation of the natural order: humans striving for freedom have to harmonize their 
ELRJUDSKLFDO VHOYHV ZLWK µQDWXUDO KLVWRU\¶ DQG EHJLQ WR WDNH VXSSRVHGO\ H[WHUQDO FDuses as their 
own reasons IRUDFWLRQ´ 
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Philosopher Lee Rice (1971: 652) notes that in this way, always enveloped in a wider non-dualist 
context, both an open-ended and an individuated dimension are accounted for: 
To be an individual is to be a center of action connected in various ways with a network of other 
individuals. It would be frivolous to claim that this causal connexion with others in a larger whole 
HUDVHVRUDEVRUEVLQGLYLGXDOVVLQFHRQ6SLQR]D¶VRZQH[DPSOHEHLQJDQLQGLYLGXDOLQRQH¶VRZQ
right is a necessary condition for being so connected. 
Yet, the paradoxical link between the embodied agent and the world is not spelt out in detail by 
Spinoza (Winkler, 2016). In fact, Spinoza tells us that the conatus is the principle underpinning 
processes of individuation and that acts of differentiation occur within an undifferentiated reality, 
but he does not explain exactly how such events ± in his terms, the transitions from the infinite to 
the finite mode (or from the Becoming to the Being) ± take place (Della Rocca, 1996; Rice, 1971; 
Saw, 1972). In this way, Spinoza is unable to make a more compelling case for a non-cognitivist 
and non-individualistic conceptualisation of the internal/external and subject/object distinction.  
However, this lacuna can be compensated for by drawing on the notion of autopoiesis. Very much 
UHVHPEOLQJ6SLQR]D¶VFRQDWXV6KDYLUR7KRPSVRQ WKHFRQFHSWRIDXWRSRLHVLVZDV
advanced by Maturana and Varela (1980/1972; 1998/1987) to explain the dynamics linking the 
higher-order processes of individuation of life and the phenomenon of cognition, and account for 
processes of individuation by locating them within a relational and open-ended context.  
For Maturana and Varela (1980/1972; 1998/1987: 40, original emphasis) both life and cognition 
VWHP IURP³DQ act of distinction´ZKHUHE\RXWRIDSULPRUGLDOPROHFXODU VRXSPHPEUDQHVZHUH
formed, making possible metabolic processes differentiated from the rest of the environment. 
Characterised by the production of an internal/external distinction, and thus by an idiosyncratic 
organisation in respect to those surrounding them, the first cells were formed constituting therefore 
higher-order degrees of individuation ± i.e. autopoietic systems. Furthermore, the differentiated 
metabolic processes (or, in Spinozian terms, the differentiated proportions of motion and rest) of a 
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cell also showed a tendency to continuously re-generate their idiosyncrasy ± indeed, the neologism 
autopoiesis means self-production (Maturana & Varela, 1972/1980).  
Like the conatus, autopoiesis is a process which tends to satisfy the criteria for the maintenance of 
DQRUJDQLVP¶VLGHQWLW\DQGLWVGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQIURPWKHH[WHUQDOHQYLURQPHQW$QGOLNHWKHFRQDWXV
here the distinction between the cell and its surrounding milieu is in no way related to a 
FRJQLWLYLVWLQGLYLGXDOLVWLF SHUVSHFWLYH DV WKH FHOO¶V PHPEUDQH LV QRW VHWWLQJ DSDUW WKH LQVLGH DQG
outside of the cell. Here too, the cell-environment relationship is enveloped in a wider non-dualist 
context ± in ThomSVRQ¶VZRUGV³DXWRSRLHVLVDOZD\VKDVWREHHFRORJLFDOO\HPEHGGHG
µ6HOI-SURGXFLQJ¶ UHIHUV WR WKH NLQG RI FLUFXODU RUJDQL]DWLRQ WKDW PDNHV WKH FHOO DQ LQGLYLGXDO LW
GRHVQRWPHDQWKDWWKHFHOOPDNHVLWVHOIDSDUWIURPLWVHQYLURQPHQW´ 
This is a separation which brings together the two separated terms in a creative process enveloping 
both of them. In fact, Maturana and Varela contend that autopoiesis involves the coupling of the 
FHOODQGWKHHQYLURQPHQW$V WKH\H[SODLQ³ZHVSHDNRIVWUXFWXUDO coupling whenever there is a 
history of recurrent interactions leading to the structural congruence between two (or more) 
V\VWHPV´ 0DWXUDQD 	 9DUHOD   6LJQLILFDQWO\ FRXSOLQJ QHLWKHU LPSOLHV WKDW WKH
organism determines the changes of the environment nor vice versa. Indeed, Maturana and Varela 
  RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV HPSOR\ WKH YHUE µWULJJHU¶ LQ RUGHU WR DYRLG WKH WHUP
µGHWHUPLQH¶± a word which they only use within the autonomy of a closed system: 
:HKDYHXVHGWKHH[SUHVVLRQµWR WULJJHU¶DQHIIHFW,QWKLVZD\ZHUHIHUWRWKHIDFWWKDWWKHFKDQJHV
that result from the interaction between the living being and its environment are brought about by 
the disturbing agent but determined by the structure of the disturbed system. 
In this way, each autopoietic system also possesses a degree of agency as the changes it goes 
through are not causally determined by external influences, but only by the internal organisation of 
the system itself. Yet, this is ultimately a form of relational agenc\RU LQWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFK¶V





the above arguments well by referring back to Spinoza:  
[For Spinoza] closure as a functional whole within the individual organism is, at the same time, 
correlative openness toward the world; its very separateness entails the faculty of communication; 
LWVVHJUHJDWLRQIURPWKHZKROHLVWKHFRQGLWLRQRILWVLQWHJUDWLRQZLWKWKHZKROH>«@2QO\E\EHLQJ
sensitive can life be active, only by being exposed can it be autonomous. And this in direct ratio: 
the more individuality is focused in a self, the wider is its periphery of communication with other 
things; the more isolated, the more related it is.  
Read through the lens of the theoretical framework endorsed by the current study, there is a 
cell/environment or internal/external distinction operating at the explanatory level of the Being ± 
i.e., according to a linear logic. Yet, this distinction is enveloped within the dimension of the 
Becoming, where the changes which both the cell and the environment go through are coupled or 
correspondent ± i.e., according to a circular logic. It is in this way that we can account for both a 
relational framework and an individuated dimension, and thus avoid the over-emphasis on external 
environments of embodiment present in many contemporary strands of body studies.  
Moreover, the notion of autopoiesis show us that the dual character of embodiment ± both open-
ended and self-constitutive, or independent and dependent ± is already present in the most 
primordial unicellular organism. In this way, the notion of autopoiesis well explicates what for 
-RQDVRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVLV³6SLQR]D¶VLQVLJKWLQWRWKHHVVHQWLDOO\GXDOFKDUDFWHURIWKH
organism: its autonomy for itself, and its openness IRU WKH ZRUOG´ ,QGHHG this is the dual and 
paradoxical character of processes of individuation ± processes according to which a monist 
dimension expresses its plurality and brings about novelty in the world. Explaining processes of 
individuation has furthermore allowed us to introduce a discussion on the capacities for agency of 
the embodied agent, here viewed in terms of power of acting and attunement between internal and 




non-dualist theoretical framework while nevertheless accounting for an individuated dimension. 
That is, both the mind-body and the internal-external relationships are enveloped in a wider non-
dualist context, and their relationship is characterised by a dynamic correspondence. It is by 
relying on this shared ability to move beyond dualistic ways of thinking that I wish now to 
H[DPLQHERWK',$¶VDQG6SLQR]D¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRf other relationships related to the mind and the 
body: those between language and corporeality, and the representational and the non-
representational.  
These two overlapping relationships are relevant in all the strands of body studies analysed in this 
thesis, as well as particularly significant in DIA training. Below I will begin with the language-
corporeality relationship and will show that in DIA there is an acknowledgment that, although it 
can be disconnected from the material world, the symbolic world of language, concepts, and ideas 
nevertheless has roots in our body ± the aim is always that of attuning mind and body, the mental 





Chapter 10: LANGUAGE AND CORPOREALITY  
 
10.1 Incarnating Discourse 
 
Along with mind and body, and internal and external environments of embodiment, DIA training 
entails the attunement also of the symbolic and corporeal dimensions of embodiment. That is, the 
DIA practitioner acknowledges that language can both detach us from, and address, our 
corporeality ± the latter option is that which is sought by her. In fact, when training, the 
SUDFWLWLRQHU¶V DLP LV WR DFWXDOO\ LQFDUQDWH 'DRLVW GLVFRXUVHV ± as pointed out by Frantzis 
³>T@LJRQJLs not the acquisition of intellectual information, but is the process of 
EHFRPLQJVRPHWKLQJ´7KLVLVPDGHSDUWLFXODUO\FOHDUE\PHGLFDOUHVHDUFKHUDQGWDLFKLLQVWUXFWRU
Peter Wayne (Kleiman, 2013e; see also Wayne, 2013) who, in a radio interview with Kleiman, 
conceives of DIA as a material manifestation of the Daoist philosophy: 
Wayne: I think we read these phrases um in the, the literature, the Asian literature and philosophy 




Wayne: to a young person and even as an, as we age and, and have more life experience but the 









makes it clear tKDWLW¶VWLPHWRJRWKHULJKWXP$QGVR\RXNQRZ,WKLQNWKDWLQLQ\RXUWHDFKLQJ
\RX\RXNQRZLI\RXZHUHQ¶WGRLQJ7DL&KLWKLVSKLORVRSK\MXVWZRXOGQ¶WXPZRXOGQ¶WSHQHWUDWH
DVIDU7KHUH¶VDOPRVWOLNHDWKHVHLGHDVXPJHWHPEHGGHGLQWRWKHIDEric of our physical body. 
That Daoist philosophy needs to be incarnated is reiterated by Brian during his interview. In this 
respect, what Brian recalls of his experience of teaching Asian philosophy at Master level is 
significant. He came to the conclusion that the subject could not be taught satisfactorily by only 
remaining on the conceptual level of the mind ± again, to fully understand Eastern philosophy, one 
needs to embody it. Below, our chat also exposes the limitations of the present research, which, 
inevitably, tends to remain on the terrain of the dichotomous mode of the Being, and can only 
partially convey the actual experience of the non-dichotomous mode of the Becoming:  
Brian: ± as, s- near an expert on Chinese philosophy as we had, so <laughs> I e-, I ended up 
WHDFKLQJLW(UP«,KHOGRQIRUTXLWHDIHZ\HDUVHUP«DQGLWJRWWRWKHSRLQWZLWKWKHWHDFKLQJDW
WKHXQLYHUVLW\WKDWHUP«ZHZHFDQ¶WWHDFK$VLDQSKLORVRSK\«E\MXVWWDONLQJDERXWLW$QG\RX
know, so you had this room full of people >WKHVWXGHQWV@DQG\RX¶GVD\\RXNQRZSKLORVRSK\IURP
a ± 
Vittorio:  6RµSKLORVRSK\LQSUDFWLFH¶,¶PDFWXDOO\TXRWLQJ\RX 
Brian: Yeah, yeah. 





Vittorio:  Yeah. 
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%ULDQ$QGWKH\¶GZULWHGRZQµ7KLVLVQRWDERXWWKRXJKWV«¶ And then they decide whether they, 
they agree with that.  
Vittorio:  ,W¶VZKDW,¶PGRLQJ>ZLWKP\UHVHDUFK@LQDZD\LQDZD\HVVHQWLDOO\ 
%ULDQ%XW\RX¶UH\RX¶UHFRPLQJDWVWDQGLQJV6R\RX¶UH± 
Vittorio:  <HDK«\HDK 
Brian: ± \RX¶UHHQJDJLQJZLWKLW as well. 
Vittorio: Yeah. 
%ULDQ7KHVHSHRSOHGLGQ¶WKDYHWKH\GLGQ¶WKDYHDZD\± 
Vittorio:  And then I got the problem to communicate this. 
%ULDQ2KDEVROXWHO\¶FDXVH¶FDXVH\RXFDQ¶W± 
Vittorio:  7KDW¶VRQHRIWKHFKDOOHQJHV 
%ULDQ<RXFDQ¶W\RXFDQ¶WQRWXQOHVV\RXGRLW 
Vittorio:  7KDW¶VZK\,¶PXVLQJGUDZLQJVDQGWU\DQGWR± 
%ULDQ<RX«WRWRSUDFWLVHDQ\NLQGRI$VLDQSKLORVRSK\\RXKDYHWREHGRLQJLW 
In a similar fashion, in an advertising e-mail I received after subscribing to his list, Frantzis 
(admin@energyarts.com, original emphasis) points out the limitations of language and argues that: 
The truth is that I could never fully explain how Tai Chi, Qigong, and Neigong completely 
redesigns your internal energy matrix and creates clear energetic pathways. But we can help you 
experience these changes in your body, especially if you train with a live instructor.    
Yet, while on the one hand it appears difficult to convey the experiences involved in DIA by only 
resorting to the symbolic world of language, on the other, it is, however, possible to evoke in the 
reader more familiar feelings, which resemble those of the DIA practitioner ± in this way language 
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is used to reveal, rather than conceal, corporeality. As data have already shown, this is achieved in 
DIA by means of metaphors15 ± -DQ-XDQJLQVWUXFWLRQVIRUH[DPSOHLQFOXGHµWKHIHHOLQJRIOLIWLQJ
DKDWRIIDFRDWUDFN¶WRHOLFLWWKHOLIWRIWKHVNXOORIIWKHQHFNERQHRUWKHIHHOLQJRIµSXOOLQJgrass 
RUDSODQWRXWRIWKHJURXQG¶WRIRVWHUWKHULVLQJXSRIWKHVSLQHVHHchapter 7.1.1).  
Indeed, it is Frantzis himself who makes an argument in favour of metaphors when telling us the 
story of how he realised how sung (for a qualification of sung see chapter 7.1) feels. Below, the 
H[WUDFWIURPRQHRI)UDQW]LV¶ERRNVZHOOVXPPDULVHVWKHG\QDPLFVLQYROYHGLQ
DIA training, where verbal communications, analogies, and metaphors (i.e., the representational) 
are employed to target the tacit knowledge of the body (i.e., the non-representational): 
When I first started trying to grasp the term sung, I did not have an easy time. In my early days of 
training in Taiwan, a very friendly Chinese man who was not my main teacher helped me gain a 
sense of what sung PHDQW>«@ZLWKWZRSLOHVRIFRLQV+HSXWWKHILUVWSLOHLQDSDSHUEDJDQGODLGD
NQLIHQH[WWRLW+HVDLGµ<RXZDQWsung EHOLNHPRQH\0DNHERG\EHOLNHPRQH\¶7KHQKHWRRN
the knife and cut the bag. The coins poured out (letting go of physical tension), fell (releasing the 
chi downward), separated (loosening the insides of the body), scattered over the floor and soon 
stopped moving (the body fully sung). 
The use of metaphors in training is made explicit by Cavel (2017: 4) when he answers his own 
TXHVWLRQ³KRZGR:HVWHUQVWXGHQWVWUDQVODWHDOLHQFRQFHSWVLQWRSUDFWLFDODSSOLFDWLRQ"7KHOLQNLV
PHWDSKRU´ 
It is on this ground that in DIA, language is always employed to reveal rather than to conceal. Or, 
put another way, the symbolic needs always to be attuned with the corporeal, rather than separated 
from it. In DIA the autonomy of the affective dimension stressed by Massumi (see chapter 4.3) is 
indeed something which is acknowledged, yet avoided. Cognition and affect, mind and body, 
                                                          
15 I have been drawing on metaphors throughout this case study ± think, for instance, of the poet and the 
philosopher or the master and her emissary to describe the crucial Becoming/Being experiential and 
analytical distinction. In fact, metaphors are foundational for our lived experience, reflexive thought, and 




internal and external, and language and corporeality, are all relationships amenable to 
phenomenological change, and, therefore, experientially, they can be more or less significant, or, 
in fact, disappear altogether, the latter being the ultimate aim of DIA practices. Below, by 
outlining the way the concepts of linear, circular, and spherical logics are actually incarnated in 
DIA, I will provide a concrete example of language-corporeality attunement.   
 
10.1.1 Incarnating Linear, Circular, and Spherical Logics 
The bridging of the language-corporeality gap in DIA is perhaps best represented by the way the 
shift from the linear or either/or logic of the Being to the non-linear or circular logic of the 
Becoming is incarnated. This is a shift that, rather than remaining at a conceptual or symbolic 
level, needs to be actually embodied at the physical level too. In practice, this is achieved by 
shifting from linear (stop/start or on/off) to circular (smooth or continuous) body movements. In 
fact, as shown below, in addition to the linear and circular, a third level ± that of the spherical ± is 
added.  
Here the third spherical level works well as a reminder that in DIA, analytical distinctions are 
always functional ± they can entail dualities like yin and yang or mind and body, tripartite 
distinctions like jing, qi, and shen, the five elements of water, wood, fire, earth, and metal, or can 
include the hundreds of acupuncture points or energy gates16 &RQVLVWHQW ZLWK:KLWHKHDG¶V VHH
chapter 7.2.1) arguments, here analytical dualities are only a starting point for more nuanced 
analyses.  
In this light, we can have an analysis of three (rather than two) major steps in body movements 
which, in the words of Kleiman (2012), are: 
Moving along this evolution from straight lines to circles to spheres. [And, along the physical 
movements, there is also the shift from a] linear awareness [to a] circular kind of awareness [and to 
                                                          
16 Energy gates can overlap with acupuncture points and, according to Frantzis (2006/1993: 129, original 




D W\SHRIDZDUHQHVVZKHUHRQHH[SHULHQFHV@DOO DW WKH VDPH WLPHEXW LW¶V QRW \RXUPLQG LW¶VQRW
yoXUERG\DQGLW¶VQRW\RXUDZDUHQHVVQRZ\RX¶UHLQWRWKHJDPHRIVRU- the spherical nature [of 
DIA].  
Indeed, in DIA even what appears a linear movement to the novice, to be executed correctly, has 
to turn first into a circular and, ultimately and ideally, a spherical movement, where the dramatic 
shift from the Being to the Becoming has been fully actualised. As explained by Cavel (2017: 98): 
As spherical movement is embodied on ever deeper levels, all motion follows one simple rule: 
if there is down, there is up; 
if there is forward, there is back; 
if there is left, there is right. 
In turn, this rule allows a shift from muscular movement according to reciprocal inhibition to 
µEHQG-and-VWUHWFKWHFKQLTXHV¶ZKHUHWKHUHLVQHLWKHUPXVFXODUFRQWUDFWLRQQRUOLQHar movements ± 
LQ&DYHO¶VRULJLQDOHPSKDVLVZRUGV 
Reciprocal inhibition is the prevailing Western model for explaining how muscles control joints to 
move the body and states that a group of muscles on one side of a joint must contract to draw a 
limb towards the body while its opposing group relaxes; then the opposing group must contract 
while the initial group relaxes to subsequently draw the limb away from the body. Bend-and-
stretch techniques disprove this model as the only method for moving the body by activating all 
WKHERG\¶VPXVFOHV± without contraction. Just about any internal arts student who has a grounding 
in the basics can demonstrate this base technique on demand; truly advanced practitioners will 
demonstrate bend-and-stretch in every move of their flowing form.  
The primacy of non-linearity is reiterated by Myers (Theosophical Society, 2016):  
[E]very movement in Tai Chi is circular. There is no, there is no movement in Tai Chi that is linear. 
If you, if you come across someone doing Tai Chi and they do, they do linear movements, it is not 
Tai Chi. <chuckles> It has to be circular in order for it to work. In fact, the Taoists are all about 
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circles. Erm the Tai Chi symbol is a circle or a sphere; you know, the cycle of being born to death 
and whatever else is a circle, everything is a circle.  
However, it is again Kleiman who provides a more detailed depiction of this 
linear/circularity/sphericality shift involving both the physical and mental level ± the way the body 
moves corresponds to the way the mind moves (and vice versa). To outline the changes from linear 
to circular and to spherical movements ± where one moves into the territory of a non-dichotomous 
mode of embodiment ± Kleiman (2012) employs the example of a qigong set called Circling 
Hands:  
[W]hen you start to look at specific movement patterns, the relative degree of linear movement or 
circular movement or spherical movement inherent in a particular [tai chi] form or 
[neigong/qigong] set has a lot to do with what, how it opens up the potential for your mind and your 
HQHUJ\ WR PRYH >«H]ow the body moves influences how your mind moves, and our goal is to 
move along this continuum from a rigid, hard, stop/start kinda mind, to some ± DPLQGWKDW¶VPRUH
flowing and fluid and circular and spherical. 
>«@ 
So the first stage that you go through with this, um, is to learn how to take some of the stop/start, 
WKHRQRIITXDOLWLHVRXWRI\RXUPRYHPHQWV>«@$QG,VHHWKLVDOOWKHWLPHZKHQHYHU\¶NQRZGD\
RQHZH¶UHJRQQDVWDUWQHZFODVVHVQH[WZHHN± people will come in and start to learn Tai Chi and 
because of the precision and the choreography and the coordination it takes, they have more on/off 
NLQGRIPRYHPHQW,VKRZWKHPWKHILUVWPRYHDQGLW¶VDEXQFKRIVWLFNVDQGOLQHVWKDWGRQ¶WTXLWH
match up.  
>«@ 
But you have to pay attention if you wanna get past that stage ± you have to pay attention to 
VRPHWKLQJ UHDOO\ VSHFLILFDOO\ DQG , FDOO LW µWXUQLQJ WKH ZKHHO¶ >«@ , UHPHPEHU WKLV GLVWLQFW
sensation, of the first time we were doing Circling Hands, where you just move your arms and your 
hands in a, in a circle ± sounds really simple, right? ± but I remember the first time I had this 
sensation of not having stop/start movement, and actually it was a little unnerving ± it was a little, 
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uh, it was, it was strange because as you turn the wheel you go around the wheel and by definition 
WKHUH¶VQRVWRSVWDUWSODFHVR\RXNQRZWKDWVHQVDWLRQZKHQ\RXFRPH\RXFUHVWRYHUWKHWRSRI
WKHIHUULVZKHHODQGLWIHHOVOLNH\RX¶UHJRLQJIRUZDUGEXWDOORIDVXGGHQ\RX¶UHJRLQJGRZQDQG
\RX¶UHJRLQJIRUZDUGDt the same time?  
>«@6R WKDW¶V WKHELJ MXPS IURPJRLQJ IURPRQRIIPRYHPHQW OLQHDU VWUDLJKW OLQHPRYHPHQW WR
circular movement 
>«@ 
7KHQH[W OHYHOZKHQ\RXVWDUW WRNH\ LQ WKHFLUFXODUPRYHPHQW LW¶V WKHGLIIHUHQFHEHWZHHQJRLQJ
DURXQGDZKHHODQGJRLQJRYHUDEDOO6RLI\RX¶YHJRWWKHZKHHOLW¶VOLNH\RXMXVWJRDURXQGRQH
\RXJRDURXQGWKHHTXDWRURIWKHEDOOULJKW"$QGWKDW¶VOike turning the wheel. But now if you run 
your hand continuously over the top, the bottom, the sides of the ball, and you do it with both 
hands, all of a sudden the dimensions that have to shift and change are much greater. And so if y± 
the place that you wan± the thing that you wanna see here is that just what it takes in your 
awareness to track the rolling feeling continuously is gonna be a-a-a jump in the number of 
GLPHQVLRQVWKDW\RX¶OOKDYHWRWUDFNDWRQFHFRPSDUHGWRWKHYHU\XPGLIIHUHQWIHHOLQJDOready of 
going around a wheel.  
>«@ 
The basic idea that we wanna lay out so far is the difference, if you take it really simply, between 
taking your hands, first stage, making a square ± forward, down, back, up ± as you go through your 
practice you try to turn that into a circle, so you go forward, falling forward ± haha ± falling down, 
falling down and back, falling up, and in, and up, and out ± so you have this constant kind of two-
GLPHQVLRQDOFKDQJH$QGZKHQ\RXJHWLQWRVSKHULFDOLW\LW¶VDQRWKHUGLPHn± ,GRQ¶WHYHQNQRZLI
LW¶VWKUHHGLPHQVLRQVQRZRUIRXURUPRUHRUZKDWEXW\RX¶UHJRQQDKDYHHYHQPRUHVWXIIWRWUDFN
>«@ WKHQ ZKDW \RX¶YH GRQH LI \RX ILJXUH RXW LQ \RXU QHUYRXV V\VWHP KRZ WR PDNH WKHVH PRUH
spherical movements, how to roll the ball, and stay with it, physically, release your nervous system 
LQDZD\WKDWDOORZVWKHSK\VLFDOWKLQJWRKDSSHQWKHQDOORIDVXGGHQZKDW\RX¶YHGRQHLV\RX¶YH
KLWFKHG\RXUPLQG WRWKHPRYHPHQWVLQDZD\WKDW¶VJRQQDVWDUW WRRSHQWKHPLQGDQGRSHQ\RXU




movement of the mind. 
>«@ 
The real payoff o-of spherical movement is that it changes the quality of mind that you can bring to 
anything, and so instead of working on one thing at a time, and then you think about the next thing, 
and you think about the next thing, you start to sense more than one thing at a time. And you start 
WR IHHO WKH VKDSH RI WKH PRYHPHQW ZKDW¶V JRLQJ RQ LQVLGH WKH PRYHPHQW DQG KRZ WKLQJV DUH
passing through the movement without getting sucked into each little detail and each little piece.  
Therefore, also the relationship between corporeality and language is conceptualised according to 
a principle of dynamic correspondence, where the two terms can be more or less attuned at the 
phenomenological level ± in the example provided by Kleiman above, there is an attunement 
between spherical movements and a paradoxical/non-linear logic. Hence, while in DIA there is a 
clear acknowledgment that the symbolic dimension of language can detach our mind from our 
body, there is also the awareness that language can address the tacit knowledge of the body. I will 
show below that, although Spinoza does not examine it in great depth, his perspective on the 
relationship between our symbolic and corporeal dimensions is consistent with that of DIA 
practitioners. In addition, to show in what ways language has roots in RXUERG\¶VPRYHPHQWV ,
will employ the neuroscientific paradigm of mirror neurons as well as the anthropological 
observations of Csordas.   
 
10.2 The Corporeal Roots of Language 
 
Although Spinoza does not address the matter in a direct manner, as mind (and the symbolic 
world) and body (and the carnal dimension) co-arise, it is implicit in his theorising that, rather than 
being cut off from our corporeality, language is ultimately intertwined with it. In fact, consistent 
with the view of the DIA practitioner, for Spinoza, language can both disclose and conceal, and it 
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is by employing the former aspect that the Dutch philosopher intends to address the tacit 
knowledge of the body and access a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment.  
As noted by philosopher David Savan (1972), although for Spinoza language cannot fully 
explicate the nature of reality, it can nevertheless be employed as an instrument to actually access 
it. Therefore, as we have seen with DIA, while the mode of the Becoming and the 
phenomenological disappearance of dualism(s) is something that words alone cannot fully express, 
words can nevertheless assist us, and indeed are a necessary aid, to bring about changes in modes 
of embodiment.  
5HVRQDWLQJZLWK',$LQVWUXFWRUV¶LQYLWDWLRQVWRDLPDWWKHµUHDOLQIRUPDWLRQKDSSHQLQJEHKLQGWKH
ZRUGV¶ VHHchapter 8.1.16DYDQ  VHH DOVR/ UNH DUJXHV WKDW IRU6SLQR]D ³D
thing is understood when it is perceived simply by WKHPLQGZLWKRXWZRUGVDQGLPDJHV´,QGHHGWR
achieve this extra-linguistic knowledge ± WKLV ³LPDJH-IUHH SKLORVRSK\´ / UNH   ± 
6SLQR]DEXLOGVKLVRZQSKLORVRSKLFDOODQJXDJHD³ODQJXDJHRIWKHGLYLQHLQWHOOHFW´=RXUDELFKYLOL
2002, in Lærke, 2014: 523). This is a language which paradoxically aims at overcoming the 
limitations of language itself.  
Similarly, philosopher Pierre-François Moreau (1994, in Lærke, 2014: 523) notes that Spinoza 
begins his theorising with a common usage of language to then modify it so that it can indicate 
what is not expressible in words ± DVKHH[SODLQV³FRPPRQXVDJHIRUPVDNLQGRIWUDPSROLQHIRU
WKRVHZKRZLVKWRGLVWDQFH WKHPVHOYHVIURPWKLVXVDJH´ ,Q WKLVUHVSHFW LW LVVLJQLILFDQWWKDW WKH
GHEDWHV RQ 6SLQR]D¶V use of language can be summed up by positions sustaining that, for the 
Dutch philosopher, language is ultimately unable to express philosophical truths, and other 
VWDQGSRLQWVDUJXLQJLQVWHDGIRU6SLQR]D¶VFRQYLFWLRQLQWKHSRZHURIODQJXDJHWRUHYHDOVXFKtruths 
(Lærke, 2014). However, as for Spinoza language both discloses and conceals, these perspectives 
are not as much in opposition as it might seem.  
)RU LQVWDQFH6SLQR]DDFNQRZOHGJHV WKHFRQFHDOLQJDVSHFWRI ODQJXDJHZKHQKHQRWHV WKDW³LW LV
not to be doubted that words, as much as the imagination, can be the cause of many and great 
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HUURUV XQOHVV ZH DUH YHU\ ZDU\ RI WKHP´ LQ / UNH   DQG WKDW ³>S@KLORVRSKHUV
SUHRFFXSLHGZLWKZRUGVRUJUDPPDU>«@IDOOLQWRVXFKHUURUV)RUWKH\MXGJHWKHWKLngs from the 
ZRUGVQRWWKHZRUGVIURPWKHWKLQJV´ibid.: 534-535). On the other hand, the revealing aspect of 
ODQJXDJH LV HPSKDVLVHG E\ SKLORVRSKHU 0RJHQV / UNH   ZKHQ KH QRWHV WKDW ³>I@RU
Spinoza, on the most basic level, words signify, or stand for, the images or traces left by external 
ERGLHVRQRXUV´ 
Indeed, resembling the arguments of cognitive linguist George Lakoff and philosopher Mark 
Johnson (1999; see also Sheets-Johnstone, 2011) according to whom the structure of human 
embodiment constitutes the ground on which linguistic concepts are formed, Spinoza (in Lærke, 
KLPVHOIFRQWHQGVWKDWZRUGVIROORZ³WKHYHU\DFWLRQDQGRUGHURIQDWXUH´2IFRXUVHLW
is this latter revealing aspect that Spinoza employs to achieve his aims.  
IQ IDFW LI ZH EHDU LQ PLQG WKDW 6SLQR]D¶V FKLHI DLP LV WR DFFHVV D QRQ-dichotomous/non-
linear/circular way to get to know and act in the world, it does not come as a surprise that some 
early critics of the Dutch philosopher judged the Spinozian language as paradoxical. For example, 
Noël Aubert de Versé (1685, in Lærke, 2014: 534-DUJXHGWKDWWKH³VRUWRIODQJXDJHWKDWZH
find in Spinoza, that the substance or God is cause of itself, or of its existence, is complete 
nonsense, and something which is contrDGLFWRU\DQGXQLQWHOOLJLEOHIRUWKHPLQG´+HUHZKLOHGH
9HUVp¶VDUJXPHQWVFDQFHUWDLQO\EHYDOLGDWWKHOHYHORIWKHHLWKHURUORJLFRIWKH%HLQJWKH\VKRZ
their limitations at the level of the paradoxical logic of the Becoming.  
That said, however, as Spinoza never elucidates in detail the language-corporeality relationship 
(Savan, 1972), I wish to compensate for this lacuna by resorting to the neuroscientific paradigm of 
mirror neurons and to the additional anthropological help of Csordas. This transdisciplinary 
exercise will allow us to understand in more depth the character of this language-corporeality 
relationship, and will show in what ways, albeit possessing different properties, these two 




10.2.1 Bridging the Language-Corporeality Gap: Mirror Neurons and the Carnalisation of 
Language 
Mirror neurons are particular sensory-motor brain cells which discharge not only when the subject 
executes a purposeful action, but also when that action is observed as carried out by another 
subject (Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008). That is, when the subject observes an action, these neurons 
fire as if the observer was personally performing that action (ibid.). On this ground, neuroscientist 
Giacomo Rizzolatti and philosopher Corrado Sinigaglia (2008) theorise mirror neurons as 
underpinning a resonance of feelings, an intercorporeal attunement, a shared form of embodiment, 
which would evoke the lived experience of a particular body movement and the purpose attached 
to it by merely observing someone else carrying out that movement.  
,QRWKHUZRUGVWKHVHQHXURQVDSSHDUWREHSDUWRIDQµHPERGLHGVLPXODWLRQ¶V\VWHPZKLFKZRXOG
allow the embodied subject to impliFLWO\ XQGHUVWDQG VRPHRQH HOVH¶V DFWLRQV LQWHQWLRQV DQG
purposes with no need to resort to mentalistic/linguistic competencies, but, rather, by remaining at 
a pre-objective/non-representational level (Gallese, 2010; 2005). According to cognitive scientist 
Vittorio Gallese (2005: 43):   
7KLVOHYHOLV LPSOLFLW>«@ZKHQWKHRUJDQLVPLVFRQIURQWLQJWKHLQWHQWLRQDOEHKDYLRURIRWKHUV LW
SURGXFHVDVSHFLILFSKHQRPHQDOVWDWHRI³LQWHQWLRQDODWWXQHPHQW´7KLVSKHQRPHQDOVWDWHJHQHUDWHV
a peculiar quality of famiOLDULW\ ZLWK RWKHU LQGLYLGXDOV SURGXFHG E\ WKH FROODSVH RI WKH RWKHUV¶
LQWHQWLRQVLQWRWKHREVHUYHU¶VRQHV 
Drawing on the phenomenological tradition, Gallese (2010) suggests that mirror neurons constitute 
the neural basis of intersubjectivity ± D µEHWZHen-ZRUOG¶ OLQNLQJ WZR VXEMHFWLYH H[SHULHQFHVDW D
tacit/extra-discursive level (Zahavi, 1999). Yet, and crucially, while mirror neurons appear to 
explain aspects of our lived experience belonging to pre-linguistic realms, they have also been 
employed to theorise the development of language and of the symbolic world in humans. In this 
way, mirror neurons constitute a bridge between non-representational and representational forms 
of knowledge, as well as language and corporeality.  
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Starting from the premise that they allow the recognition of the intention of an action observed as 
SHUIRUPHG E\ VRPHRQH HOVH 5L]]RODWWL DQG 6LQLJDJOLD   YLHZ PLUURU QHXURQV DV ³D
PHFKDQLVPWRWUDQVIRUPYLVXDOLQIRUPDWLRQGLUHFWO\LQWRSRWHQWLDOPRWRUDFWV´)RULQVWDQFH under 
experimental conditions which did not provide context, the type of grip on a cup of tea may be 
understood as either having the goal of drinking from the cup, or of clearing the cup away after 
breakfast (Iacoboni et al., 2005, in Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008: 126). Although this is certainly 
not a well-developed form of communication, as Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008: 154) note:  
>7@KHYHU\ILUVWVLJQVRIPRYHPHQWLQWKHKDQGµFRPPXQLFDWH¶VRPHWKLQJWRXVDQGWKDWVRPHWKLQJ
is the meaning of the acWWKLVLVZKDWµFRXQWV¶ZKDWZHVKDUHZLWKWKHSHUVRQZKRLVH[HFXWLQJWKH
acts, thanks to the activation of our motor areas. 
By drawing on George Herbert Mead, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008: 155, original emphasis) 
suggest that this implicit communicaWLYH LQWHQWLRQPLJKWKDYHEHFRPHD PRUH H[SOLFLW ³JHVWXUDO
FRQYHUVDWLRQ´ WKURXJK D IRUP RI ³mutual readjustment´ 7KDW LV WKH LPSOLFLW JUDVSLQJ RI WKH
LQWHQWLRQ RI VRPHRQH¶V DFWLRQV DORQJ ZLWK ERWK WKH capacities to imitate those actions and the 
ability WR UHFRJQLVH RQH¶V RZQ DFWLRQV DV LQWHQWLRQDOO\ LPLWDWHG E\ RWKHUV ± in other words, the 
formation of an intentional intersubjectivity ± might have triggered a process of co-constitution of 
expressly communicative acts, which may have been the precursor of more explicit forms of 
communication, eventually developing into language as we know it.  
In this respect, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008: 154) describe a convincing scenario depicting the 
shift from pre-objective to objectified forms of communication occurring in a manner not too 
dissimilar from the circular dynamics characterising DIA training: 
Let us suppose, for example, that the act we are watching is of particular interest to us. In this case, 
when we see the other person moving their hand, our hand may tend to move in a similar manner 
almost without our being aware of it; this slight movement will not escape the attention of the other 
person and may modify their behaviour. The mirror mechanism which allowed us to understand the 
act of the other person from their very first movements, also ensures that we comprehend the 
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effects our involuntary response has produced, thus creating a relationship of reciprocal interaction 
between our hand and that of the other person. 
Hence, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008) believe that the evolution of language has more to do with 
primitive forms of gestural communications than vocal communications. In line with the principle 
of mind-body correspondence, here language develops with ERG\¶V PRYHPHQWV DQG IHHOLQJV
Indeed, DV 5L]]RODWWL DQG 6LQLJDJOLD   WKHPVHOYHV QRWH ³>W@KH FRQFHSW RI WKH JHVWXUDO
RULJLQRI ODQJXDJH LVDQ\WKLQJEXWQHZ´7KH\ OLVWD VHULHVRISLHFHVRIHYLGHQFHVXSSRUWLQJ WKH
view that language arose from the integration of facial and hand gestures, and that vocalisations 
were initially merely accompanying those gestures.  
For instance, Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008: 164) cite the work carried out by amateur researcher 
Richard Paget in the early 1930s, who reported a correspondence between sounds and meaning, 
and hand gestures and movements of the mouth, lips, and tongue. For example, Paget (ibid.) 
FRQWHQGHG WKDW WKH VRXQGV RI WKH YRZHOV µ$¶ DQG µ,¶ ZHUH FRQQHFWHG WR WKH KDQGOLQJ DQGRU
indication of something respectively large or small. Paget, in other words, was pointing out a link 
EHWZHHQWKHVKDSHDVVXPHGE\ WKHKDQGZKHQJUDVSLQJDQREMHFWDQGWKDWRIWKHPRXWK3DJHW¶V
intuition is consistent with recent empirical investigations showing a connection between manual 
acts and oro-laryngeal articulations, and providing support to the argument that grasping larger 
objects yields larger oro-laryngeal gestures and syllable pronunciation (Gentilucci et al., 2001, in 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008: 165-166).  
This hand-mouth connection is also supported by clinical studies, where patients with cerebral 
lesions are helped to recover their speech by the use of manual gestures (Hadar et al., 1998, in 
Rizzolatti & Sinigaglia, 2008: 167). In the words of Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia (2008: 166, original 
emphasis):  
[M]otor acts requiring a large aperture of the hand and oro-laryngeal acts requiring a large aperture 
of the mouth appear to be based on a common neural organisation that represents a vestigia of the 
stage in the evolution of language in which sound started to convey meaning thanks to the capacity 
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of the mouth and oro-laryngeal systems to articulate gesture with a semiotic value analogous to 
those coded by the manual system. 
Of course, the integration of manual and oro-facial gestures was an early stage of language 
development, which was then followed by the emergence of mimetic/gestural proto-signs, the 
appearance of a bimodal proto-language involving both gestures and sounds, and, finally, the 
prevalently vocal form of language as we use it today, characterised by the distinction of the vocal 
system from the gestural, and the consequent emergence of the symbolic world as a system in its 
own right, with its peculiar properties (ibid.).  
However, UHVHPEOLQJ ',$¶V SHUVSHFWLYH ZKDW 5L]]RODWWL DQG 6LQLJDJOLD¶V SK\VLRORJLFDO DFFRXQW
highlights is that although language can detach us from corporeality, it is ultimately intimately 
linked to the pre-objective/non-representational/sensuous dimension of embodiment. In turn, this 
DFNQRZOHGJPHQWEULQJVXVEDFNWR&VRUGDV¶HIIRUWWRUHYHDOWKHILFWLYHFKDUDFWHURIWKHRSSRVLWLRQV
between language and experience, textuality and embodiment, and the representational and the 
non-UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO ,QGHHG&VRUGDV¶ (see chapter 3.2) quest into the (inter)corporeal nature of 
language, which we saw when discussing the corporeal turn, has conducted him on a path parallel 
to that of Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia.  
,QDPRUHUHFHQWZRUN&VRUGDV³WUDFH>V@DSURJUession from interaction as inherently 
PHDQLQJIXOWRLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\DQGIURPLQWHUVXEMHFWLYLW\>«@WRLQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\´,QWKLVZD\LW
LVIURP³LQWHUFRUSRUHDOLW\DVDPRGHRIFROOHFWLYHSUHVHQFHLQWKHZRUOG´ibid.: 117) ± i.e., from 
the shared form of embodiment theorised by Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia ± which language would 
RULJLQDWH &VRUGDV LV ³FDUQDOL]LQJ ODQJXDJH´ ibid  ZKHQ KH DUJXHV WKDW ³WKH ILODPHQWV RI
intentionality that crisscross between and among us humans take sensuous form in language. 
6SHDNLQJLVDNLQGRIVRQRURXVWRXFKLQJODQJXDJHLVWLVVXHLQWKHIOHVKRIWKHZRUOG´ibid.: 118). 
Nevertheless, his contention does not imply the dismissal of the self-referential character of 
textuality. What Csordas (ibid.: 119) is pointing out is that, once again, language can both disclose 
and obscure, and we cannot only take account of the former feature while ignoring the latter:    
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[The fact that] language can be described as a medium of experience does not mean that it mediates 
experience E\ GLVWRUWLQJ VRPHWKLQJ WUXH EXW LQDFFHVVLEOH >«/@DQJXDJH FDQ ERWK GLVFORVH DQG
obscure experience, but our narrative theory sometimes seems only to acknowledge that it can 
obscure and distort.  
Therefore, while at one point in our history there has been the emergence of a distinction from a 
system which was relating on both sounds and gestures to another which, by being only 
circumscribed by sounds and written signs, acquired its autonomy, this is not to say that language 
has lost its (inter)corporeal, non-verbal, and material connections ± language would be 
meaningless otherwise. This is well explained by philosopher of language Horst Ruthrof (2000, in 
Csordas, 2008: 114):  
Language is empty, it remains without meaning, if it is not associated with its Other, the nonverbal. 
If we had not learned from earliest childhood, perhaps to some extent even prenatally, how to 
associate linguistic sounds with nonverbal materials, we would have no meaning. This Other of 
language is not the world as a set of unmediated data, but rather a fabric of nonverbal signs out of 
which cultures weave the world the way they see it. 
Cutting across the cognitive sciences, phenomenology, and anthropology, the above perspective on 
the language-FRUSRUHDOLW\ UHODWLRQVKLS DSSHDUV WR EH VWULNLQJO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK 6SLQR]D¶V DQG
',$¶VZKHUHour lived experience is mediated by, but also given in, language, which therefore can 
be effectively employed to access the pre-objective/tacit knowledge of the body. Here, while 
language and corporeality can be considered as two distinct experiential dimensions of 
embodiment, each with its own peculiar properties, ultimately they are not cut off from one 
another.  
These arguments lead us to delve deeper into another relationship closely related to that between 
language and corporeality: this is the relationship between the representational and the non-
representational, or in different guises, between cognition and tacit knowledge of the body, or 
reflective and pre-reflective forms of knowledge. Perhaps unsurprisingly for the reader at this 
point, in DIA training these two forms of knowledge too can be disattuned or attuned, with the 
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latter option being that sought by the practitioner, while the former that to be avoided. In fact, 
below I will show that, resembling what occurs with the language-corporeality relationship, the 
DIA practitioner pragmatically engages with the representational and the non-representational with 
the aim of bringing together these two dimensions of embodiment.  
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Chapter 11: THE REPRESENTATIONAL AND THE NON-
REPRESENTATIONAL  
 
11.1 Using the Reflective to Target the Pre-reflective 
  
Like other relationships previously examined, also that between the representational and the non-
representational is grounded in a principle of dynamic correspondence where the two terms can be 
more or less attuned at the phenomenological level ± the aim of the DIA practitioner being the 
former option. Overlapping with the Being/Becoming¶V and language/corporeality¶V analytical 
distinction, Frantzis (2006/1993: 233) provides an explanation of the representational and non-
representational which appears to be useful in shedding light on these forms of knowledge: 
³>W@KHUH DUH WZR NLQGV RI NQRZOHGJH DERXW ERG\PLQG VXEMHFWV 7KH ILUVW HQWDLOV RQO\ WKDW \RX
intellectually understand the framework within which it exists. The second type of knowledge 
regarding neigong requires that you experience it LQ\RXUERG\´ 
In an online video, Frantzis calls the lack of attunement between these two forms ± the 
representational and the non-representational ± µGLVDVVRFLDWLRQ¶ 5HVRQDWLQJ ZLWK &DYHO¶V VHH
chapter 8.1) warning of EHFRPLQJ D OHJHQG LQ RQH¶V RZQ Pind, Frantzis (Energy Arts, 2013b) 
makes an argument against a misuse of visualisations detached from a sensuous/non-
representational dimension: 
,Q7DL&KL\RX IHHO \RXUERG\DQG LI \RX¶UHJRLQJ WRYLVXDOLVH LI \RX¶UHJRLQJ WRYLVXDOLVH \RX
must also feeO\RXUERG\<RXPXVWQHYHU>QRW@IHHOQRWIHHO\RXUERG\EXWYLVXDOLVHZKDW\RX¶UH









same thing as compOHWHO\ IHHOLQJ ZKDW¶V KDSSHQLQJ LQVLGH \RXUVHOI DQG LI \RX FDQ YLVXDOLVH WKH
LQVLGHRI\RXUERG\DV\RX¶UHIHHOLQJLWWKHQLW¶VILQH 
%XW LI \RX RQO\ FDQ YLVXDOLVH WKH LQVLGH RI \RXU ERG\ EXW QRW IHHO LW WKDW¶V QRW ILQH DQG ZKDW¶V
worse of all three is WKDW\RXGRQ¶WIHHO\RXUERG\DWDOOEXW\RXYLVXDOLVH\RXUVHOIOLNH\RX¶UHRXW
there somewhere and for that, you might as well just get one of these brainwave goggles, let the 
OLJKWVIODVKDQGOLVWHQWRWKHVRXQGVµFDXVHWKDW¶VSXUHO\DEUDLQRSHUDWLRQ,W¶VQRWDEUDLQRSHUDWLRQ
LW¶VLQWHJUDWLQJZLWKDOOWKHIOHVKRI\RXUERG\6R,WKLQNDOORIWKHVHWRJHWKHUDUHELJYHU\FRPPRQ
mistakes that people make during Tai Chi. 
Similarly, Kleiman (2013a) admits he fell for the mistake of remaining stuck for a long time on the 
representational level when addressing his energy gates: 
[T]he mistake that I did and try to visualise a bunch of dots all over your body. I did that for years 
when I first started this practice, and finally I realised I was so stuck in the visualisation that I took 
WKUHH\HDUVDQG,GLGQ¶WGRDQ\JDWHZRUN,Must did feel the body, feel the body, feel the body, sink 
down through the body, sink my chi, get a sense of something dropping through, and when I came 
back to the gates, and tried to do specific slices, specific sections, specific points, I had such a better 
IHHOLQJ IRU ZKDW WKH LQVLGHRI P\ERG\ ZDV DQG ZKDW P\ HQHUJ\ ZDV WKDW«DQG WKHQ WKH JDWHV
made sense from a felt point of view, not a visualised dot point of view.  
$JDLQLQ)UDQW]LV¶ZRUGV 
[T]hose little funny pictures, channels and chakras17ZHOO«\RXNQRZVRPHWKLQJLW
VIRUUHDO%XW
it's not for real, if you can't manifest it inside you. Then, it's a pretty picture book. 
By telling me about a mundane practice such as having a daily shower, DIA practitioner Chris 
provides a simple yet effective example of how a visualisation or a metaphor at the 
representational level can directly target the non-representational dimension to obtain sung (see 
chapter 10.1). Aiming to drop energy into the lower part of his body to counterbalance feelings of 
                                                          
17 Chakras are energy points/gates in the body according to the Indian philosophical and religious tradition. 
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anxiety where instead chi tends to move in upper areas like the chest, below Chris incarnates the 
metaphor of the shower suggested by Brian when training: 
&KULV,ZDNHXSIHHOLQJYHU\DQ[LRXVHYHU\PRUQLQJ,¶PYHU\DQ[LRXV>WKLVIHHOLQJLVGXHWR&KULV¶
extremely difficult family situation], but I go into the shower and as I stand under the shower I put 
LQWRSUDFWLFHWKLVLGHDRIEHLQJ«HYHU\WKLQJZDVKLQJWKURXJK\RXDVKH>%ULDQ@WHOOVXV 
9LWWRULR7KLV LV DFWXDOO\« LW¶V PHWDSKRULFDO EXW LW¶V UHDO IRU you actually got the feeling of the 
shower as well. 
Chris: And I make it real and my anxiety goes and I find that I can face the day. 
The need to bring together the representational and the non-representational appears to be well 
acknowledged also by partiFLSDQWVZKRZHUHQRWWUDLQLQJZLWKLQ)UDQW]LV¶WUDGLWLRQOLNH&DWKHULQH
Hannah, and Danielle. For instance, Catherine, who has already described the realm of 
YLVXDOLVDWLRQHDUOLHUDVKDYLQJKHUµPLQGOLNHDEDOORRQEREELQJDURXQG¶VHHchapter 8.1), clarifies 
further that in her tai chi training, language and visualisations were always targeting the body ± the 
aim here being, once more, the attunement of the two dimensions: 
&DWKHULQH:HOOLWZDVQ¶WVRPXFKYLVXDOLVDWLRQOLNHVKH>&DWKHULQH¶V',$LQVWUXFWRU@ZDVQ¶WWHOOLQJ
us to visualise any specific ± 
Vittorio: Yeah. 
Catherine: ± OLNHDQ\WKLQJWKDWZDVQ¶WWKHUHEXWVKHKDGDZD\RIHVSHFLDOO\GXULQJWKHZDUP-ups, 
kind of drawing our attention to one bodily thing or another, and telling us to notice things, like for 
H[DPSOHZKHQZHZHUHHUP«WKHUHZDVDELWRIWKHZDUP-up that ended, that, that involved sort of 
KDQJLQJGRZQVWUHWFKZKHUH\RX¶GVRUWRIOHDQIRUZDUGXQWLO WKHZKROHIURQWRI\RXZDVKDQJLQJ
GRZQDQG\RXUIHHWZHUH«\RXU\RXUKDQG, your hands were kind of s± «HUP«DOPRVWGUDJJLQJ
RQWKHIORRUDQG«VKHZRXOGVRUWRIWU\DQGGUDZ\RXUDWWHQWLRQWRZKHUHDUH\RXFDUU\LQJWHQVLRQ"
And this sounded at first like a kind of a quite vague, hippyish thing to say, and then I realised that 
there were particular knots in my back or in my hamstrings or whatever which were making that bit 




Oh just er yeah, there was never any sort of imagining anything that ± 
Vittorio: No? 
Catherine: ± waVQ¶W DFWXDOO\ KDSSHQLQJ ,W ZDV DOO DERXW DZDUHQHVVRI ZKDW ZDV JRLQJ RQ LQ WKH
moment.  
Hannah makes a similar argument and qualifies the visualisations employed in her training as 
µSUDJPDWLF¶ 
Vittorio:  >'@RHVWKHWHDFKHULQ\RXUFODVVXVHHUXP«PHQWDO visualisations?  




Being a DIA instructor, Danielle appears to be particularly suspicious of visualisations: 
9LWWRULR>«@GRHUGR\RXXVHSHUVRQDOO\RUGR\RXHUP«HU«XVHLQWKHLQWKHFODVVZKHQ\RX
teach, er mental er visualisations?  
'DQLHOOH(UPQR%XWQR(UP«,WKLQN«WKDW¶VDOLWWOHELWPRUH\RX¶UHM± «ZH¶UHEULQJLQJWKH
DZDUHQHVVLQWRWKHKHDGDORWPRUHLI\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRGRWKHYLVXDOLVDWLRQVZKHUHDVDFWXDOO\ZKDW
\RX ZDQW LV WR« \RX PD\ \RX PLJKW want people to be aware of their feet or their hips or 
VRPHWKLQJOLNHWKDW6RHUP«QR,WHQGQRWWRXVHWKHYLVXDOLVDWLRQV 
Yet, when I asked her if she dwells on verbal explanations and uses metaphors, mirroring 







tell them in a, a simple thing that they can try and then hopefully they will feel something and then 
ZKHQWKH\IHHOVWDUWWRIHHOLWWKHQWKH\IHHOZKDWWKHWKLQJLVWKDW\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRWHOOWKHPVRLW¶V
kind of circular. 
7RHYRNH6KLOOLQJ¶VVHHchapter 5.2FRPPHQWRQFRQWHPSRUDU\GDQFHWUDLQLQJ¶VHPSKDVLVEHLQJ
related to the µaffective weight RI FRQFHSWV DQG V\PEROV¶ LQ ',$ WKH HPSOR\PHQW RI WKH
representational level, the verbal, or the use of metaphors is always targeting a change in the body 
at the level of its tacit knowledge. As also witnessed by the use of the numerous metaphors we 
have encountered to evoke specific feelings and bodily changes, the representational level is 
inevitably involved in the training ± it could not be otherwise.  
',$ SUDFWLWLRQHU $OLFH¶V REVHUYDWLRQV H[SODLQ WKH DERYH FOHDUO\ 2Q WKe one hand, she 
acknowledges the primacy of the pre-reflective and enjoys her tai chi training as she is able to 
avoid any reflexive activity (something that, being an academic, she engages in most of the time):  
Alice: [In tai chi training] there is this thing that grasps you in your body, and does not necessarily 
get to a level of awareness, or, anyway, I am not interested in doing it, reach that level, because I 
could destroy it [the practice]. 
On the other hand, however, she finds metaphors like that of KDYLQJD³WDSEHORZWKHEHOO\EXWWRQ´
WRLQGLFDWHWKHORZHUGDQWLHQRU³LPDJLQLQJDLUOLNHZDWHU´WRDPHOLRUDWHKHUEUHDWKLQJH[WUHPHO\
useful ± IRU$OLFHWKHVHDUHSUDFWLFDOYLVXDOLVDWLRQV³LPDJHV«WRGRWKLQJV´ 
In a similar vein DIA practitioner Francisca, another academic who appreciates tai chi for reasons 
VLPLODU WR $OLFH¶V DFNQRZOHGJHV ERWK WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO DQG RI YHUEDO
explanations and the need to employ those to target the non-representational and the body and, 
DJDLQµWRGRWKLQJV¶± for her, representational and non-representational must not be separate but 
attuned: 
Francisca: the thing is like talking and doing. I, I would not say that is, yeah, something separate, 




explaining, explaining, explaining and do nothing. I like to do the things with an explanation, but to 
do it.  
Therefore, if the representational is not adequately employed, the results are clearly unsatisfactory, 
as I have witnessed in a number of tai chi and qigong classes I attended at the beginning of my 
empirical investigation where verbal explanations and visualisations appeared to be the aim rather 
than the instruments to achieve it.  
To be sure, however, language and the representational are essential in training; they are also 
HVVHQWLDOWRLQWHUYHQHZKHQWKLQJVJRµZURQJ¶,QWKLVUHVSHFWRQHRIP\',$FOassmates ± Jane ± 
WROGPHWKHVWRU\RIZKHQVKHIHOWµOLJKW-KHDGHG¶GXULQJWUDLQLQJQRWDYHU\XQFRPPRQLQVWDQFH
when moving chi in the upper part of the body) and Brian used intercorporeal and non-
representational interaction along with verbal communication and visualisation in his intervention:  
Jane: [I]t was near the end of Dragon and Tiger, doing this movement a few times I started to feel 
really light-headed, I felt a bit spaced out, you know, I just, just felt really, really strange, and 
Martha [a pVHXGRQ\P@FDOOHG%ULDQRYHUDQGKHFDPHDQGNLQGRI«SXWKLVKDQGVRQP\KHDG\RX
NQRZDWWKHWRSRIP\WKURDWDQGKHNLQGRI«JRWWKDWVLQNLQJIHHOLQJ 
>«@he kind of talked me through you know, bring your, your th, your thoughts down and imagine 
everything sinking down over your face into your chest, into your stomach, your back, your, your 
feet sort of going down into the ground and ± 
Vittorio: So he was also using a bit visualisation so he was talking to you? 
Jane: Yes, yeah. Yeah. 
When I probed Brian on the relationship between the representational and the non-representational 
by noticing that he employs metaphors, images, and copious verbal explanations in his teaching, 
he replied that language and visualisations are certainly used, but only as a means, rather than an 
end ± the danger to avoid is to remain stuck on the representational level: 
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Brian: Language is really, really important. But at a certain point you then need to look at your, 
what it points at. 
Vittorio: No, no, absolutely, it makes sense. 
%ULDQ$QGDQGDQGWKLVVFKRROLVSDUWLFXODUO\DUWLFXODWH0RVWVFKRROVGRQ¶WWDONDERXWWKLVVWXII
the way we talk about it. They [inaudible] 
Vittorio: I know, yeah, this is one of the, the characteristics I think ± of, of the, of our, you know, 
\RXUFODVVDWOHDVW,GRQ¶WNQRZWKHWKHRWKHUSHRSOHLQLQHU«WKLVWUDGLWLRQ%UXFH>)UDQW]LV@DQG
VWXIIEXWWKHUHWKHUH¶VORWVRIWDONLQJ$SDUWIURPWKHWHD18 DQGVRRQ7KDWWKDW¶VZK\HUPDOVR,
found that you know, really, there was again er, HUHUHULW¶VLW¶VMXVWWKHILQJHUSRLQWLQJ± but you, 
probably need that. 
Brian: You need it, in this culture. 
9LWWRULR(VSHFLDOO\IRUXV:HVWHUQHUVLW¶VDWRRO± 
Brian: This culture ±  
Vittorio: ± to actually get there. You know.  
Brian: Oh yeah. I,¶YHVHHQORWVRISHRSOHZKR¶YHZKR¶YHGRQHWKHRWKHUWKLQJDVZHOO<RXMXVW
VWDQGWKHUHDQG\RXVHHZKDWKDSSHQVDQG«SDXVH!WKH\JHWVRPHRILWEXWWKH\GRQ¶WJHWDOORI
LWEHFDXVH«\HDKWKHZRUGVDUHUHDOO\XVHIXOVRZKHQ%UXFHVWDUWVVD\LQJWKLQJVOLNH«\RXNQRZ
µ7KHUH¶V WKLV HQHUJ\ FKDQQHO KDSSHQLQJ KHUH QRZ« ,¶P GRLQJ LW WR \RX FDQ \RX IHHO LW"¶ <RX
know what to look for. Other than just standing there and you get this ± 
Vittorio: Yes. 
Brian: ± YDJXHLGHDWKDWVRPHWKLQJ¶VKDSSHQLQJ 
Vittorio: Yes. Yes. 
                                                          
18 :H KDYH WHD EUHDNV LQ %ULDQ¶V FODVVHV LQ RUGHU WR UHVW DQG DOVR UHIOHFW RQ DQG GLVFXVV ZKDW KDV EHHQ
previously done. Brian sees these breaks as an integral part of the training and necessary to allow new 










Brian: Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. 
>«@ 
Vittorio: AnG LQ YHU\ VLPSOH WHUPV WKLV XVH WKH VRPHWLPHV LW¶V VR LUULWDWLQJ IRU PH WKLV XVH RI
visualisations ± 
Brian: Oh! 






Vittorio: Yeah, no ± 
Brian: ± busy making a mental image. 
Vittorio: I, I, I, I definitely agree. , GHILQLWHO\ DJUHH ODXJKV! ,¶YH EHHQ LQ FODVVHV VR« , MXVW








%ULDQ , UHPHPEHU HUP DW RQH RI %UXFH¶V WUDLQLQJV HU VRPHERG\ ZKR KDG EHHQ WUDLQLQJ ZLWK
Mantak Chia for years ± 
Vittorio: I think I heard about him actually. 
BULDQ+H¶VRQHRIWKHVHELJYLVXDOLVDWLRQSHRSOH 
Vittorio: Oh right.  
%ULDQ$QG\RXNQRZKH¶V«WDXJKWORWVRISHRSOH$QGWKLVWKLVSHUVRQZDVVLWWLQJWKHUHWKLVZDV
ZDV'UDJRQDQG7LJHUDQGKHZDVVD\LQJ«µ2K\HV,¶P,¶PHU,¶PGRLQJHYHU\WKLQg Bruce was 
WDONLQJDERXW ,\RXNQRZ,FDQGR LWDOO LW¶VHDV\ ,¶PJRLQJ WRDVNKLPLI ,FDQGR WKH OHYHO
WUDLQLQJ¶<RXNQRZWKHUHWKHUHDUHRQO\IRXUSHRSOHLQWKHLQWKHLQWKHZKROHFRXUVHZKRZHUH
anywhere ready to do, do the level 3, and thLVZDVVRPHERG\ZKR¶GQHYHUEHHQWRD%UXFHWUDLQLQJ
EHIRUHµ2K\HDK,FDQ,FDQGRLWDOO¶$QGHUPVR,,ZDWFKHGKLPGRKLVWHVWV3DXVH!1RQRLW
was before he did his tests. Before he did his tests.  
Vittorio: With Bruce? < chuckles > 




                                                          




%ULDQ +H ZDV KH ZDV TXLWH DQG« QRWKLQJ LV KDSSHQLQJ /DXJKV! +H GLGQ¶W SDVV KLV OHYHO 
µFDXVH DOO WKH WKLQJV WKDW KH WKRXJKW KH ZDV GRLQJ LW ZDV MXVW LQ KLV KHDG 1RWKLQJ KDSSHQLQJ
<Laughs>  
Therefore, along with the acknowledgment that, as sinologist Chad Hansen (de la Fuente, 2014) 
REVHUYHVLQUHODWLRQWRWKH'DRLVW WUDGLWLRQ³ODQJXDJHFUHDWHVGLYLVLRQVZKHUHWKHUHLVXQLW\´E\
UHFRJQLVLQJ WKDW WKH WUDGLWLRQKH WHDFKHV LV µSDUWLFXODUO\DUWLFXODWH¶%ULDQDOVRDFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW
language and the representational can be used to address the tacit knowledge of the body.  
8OWLPDWHO\ WKH ',$ SUDFWLWLRQHU¶V DLP LV WR HQJDJH ZLWK WKH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO DQG WKH QRQ-
representational to attune the two dimensions, bring about change in embodied dispositions, and 
access a non-dichotomous mode of knowing and engaging with the world. And this is the aim of 
Spinoza too, onto whom I will now narrow my focus. In fact, when RXWOLQLQJ6SLQR]D¶VYLHZRI
the relationship between representational and non-representational dimensions of embodiment I 
will emphasise the theoretical component in order to re-turn to the controversial notion of affect. 
As shown in what follows, Spinoza does not set cognition and affect in opposition, or conceive of 
them as cut off from one another. Rather, he aims at bringing about change in affective dynamics 
by attuning these to our conscious deliberations. 
 
11.2 Re-Turning to Affect 
 
$IUXLWIXOZD\WRRXWOLQH6SLQR]D¶VYLHZRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODQGWKH
non-representational, and the way he intends to attune these two dimensions, is by re-turning to the 
notion of affect ± DFUXFLDOFRQFHSWLQWKH'XWFKSKLORVRSKHU¶VSURMHFWRIKXPDQHPDQFLSDWLRQ,Q
IDFWLI6SLQR]D¶V-70, EIIID1,D2,D3, original emphasis) definition of affect is often 
evoked by affect theorists, it is rarely contextualised within a wider portion of text from Ethics as 
in the extract below:  
I call that cause adequate whose effect can be clearly and distinctly perceived through it. But I call 
it partial or inadequate, if its effects cannot be understood through it alone.  
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I say that we act when something happens, in us or outside us, of which we are the adequate cause, 
that is, when something in us or outside us follows from our nature, which can be clearly and 
distinctly understood through it alone. On the other hand, I say that we are acted on when 
something happens in us, or something follows from our nature, from which we are only a partial 
cause.   
By affect I understand affections of the body by which tKHERG\¶VSRZHURIDFWLQJLVLQFUHDVHGRU
diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, the ideas of these affections. Therefore, if we 
can be the adequate cause of any of these affections, I understand by the affect an action; 
otherwise, a passion. 
While the notions of actions and passions, and adequate cause and inadequate cause, will become 
clear at the end of this chapter, I will begin my discussion with the two similar yet different terms: 
affect and affections ± the original Latin words used by Spinoza are respectively affectus and 
affectiones. An affection is the state of a body resulting from its encounter with another body 
(Deleuze, 1988; Hallett, 1972). Deleuze (1978) explains the term by employing the example of 
sunrays falling on someone¶VERG\,QWKLVLQVWDQFHDOWKRXJKWKHFKDQJHRIWKHVWDWHRIRQH¶VERG\
caused by the action of the sun ± say, an increase of temperature ± is a state of that particular body 
VRPHRQH¶VERG\LWQHYHUWKHOHVVFDQQRWRFFXUZLWKRXWWKHDFWLRQRIDQRWKHUERdy (the sun).  
Thus, an affection is always the outcome of an encounter between two bodies. Linked to this, an 
affect is instead what has been acquired by a body as a result of a particular encounter with another 
body ± what is retained from an affection in the form of a novel embodied disposition. In the 
ZRUGVRI+DOOHWWRULJLQDOHPSKDVLV³¶affectus¶>«@LVDdisposition towards another 
arising from an affectio or state GHWHUPLQHGE\WKDWRWKHU´'HOHX]H¶VVXQUD\VH[DPSOHFDQKHOSWR
unpack the above.  
Sunrays hit my body and cause an affection ± e.g., an increase of temperature. In turn, such 
affection either increases (if, for example, it is winter and I am cold) or decreases (if, for instance, 
it is summer and I am hot) my power of acting (i.e., my degree of individuation, capacity to affect 
and be affected by other bodies, or attunement with the world ± see chapter 9.2). As a 
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consequence, my body undergoes a change of its constitution (of its equilibrium of motion and 
rest, in Spinozian terms). While the state of my body following the encounter with the sunrays is 
an affection, the ensuing change in disposition is an affect. Therefore, while an affection captures 
the state of a body at the moment it encounters another body, an affect has to do with the actual 
passage from one state to another and the novel disposition originating from that encounter, which 
has increased or decreDVHGRQH¶VSRZHURIDFWLQJ 
The apparent overlap between the notions of affect (affectus) and affection (affectio) is, again, 
clarified by Hallett (1957: 97, original emphasis):  
[F]or Spinoza an affectus is, not the affectio by which greater or less perfection is conditioned but 
the attaining of greater or less perfection involved in the change of affectio, or involving it. Though 
the affectiones which are the improvement or deterioration are, as termini, involved in the affectus, 
the affectus itself is the passage, or the endeavour by which it is conditioned, and the idea of it is 
the idea of the transition or endeavour.  
With his clarification, however, Hallett points out a further and crucial point: an affect of the body 
is always also an affect of the mind ± µWKH LGHD RI WKH WUDQVLWLRQ¶ RU DV VWDWHG LQ 6SLQR]D¶V
GHILQLWLRQ µWKH LGHDV RI WKHVH DIIHFWLRQV¶ LV ZKDW LV H[SHULHQFHG E\ WKH HPERGLHG VXEMHFW
Likewise, Deleuze (1988: 48-49, original emphasis) conceives of affects as affections turning into 
perceptions, and thus:  
[F]rom one state to another, from one image or idea to another, there are transitions, passages that 
DUH H[SHULHQFHG GXUDWLRQV WKURXJK ZKLFK ZH SDVV WR D JUHDWHU RU OHVVHU SHUIHFWLRQ >«@ 7KHVH
continual durations or variations of pHUIHFWLRQDUHFDOOHGµDIIHFWV¶RUIHHOLQJVaffectus).  
7KHUHIRUH EHDULQJ LQ PLQG WKDW WKH µJUHDWHU RU OHVVHU SHUIHFWLRQ¶ UHIHUV WR RQH¶V capacities for 
agency, for Deleuze (ibid.: DQDIIHFW³LQYROYHVDQLQFUHDVHRUGHFUHDVHRIWKHSRZHURIDFWLQJ
IRU WKH ERG\ DQG WKH PLQG DOLNH´ 7KLV LV RI FRXUVH IDLWKIXO WR WKH 6SLQR]LDQ SV\FKRSK\VLFDO
worldview whereby a change of the body corresponds to a change of the mind. Hence, as a 
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transition affecting both body and mind, an affect is the attainment of a shift in embodied 
disposition ± both mind and body ± ZKLFKHQKDQFHVRUOHVVHQVRQH¶VGHJUHHRILQGLYLGXDWLRQ 
On the ground of the above, I intend to show that, like a DIA practitioner, but differently from 
some interpretations in contemporary body studies, while Spinoza acknowledges that mind and 
body can be phenomenologically distinct, and that affect can bypass ± RU LQ)UDQW]LV¶ WHUPVEH
disassociated from ± our conscious awareness, he nevertheless aims at attuning the two 
GLPHQVLRQV VR WKDW WKH HPERGLHG DJHQW FDQ UHIOH[LYHO\ DQG DFWLYHO\ DGGUHVV DIIHFWV¶ G\QDPLFV
bring about changes in modes of embodiment, and thus increase her power of acting. In this way, 
resembling DIA training, Spinoza employs experiential dimensions ± in this instance, affects ± as 
analytical categories to achieve his aims.  
In fact, Spinoza (1996/1994: 70-112, EIIIP1-P59I-XLVIII) lists and carefully analyses about fifty 
different affects ± e.g., love, hate, hope, fear, anger, confidence, despair, gladness, remorse, 
inclination, aversion, devotion etc. ± which are however only exemplary of the virtually infinite 
embodied dispositions. Not only do these affects need to be situated within a specific historical, 
social, and cultural milieu, but they are also unique to each individual (Hallett, 1957). While 
dwelling on the numerous affects discussed by Spinoza is certainly a task which would far exceed 
the framework of this thesis, we can however examine the three chief affects in the Dutch 
SKLORVRSKHU¶VWKHRULVLQJGHVLUHMR\DQGVDGQHVV7KHVHDSSHDUWREHWKRVHUHODWHGWRSUH-reflective 
experiences, and those on which reflective experiences are built. Therefore, these three affects are 
particularly helpful to shed more light on the relationship between representational and non-
representational experiential dimensions in Spinozian terms, and show that these two dimensions 
are not cut off from one another.   
 
11.2.1 The Three Primary Affects: Desire, Joy, and Sadness 
6SLQR]D¶V  5-81, EIIIP6-P18) account of embodied dispositions begins with three 




ibid.: 104, EIIIP59S): the most primary form of affect, an impulse to survive and maintain our 
individuation, our implicit awareness of the conatus, a consciousness of our power of acting and 
thus of being an agent ± LQ'HOHX]H¶V VHHDOVR)RUV\WK+DOOHWW57) reading, 
³6SLQR]DGHILQHVGHVLUHDVWKHFRQDWXVKDYLQJEHFRPHFRQVFLRXV´ 
With desire Spinoza addresses the slippery and controversial territory where the Becoming turns 
into the Being, and where it is problematic to draw clear lines between the reflective and the pre-
reflective, the cogito and the tacit cogito, what we are aware and what we are not aware of. Rather 
than a truly pre-individual experience (as this would be a contradiction in terms), this is the 
disclosure of the pre-individual realm to ourselves ± an entre-deux or mode of givenness like 
Merleau-3RQW\¶V µQR PDQ¶V ODQG¶ +D\OHV¶ µFXVS¶, +XVVHUO¶V µWUDQVFHQGHQFH ZLWKLQ LPPDQHQFH¶
(see chapters 3.4 & 3.5RU0DVVXPL¶VµLQWHUIDFHEHWZHHQWKHYLUWXDODQGWKHDFWXDO¶VHHchapter 
4.2).  
Similar to the taken-for-granted feeling of being a subject of experiences, a feeler of feelings, a 
WKLQNHU RI WKRXJKWV DQ LQLWLDWRU RI DFWLRQV 6SLQR]D¶V GHVLUH LV WKH HDUOLHVW H[SHULHQFH RI WKLV
disclosure ± i.e., the pre-reflective experience par excellence. A pre-reflective experience is, in 
phenomenological terms, non-intentional, in the sense that it is an experience which does not have 
a content or an object ± it is pre-objectified. Conversely, a reflective experience has a clear 
recognisable object ± it is objectified. If one envisages the pre-reflective and the reflective on a 
continuum, at the very extreme pole of pre-reflective experiences we find what in 
phenomenological literature is often referred to as a minimal self ± a pre-reflective awareness of 
me as a self in any given experience (Zahavi, 2005; 2013/2011).  
This is an implicit knowledge of oneself as a single and enduring entity underpinning the ever-
changing flow of all our experiences. Such knowledge is tacit not only in the sense of being 
µJLYHQ¶DQGWKXVLPSOLFLWEXWDOVRLQWKHOLWHUDOVHQVHWKDWLWFDQQRWEHIXOO\DUWLFXODWHGLQZRUGV
albeit still being, crucially, a conscious lived experience, rather than something we are utterly non-
conscious of (Zahavi, 2005). Phenomenologist Dan Zahavi (2013/2011: 58, original emphasis) 
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GHVFULEHV LW DV ³D GLPHQVLRQ RI for-me-ness or mineness´ 7KLV LV ZKDW SUHVXSSRVHV KLJK-order 
representational modes of thought, up to those which characterise, for example, our reflexive 
deliberations, which are instead at the opposite end of the pre-reflective/reflective continuum.   
To be clear, such foundational pre-reflective experience is neither referring to the ineffable 
qualities of experience which philosophers call qualia ± e.g., the taste of a chocolate ice cream or 
the smell of coffee ± but to something even more, phenomenologically speaking, primordial. As a 
feature of experience which is implicitly self-given, in the words of Sartre (2003, in Zahavi, 
  WKLV µPLQHQHVV RI WKH H[SHULHQFH¶ LV µIRr-LWVHOI¶ ± it is the phenomenological 
structure of our experiences, which needs introspective exercises to be accessed, such as, for 
example, forms of meditation (see Shear, 2000), psychoanalytic techniques (see Gendlin, 
2003/1978), bioenergetics (see Beaupre, 2011), or DIA practices.  
However, the fact that I am describing it here, or that, better than me, Zahavi (like many others) 
has provided an account of it, shows that such experience can be represented, at least to a certain 
extent. It is in this way, I suggest, that the phenomenological minimal self shows commonalities 
ZLWK 6SLQR]D¶V GHVLUH DV WKH FRQVFLRXVQHVV RI WKH FRQDWXV DQG ZKDW PDNHV DOO RXU H[SHULHQFHV
possible in the first place ± LQWKHZRUGVRI+DOOHWWIRU6SLQR]D³LQDOONnowledge there 
LVLQYROYHGDQDZDUHQHVVRIVHOIDVFRJQLWLYHDJHQW´:LWKDTXDOLILFDWLRQRIGHVLUHLQSODFHZHFDQ
now proceed to those affects which are based on it: joy and sadness. 
,Q6SLQR]D¶V, EIIIP59SZRUGV³-R\LVDPDQ¶V>VLF@SDVVDJHIURPDOHVVHUWRD
JUHDWHUSHUIHFWLRQ6DGQHVVLVDPDQ¶VSDVVDJHIURPDJUHDWHUWROHVVHUSHUIHFWLRQ´*LYHQWKDWIRU
6SLQR]D µSHUIHFWLRQ¶ UHJDUGV RQH¶V GHJUHH RI LQGLYLGXDWLRQ RU SRZHU RI DFWLQJ MR\ LV WKH
experience of the attainment of the self-affirmation of ourselves as agents ± the fulfilment of desire 
)RUV\WK  WKH DIIHFW H[SHULHQFHG ZKHQ RXU ERG\¶V DQG PLQG¶V SRZHU RI DFWLQJ LQFUHDVHV
(Deleuze, 1988). This is the subtle feeling that I experience when it is winter, I am cold, and 
sunrays hit my body.  
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Sadness is, of course, the opposite of joy. This is the feeling we experience when our power of 
acting decreases, when our self-affirmation is impeded, and desire cannot be fulfilled ± e.g., it is 
summer, it is hot, sunrays hit my body and make the temperature unbearable for me. In very 
simple terms, joy and sadness could also be seen as elemental forms of pleasure and pain (Fløistad, 
1972), or feelings which provide us with an elemental knowledge of what is µJRRG¶RUµEDG¶IRUXV
ZKDW IDYRXUV RU WKUHDWHQV WKH FRQDWXV 'HOHX]H  +DOOHWW  ,Q 6SLQR]D¶V 
120, EIVP8, original emphasis) words, ³>W@KHNQRZOHGJHRIJRRGDQGHYLOLVQRWKLQJEXWDQDIIHFW
RIMR\RUVDGQHVV´.  
 
11.2.2 The Representational Aspect and the Analytical Currency of Affect 
In light of the above, we can appreciate that these three basic affects, rather than being cut off from 
our consciousness, already involve a form of awareness, albeit a tacit/implicit/pre-reflective one. 
$VSKLORVRSKHU0LFKDHO'HOOD5RFFDVHHDOVR+DOOHWWDVVHUWVIRU6SLQR]D³>D@W
WKH ERWWRP DOO DIIHFWV DUH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDO´ 2I FRXUVH 'HOOD 5RFFD¶V (ibid.) use of the word 
representational is not intended to evoke a cognitivist and Cartesian scenario, but rather points out 
that every change of the body is also a change of the mind (and vice versa), and, as such, can be 
experienced. In fact, although Deleuze (1978) defines these subtle feelings of transition as non-
representational, he makes it clear that he does not intend something which we are altogether non-
conscious of, but rather an experience which is not clearly representable as an object ± a pre-
objectified experience, which one tends to take for granted and thus is not fully acknowledged.  
It is in this sense that, I believe, we can analytically and productively employ the experiential 
dimensions of the representational ± as an objectified experience, and the non-representational ± as 
a pre-objectified experience. This is what the DIA practitioner does when she introspectively 
attends non-representational feelings, objectifies and represents them, so that they can be targeted 
to bring about change in her embodied dispositions. And this is what is involved in contemporary 
therapeutic forms like those we have already encountered with Gendlin (see chapter 6.3). Precisely 
LQ FRPPHQWLQJ RQ *HQGOLQ¶V ZRUN *ODQ]HU   QRWHV WKDW FKDQJHV LQ HPERGLHG
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GLVSRVLWLRQVHQWDLO³DEL-GLUHFWLRQDOSURFHVVVLWXDWHGDW>«@WKHLQWHUIDFHRUedge between implicit 
DQGH[SOLFLWNQRZLQJLQWKHH[WHQGHGERG\´ 
This is what Spinoza engages in too. Resembling a DIA practitioner or a patient of Gendlin, the 
Dutch philosopher employs experiential dimensions/analytical categories ± e.g., affect, mind, body 
± at the level of the either/or logic of the Being as instruments to access the mode of the Becoming 
and bring about change. As explained by Brown and Stenner (2001: 90, original emphasis): 
Affects occur between finite things on the basis of their mutual relations, in the context of an 
LQILQLWHO\SURGXFWLYH1DWXUH>«@+HUH6SLQR]D¶VµJHRPHWULFPHWKRG¶VHUYHVDVDWRROWRµGLDJUDP¶
each encounter, demonstrating precisely which relations are at issue and the orderings of the bodies 
and ideas they call forth. The first step in analyzing encounters is to maintain the parallelism of 
body and mind. This involves, for Spinoza, a separate explication of how affects order relations 
between bodies and between ideas. Proximate causes are sought within each attribute. The body 
cannot act as the cause of changing order within ideas, nor do ideas directly bring about 
PRGLILFDWLRQV LQ ERGLHV 6LQFH µWKH RUGHU DQG FRQQHFWLRQ RI LGHDV LV WKH VDPH DV WKH RUGHU DQG
FRQQHFWLRQRI WKLQJV¶ ( ,,SURSZKDW LVVRXJKW LV the dual expression of the encounter as it 
presents under each attribute. 
Therefore, for Spinoza, attuning the representational and non-representational, and being aware of 
the dynamics involved in the affects, is key to yielding changes in modes of embodiment. On the 
ground of the above, we now have elements to understand the further analytical categories 
employed by the Dutch philosopher to achieve his aims ± those categories encompassed in his 
qualification of affect: actions and passions, and adequate causes and inadequate causes.  
According to Spinoza (1996/1994), passions are affects which emerge from encounters and 
affections of which we do not have an adequate knowledge and which therefore we are not the 
adequate cause. That is, passions are affects which do not originate from us in the deliberative 
exercise of our agency, affirming our conatus by bringing about novelty within the circumstances 
in which we find ourselves. Making also the internal/external distinction salient here, passions 
originate from external causes unknown or not adequately known by us. Not being able to grasp 
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the relations at stake and the patterns characterising the encounters from which these affects arise ± 
RULQWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\¶VWHUPVQRWEHLQJWKHUHSUHVHQWDWLRQDODQGQon-representational dimensions 
attuned ± we play a passive rather than an active role, and consequently our power of acting or 
capacities for agency diminish.  
Conversely, actions are affects which emerge from encounters and affections of which we have an 
adequate knowledge and are adequate cause. Actions are not cut off from our conscious 
deliberations but are rather attuned with them. In this way, being affects that we have attended to 
and are aware of, actions originate from internal causes ± here the representational and the non-
representational are attuned, and we play an active role, which in turn increases our power of 
acting. Once again, while the affects can be disattuned from our conscious awareness, they can 
also be known by us, so that we can be their adequate cause ± LQ6SLQR]D¶Vibid.: 163, EVP3C, P4, 
original emphasis) words:  
The more an affect is known to us, then, the more it is in our power, and less the mind is acted on 
by it.  
There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct concept  
7KHUHIRUH6SLQR]D¶VTXDOLILFDWLRQRIDIIHFWDQG WKHQRWLRQV LQFOXGHG LQ LW ± affections, power of 
acting, actions, passions, adequate causes and inadequate causes ± should now be clearer for the 
reader. It should furthermore now be evident that for Spinoza there is no insurmountable divide 
between affect and cognition, our conscious deliberations and the tacit knowledge of the body, or 
the representational and the non-representational ± these are all dynamic relationships amenable to 
change, which can turn from dualism(s) to dualities. Affect can bypass our conscious thought, but 
can also be seized by it ± the latter being the aim of both the DIA practitioner and Spinoza, who 
LQWHQGWRDFTXLUHNQRZOHGJHRIWKHDIIHFWVLQRUGHUWRDYRLG³GLVDJUHHDEOHHQFRXQWHUV´%URZQ	
StHQQHU   RU ³GLVKDUPRQLRXV UHODWLRQV´ ibid.: 91), so that we can be attuned with the 
world around us, access the mode of the Becoming, and thus increase our power of acting. 
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Transcending the traditional cognition-emotion opposition still vexing contemporary human (ibid.) 
and natural sciences (Colombetti & Thompson, 2008), from feelings we can barely be aware of to 
our reflexive capacities, for Spinoza these are all experiential dimensions and analytical categories 
conceptualised on a continuum, which can vary according to different degrees. Indeed, it is the 
notion of degrees to which I wish to turn my attention in what follows. This notion will allow us to 
IXUWKHUH[SDQGRXUNQRZOHGJHRI6SLQR]D¶VSURMHFWRIKXPDQHPDQFLSDWLRQDQGRI WKHZD\VRXU
reflexive capacities are employed by the Dutch philosopher to target affective dynamics.  
(YHQPRUH LPSRUWDQWO\ IRU WKHSUHVHQW VWXG\¶VDLPV WKHIROORZLQJGLVFXVVLRQZLOO VKRZXV WKDW
both for the DIA practitioner and Spinoza, the shift from the Being to the Becoming, rather than a 
single event, is best conceptualised in terms of degrees of integration or individuation, each 
possessing its own specific properties, ways of getting to know and acting in the world, and 
capacities for agency. In addition, the notion of degree functions as an antidote to sharp divides, 




Chapter 12: THE NOTION OF DEGREES  
 
12.1 Daoist Degrees of Integration 
  
As explained by Frantzis earlier (see chapter 7.1), the shift from the Being to the Becoming is not 
a single or fixed event but, rather, it is an ongoing struggle to move from a dichotomous towards a 
non-dichotomous mode of embodiment. In this way, in DIA embodiment is mainly conceptualised 
as an unfinished process where the attunement ± or the integration, as put by DIA instructors ± of 
the experiential dimensions/analytical categories previously outlined can be productively analysed 
according to different degrees, each yielding different modes of embodied knowledge and action, 
and attached emergent properties.  
For example, Master Fang Ning, (Neigong.net, 2016c) below acknowledges ten levels of tai chi ± 
compared to doors the practitioner needs to go through, each degree gives access to different 
embodied outcomes and capacities for agency:  
Tai Chi Chuan kung-fu is divided into ten levels.  
>«@  
In level one, most of the movements are composed of stiff and rigid energy, very little of yielding 
energy. In the second level, yielding energy increases and rigid energy decreases in all movements. 
This is the result of understanding the concepts of push hands exercises and getting familiar with 
WKHRSSRQHQW¶VHQHUJ\DQGPRYHPHQWV,QWKHWKLUGOHYHODOOWKHPRYements are controlled mainly 
by the yielding energy and one begins to understand the jing. At this time, one does not just 
understand and know the jing but is able to maneuver in a circular motion to neutralize the coming 
energy. 
>«@ 
Fourth to sixth level kung-IX LV ZRUNLQJ ZLWK WKH DGYDQFH FLUFOH >«@ :KHQ , VSHDN RI DGYDQFH
circle, it is not simply a response after retreat. It is in the process of retreating that your yielding 
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HQHUJ\ DGKHUHV WR WKH RSSRQHQW¶V HQHUJ\ DW DOO WLPHV DQG XQGHU WKLV FRQGLWLRQ \Ru are forced to 
advance. For in this situation, your advance maneuver threatens and can cause your opponent to 
lose balance and get defeated. Your offensive maneuver can be a strike or just fa jing (release 
HQHUJ\DQGFDQVHQGWKHRSSRQHQWIO\LQJ>«@$WWhis time the practitioner should feel the legs and 
IHHWDUHPXFKVWURQJHUDQGDUHURRWHG>«@ 
>«@)URPP\VL[W\\HDUVRISUDFWLFDOH[SHULHQFHOHYHOVHYHQLVWKHNH\OHYHOLQZKLFKRQHLVJRLQJ
from middle kung-fu into higher kung-fu transition. It is the level of using the mind to control all 
PRYHPHQWVDQ\ZD\RQH OLNHV>«@$WWKLVWLPHRQHVKRXOGILQGWKDWSDUWRIWKHERG\LVVRIWDQG
every part of the body is solid. Every part of the body can yield and every part can fa jing. 
Therefore, depending on which part of the body is in contact with the opponent, that part of the 
body will strike the opponent. 
 >«@ 
Levels eight to ten are advanced Tai Chi Chuan kung-fu. Because I have not achieved this yet, I 
cannot define what it is. From what I heard from my teacher and sixty years of practical experience, 
anyone who has achieved this level can do wonderful things. This is what the classics commonly 
UHIHUWRZKHQLWVD\VµWKHRSSRQHQWGRHVQRWNQRZPHEXW,NQRZWKHRSSRQHQW¶7KHERG\LVVR
sensitive and light that one cannot add one feather, fly and mosquito cannot land on the body. 
When an opponent punches the body, the opponent is already injured and is flying backward but 
you did not see my improvement. Any movement can cause the opponent injury and bleeding. Of 
course, in martial arts training, there is no such thing as the end state. The more you practice, the 
better the skill. Skill is infinite. Tai Chi Chuan practitioners past and present have achieved skill 
that most people do not believe was humanly possible. 
&KX¶VFRQFOXVLRQKLQWVDWZKDWLQWKLVVWXG\¶VWHUPVPLJKWEHFDOOHGDKLJKHU-order degree of the 
Becoming, endowed with emergent properties able to push the embodied agent to the threshold of 
her human capacities ± it is here tempting to evoke Spinoza (1996/1994: 72, EP2S) when he states 
WKDW³QRRQHKDV\HWGHWHUPLQHGZKDWWKHERG\FDQGR>«@WKHERG\LWVHOIVLPSO\IURPWKHODZVRI
LWVRZQQDWXUHFDQGRPDQ\WKLQJVZKLFKLWVPLQGZRQGHUVDW´6LPLODUO\DOWKRXJKKLVWHDFKLQJ
only includes the tripartite jing/qi/shen distinction, Brian acknowledges five main levels of 
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embodied knowledge and action in the Daoist tradition ± in this instance, he identifies the highest-
order degree of the Becoming as the Dao: 
%ULDQ$QGVRLW¶V«WKDWPHUJLQJRIPLQd and body is the first step, yeah? One of the traditional 
erm structures that, that Ch- &KLQHVHWKRXJKWXVHV>«@± er is Jing Qi Shen, so body, energy, spirit. 
Vittorio: Mm. 
%ULDQ7KHUHDUHDFWXDOO\ WZRPRUH OHYHOV WR WKDWDVZHOO WKHUH¶V WKHQ:XZKLFK is nothingness, 
YHU\VLPLODUWR%XGGKLVW«LGHDVIRULW 
Vittorio: Yeah. 
Brian: Erm Dao. 
9LWWRULR5LJKWVRLW¶V'DRLVDFWXDOO\KLJKHUOHYHOWKDQ± 
Brian: Yeah, mmm. Yeah. 
Vittorio: <Laughs> 
Brian: Qi Shen Wu Dao, so these, these steps, so you start with, you start with the body. 
Vittorio: Mm. 
%ULDQ &RQQHFW WKH ERG\ /HDGV \RX WR FRQQHFWLQJ WR HQHUJ\ 6R LW¶V LW¶V D- again levels of 
integration. 
Vittorio: Mm.  
Brian: Once, once you get your, your energy working, which includes er all of the lower emotions, 
then you are going to Shen the spirit, which is all the higher emotions, mind± Once you, once that 
VWDJH>LQDXGLEOH@\RX¶UHWKHQPRYLQJLQWRHPSWLQHVV 
Having shown that the number of degrees of integration in DIA can vary, I now wish to narrow my 
IRFXVRQWRWKHWKUHHOHYHOVHPSOR\HGLQ)UDQW]LV¶WHDFKLQJ± these are well illustrated by diagram 
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10, from Cavel, which furthermore highlights the overlaps and non-neat distinctions between the 
different levels and the neigong practices designed for each of them:  
 
Diagram 10: Overlaps in levels of neigong practice (source: Kleiman, 2013d) 
Cavel, along with Kleiman (2013b), expands on this diagram by providing an account of these 
different degrees of embodied knowledge and action, and the attached emergent properties:  
.OHLPDQ <RX VDLG µ\RX FDQ WKLQN RI 4LJRQJ DV KDYLQJ WKUHH EURDGO\ GHILQHG OHYHOV ZKLFh are 
beginning or Foundation Practices, intermediate or Power Production Practices, advanced or 
,QWHJUDWLRQ 3UDFWLFHV¶ ,Q WKH (QHUJ\ $UWV 6\VWHP >)UDQW]LV¶ V\VWHP@ WKH WKUHH OHYHOV ZRXOG
generally correspond to the following Qigong programmes [neigong/qigong sets]: Foundation 
would be Dragon and Tiger, Opening the Energy Gates, and the Marriage of Heaven and Earth. 
Power Production Practices are Spiralling Energy Body and Bend the Bow. Then the Integration 
3UDFWLFHLV*RGV3OD\LQJLQWKH&ORXGV>«:@KDWof defines each of these levels? 
&DYHO >«@ ,Q WKH )RXQGDWLRQ \RX¶UH EXLOGLQJ DOO WKH NH\ FRPSRQHQWV QRW MXVW LQ WKH SK\VLFDO
PRWLRQ EXW DOVR LQ WKH QHLJRQJ WKDW \RX¶UH XVLQJ 7KH UHDO HVVHQWLDOV OLNH DOLJQPHQWV EUHDWKLQJ
stretching your tissues, opening and closing, twisting of the soft tissues, and you have these layers 
that are basically in every Qigong, all Tai Chi and all Bagua [a Daoist martial art].  
>«@6RWKH)RXQGDWLRQ3UDFWLFHVSUHSDUHWKHERG\IRUHYHU\WKLQJWKDW¶VJRQQDFRPHLQWKH3RZHU
PrRGXFWLRQDQG WKH ,QWHJUDWLRQ3UDFWLFHV$QG LI \RXGRQ¶WGRHQRXJKZRUNZLWK WKH)RXQGDWLRQ
then when you come to the Power Production and you really start amping up the internal pressures 
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and the chi running through your channels, you have the possibility of causing yourself some 
problems and unless that is really clean in your body, the chances of integrating the whole neigong 
into one thing is absolutely impossible. So this is why I split it into these three layers. 
Thus, as already seen with the linear/circular/spherical stages, the shift from the Being to the 
Becoming, and the merging of mind and body, progresses through three different degrees. In turn, 
once sedimented, each degree brings about emergent properties and thus opens up access to novel 
ways of knowing and acting in the world. This reasoning would also explain the popular discourse 




actually put it in your body, the next piece will not show LWVHOILWZRQ¶WFRPHDOLYHLQVLGHRI\RX
6RWKLVLVZK\LW¶VDVHFUHW\RXFDQWHOOHYHU\ERG\HYHU\WKLQJDQGWKHUH¶VSHRSOHDURXQGWKH\FDQ
talk till the cows come home about all the different stuff within the± within the material, but you 
ask ± them tRVKRZ\RXVRPHWKLQJDQGWKHLUSUDFWLFHLVUHDOO\SRRU6RWKHUH¶VDGLVFRQQHFWKHUH
ZKHQDSHUVRQZKR¶VWUDLQLQJUHDOO\WUDLQVDQGWKHQDWVRPHSRLQWLQWKHLUWUDLQLQJWKLQJVVWDUWWRJHO
and integrate, the next level of information, the next level of that training starts to present itself and 
WKHQWKH\FRPHWR\RXZLWKWKHTXHVWLRQµRKZHOO,¶PJHWWLQJWKLVKDSSHQLQJLQP\SUDFWLFHQRZ¶
DQG \RX JR µJUHDW¶ ± QRZ \RX NQRZ WKH\¶YH DFWXDOO\ HPERGLHG ZKDW \RX¶YH SUHYLRXVO\ WDXJKW
WKHPDQG WKDW¶V WKHSUHcise moment that you drop the next piece in or you explain the different 
OHYHOVRI«EHFDXVHQRZWKH\¶UHYHU\UHFHSWLYHDQGWKHIRXQGDWLRQFDQWDNHLWRQERDUG 
In the shifting process from a dichotomous to a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment, analytical 
distinctions/experiential dimensions are pragmatically employed in a way that each neigong set is 
FDUHIXOO\GHVLJQHG WRDVVHPEOH WKHQHLJRQJFRPSRQHQWVLQDSHFXOLDU IDVKLRQDFFRUGLQJ WRRQH¶V
contingent needs and training goals, while the Gods plays the role of integration par excellence. In 
fact, here integration might be conceptualised as the envelopment of all these 
dimensions/categories in a non-GXDOLVW FRQWH[W ZKHUH WKH\ GLVDSSHDU IURP WKH SUDFWLWLRQHU¶V
phenomenological field or are re-lived in a non-dichotomous/non-linear manner ± as Brian (Diary 
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± Gods Playing in the Clouds class ± 17th 0DUFKVDLGGXULQJD*RGVFODVV µLQWHJUDWLRQ LV
IHHOLQJHYHU\WKLQJDWRQFHDQGDVRQH¶ 
On this ground, embodiment is fundamentally conceptualised as a process wherein the different 
configurations of the several elements involved yield different embodied outcomes and related 
emergent properties. In relation to the 16 neigong components (see chapter 7.1.1), Cavel (2013) 
reiterates the above points by using the metaphor of a Moroccan carpet where a number of 
coloured threads can be assembled in a variety of ways:   
7KHUH¶VQHLJRQJDQGZKHQ\RXJHWWKHZKROHSDFNDJHWRJHWKHULQ*RGV3OD\LQJLQWKH&ORXGV
WKH\¶UHDOOSUHVHQW1RZLI\RXJRWRD0RURFFDQED]DDURUsomeplace of this nature, and you see all 
WKHVH FDUSHWV DQG \RX VHH DOO WKHVH EODQNHWV DQG WKH\¶UH EDVLFDOO\ PDGH RXW RI  RU  FRORXUHG
threads, but there are many many patterns, there are many many different carpets. Yes? When you 
get 16 threads, there are many ways you can weave them together. OK? And through these different 
weaves, the neigong content produces xing-yi, WDLFKLEDJXDPHGLWDWLRQ<HV",W¶VQRWWKDWRQHKDV
VRPHWKLQJWKHRWKHUGRHVQ¶W LW¶VPRUHRIWKHEOHQG1RZLI\RXWDNHLQJUHGLHQts ± flour, butter, 
sugar, eggs ± depending on the quantity of those ingredients you can have a very light sponge or 
you can have a really dense heavy cake. No difference, only the quantities and ratios.  
So your alignments and your open and closings and your breathings ± these are the ingredients, and 
weaving these together in different ways will make a very different practice. Yes? It can make you 
feel extremely different ± I mean, extending your soft tissues very gently and getting a really strong 
pulse in the body has a completely different feeling to it to really lengthening open the soft tissues 
to your maximum comfort zone and having a light pulse underneath it. Just those two alone can 
PDNH WKHERG\ IHHO YHU\GLIIHUHQW 6R DV \RX¶UHJRLQJ WKURXJK \RXUQHLJRQJDQG DV ZH¶UHJRLQJ
WKURXJK WKHGLIIHUHQWHOHPHQWV LQ WKHQHLJRQJ MXVW WU\DQGXQGHUVWDQG WKLV LW¶VQRW WKDW WKLVRQH¶V
EHWWHU WKDQ WKDW RQH RU WKDW RQH¶V EHWWHU WKDQ WKLV RQH WKH\¶UH XQLTXH WKH\ JLYH \RX GLIIHUHQW
IODYRXUV DQG DV XP« LW¶V Tuite often put over: if you can eat ice cream every day of your life 
\RX¶OOVRRQJHWERUHGLIWKHRQO\IODYRXULVYDQLOOD 
The purpose of the different neigong sets is so that you can develop your body at different times in 




SK\VLFDOPRWLRQLVWKDW\RX¶UHGRLQJ\RX¶UHJRQQDZDQWWRZHDYH\RXUQHLJRQJWRVuch a degree of 
JHWWLQJDORWRIZDWHULQWRWKHSUDFWLFHWRTXHQFKWKHILUHLQ\RXUQHUYHV7KDW¶VJRQQDEH\RXUKLJK
SULRULW\$QG\HW LI\RXKDYHDPRWRUF\FOHDFFLGHQWDQG\RX¶UH O\LQJRQ WKHURDGDQG\RX¶UHQRW
EOHHGLQJWKHUH¶VQRWKLQJEURNHQLQWHUQDOO\RUH[WHUQDOO\EXW\RX¶YHMXVWKDGRQHKHOORIDVPDVK
then pulsing all your joints and cavities to start clearing those, that condensed chi in your body, out 
RI\RXLVDYHU\KDQG\SUDFWLFHWRKDYH$QGLI\RXSXOO«LI\RXSXOODOLJDPHQWLQ\RXUVSine, if 
you slip a disc, then having merge of Heaven and Earth to initially open up the ligaments of the 
spine and then Bend the Bow Shoot the Arrow to strengthen those ligaments is a very handy 
practice to have. Yes? 
Here no thread is more important than another (or, none of the experiential dimensions of 
embodiment is an epiphenomenon), and each carpet is a pragmatic blend of the threads specifically 
combined together to bring about particular patterns, address contingent goals, and achieve 
specific embodied outcomes. However, and crucially, this organisation into degrees of 
integration/attunement must not be seen in a hierarchical way, but rather in an interdependent 
fashion. As explained by Frantzis (2006/1993: 237):  
The order of the 16 neigong components is not fixed or linear, only descriptive. Each component 
forms a segment of a circle. Just as there is no beginning or end point of a continuously rotating 
circle, neigong has neither a beginning nor end. Each component catalyzes and influences the 
others. Every time you revisit any of the components, it becomes possible to attain a deeper, more 
fulfilling and beneficial level within the component itself and those that precede and follow it.  
In this way, and according to the primacy of a circular logic, without a solid sedimentation of 
lower degrees of integration, it is not possible to progress to deeper levels and thus yield the 
emergent properties attached to particular modes of embodiment. This is reiterated by Cavel 
(Kleiman, 2014a) when he conceives of the different degrees as climbs or plateaus, and makes a 
contrast between a ladder and a pyramid, arguing in favour of the utility of the latter metaphor, and 
thus stressing a non-hierarchical interpretation of the DIA system where there is a dynamic and 
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circular co-determination between the different plateaus ± here, the higher the apex of the pyramid, 
the wider the foundation needed to sustain it: 
Cavel: So you have climbs and plateaus. So you climb to a certain point, what you can take on 
board, and WKHQ\RXKDYHWKLVSODWHDXDQGIRUDZKLOH\RX¶UHSUDFWLFLQJWKDW\RX¶UHWU\LQJWRJHWLW
RQOLQH\RX¶UHHPERG\LQJ LW\RX¶UH\RX¶UHSOD\LQJZLWK LW\RX¶UH WDNLQJ LWDSDUWDJDLQDQGDJDLQ
and rebuilding it and you just keep playing with that for a period of time until you feel that you 
NQRZ\RX¶YHGRQHZKDW\RXFDQGRZLWKWKDW7KHQGRQ¶W WKLQNDERXWJRLQJWR WKHQH[WOHYHOJR
back to the beginning, go back to the foundation material, run through your foundation material 
again, come back up to that levHOWKDW\RX¶UHDWWKDWSODWHDX\RXDUHZRUNLQJDWDQGWKHQWDNHWKH
next step up the ladder. And then you plateau again and you work that, and when that gets solidified 
and embodied to some degree, to whatever you can do, then come all the way back to the beginning 
DJDLQDQGJRWKURXJKWKDWSURFHVV>«@%HFDXVHHYHU\VWHS\RXJRXSWKHODGGHUZKHQ\RXJREDFN
WRWKHEHJLQQLQJ\RXILQGPDWHULDOWKDW\RX¶KDYHQ¶WDFWXDOO\VROLGLILHGDWWKHEDVHOHYHO$QGWKLVLV
why you should look at it as a pyramid rathHUWKDQDODGGHU>«@%HFDXVHWKDWS\UDPLGWKHEDVHRI
WKDW S\UDPLG LV UHDOO\ ZLGH DQG UHDOO\GHHS WR JHW WKH DSH[ WR UHDFK WKH VN\ $QG WKDW¶V D ORW RI
material on the base level.  
In the next extract, Cavel further elaborates these arguments by describing a foundational neigong 
VHW HPSOR\HG WR EXLOG XS V\PPHWU\ &ORXG +DQGV &DYHO¶V ibid.) explanation shows how the 
metaphors of the pyramid with a solid foundation and of integration are literally incarnated in the 
legs and body of the practitioner:  
&DYHO(?LI\RXORRNDW&ORXG+DQGVIRULQVWDQFH\RXKDYHDDV\VWHPDWLFEXLOG\RXKDYHDWKH
alignments, and then you have a weight shift, you have a turning in the body, and so all of those 
things need to be built in individually, before you even think about your arms, because as soon as 
\RXSXWWKHDUPVRQDQG\RXPRYHIURPWKHDUPVEDVLFDOO\LW¶VJRQQDOHDYHEHKLQGWKHOHJVDQGWKH
spine and all the good work downstairs. So you need to really focus on getting your weight shift 
clean and smooth DQGQRZZKHQ\RX¶UH IRFXVLQJRQ WKDWRQHVLQJOHFRPSRQHQW\RXZLOOVWDUW WR
QRWLFHZKHUH\RXUERG\¶VVWLIIZKLFKVLGHRI\RXUERG\¶VPRUHIOH[LEOHWKDQWKHRWKHUZKLFKVLGH




tighter; and therefore in just doing the weight shift not only do you notice these things, but as you 
focus in deeper and you control your movement you start to release those tensions from your body, 
DQG\RXDFWXDOO\JDLQWKHEHQHILWWKDW\RX¶UHORRNLQJIRUIURPWKHH[HUFLVH>«@$QGWKHQ\RXEULQJ
the arms in, and you learn the arms independently, and then you put it all together, and suddenly 
\RXU&ORXG+DQGVLVDYHU\GLIIHUHQWDQLPDO6RLW¶VWKLVV\VWHPDWLFDSSURDFKDQGUHDOO\IRFXVLQJ
DQG KRQLQJ LQ RQ WKH RQH WKLQJ \RX¶UH GRLQJ ZKHWKHU WKDW RQH WKLQJ LV D VLQJOH FRPSRQHQW RU
whether that one thing is combining some components together or whether that one thing is the 
whole movement. 
Finally, I wish to conclude by re-emphasising the mere functional use of the notion of degrees, as 
the number or type one chooses to use is arbitrary and instrumental to specific needs and 
contextual goals. As he points out that analytical categories are always enveloped in a wider non-
dualist context and thus highlights the ontological primacy of a non-linear/circular, or, better, 




JLYHDFRQFHSWXDO IUDPHZRUNIRU\RX WR ORRNDW LW%XW WKHUH¶VYarious models and maps you can 
PDNHWKURXJKWKHQHLJRQJEXWWKHQHLJRQJLVEDVLFDOO\DVSKHUHDQGZKHQ\RX¶UHLQWKHVSKHUH\RX
can go in any direction and develop any particular component and the point is to get to every part of 
the sphere and to integrate it into one coherent whole. That is the 16 neigong, unifying the entire 
body, energy, mind into one coherent whole.  
Thus, in DIA the either/or, linear, and dichotomous logic of the Being is a tool to achieve the 
paradoxical/spherical/non-dichotomous logic of the Becoming ± again, the aim is to envelop the 
Being within the Becoming, and obtain the phenomenological disappearance of dualism(s). To 
achieve this aim, the notion of degrees is employed as a further analytical tool to account for the 
causal powers of the experiential dimensions of embodiment and the emergent properties attached 
to the different modes according to which one can get to know and act in the world.  
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Additionally, the notion of degrees also functions as an antidote to the reification of each 
experiential dimension and the consequent neat and dualistic divides. That is, it is not only the 
shift from the Being to the Becoming that can be conceived of in terms of degrees, but also the 
shift from the phenomenological salience of one experiential category to another, or the 
attunement between the different dimensions of embodiment. For example, we have seen how the 
mind and body can be considered in a more nuanced fashion by adding the spiritual dimension 
(see chapter 5.5), or, to the linear and circular logic, we have added a spherical one (see chapter 
7.1.1).  
To further develop the above arguments, and complete my sketch of a re-conceptualisation of 
embodiment, I will revisit the notion of degree from a theoretical perspective and show that 
Spinoza too envisages the shift from a dichotomous to a non-dichotomous form of embodiment 
according to a tripartite categorisation ± i.e., what he calls the three kinds of knowledge of 
imagination, reason, and intuition. In this way, Spinoza conceives of processes of individuation 
according to different degrees of complexity, each endowed with its own emergent properties and 
power of acting. What follows below will additionally shed more light on the ways analytical 
categories/experiential dimensions are engaged with by Spinoza, so that the affects and the tacit 
knowledge of the body can be seized by, rather than bypass, our conscious deliberations.   
 
12.2 Spinozian Degrees of Individuation 
 
A further conceptual outcome of the reassessment of the hierarchy between mind and body 
proposed by Spinoza appears to be close to the positions endorsed by some new materialist strands 
where all matter is somehow seen as animate (see chapter 4.1). That is 6SLQR]D¶V
conceptualisation of the mind-body relationship entails that not only the human body (or any 
living body), but all bodies (also non-living ones) ± LH DOO µWKLQJV¶ ± are endowed with a 
phenomenological field, or a certain degree of cognition, proportionate to their degree of 
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individuation. As Spinoza (1996/1994: 40, EIIP13SSRLQWVRXW³WKHWKLQJVZHKDYHVKRZQVRIDU
>«@WKRXJKLQGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVDUHQHYHUWKHOHVVDQLPDWH´ 
However, differently from many contemporary materialisms or material-semiotic sociological 
theories such as actor-network theory, for Spinoza, such preposition does not imply erasing the 
qualitative differences between living and non-living beings, or neglecting altogether the agentic 
powers of our phenomenological world. Here, the different degrees according to which we get to 
know and act in the world, that is, the different degrees of individuation and emergent properties 
of modes of embodiment, can vary enormously, to the extent of constituting an embodied agent 
with a sense of self, reflexive abilities, and a greater capacity to bring about novelty in the world 
6WHQQHU  6SLQR]D¶V WKHRULVLQJ KHUH LV RQFH PRUH XWWHUO\ FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK WKH QRWLRQ RI
autopoiesis.  
In fact, Maturana and Varela (1980/1972; 1998/1987) distinguish different orders of autopoietic 
V\VWHPVRUDVWKH\DOVRSXWLWGLIIHUHQWµHPERGLPHQWVRIDXWRSRLHVLV¶:KLOHDFHOOLVDILUVW-order 
autopoietic system, systems which include more cells ± metacellular organisms ± constitute 
second-order auWRSRLHWLF V\VWHPV )RU 0DWXUDQD DQG 9DUHOD   ³>D@Q DXWRSRLHWLF
system whose autopoiesis entails the autopoiesis of the coupled autopoietic unities which realize it, 
LV DQ DXWRSRLHWLF V\VWHP RI KLJKHU RUGHU´ ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV VHFRQG-order autopoietic systems are 
systems where a recurrent interaction ± i.e., coupling ± involves also two first-order autopoietic 
systems, rather than only an autopoietic system and the surrounding environment.  
Following this reasoning, when coupling occurs between two or more metacellular organisms, 
third-order autopoietic systems arise. As explained by Maturana and Varela (1998/1987: 180-181, 
RULJLQDO HPSKDVLV ³>Z@KHQ WKLV KDSSHQV WKH FR-drifting organisms give rise to a new 
phenomenological domain, which may become particularly complex when there is a nervous 
V\VWHP´ 7KXV KLJKHU-order autopoietic systems can generate emergent phenomena such as the 
social (ibid.: 195) and cultural (ibidGRPDLQVDVZHOODVODQJXDJHZLWKLQZKLFK³WKHUHLVQR
limit to whDWZHFDQGHVFULEHLPDJLQHDQGUHODWH´ibid.: 212) ± indeed, human embodiment itself 
259 
 
emerges in a co-determinate fashion with these novel phenomenological domains (ibid.), 
according to a circular logic.  
Hence, similarly to what we have encountered in DIA, to be integrated into the Spinozian 
psychophysical system, we have here a simple yet useful conceptual device ± that of degrees. The 
more complex the configuration of the body, the more complex is that of the mind, and the more 
complex are the related emergent properties. As reiterated by Hampshire (1996: ix):  
,Q6SLQR]D¶VPHWDSK\VLFDOYLVLRQDOOWKLQJVDUHLQDVHQVHDQGLQGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVDQLPDWHG7KH
LPSRUWDQWTXDOLILFDWLRQ LV µLQGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHV¶ >«@7KHUH LVD VFDOHRIFRPSOH[LW\ LQ WKHPHQtal 
GRPDLQ >«@ PDWFKLQJ WKH VFDOH RI FRPSOH[LW\ DPRQJ SK\VLFDO REMHFWV $ KXPDQ ERG\ DQG
particularly a brain, is an extraordinarily complex thing, and Spinoza remarks that its powers are 
still unknown. 
Importantly, by adopting the concept of degrees we can avoid sharp Cartesian ruptures, such as 
anthropocentric and hierarchical perspective of the world where humans are the only beings 
HQGRZHG ZLWK µVRXO¶ VHSDUDWLQJ WKHP IURP WKH UHVW RI QDWXUH ,QVWHDG ZLWKRXW DQ\ GUDVWLF JDS
between humans and non-humans, and between living and non-living things, here we have 
GLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVRIFRJQLWLRQSDUDOOHOLQJWKHGLIIHUHQWGHJUHHVRIERGLHV¶FRQILJXUDWLRQVZLWKLQWKH
actualisation of the one and the same substance. Moreover, evoking the DIA system as explained 
by Cavel, each degree of individuation is built on the others in a non-hierarchical way. For 
instance, if we wish to reason again in biological terms, emergent phenomena like our capacities 
for deliberation can only occur thanks to processes taking place at the cellular level of neurons 
(Maturana & Varela, 1980/1972; 1998/1987). 
7KDWVDLGKRZHYHUWRDGGUHVVLQDPRUHGLUHFWPDQQHUWKLVWKHVLV¶LQWHUHVWZLWKFKDQJHVLQPRGHV
of embodiment, we need to narrow our focus onto how the degrees of organisation of a body and 
the degrees of awareness attached to it can significantly vary also within the same processes of 
individuation. Put another way, in what way can we conceptualise the shift from a dichotomous to 




12.2.1 Degrees of Engagement with the World ± The Three Kinds of Knowledge  
As we have seen with DIA, reasoning in terms of degrees appears to be a useful strategy to map 
out different modes of embodiment and the related ways we get to know and act in the world. The 
usefulness of this strategy is acknowledged across many traditions. In addition to Maturana and 
9DUHOD¶VELRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHDOVRSKLORVRSKHUVOLNH-DPHV6LPRQGRQDQG:KLWHKHDGFRQFHLYH
of different degrees of individuation.   
As noted by Stenner (2011: 117), for example, for James ³RULJLQDOO\ FKDRWLF SXUH H[SHULHQFHV
JUDGXDOO\GLIIHUHQWLDWHRYHU WLPH LQWRPRUHRUGHUO\JUDGHV´$FFRUGLQJ WR -DPHVPRUH FRPSOH[
experiences build on more elemental ones by means of what is fundamentally a process of creative 
addition which at a higher order generates emerging properties, such as conceptual categorisations 
or reflexive deliberations (ibid.). James distinguishes four main degrees of knowledge: energetics, 
percepts, concepts, and discourse, with the latter being the highest-order degree of individuation 
(ibid.). 
In a similar vein, Simondon theorises the qualitative changes in the world ± LH LWV ³HPHUJHQW
RUJDQLVDWLRQ´± E\GLVWLQJXLVKLQJ³GLIIHUHQWUHJLPHVRILQGLYLGXDWLRQDVSURYLGLQJWKH
foundation for different domains such DV PDWWHU OLIH PLQG DQG VRFLHW\´ ibid.: 311-312). For 
Simondon, (ibid³>W@KHVHSDUDWLRQWKHJUDGDWLRQDQGWKHUHODWLRQVRIWKHVHGRPDLQVDSSHDU
DVDVSHFWVRILQGLYLGXDWLRQDFFRUGLQJWRLWVGLIIHUHQWPRGDOLWLHV´$V6LPRQGRQibid.: 311, original 
HPSKDVLVH[SODLQVKHLQWHQGV³WRVWXG\WKHforms, modes and degrees of individuation in order to 
situate accurately the individual in the wider being [Becoming] according to three levels of the 
SK\VLFDOWKHYLWDODQGWKHSV\FKRVRFLDO´ 
As observed b\6WHQQHU IRU:KLWHKHDG WRR WKHUHDUH³DYDULHW\RIJUDGHVRIDFWXDO
occasions of experience. These grades correspond to a variety of levels of coordinated complexity, 
HDFK OHYHO EXLOGLQJ XSRQ DQG SUHVXSSRVLQJ WKH RWKHUV´ ,W LV ZLWKLQ WKLV Serspective that, in 
6WHQQHU¶V   ZRUGV ³WKH KXPDQ EHLQJ LV FDSDEOH RI ZKDW :KLWHKHDG FDOOV RXWUDJHRXV
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QRYHOW\´ :KLWHKHDG LGHQWLILHV VL[ OHYHOV RI DFWXDO RFFDVLRQV ULVLQJ IURP WKH VXEDWRPLF ZRUOG
through inorganic aggregates, unicellular organisms, vegetable kingdom, non-human life, up to the 
higher-order complexity of human existence, where more composite actual occasions bring about 
WKHSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOGLPHQVLRQVZHH[SHULHQFHDV³µWKHSV\FKH¶µLQWHULRULW\¶DQGµVHOI-LGHQWLW\¶´
(Stenner, 2008: 105). 
Moreover, Whitehead (1985/1978) distinguishes between three kinds of knowledge: causal 
efficacy, presentational immediacy, and symbolic reference. Causal efficacy is the lowest-order 
and yet most immediate form of experience, which is formed out of past sedimented experiences 
(ibid.). As such causal efficacy is a taken-for-granted and thus ineffable experience which tends to 
escape conscious awareness (ibid.). However, it provides the basis for, and the continuity between, 
all our experiences. It is on this form of experience that the sense perception of presentational 
immediacy is built (ibid.).  
In symbolic reference the sensory perceptions of presentational immediacy are taken as symbols 
by means of an act of abstraction (ibid.). As for the DIA practitioner, for Whitehead, the 
abstractions of the symbolic world can also be illusionary and mistaken (ibid.). By employing 
0DJULWWH¶V µ&HFL Q¶HVW SDV XQH 3LSH¶ DUWZRUN DV H[DPSOH 6WHQQHU   HOXFLGDWHV
:KLWHKHDG¶VSRLQWZHOOZKHQKHVD\VWKDW³symbolism does, of course, admit of error: we risk no 
error in reporting that we see a roundish patch of brown elongated on one side, but we can be 
ZURQJLIZHFRUUHODWHWKLVZLWKDQHQHUJHWLFREMHFWDQGVD\ZHKDYHVHHQµDSLSH¶´:KLWHKHDG¶V
three types RINQRZOHGJHOHDGXVWR6SLQR]D¶VVLPLODUFDWHJRULVDWLRQ 
Like a DIA practitioner, Spinoza (1996/1994) conceives of the journey from a dichotomous to a 
non-dichotomous mode of embodiment according to three main stages ± three degrees according 
to which the embodied agent engages with the world ± which he calls kinds of knowledge. These 
are imagination (imaginatio), reason (ratio), and intuition (scientia intuitiva) (ibid.). The first ± 
imagination ± can in turn be divided into random/vague experience (experientia vaga) and 
experience from signs (experientia ex signis) (Garrett, 2010). Random/vague experience is a type 
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RINQRZOHGJHWKDWUHODWHVWRVHQVHSHUFHSWLRQ,Q6SLQR]D¶V, EIIP40S2) words, this 
is when we perceive the world: 
[F]rom singular things which have been represented through us through the senses in a way which 
LV PXWLODWHG FRQIXVHG DQG ZLWKRXW RUGHU IRU WKH LQWHOOHFW >«@ IRU WKDW UHDVRQ , KDYH EHHQ
accustomed to call such perceptions knowledge from random experience.  
+RZHYHULPDJLQDWLRQGRHVQRWQHHGWREHWKRXJKWRIDVDµQDWXUDO¶QDwYHIRUPRINQRZOHGJHRIWKH
world (Hallett, 1957). As has been long acknowledged, our senses are not socially and culturally 
untouched. That is, social and cultural domains shape our view of the world, including our sense 
perception (Ingold, 2011; Pink, 2009; Shilling, 2005) ± we sense (or do not sense) our world 
through a social and cultural filter. In a similar vein, Spinoza notes that we experience the world 
through words and ideas LQKDELWLQJRXU VRFLHW\DQGFXOWXUH WKRVHZKLFKKHFDOOV µVLJQV¶ ,Q WKLV
ZD\LPDJLQDWLRQLVDQH[SHULHQFHVKDSHGE\VLJQV$JDLQLQ6SLQR]D¶V 57, EIIP40S2) 
own words, this is when we perceive the world: 
[F]rom signs, for example, from the fact that, having heard or read certain words, we recollect 
WKLQJVDQGIRUPFHUWDLQLGHDVRIWKHPOLNHWKRVHWKURXJKZKLFKZHLPDJLQHWKHWKLQJV>«@WKHVH
two ways [i.e., experience from senses and experience from signs] of regarding things I shall 
henceforth call knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination. 
In this way imagination is the lowest-order kind of knowledge ± Spinoza calls it imagination 
precisely because it makes us imagine things which do not exist. At the same time, however, 
imagination constitutes the foundation of our way of getting to know and acting in the world, the 
kind of knowledge which we need to tap into to shift our mode of embodiment. In fact, 
imagination could be conceived of as a lower-order degree of the non-dichotomous mode of 
embodiment of the Becoming, as with this kind of knowledge we do not distinguish between the 
mind and the body, the subject and the object, or the inner and outer. Resembling what philosopher 
John Dewey (2012) calls unintelligent habits ± i.e., habits unable to deal with, and bring about, 
novelty ± this is the form of knowledge mostly salient in our everyday tasks, when we neither 
263 
 
employ our reflexive capacities nor engage in particularly demanding performances, and therefore 
DFWLQDQµDXWRPDWLF¶mode.  
The above can be clarified by using the example of an activity many of us have experience with: 
driving a car on a familiar route. If I am an experienced driver and I am driving on the route I take 
every day to go to work, I engage with such activity in a non-dichotomous manner: I do not 
experience myself, the car, my hands and feet, the steering wheel, the gears, the pedals, and indeed 
the road itself, as separate entities. In fact, I can become unaware of the activity itself and be 
absorbed in the music played on the stereo or in my inner conversations planning my next meeting, 
DQGKDYLQJWKHUHIRUHWKHPRGHRIWKH%HLQJRSHUDWLQJLQWKHEDFNJURXQG7KLVµDXWRSLORW¶IRUPRI
embodiment is what I call lower-order Becoming. Of course, this mode can quickly shift when 
something unexpected occurs: the road is interrupted as something has happened ± the Being now 
becomes the prevalent mode, and I analytically deliberate on the course of action by using the 
second kind of knowledge of reason.  
Reason is a functional yet somehow disembodied and fictive kind of knowledge. By means of 
reason we seem to be able to detach ourselves from our contingencies and from our body. This 
allows us a view from above, an abstract perspective, from where things appear to us as frozen, 
lifeless, and separated from one another. Dewey (ibid.: 75-76) appears to explain well both the 
functionality and fictivity of reason, which he calls deliberation:  
Deliberation is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible actions are really 
like. It is an experiment in making various combinations of selected elements of habits and 
impulses, to see what the resultant action would be like if entered upon. But the trial is in 
imagination, not in overt fact. The experiment is carried on by tentative rehearsals in thought which 
do not affect physical facts outside the body.  
>«@ 




Consistent with the above, here the either/or logic of the Being is dominant as, according to 
6SLQR]DE\HPSOR\LQJUHDVRQ³>Z@HUHSUHVHQWWKLQJVE\VHHLQJWKHPLQDQH[SODQDWRU\QHWZRUN´
(Della Rocca, 2008: 35). Every time we are immersed in abstract thought, we are knowing the 
world according to the second kind of knowledge of reason.  
,QWKH'XWFKSKLORVRSKHU¶VSURMHFWLWLVUHDVRQZKLFKSOD\VWKHFUXFLDOUROHRIDGGUHVVLQJDIIHFWV¶
dynamics ± LQ6SLQR]D¶VZRUGVEVpreface, original emphasis):  
I shall treat of the power of reason showing what it can do against the affects, and what freedom of 
mind, or blessedness, is. From this we shall see how much more the wise man [sic] can do than the 
ignorant.  
By providing us with an adequate knowledge of what relations, and what experiential 
dimensions/analytical categories, are at stake in a particular embodied encounter, reason enables 
us to arrange encounters which yield actions rather than passions (Deleuze, 1988).  
Here Spinoza resorts to this kind of knowledge in a manner very similar not only to a DIA 
practitioner when she aims at bringing about changes in her embodied dispositions, but also to a 
social scientist engaged in a sociological analysis. That is, Spinoza employs reason to understand 
the agreements or disagreements between bodies and minds, the relationships between the 
attributes and the modes, or the patterns of affections and affects involved in embodied social 
encounters (Deleuze, 2013/1992: 280; see also chapter 11.2.2). Deleuze (1988: 56, original 
emphasis) reiterates the above effectively when he explains that for Spinoza:  
Reason is: 1. an effort to select and organize good encounters, that is, encounters of modes that 
enter into compositions with ours and inspire us with joyful passions (feelings that agree with 
reason); 2. the perception and comprehension of the common notions, that is, of the relations that 
enter into this composition, from which one experiences new feelings, active ones this time 
(feelings that are born with reason). 




The second kind [of knowledge] is defined by the common notions, that is by the composition of 
relations, the effort of reason to organize the encounters between existing modes according to 
relations that agree with one another, and either the surpassing or the replacement of passive affects 
by active affects that follows from the common notions themselves. 
A typical example of the usefulness of reason is the capacity WRGLVWLQJXLVKDµJRRG¶ MR\ IURPD
µEDG¶ MR\± i.e., a joy which is an action from a joy which is a passion. Although joy is always 
experienced by us as a positive affect, it can however have negative connotations which ultimately 
decrease our power of acting ± it can disagree or not be attuned with reason, and therefore be a 
passion. A passion springing from joy is, for instance, lust, where we are passive in relation to the 
object of our joy (Spinoza, 1996/1994: 112, EIIIP59XLVVIII).  
A more trivial instance in this respect is, once more, provided by the example of the sunrays 
KLWWLQJ P\ ERG\ ,I P\ HQFRXQWHU ZLWK WKH VXQUD\V ZKHQ , DP FROG PLJKW JHQHUDWH µJRRG¶
DIIHFWLRQVDQGWKHµJRRG¶DIIHFWRIMR\DWWKHILUVWOHYHORINQRZOHGJHRILPDJLQDWLRQDVWKH warmth 
of the sun is certainly pleasant), it is however by employing the second level of knowledge of 
reason that I can understand that, despite being, let us say, a cold April day, sunrays can be strong 
enough to burn my skin, and that I should therefore either retire to the shade or use a sun 
protection cream. Here, it is by means of reflexive deliberations that we can actively change our 
HPERGLHGGLVSRVLWLRQVSXUSRVHO\DFKLHYHZKDWLVµJRRG¶IRUXVDQGLQFUHDVHRXUSRZHURIDFWLQJ 
Yet, albeit functional, the detached view of reason from above is ultimately fictive and limited ± 
ZHFDQQRWIXOO\WUDQVFHQGRXUHPERGLHGFRQGLWLRQ7KDWLVUHVHPEOLQJ',$LQVWUXFWRUV¶ZDUQLQJV
while for Spinoza the second kind of knowledge is necessary to access the third, if misconceived 
as the most fundamental kind of knowledge, it can lead to a disembodied and passive apprehension 
of the world ± that which indeed very PXFKUHVHPEOHV'HVFDUWHV¶DQGZKLFKXOWLPDWHO\GHFUHDVHV
rather than increases our power of acting. IQ IDFW XOWLPDWHO\ 6SLQR]D¶V UHDVRQ LV QHLWKHU
disembodied nor transcendental, but rather fundamentally embodied and relational. In the words of 




The capacity of a thinking body to mould its own action actively to the shape of any other body, 
to coordinate the shape of its movement in space with the shape and distribution of all other bodies, 
Spinoza considered to be its distinguishing sign and specific feature of that activity that we call 
µWKLQNLQJ¶RUµUHDVRQ¶ 
Indeed, the degree of individuation, the degree of idiosyncrasy, that is, the degree of agency or 
power of acting of the embodied subject in relation to her circumstances, ultimately depends on 
her capacity to relate to other bodies and minds ± it is proportionate to her capacity to affect, and 
be affected by, other bodies and minds. As explained by Lenz (2017: 10), for Spinoza: 
[H]uman freedom is not an all-or-nothing affair but a gradual matter; it rises and falls with increase 
or decrease of power of persistence. Taking freedom as a gradual notion ranging between the 
complete self-determination of God and the degrees of human bondage, the original definition cited 
above can be taken as a maximal standard that is consistent with quantifying different degrees of 
freedom in beings that are merely part of God. 
Similar to the Daoist tradition, here agency is a matter of attunement between the embodied agent 
and the world (or God or Nature, in Spinozian terms) according to different degrees.   
And in fact, for Spinoza, reason can only allow a certain degree of this attunement. As explained 
by Hallett (1957: 80), for Spinoza, the highest-order degree of knowledge is intuition: 
Imaginatio itself is rooted in intuition, though by reason of its unwitting eccentricity of projection 
under finite self-reference, the individuals ostensibly perceived exhibit their real natures as greatly 
confused, fragmented, divided and contorted. Under Ratio, their incorrigible factors are distilled, 
but at the cost of their finite individuality. 
The highest form of knowledge is instead what Spinoza originally called in Latin, Scientia intuitiva 
± intuition. 
Intuition is the kind of knowledge with which we can appreciate the world not in the form of 
separate entities, but in its fundamental unity, including that of mind and body. Importantly, 
despite the fact that both could be defined as non-dichotomous modes of embodiment of the 
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Becoming, imagination and intuition differ greatly. Intuition is a way of engaging with the world 
which Dewey (2012) would associate with intelligent habits ± habits capable of dealing with, and 
bringing about, novelty in the world. If imagination or Imaginatio ± the first kind of knowledge 
mainly based on senses and hearsay ± was a poor and passive degree of the Becoming, intuition or 
Scientia Intuitiva is a richer and active degree of the Becoming, enriched by the Being20 and 
characterised by increased power of acting and creative capacities. For Deleuze (2013/1992: 304, 
RULJLQDOHPSKDVLV6SLQR]D¶V³WKLUGNLQGRINQRZOHGJH WKXVKDVQRRWKHU formal cause than our 
power of action and of understanding, the power of thinking, that is, of God himself, insofar he is 
H[SOLFDWHGWKURXJKRXURZQHVVHQFH´ 
In other words, here we have a higher-order degree of attunement between the embodied agent and 
the world to the point that there is in fact no distinction between the two at the phenomenological 
OHYHO$JDLQLQ'HOHX]H¶VZRUGVZKHQ³ZHOHDYHEHKLQGWKHVHFRQGNLQGRINQRZOHGJHDQGHQWHU
LQWRDQHZVWDWH´ZHDUHLQWR³WKHGRPDLQRIH[SUHVVLRQ´ibid.: 291) where there 
LV XQLYRFLW\ EHWZHHQ WKH ZRUOG¶V DQG WKH LQGLYLGXDO¶V VHOI-actualisation. Of course, this type of 
knowledge too, is inextricably linked to the affects, in particular to the affect which Spinoza calls 
blessedness, an embodied disposition of permanent joy, where one become fully aware of the 
ultimate XQLW\RIPLQGDQGERG\)O¡LVWDGDQGZKLFKDVSXWE\'HOHX]H³JLY>HV@XV WKH
H[SHULHQFH RI EHLQJ HWHUQDO´   DQG ³WKH YHU\ IHHOLQJ RI *RG´  
Overlapping with Daoist concepts like wu wei, emptiness, or Dao itself (see chapters 5.5, 7.1, & 
12.1) ZLWK EOHVVHGQHVV WKH DIIHFWV ³DUH QR ORQJHU GHILQHG E\ DQ LQFUHDVH RI RXU SHUIHFWLRQ RU
SRZHURIDFWLQJEXWE\WKHIXOOIRUPDOSRVVHVVLRQRIWKDWSRZHURISHUIHFWLRQ´'HOHX]H
original emphasis).  
On this ground, either/or logic, reason, and abstraction ± the bedrock on which the Ethics are built 
± DUHQHFHVVDU\EXWQRWVXIILFLHQWLQVWUXPHQWVIRU6SLQR]D¶VDLPRIKXPDQIUHHGRP6DYDQ
                                                          
20 ,Q IDFW 6SLQR]D¶V LQWXLWLRQ RU ZKDW , FDOO KLJKHU-order degree of the Becoming, could alternatively be 
conceived of as an integration of the Becoming and the Being, if this conceptualisation might be more useful 
to a theorist. However, I have opted to stick to the term Becoming to stress the non-dichotomous 
phenomenological connotation of this way of knowing and engaging with the world ± indeed the higher-
order degree of the Becoming is a conscious experience of the processual and relational nature of the world.  
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Once again, it is the second kind of knowledge which Spinoza employs throughout his works and 
it is the second kind of knowledge which I am employing right now to provide the reader with a 
VHQVHRI WKH WKLUGRQH8OWLPDWHO\KRZHYHU WKHUHDGHU¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI6SLQR]D¶V DVZHOODV
my) arguments would require a shift to the third form of knowledge, where language and binary 
logic ± the instruments I am using here ± become insufficient. In this respect, as already noted (see 
chapter 10.1), effectively conveying and re-presenting such a form of knowledge to academic and 
non-DFDGHPLFDXGLHQFHVLVRQHRIWKLVUHVHDUFKSURMHFW¶VPRVWFKDOOHQJLQJWDVNV 
Precisely working towards the accomplishment of such a goal, if the above arguments may sound 
abstract or indeed abstruse, I believe that, mimicking what occurs in DIA training, they can 
become clearer once similar non-dichotomous experiences can be evoked by means of metaphors 
and more familiar examples. In fact, instances of various forms of intuition are not as rare as they 
might seem. How many times, especially when we are immersed in nature, did we feel at one with 
it? (see Leder, 1990, for a phenomenological description, and Naor & Mayseless, 2017, for a 
psychological account). In terms of more complex ways of knowing and acting in the world, think, 
for instance, of professional athletes who, when performing, attain the mind-body unity of the 
Becoming ± WKHQRWLRQVRI µIORZ¶RU µEHLQJ LQ WKH]RQH¶DUHRIWHQHYRNHG LQ WKHVHFRQWH[WV VHH
Stenner, 2014, for a psychosocial perspective, and Swann et al., 2017, for a more scientific 
approach).  
In these instances there is no distinction between mind and body, subject and object, external and 
internal environment of embodiment, and the action the performer is engaged in, and the 
knowledge she employs, are grounded in, yet far exceed, her capacities for reflexivity. For 
example, a tennis player does not have the time to think or reason when she returns an over-a-
hundred-mile-an-hour serve ± she becomes one with her racquet, the ball, the other player, and the 
court. Likewise, during a Formula One race, the subject-object distinction between the driver, her 
car, the team, and the circuit disappears. The same applies to a master musician who becomes one 
with her instrument and the music played, or an actor who becomes the role itself. Similarly, 
within the more familiar academic circles, if a doctoral student is lucky enough, she might access 
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the Becoming when writing. A good piece of work will be written ± or, perhaps more exactly, it 
will write itself ± by employing a kind of action and knowledge whicKJRHVEH\RQGWKHVWXGHQW¶V
capacities for reflexivity.  
To be sure, a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment is equally significant when we get to know 
and act in the world at the level of a lower-order degree of the Becoming ± indeed our default 
condition. Yet, the examples provided above refer to higher-order degrees of individuation, 
requiring more complex sedimentations of affective patterns, those which can only be obtained 
with intensive, specific, and disciplined practice ± the non-dichotomous mode of embodiment of 
someone driving on a familiar route to go to work and the Becoming of the Formula One driver 
strikingly differ, and certainly require a different type of training.  
In fact, these professional performances ± when playing tennis, playing an instrument, or acting ± 
require a level of skilfulness involving years of training, where the consolidation of particular 
affects would be inconceivable without the extensive employment of reflexive deliberations 
(Burkitt, 2002). Hence, reflexive deliberations are crucial in the process of expanding our 
awareness of feelings and our ability to objectify them ± feelings which otherwise would remain 
unrecognised. Cognition is, in other words, a necessary condition in the incorporation of any 
cultural practice (Shilling, 2017), and the representational can be, indeed needs to be, employed if 
one wishes to address a non-representational dimension.  
All in all, the notion of degree is able to account for the different emergent properties attached to 
different modes of embodiment. Furthermore, the notion works well as an antidote to the 
reification of the categorisations one wishes to employ. In other words, we need to bear in mind 
that we are not conceptualising neat distinctions, but rather, pragmatically trying to orientate 
ourselves in the complexities of our phenomenal and processual world in order to target the tacit 




In addition, it is equally important to remember that we continuously shift between different 
experiential dimensions, degrees of knowledge, and modes of embodiment. Here any categorising 
exercise has the mere functional purpose of understanding the patterns and dynamics involved in 
human embodiment and bringing about positive change within it. And, if taken as ontologically 
valid, would only have the effect of freezing any phenomenon analysed in a snapshot lacking any 
sign of dynamism ± certainly an outcome unfaithful to the process-oriented ontology endorsed by 




Conclusion ± Dualism(s) Revisited  
 
By asking to what extent the notion of embodiment has fulfilled its promise to bridge the mind-
body gap, I revealed the subtle persistence of the Cartesian paradigm within the same theorising 
which aims at overcoming it. The outcome of this state of affairs is that mind and body are too 
often set in opposition or conflated, our phenomenological life appears to be neglected as an 
epiphenomenon, and external environments of embodiment tend to be over-emphasised. 
Something important, I felt, was missing, and I found myself asking: how can we retain a 
fundamentally process-oriented and relational framework, while accounting for the causal powers 
of our phenomenological life and individuated dimension? Or, to evoke the words of Stenner, how 
can we avoid throwing out the baby of our phenomenological life with the bathwater of the 
Cartesian worldview?  
To find meaningful answers to these questions I have let two self-cultivation practices ± Daoist 
,QWHUQDO $UWV DQG 6SLQR]D¶V 3UDFWLFDO 3KLORVRSK\ ± engage in an iterative process of co-
determination. Although the sketch of embodiment produced by this process is very much a work 
in progress, it does point to a significant re-conceptualisation of the term and of its relationship 
with the Cartesian paradigm. More specifically, there exist a range of non-dualist perspectives on 
human embodiment, from different geographical, historical, and conceptual traditions, which share 
a common ground suggesting revisiting dualism(s). That is, to be transcended, dualism(s), rather 
than being ignored, avoided, or denigrated, need to be engaged with.  
In pursuing this path, my re-visitation of dualism(s) has taken place by means of three chief and 
interrelated conceptual steps, which constitute the common ground shared by both DIA and SPP. 
The first was an analytical distinction between experiential dimensions at the epistemological level 
and their reification as self-contained entities at the ontological level. The second was an analysis 
of embodiment grounded in two main modes of embodiment: the non-dichotomous Becoming and 
the dichotomous Being. The third was the envelopment of dualism(s) into a wider non-dualist 
context so that they are turned into dualities in unity. 
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Once these three steps are implemented, relationships like those between mind and body, internal 
and external environments of embodiment, language and corporeality, and the representational and 
the non-representational, can be engaged with according to a principle of dynamic correspondence. 
Here, as their ontological unity is not fixed at the epistemological level, the terms of these 
relationships can be experienced as more or less attuned. In this way, there is neither opposition 
nor conflation of all the dimensions of embodiment, and none of the terms of these relationships 
acquires a privileged role or is disregarded as an epiphenomenon ± all of them possess causal 
powers and analytical currency.  
Overall, what emerges from the current study is a view of embodiment as a chiasmic, paradoxical, 
and multidimensional phenomenon, as a process located at the intersection of a pre-individual and 
an individuated dimension, an act of differentiation according to which the Becoming unfolds into 
the Being and what is only one substance expresses itself in its multiplicity by bringing about 
change in the world. It is in this way that embodiment is conceptualised as a dynamic process of 
individuation possessing a dual character ± i.e., it is both open-ended and differentiated, many and 
one, process and structure, and pre-individual and individuated, continuously shifting between 
these modes.   
Differently from many contemporary accounts, the multidimensional perspective suggested by the 
present research has elucidated how the engagement with our phenomenological world can tap into 
the tacit knowledgH RI WKH ERG\ EULQJ DERXW UDGLFDO WUDQVIRUPDWLRQV LQ RQH¶V PRGH RI
HPERGLPHQWDQGXOWLPDWHO\LQFUHDVHWKHHPERGLHGDJHQW¶Vcapacities for agency. Indeed, for both 
the DIA practitioner and Spinoza, agency appears to be a matter of attunement between internal 
and external environments of embodiment ± here, the more the embodied agent is attuned with the 
world, the more her power of acting is increased. 
By putting forward the simple yet useful notion of degrees, I have furthermore emphasised the 
dynamism involved in the shift from a dichotomous to a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment, 
which is not a single event, but rather an ongoing and unfinished process, which is best thought of 
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as taking place according to different degrees of complexity. In contrast with a conflated/flat/one-
dimensional perspective, here embodiment is a process of individuation which can be enacted 
according to different modes, each endowed with different emergent properties and capacities for 
agency.  
In fact, each mode can also be analysed at different levels, thus providing the depth which is 
lacking in much contemporary theorising. For example, we have seen that the Becoming can be 
enacted at a lower-order degree ± DVZLWK6SLQR]D¶VLPDJLQDWLRQRUDWDKLJKHU-order degree ± as 
with SSLQR]D¶VLQWXLWLRQ+HUHZKLOHERWKLPDJLQDWLRQDQGLQWXLWLRQDUHQRQ-dichotomous modes of 
embodiment, they possess different properties, and greatly differ in the power of acting they can 
grant to the embodied agent.  
Conceiving of modes of embodied knowledge and action in terms of degrees additionally provides 
an antidote to neat divisions between, or reifications of, experiential dimensions and analytical 
categories ± including the Becoming/Being, ontological/epistemological, or empirical/theoretical 
disWLQFWLRQVDOORIZKLFKKDYHVXVWDLQHGWKHFXUUHQWVWXG\¶VUDWLRQDOH7KH\WRRPXVWQRWEHUHLILHG
but, rather, instrumentally employed as useful categorisations.  
Overall, being considered fictive yet functional, the analytical distinctions we have encountered 
are not rigidly fixed, and their categorisation and employment can vary according to the DIA 
SUDFWLWLRQHU¶V FRQWLQJHQW WUDLQLQJ JRDOV RU PRUH SHUWLQHQWO\ WKH VRFLDO WKHRULVW¶V VSHFLILF
analytical needs. To be sure, however, the above is not a call IRUDQ µDQ\WKLQJJRHV¶ WKHRULVLQJ
Rather, although flexible, all the analytical categories are solidly grounded in an ontologically 
monist yet epistemologically pluralist theoretical framework, in the strategy of enveloping 
dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context, and in the acknowledgement of the dual character of 
embodiment ± i.e., in the common ground shared by a number of non-dualist perspectives of 








Epilogue: TOWARDS A POST-CARTESIAN PERSPECTIVE 
 
 
I believe that that the outcome of this thesis can constitute a fertile conceptual landscape on which 
to further develop a post-Cartesian perspective of embodiment. While there is no room here to 
discuss more extensively how this development could occur, a few observations can be made to 
provide a glimpse into what kind of contribution the current study offers to ongoing debates on 
embodiment and social theory. Therefore, below I will first make a number of brief theoretical 
considerations, and then discuss a recent publication on youth leisure practice to illustrate with a 
concrete example how the present study could help re-read and address contemporary social and 
cultural phenomena.   
 
Two Different Logics: Conciliating Critical Realism with a Process-Oriented 
Ontology 
  
One the main goals of this thesis was to establish a dialogue across different conceptual traditions 
within sociology and cultural studies. On this ground, the employment of two different logics ± a 
linear and a circular logic ± helped me to bring together what might appear distant standpoints. If, 
for instance, a typical critical realist approach emphasises the instrumental roles of analytical 
categories and our reflexive capacities, whereas new materialistic perspectives stress the 
significance of the non-representational and processual nature of our world, the present study has 
elucidated how the two views are not mutually exclusive but in fact complementary. In this 
respect, I suggest that, to avoid reductionisms when theorising and researching embodiment, both 
the Being (and a linear logic) and the Becoming (and a circular logic) are needed, with the former 
always enveloped by the latter. It is in light of this consideration that the case study unfolded by 
presenting each argument at both the theoretical (by employing the mode of the Being) and the 
empirical (by evoking the mode of the Becoming) level. 
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In addition, following Spinoza, the present study intends to both do justice to the causal powers of 
our conscious deliberations and acknowledge the primacy of the pre-reflective knowledge of the 
body. Put another way, the arguments of Archer or Giddens are not set in opposition to those of 
Bourdieu. As demonstrated by both the self-cultivation practices employed by the current research, 
recognising that the tacit knowledge of the body exceeds our conscious awareness does not need to 
imply that we cannot address and change our sedimented habits by means of our reflexive 
capacities. Moreover, as opposed to an interpretation of the habitus as reproducing extant realities 
in a vicious circle, I suggest that a view of embodiment as a process of individuation emphasises 
asymmetry and change rather than symmetry and stasis, while, however, accounting for both. In 
fact, I have qualified processes of individuation precisely as acts of differentiation which bring 
about novelty in the world. 
 
Body Pedagogics and the Attunement between the Dimensions of Embodiment  
 
While the current research offers further empirical evidence to the emergent sociological interest 
in Martial Arts and Combat Sports (MACS) and to debates on how such interest can in turn 
constitute a basis for wider health research (see Jennings, Forthcoming), I believe that a 
contribution more valuable in scope and content is offered to the body pedagogics approach to 
embodiment. We have previously seen that body pedagogics constitutes a multidimensional 
perspective intended to address culturally structured practices, and account for the means, 
experiences, and embodied changes involved in the reproduction, modification, or disappearance 
of these practices. 
Precisely for its emphasis on avoiding one-dimensional and conflated analyses, for its attention to 
the relationships between pre-reflective and reflective types of knowledge and internal and 
external environments of embodiment, and for its latest call for a non-cognitivist conceptualisation 
of our conscious deliberations, body pedagogics has played a significant role in shaping the 
SUHVHQW UHVHDUFK¶V UDWLRQDOHDQGFRQVWLWXWLQJD VROLGJURXQd on which to carry out empirical and 
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theoretical investigations. In this respect, the present study has consolidated and further developed 
the insights provided by studies within a body pedagogics ethos (for an account of these, see 
Shilling 2008, 2017, 2018), which demonstrates that, whether a practice relates to occupational, 
religious, sporting, or, indeed, self-cultivation contexts, the alignment or attunement of the 
different dimensions involved is crucial for such practice to be successfully incarnated and 
performed.  
In addition, if the intertwinement between discursive and corporeal dimensions has long been 
acknowledged by extant research, the current study has delved deeper into the nature of the 
relationship between these experiential dimensions, which, as we have seen, is characterised by a 
principle of dynamic correspondence according to which the symbolic and carnal worlds can be 
more or less attuned. Or, seen from a different angle, the current study has provided a contribution 
towards our understanding of how certain discursive practices are taken on and become dominant 
while others are not, or how certain discourses are more successfully incorporated than others. 
 
Engaging with our Phenomenological World and Grounding Analytical 
Categories in Experiential Dimensions  
 
The significance of the attunement between different dimensions of embodiment reinforces an 
DUJXPHQWZKLFKZHKDYHDOUHDG\WRXFKHGRQLQUHODWLRQWR-DPHV¶UDGLFDOHPSLULFLVPDWKHRU\RI
embodiment should be attentive to our phenomenological world (without, of course, falling into 
naïve positivism). As the present study has shown, what occurs at the level of our experiential 
dimensions strongly resonates with significant shifts in the ways the embodied agent knows and 
engages with the world. In other words, the above implies that the analytical categories one 
employs need to be grounded in the experiential dimensions of embodiment (see also Varela, 
2000).  
Consequently, following the examples of DIA practitioners and Spinoza, if one wishes to access 
the deeply ingrained tacit knowledge of the body, it seems advisable to endorse a multidimensional 
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perspective and account for the nuances involved in our experiential world. In fact, whether 
nuance is a virtue or not is one of the arguments discussed in recent debates on sociological theory 
(see Healy, 2017). In this respect, I argue that nuance per se LVQHLWKHUµJRRG¶QRUµEDG¶5DWKHU
OLNHWKHVXEWOHWLHVLQYROYHGLQ',$WUDLQLQJRULQ6SLQR]D¶VSURMHFWRIKXPDQHPDQFLSDWLRQQXDQFH
needs to be functional ± i.e., able to provide the depth needed to tap into our phenomenological 
world (see also Mears, 2017).  
In fact, the present research suggests that, although lived differently according to cultural and 
historical milieus, a number of experiential dimensions (again: mind and body, internal and 
external environments of embodiment, language and corporeality, and the representational and the 
non-representational) are constitutive features of human embodiment. In turn, these experiential 
dimensions are linked to analytical categories constituting dynamic relationships which, albeit in 
different guises, appear to have been sources of debate for millennia and are unsurprisingly still 
salient in contemporary body studies ± as argued by Lakoff and Johnson (1999: 6, original 
HPSKDVLV³>R@XUFRQFHSWXDOV\VWHPVDUHQRWWRWDOO\UHODWLYHDQGQRWmerely a matter of historical 
contingency, even though a degree of conceptual relativity does exist and even though historical 
contingency does matter a grHDWGHDO´ 
+HUH , KDYH DYRLGHG ERWK WKH LPSRVVLEOH WDVN RI WU\LQJ WR µVROYH¶ WKH LVVXHV UHODWHG WR WKHVH
relationships and the sterile enterprise of deliberately ignoring them altogether. Instead, following 
WKH',$SUDFWLWLRQHU¶VDQG6SLQR]D¶VSUDJPDWLFDSSURDFKHV,KDYHVXJJHVWHGµGHDOLQJ¶ZLWKWKHP
In fact, both the DIA practitioner and Spinoza have not only dealt with some of these 
SUREOHPDWLFVEXWKDYHLQIDFWLQVWUXPHQWDOO\µH[SORLWHG¶WKHVHSKHQRPHQRORJLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSVWR
obtain a shift from a dichotomous to a non-dichotomous mode of embodiment, and turn dualism(s) 
into dualities in unity. 
In this way, the self-cultivation practices considered in the current research show that a theory of 
HPERGLPHQW µZRUNV¶ ZKHQ UDWKHU WKDQ RQO\ UHPDLQLQJ RQ DQ DEVWUDFW OHYHO LW FDQ DFWXDOO\ EH
incarnated, experienced, and lived ± it is in this sense that, once more, analytical categories need to 
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be grounded in the experiential dimensions of embodiment. We know that the concepts and 
discourses advanced by a theory are performative ± ideas, as Spinoza sustains, are mental actions, 
that are not less actual than material actions. Yet, the present research indicates that the capacity of 
concepts, discourses, and ideas to bring about change increases when they are able to be attuned 
with our phenomenological world and bodily being.    
 
Applying the Dual Lens: The Example of Youth Leisure Practices 
 
While all the above considerations are certainly implicated in most social and cultural dynamics, I 
wish to show how the outcome of the present research can enrich our understanding of 
contemporary socio-cultural phenomena by narrowing my focus to a recent publication by cultural 
FULPLQRORJLVWV (OHQL 'LPRX DQG -RQDWKDQ ,ODQ  'LPRX DQG ,ODQ¶V DLP LV WR VKRZ WKDW
subcultural and post-subcultural theories are not mutually exclusive, as each emphasises different 
dimensions of contemporary youth leisure practices ± respectively a reflective and pre-reflective 
dimension. In this way, according to the authors, rather than being set in opposition, the two 
perspectives are complementary, and both are needed to avoid reductionist accounts of youth 
leisure practices.  
,Q D QXWVKHOO LI VXEFXOWXUDO WKHRULVWV DSSHDU WR JUDQW D FHUWDLQ GHJUHH RI µUHVLVWDQFH¶ DQG WKH
possibility of political consciousness to youth leisure practices, post-subcultural theorists seem to 
be more sceptical on the matter and tend to dismiss these activities as mere forms of hedonism 
empty of any political content. Within these debates, Dimou and Ilan (2018: 2) argue that any 
youth leisure practice possesses proto-political implication as it is always endowed with novel pre-
reflective experiences to which must correspond novel reflective experiences ± in their words, 
³VXEFXOWXUDO SUDFWLFH SURYLGHV D KRVW RI DOWHUQDWLYH H[SHULHQFHV WKDW FKDOOHQJH GRPLQDQW ODWH-
capitalist ideals and hold out a lived sense of H[LVWLQJGLIIHUHQWO\´+HQFH'LPRXDQG,ODQFRQWHQG
that by offering access to alternative modes of embodiment, subcultural practice possesses a 
transformative potential and thus proto-political connotations.  
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I am very much in agreement with their propositions. In fact, supporting their arguments with the 
common ground shared by Spinoza and Gramsci, albeit implicitly, Dimou and Ilan adopt a 
theoretical framework consistent with that of the present study. However, I suggest that, re-read 
through the lens of the current research, their arguments can be both consolidated and further 
enhanced in terms of analytical purchase. In this respect, my re-reading intends to illustrate in what 
ways the post-Cartesian perspective proposed by this thesis could ameliorate our understanding of 
youth leisure practices and the dynamics of political resistance and apolitical defiance involved in 
WKHP%HORZ,ILUVWIODJXSWKHVLPLODULWLHVEHWZHHQ'LPRXDQG,ODQ¶VDUJXPHQWVDQGWKRVHRIWKH
current study, and then provide a snapshot of the productive possibilities involved in bringing to 
the fore the arguments advanced by the present research.  
7REHJLQZLWKFLWLQJ6SLQR]D'LPRXDQG ,ODQ  UHPLQGVXV WKDW WKH³FRJQLWLYHDQG WKH
DIIHFWLYHUXQLQSDUDOOHO´DQGWKHUHIore in any leisure practice both a reflective and a pre-reflective 
dimension are always involved. Moreover, as does the present research, they stress the primacy of 
the pre-reflective but, at the same time, do not dismiss the role of the reflective. In this way, 
Dimou and Ilan (ibid.: 15, my emphasis) resemble DIA instructors when, by citing Gramsci, they 
note that:  
Gramsci, after all made the argument that the need for and means to change must be bodily felt not 
just intellectually understood. In the absence of a contemporary ideology that provides the ideas 
and analysis that can harness and reflect the feelings that young people experience in their everyday 
lives to the extent that they are moved by it, simply dismissing their behaviour as apolitical and 
exclusively hedonistic risks over-simplifying what is occurring. It remains necessary for an 
ideology to emerge that can do this, and thus far neither academic intellectuals nor youth 
subcultures seem to have been successful in supplying this. 
Therefore, like in DIA, rather than being a matter of mere intellectual understanding, here change 
is a matter of attunement between mind and body, discourse and corporeality, and feeling and 
movement. The distinction between internal and external environments of embodiment also 
appears to be salient for Dimou and Ilan (ibid.: 7, original emphasis) when they observe that 
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³6SLQR]D VDZ WZR PRGHV RI SRZHU RSHUDWLQJ ZLWKLQ VRFLHW\ potestas (force from above which 
suppresses and limits the subject) and potentia (energy and potential, the inner force possessed by 
HDFKLQGLYLGXDOKXPDQ´,QWKLVZD\IRU'LPRXDQG,ODQLELG³>\@RXWKVXEFXOWXUHVFRQWLQXH
to be a site of struggle where internal understandings of the self, meet external impressions of the 
OtheU´ 
Furthermore, Dimou and Ilan make a sophisticated analysis of the relationship between the affects 
DQGRXUDJHQWLFSRZHUV%\GUDZLQJRQ6SLQR]D¶VDIIHFWVRIMR\DQGVDGQHVVUHVSHFWLYHO\OLQNHGWR
feelings of increase and decrease of the embodied agenW¶VSRZHURIDFWLQJWKH\VKRZWKDWWKHSUH-
UHIOHFWLYHDIIHFWRIMR\GRHVQRWDOZD\V\LHOGDQDFWXDO LQFUHDVHRIRQH¶V capacities for agency ± 
rather the opposite might often occur, and a feeling of empowerment can ultimately lead to 
defiance rather than resistance. To illustrate this point, Dimou and Ilan refer to a study carried out 
by Willis in the late seventies describing teenage boys (his so-called lads) experiencing joy and an 
apparent increase of their power of acting when laughing at their teachers and bosses. On 
FRPPHQWLQJRQ:LOOLV¶UHVHDUFK'LPRXDQG,ODQLELGDUJXHWKDW 
[In] the absence of conscious forms of ideology that can galvanise and advance these proto-politics, 
they [i.e., pleasurable moments of subcultural leisure/practice] remain not as transformational 
movements, but as self-defeating modes of defiance. Defiance burns bright with a body-felt-sense 
RISRZHUEXWXOWLPDWHO\IL]]OHVRXW,WGLIIHUVIURPµUHVLVWDQFH¶LQWKDWLWLVRIWHQQRWGLUHFWHGDJDLQVW
a particular set of socio-economic principles, but is ultimately concerned with the momentary 
thwarting of a particular institution to generate a sense of power that is otherwise difficult to 
achieve (Ilan 2014, 2015). Defiant gestures by targeting surface, rather than root forms of perceived 
oppression ultimately do not threaten the status quo, and often simply reinforce or exacerbate the 
GHILDQW LQGLYLGXDO¶V SRVLWLRQ ZLWKLQ LW &RQVLGHU WKH FDVH RI :LOOLV >VLF@  ODGV ZKR IHHO D
power over the teachers they laugh at, only to find themselves years later performing similarly at 
the expense of their bosses as they take up semi/low skilled work. 
Therefore, the affect of joy does not automatically grant an actual increase of our agentic powers. 
Like the empowering feeling I can experience when sunrays hit my unprotected skin on a cool 
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April day, ultimately joy can end up in a decrease of agency (see chapter 12.2.1). That is, if, in 
Spinozian terms, the affect of joy does not agree with reason, despite the pleasurable experiences 
iQLWLDOO\ LQYROYHG:LOOLV¶ ODGVZLOOQRWKDYHFKDQJHG WKHLURSSUHVVHGSRVLWLRQZKLOH ,ZLOOEH LQ
pain with sunburn ± LHERWK:LOOLV¶ODGV¶DQGP\SRZHURIDFWLQJZLOOKDYHGHFUHDVHGUDWKHUWKDQ
increased.  
Overall, Dimou and Ilan (ibid.) suggest that youth leisure practices always need to be 
conceptualised as endowed with proto-political seeds, and that these seeds possess the potential of 
yielding political consciousness and action. Yet, as they note, this positive outcome does not 
always occur, and the analytical tools for understanding the conditions which can foster 
subcultural practices of resistance rather than defiance do not seem to be available. In the present 
VWXG\¶VWHUPVVRFLDODQGFXOWXUDOWKHRULVWVDSSHDUXQDEOHWRXQGHUVWDQGLQZKDWZD\s a subcultural 
practice can constitute a ground where novel, non-dichotomous, and transformative lived 
experiences can be possible, emergent properties can be brought about, and, more importantly, the 
HPERGLHGDJHQW¶VHPDQFLSDWLRQFDQWDNHSODFH 
In fact, well aware of this state of affairs, Dimou and Ilan (ibid.) point out the lack of a theory that 
is able to account for the different dimensions involved in youth leisure practices. Agreeing with 
them on this point, I contend that the theoretical framework sketched by the current study could 
contribute to ameliorating this deficiency. For instance, following Spinoza (and Gramsci), what 
would be the analytical advantage of enveloping dualism(s) in a wider non-dualist context and 
turning them into dualities in unity? In other words, what could be gained by taking into account 
the attunement and disattunement of the different dimensions of embodiment when 
conceptualising the shift from defiance and proto-political to resistance and political 
consciousness?   
In what ways, for example, can political consciousness be attuned with or disattuned from the pre-
reflective experiences of a subcultural practice? Or put another way, how can emancipative 
ideology, the political, and resistance actually be incarnated so that emergent properties can be 
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brought about? Albeit implicitly, Dimou and Ilan (ibid.: 6) ask these questions when citing 
*UDPVFL¶VFDOOIRUWKHDWWXQHPHQWRISKLORVRSK\DQGDFWLRQ 
One RI *UDPVFL¶V SULQFLSOH FRQFHUQV ZDV SUD[LV KXPDQ DFWLRQ RU WKH FRQYHUVLRQ RI SROLWLFDO
ideology into social action/reality (1971, 321±377). His argument was that ideas alone could not 
PRWLYDWHµWKHPDVVHV¶LQWRRSSRVLQJDQXQMXVWVRFLR-economic order. Such a trajectory could only 
stem from a lived sense that the world can be different and that this could only emerge from within 
WKHHYHU\GD\OLYHVRIRUGLQDU\SHRSOHµWKHRQO\µSKLORVRSK\¶LVKLVWRU\LQDFWLRQWKDWLVOLIHLWVHOI¶
(Gramsci 1971, 357). 
AnG WR JR EDFN WR :LOOLV¶ ODGV¶ DIIHFW RI MR\ ZKDW UROH ZLWKLQ \RXWK OHLVXUH SUDFWLFHV GRHV D
Spinozian reason play in the incarnation of resistance rather than defiance? Crucially, the reason of 
Spinoza in no way resembles the neo-liberal rationality associated with individualism, economic 
productivity, and self-LQWHUHVW ,Q IDFW LQ 'LPRX DQG ,ODQ¶V LELG  ZRUGV LQ VXEFXOWXUDO
SUDFWLFH³>U@DWLRQDOLW\ LVPDGHVHFRQGDU\ WR WKH HPERGLHG VHQVRU\ DQGDIIHFWLYH´ ,Q FRQWUDVW WR
dominant imperatives, the kind of reason I am discussing here is ultimately a fictive yet 
instrumental one, that related to the Being and the reflexive capacities employed to access the non-
dichotomous mode of the Becoming where change takes place.    
Indeed, conscious deliberations are always involved in transformative subcultural practices as 
instruments to arrange embodied encounters and access alternative experiences ± again, here the 
Being is instrumental to shift to the Becoming. In this respect, past research in youth leisure 
SUDFWLFH KDV VKRZQ WKDW KHGRQLVP LV DOZD\V µFDOFXODWHG¶ 6]PLJLQ HW DO  µIXQ¶ LV DOZD\V
kept under a certain degree of control compatible with the appropriateness of the social context 
(Measham, 2004), and even the awareness of a state of intoxication ± a phenomenon which might 
fall into a pre-reflective realm ± can only be possible with the corresponding reflexive evaluation 
RI D µFXOWXUHG QRUPDOLW\¶ 6XONXQHQ  7KHVH µFDOFXODWLRQV¶ , VXJJHVW GR QRW QHFHVVDULO\
equate to neo-liberal rationality, but rather often aim at eschewing it.   
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And, of course, I do not intend to suggest a straightforward link between the mode of embodiment 
of the Becoming and political consciousness, emancipative action, or positive social change. 
Rather, bearing in mind how neo-liberal politics and the culture industry have appropriated 
FRQVXPHUV¶DIIHFWVDQGWDUJHWHGSUH-reflective knowledge (see Lash & Lury, 2007; Grainge, 2011), 
I am pointing out the need to unveil what can be an even more oppressive and effective 
appropriation ± i.e., that of the non-dichotomous mode of the Becoming. In this respect, a 
particularly significant example is provided by cultural theorist Carolyn Pedwell (2014) when she 
notes how a non-dichotomous/non-individualistic affect par excellence, such as that of empathy, 
can be subtly mobilised to reinforce rather than threaten the status quo ± an observation which also 
functions as a warning against contemporary celebrations of affect as a transformative, liberating, 
and emancipative force per se (see also Hemmings, 2005).  
Due to space constraints, I am here unable to develop my arguments further, and I have only 
KLQWHG DW RQH RI WKH SRVVLEOH XVHV RI WKH SUHVHQW VWXG\¶V SHUVSHFWLYH RI HPERGLPHQW ± a post-
Cartesian approach which acknowledges two main ways of getting to know and acting in the world 
enacted according to different degrees, envelops analytical distinctions in a non-dualist context, 
and analyses the attunement or disattunement of the experiential dimensions constituting our 
phenomenological world. This is a perspective that, differently from a linguistic or affective 
DSSURDFKGRHVQRWVHWLQRSSRVLWLRQPLQGDQGERG\)XUWKHUPRUHGLIIHUHQWO\IURPµIODW¶WKHRULHV
like ANT, it is an approach which, when mapping out the conditions fostering certain social 
phenomena, accounts for the depth involved in them and acknowledges the causal powers of our 
phenomenological world. In this way the embodied agent is not a mere passive and dependent 
subject but is also able to be active and independent in bringing about novelty in the world ± i.e., 
she possesses a dual character.  
There is no need to say that my ultimate concern is with the power relationships involved in being 
able to target the pre-reflective/non-representational/tacit knowledge of the body, shifts in modes 
of embodiment, and the transformative space of the Becoming. I contend that power ± as both an 
emancipatory and oppressive force ± is most effective when it is able to attune mind and body, 
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internal and external environments of embodiment, language and corporeality, and the 
representational and the non-representational. As my work in progress has only provided a sketch 
of a post-Cartesian perspective of embodiment, further research is needed, especially in terms of 
implementing the theoretical framework suggested here in concrete social and cultural phenomena. 
























INFORMATION SHEET  
Researching Embodiment, Embodying Research:   
A Case Study of Eastern Traditions of Bodywork 
 
My name is Vittorio Giovine and I am a PhD sociology student at the University of Kent. You 
have been invited to participate in a research study which aims to understand the ways our body 
shapes and is shaped by culture and society.  
 
Background 
In the last thirty years the body has increasingly acquired relevance in the research conducted in 
both the human and natural sciences. This is because the body and our senses are the primary 
means by which we experience, know, and act in the world. It is to everybody self-evident that 
without our body we could not have an identity, could not perform any action, and therefore could 
not take part in any cultural and social activity. The body is, in other words, what allows us to exist 
as persons and the medium for experiencing a world. However, it seems that the more we research 
our body the more slippery this object of study becomes. What can appear as very simple 
questions are in fact left unanswered: Are we our body? Or do we have a body? And what is the 
nature of the relationship between the body and the mind?   
My research project intends to explore possible answers to these questions by taking into serious 
consideration how the body (and its relation to the mind) is conceived of within Eastern traditions. 
My training and experience as a Shiatsu practitioner have FRQYLQFHG PH WKHVH µHQHUJ\ ZRUN¶
approaches have much to offer to enhance our understanding of the body and the way we 
experience it. That is why I have also become interested in other practices stemming from a 
common Daoist root such as Tai Chi and Qigong. All these traditions have already been 
researched from a sociological point of view, but have never been regarded as practices that can 
µLQIRUP¶ VRFLRORJ\ UDWKHU WKDQ EHLQJ µVWXGLHG E\¶ VRFLRORJ\ ± can these Eastern traditions of 




What types of data are being collected? 
Whether you are someone who has recently decided to approach these Eastern Traditions (Tai Chi 
and/or Qigong) or are an experienced practitioner, you are invited to participate in the study. If you 
choose to do so, you will be asked to take part in a one-to-one interview with the researcher 
(myself). The interview will be an informal chat which is unlikely to last longer than one hour. I 
am interested in your views and opinions about, and experiences with, these Eastern practices.  
Of course, there are no right or wrong answers to the questions you will be asked to discuss and 
you are free to decline to answer any question or to end the interview at any time without giving 
any reason. The interview will be audio-recorded, transcribed, analysed using qualitative methods, 
and used in the content of this project.  
 
 
What will happen on the day? 
Once you have arrived, I will ask you to read and sign the consent form. You will be given a copy 




my research. Once you are happy for the interview to begin, I will switch on the recorder and 
record our conversation. You will be given the opportunity to ask questions at the beginning and at 
the end of the interview.  
 
Will I be identifiable? 
No. The interview will be transcribed only by me and I will ensure the transcript is anonymised so 
that any personally identifying information has been changed or removed. I will delete any 
recordings I have made once their contents are transcribed and anonymised. A pseudonym ± which 
can either be chosen by you or given by me ± will replace your name to identify your interview 
data. 
 
How will the interview data be used? 
Once anonymised, the data will be analysed for my research, and anonymised extracts from the 
data may be quoted in my research project and any publication and conference presentation arising 
from the study. The information you provide will be treated confidentially and personally 
identifiable details will be deleted. Agreeing to take part in this research means that you agree to 
this use of the information you provide. You are also encouraged to keep my e-mail address and 
contact me at the end of the study to find out about its outcome (I will invite you to retain a copy 
of this sheet as a reminder of the research and of my contact details). 
 
How do I withdraw from the research? 
You have the right to withdraw up to one month after the interview and without giving any reason. 
If you decide to withdraw from the research after participating in the interview, please contact me 
quoting the pseudonym we have agreed on.  
 
Are there any risks involved? 
There are no particular risks involved in this project, and you are free to decline to answer any 
question or to end the interview at any time without giving any reason. You may enjoy your 
experience of taking part in the interview and this can also be a moment of personal reflection on 
your experience of Tai Chi, or Qigong.  
 
This research has been approved by the School of School of Social Policy, Sociology and Social 
Research Ethics Committee. If you wish to take part in the research, or if you have any questions 
about the study, please contact me at vg84@kent.ac.uk.  
 










Participant Consent Form 
Researching Embodiment, Embodying Research:   
A Case Study of Eastern Traditions of Bodywork 
 
 
Having read the information sheet of the PhD research project Researching Embodiment:  
A Case Study of Eastern Traditions of Bodywork, I give my consent to participate in the research. I 
understand that: 
x I am participating in the interview on a voluntary basis and I am free to decline to answer 
any question or to end the interview at any time without giving any reason. 
x My identity will be kept confidential and the information I provide will remain 
anonymous. 
x My interview will be audio-recorded and a pseudonym will represent my data for 
anonymity and confidentiality. 
x The interview will be transcribed by a PhD student (Vittorio Giovine).  
x Only the researcher (Vittorio Giovine) will have access to the data in full. 
x I can withdraw from the research up to one month after taking part in it without giving a 
reason by quoting my pseudonym. 
x The extracts from the interview may be quoted in a PhD research project, academic 



















INTERVIEW SCHEDULE  
Researching Embodiment, Embodying Research:  
A Case Study of Eastern Traditions of Bodywork 
How did you travel here today?  
Where are you from originally?  
Is Tai Chi (or Qigong) the only type of Eastern bodywork you have ever engaged in? 
How long have you been practising (and/or teaching) Tai Chi (or Qigong)? 
How did you first get into Tai Chi (or Qigong)? 
What was your goal in starting this practice? 
What do you remember about these first experiences with Tai Chi (or Qigong)? 
Are you continuing with your practice or have you taken a break from your sessions? (Why?) 
How do you prepare yourself for a Tai Chi (or Qigong) session?  
How often do you practise and for how long?  
How do you feel during a session?  
How do you feel about your body during practice?  
How does your body feel after the practice? How long does this feeling last?  
How about your mind? 
Is there any particular area of the body, or a particular movement or form, that elicits a specific feeling, 
emotion, or memory?  
What is your favourite practice (movement or form) and why? 
Do you use mental visualisations? Or perhaps metaphors (e.g., the waterfall)? If yes, in what way?  
Do you stand? How does it feel? And for how long?  
+DYH\RXH[SHULHQFHGµQHZIHHOLQJV¶"7KDWLVIHHOLQJV\RXKDYHQHYHUH[SHULHQFHGEHIRUH"HJVHQVHRI
lightness, sense of dropping or releasing of a certain area of the body, etc.)  
Can you describe this (or these) feeling(s) in some way? What about if you have to describe it/them in three 
words? 
How long does this feeling last? When do you lose the feeling? Does it always follow the same pattern? 
Have you become aware of parts of your body you were not once aware of? If yes, which ones?  
'R\RXWKLQN\RX¶UHPRUHDZDUHRIZKDWLVgoing on inside your body since you started practising?  
And what about outside of your body ± KDYH\RXEHFRPHPRUHDZDUHRIIHHOLQJVµRXWVLGH¶\RXUERG\RURI
areas/parts outside of your body? 
Has the way you experience your body changed since you have been practising?  
Has your experience of the relationship between you and the world around you changed since you have been 
practising?  
Do you wear different clothes when you practice? 




Where is the centre of you awareness (or gravity) now?  
Do you think that you can sleep better when you practice? Or since you have been practising?  
Do you think that you have changed some of your habits since you started practising? If yes, which ones? 
And why (and/or how) do you think it has happened?  
'R\RXWKLQN\RX¶UHVOHHSLQJEHWWHU" 
Do you think that other people feel similarly about Tai Chi (or Qigong)? Have you ever talked to other 
people practising Tai Chi (or Qigong)?  
Do you think that Tai Chi (or Qigong) has somehow changed the way you live/experience your body? If yes, 
in what way?  
And how about your mind?  
Do you think Tai Chi (or Qigong) has changed the way you carry out your routine tasks? Or perhaps some 
of your habits? If yes, in what way?   
What is the impact of Tai Chi (or Qigong) on your wider life?  
Do you think that your experiences with Tai Chi (or Qigong) have somehow changed the way you relate to 
other people, or to things happening in your life? 
Do you think that Tai Chi (or Qigong) has changed you as a person? If yes, why do you think that has 
happened?  
Does your teacher spend time explaining the correct execution of the movements? Does s/he spend time 
explaining the philosophy behind tai chi? 
Do you work in pair with other practitioners? If yes, do you find it useful and in what way?  
Can you recall a significant moment, movement, or experience?  
Can you describe that with a word, colour, or a sound (musical instrument)? 
With a drawing?  
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